Re “decoupling” Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process.
Ukraine accession to the EU during an active war with Russia is unworkable and seems more of a pipe dream. Following the withdrawal of US security guarantees from the region, Europe would need to build out a security framework outside of NATO (or repurpose NATO if that's still …
Re “decoupling” Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process.
Ukraine accession to the EU during an active war with Russia is unworkable and seems more of a pipe dream. Following the withdrawal of US security guarantees from the region, Europe would need to build out a security framework outside of NATO (or repurpose NATO if that's still possible, possibly by excluding the US) and provide security guarantees to Ukraine, while also defeating Russia by providing meaningful military assistance to Ukraine. Unless all of these conditions are satisfied, it's very hard to envision the Ukraine war zone being in any shape or form part of the EU. Otherwise it's just a bureaucratic exercise that doesn't take into account the realities on the ground.
In some ways the same can be argued for Moldova. Even if Moldova successfully negotiates all chapters and gets admission into the EU, this might not be worth a whole lot if the Ukrainian South front collapses and Odessa is occupied. If it ever were to happen that Odessa falls, Moldova would be a realistic target for occupation or regime change in very short order.
The same argument can be made more generally for the EU as a whole. If and when Russia invades the Baltic republics again, what is the value of being part of the EU for them then? And the reverse is also true: what will the EU be worth if its members can easily end up under Russian occupation? The EU as a political project cannot operate without a Military Alliance counterpart when confronted by an expansive aggressor at its borders. The EU will need a military framework that's entirely regional without external dependencies, as it's unclear if NATO is fit for purpose in the current context with the US aligning itself with Russia (notwithstanding that there were significant doubts about NATO readiness and willingness to defend its Eastern borders well before the current war).
Hey Arita, thanks for the long comment. I see the following as the 2 key points:
1) MD and UA face an incredibly difficult path to join the EU in its current form (factoring in security, unanimity aka Hungary, etc)
2) Whether or not their journey to the EU is coupled, MD and UA security is coupled.
My view is that we first need to realize that these are not facts that are set in stone but are derived from decisions that have been made. Russia has worked *very* hard to make both of these points the reality. They are the result of years to diplomatic, covert and military maneuvering. Taking the US out of the equation just lays bare the underlying assumptions.
As the same time, they can (and must) change. I think that the EU can't really take Moldova or Ukraine without making internal changes - to decision making, security policy, etc. At the same time I believe that those conversations are already underway. If so, then it is key that MD and UA both move forward with negotiations in the hope that all of these changing factors meet up at a future point - 2030 apparently being the goal for all parties.
Trump has just woken up Europe. Let's see what they do with that jolt.
Re “decoupling” Moldova and Ukraine in the accession process.
Ukraine accession to the EU during an active war with Russia is unworkable and seems more of a pipe dream. Following the withdrawal of US security guarantees from the region, Europe would need to build out a security framework outside of NATO (or repurpose NATO if that's still possible, possibly by excluding the US) and provide security guarantees to Ukraine, while also defeating Russia by providing meaningful military assistance to Ukraine. Unless all of these conditions are satisfied, it's very hard to envision the Ukraine war zone being in any shape or form part of the EU. Otherwise it's just a bureaucratic exercise that doesn't take into account the realities on the ground.
In some ways the same can be argued for Moldova. Even if Moldova successfully negotiates all chapters and gets admission into the EU, this might not be worth a whole lot if the Ukrainian South front collapses and Odessa is occupied. If it ever were to happen that Odessa falls, Moldova would be a realistic target for occupation or regime change in very short order.
The same argument can be made more generally for the EU as a whole. If and when Russia invades the Baltic republics again, what is the value of being part of the EU for them then? And the reverse is also true: what will the EU be worth if its members can easily end up under Russian occupation? The EU as a political project cannot operate without a Military Alliance counterpart when confronted by an expansive aggressor at its borders. The EU will need a military framework that's entirely regional without external dependencies, as it's unclear if NATO is fit for purpose in the current context with the US aligning itself with Russia (notwithstanding that there were significant doubts about NATO readiness and willingness to defend its Eastern borders well before the current war).
Hey Arita, thanks for the long comment. I see the following as the 2 key points:
1) MD and UA face an incredibly difficult path to join the EU in its current form (factoring in security, unanimity aka Hungary, etc)
2) Whether or not their journey to the EU is coupled, MD and UA security is coupled.
My view is that we first need to realize that these are not facts that are set in stone but are derived from decisions that have been made. Russia has worked *very* hard to make both of these points the reality. They are the result of years to diplomatic, covert and military maneuvering. Taking the US out of the equation just lays bare the underlying assumptions.
As the same time, they can (and must) change. I think that the EU can't really take Moldova or Ukraine without making internal changes - to decision making, security policy, etc. At the same time I believe that those conversations are already underway. If so, then it is key that MD and UA both move forward with negotiations in the hope that all of these changing factors meet up at a future point - 2030 apparently being the goal for all parties.
Trump has just woken up Europe. Let's see what they do with that jolt.
2030 seems like a good year for this - that’s when Gen 5 Rafale is set to be launched.