Re “decoupling” Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process.
Ukraine accession to the EU during an active war with Russia is unworkable and seems more of a pipe dream. Following the withdrawal of US security guarantees from the region, Europe would need to build out a security framework outside of NATO (or repurpose NATO if that's still possible, possibly by excluding the US) and provide security guarantees to Ukraine, while also defeating Russia by providing meaningful military assistance to Ukraine. Unless all of these conditions are satisfied, it's very hard to envision the Ukraine war zone being in any shape or form part of the EU. Otherwise it's just a bureaucratic exercise that doesn't take into account the realities on the ground.
In some ways the same can be argued for Moldova. Even if Moldova successfully negotiates all chapters and gets admission into the EU, this might not be worth a whole lot if the Ukrainian South front collapses and Odessa is occupied. If it ever were to happen that Odessa falls, Moldova would be a realistic target for occupation or regime change in very short order.
The same argument can be made more generally for the EU as a whole. If and when Russia invades the Baltic republics again, what is the value of being part of the EU for them then? And the reverse is also true: what will the EU be worth if its members can easily end up under Russian occupation? The EU as a political project cannot operate without a Military Alliance counterpart when confronted by an expansive aggressor at its borders. The EU will need a military framework that's entirely regional without external dependencies, as it's unclear if NATO is fit for purpose in the current context with the US aligning itself with Russia (notwithstanding that there were significant doubts about NATO readiness and willingness to defend its Eastern borders well before the current war).
Hey Arita, thanks for the long comment. I see the following as the 2 key points:
1) MD and UA face an incredibly difficult path to join the EU in its current form (factoring in security, unanimity aka Hungary, etc)
2) Whether or not their journey to the EU is coupled, MD and UA security is coupled.
My view is that we first need to realize that these are not facts that are set in stone but are derived from decisions that have been made. Russia has worked *very* hard to make both of these points the reality. They are the result of years to diplomatic, covert and military maneuvering. Taking the US out of the equation just lays bare the underlying assumptions.
As the same time, they can (and must) change. I think that the EU can't really take Moldova or Ukraine without making internal changes - to decision making, security policy, etc. At the same time I believe that those conversations are already underway. If so, then it is key that MD and UA both move forward with negotiations in the hope that all of these changing factors meet up at a future point - 2030 apparently being the goal for all parties.
Trump has just woken up Europe. Let's see what they do with that jolt.
"Hybrid Warfare" tends to make it seem as if these are not Russian acts of war. Warfare is warfare and should be called as such. Call it 'act of war' (which they are) and then retaliation against Russia doesn't seem out of place and you can start actively defending. Else you risk ending up in the US scenario, complete capture without as much as a fight. Europe better learn the lesson fast or they risk being next.
Well, you're highlighting a major problem that I've been mulling over. I try and loosely section the newsletter across foreign affairs, security / defense, politics, justice and economics. For a long time I put news like this under "Shor" as a subsection of Justice. Then I moved it to politics and then defense. The problem with hybrid warfare is that it's all of these things while also being something else.
I also realized that calling it all "Shor" is giving him too much credit and focus and taking a bit off of Russia. The Kremlin has other agents after all. So for this newsletter I tried a hybrid warfare header - but I was also not satisfied with that even before sending it.
I won't be just saying "warfare" because there is a difference. In past days (pre-nuclear, etc) acts like this would surely lead to war or some kind. But now everything is calibrated to do damage while not exposing what is going on to the general public. The government is going with hybrid war so I'm working with that term.
If you have an idea for a section header taking all of this in I'm all ears :) I'm actively debating it myself.
Tricky to get this one right. Many people - including me - hear "Hybrid Warfare" and think this isn't really warfare, maybe just some internet meme or something. The issue with the "Hybrid" moniker is that no one feels compelled or entitled to retaliate or otherwise respond.
Gabrielius Landsbergis, former minister in Lithuania, makes the point eloquently in this interview:
I don't quite agree with that - covert responses are going on all the time. Just because we know of an ammunition factory fire in Germany does not mean there aren't a few in Russia too. Same with online / cyber. The real issue is that whether we talk about economic warfare, cyberwarfare or kinetic warfare, Moldova just doesn't have any real responses alone. The political challenge for the government is to highlight the threat while also not giving people a reason to despair. Sweden uses a "total defense" or civil resilience model for this. It doesn't seem like Moldova has a real strategy for dealing with these challenges other than reliance on allies / partners. That said, there's a lot we don't see in these kinds of fights.
Re “decoupling” Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process.
Ukraine accession to the EU during an active war with Russia is unworkable and seems more of a pipe dream. Following the withdrawal of US security guarantees from the region, Europe would need to build out a security framework outside of NATO (or repurpose NATO if that's still possible, possibly by excluding the US) and provide security guarantees to Ukraine, while also defeating Russia by providing meaningful military assistance to Ukraine. Unless all of these conditions are satisfied, it's very hard to envision the Ukraine war zone being in any shape or form part of the EU. Otherwise it's just a bureaucratic exercise that doesn't take into account the realities on the ground.
In some ways the same can be argued for Moldova. Even if Moldova successfully negotiates all chapters and gets admission into the EU, this might not be worth a whole lot if the Ukrainian South front collapses and Odessa is occupied. If it ever were to happen that Odessa falls, Moldova would be a realistic target for occupation or regime change in very short order.
The same argument can be made more generally for the EU as a whole. If and when Russia invades the Baltic republics again, what is the value of being part of the EU for them then? And the reverse is also true: what will the EU be worth if its members can easily end up under Russian occupation? The EU as a political project cannot operate without a Military Alliance counterpart when confronted by an expansive aggressor at its borders. The EU will need a military framework that's entirely regional without external dependencies, as it's unclear if NATO is fit for purpose in the current context with the US aligning itself with Russia (notwithstanding that there were significant doubts about NATO readiness and willingness to defend its Eastern borders well before the current war).
Hey Arita, thanks for the long comment. I see the following as the 2 key points:
1) MD and UA face an incredibly difficult path to join the EU in its current form (factoring in security, unanimity aka Hungary, etc)
2) Whether or not their journey to the EU is coupled, MD and UA security is coupled.
My view is that we first need to realize that these are not facts that are set in stone but are derived from decisions that have been made. Russia has worked *very* hard to make both of these points the reality. They are the result of years to diplomatic, covert and military maneuvering. Taking the US out of the equation just lays bare the underlying assumptions.
As the same time, they can (and must) change. I think that the EU can't really take Moldova or Ukraine without making internal changes - to decision making, security policy, etc. At the same time I believe that those conversations are already underway. If so, then it is key that MD and UA both move forward with negotiations in the hope that all of these changing factors meet up at a future point - 2030 apparently being the goal for all parties.
Trump has just woken up Europe. Let's see what they do with that jolt.
"Hybrid Warfare" tends to make it seem as if these are not Russian acts of war. Warfare is warfare and should be called as such. Call it 'act of war' (which they are) and then retaliation against Russia doesn't seem out of place and you can start actively defending. Else you risk ending up in the US scenario, complete capture without as much as a fight. Europe better learn the lesson fast or they risk being next.
Hi Arita,
Well, you're highlighting a major problem that I've been mulling over. I try and loosely section the newsletter across foreign affairs, security / defense, politics, justice and economics. For a long time I put news like this under "Shor" as a subsection of Justice. Then I moved it to politics and then defense. The problem with hybrid warfare is that it's all of these things while also being something else.
I also realized that calling it all "Shor" is giving him too much credit and focus and taking a bit off of Russia. The Kremlin has other agents after all. So for this newsletter I tried a hybrid warfare header - but I was also not satisfied with that even before sending it.
I won't be just saying "warfare" because there is a difference. In past days (pre-nuclear, etc) acts like this would surely lead to war or some kind. But now everything is calibrated to do damage while not exposing what is going on to the general public. The government is going with hybrid war so I'm working with that term.
If you have an idea for a section header taking all of this in I'm all ears :) I'm actively debating it myself.
Tricky to get this one right. Many people - including me - hear "Hybrid Warfare" and think this isn't really warfare, maybe just some internet meme or something. The issue with the "Hybrid" moniker is that no one feels compelled or entitled to retaliate or otherwise respond.
Gabrielius Landsbergis, former minister in Lithuania, makes the point eloquently in this interview:
youtube.com/watch?v=4Gr2wO7ll10
I don't quite agree with that - covert responses are going on all the time. Just because we know of an ammunition factory fire in Germany does not mean there aren't a few in Russia too. Same with online / cyber. The real issue is that whether we talk about economic warfare, cyberwarfare or kinetic warfare, Moldova just doesn't have any real responses alone. The political challenge for the government is to highlight the threat while also not giving people a reason to despair. Sweden uses a "total defense" or civil resilience model for this. It doesn't seem like Moldova has a real strategy for dealing with these challenges other than reliance on allies / partners. That said, there's a lot we don't see in these kinds of fights.