Moldova's Approach to Reintegration
Why the Country Is Betting on Convergence, Not a Quick Fix in Transnistria
This article is based on closed-door discussions held under Chatham House rules with Moldovan officials, international partners, and civil society actors, as well as subsequent background conversations. No participants agreed to be quoted or identified. The analysis reflects the author’s reporting, analysis and synthesis of these discussions.
A Window of Opportunity for Reintegration?
I recently wrote an article looking at the recent “elections” in Transnistria and the changed power dynamics between Chisinau and Tiraspol1. In it I lay out a political, economic and geopolitical landscape that means the status quo in Transnistria cannot hold.
With Transnistria weaker than ever before some see this as a moment of opportunity. Why not “solve” the Transnistria problem now and enter the EU without all this baggage? Given the region’s collapsing economy isn’t now a good time to apply pressure and force change?
This article will dive into how Moldova plans to approach reintegration and how talk of economic collapse leading to a window of opportunity may not present the full picture.
For those who missed the previous article, here’s a link:
Setting the Baseline
Before discussing strategies and approaches to potential reintegration, here are some baseline facts and assumptions that are driving decision makers’ approach to the problem:
Russia views Transnistria as a regional security asset. Russian uses the region to influence Moldova and its troops there are most often seen in that context. At the same time, Russia views them as an important regional asset given NATO deployments in Romania and because they pin down Ukrainian troops who guard the border2.
The Economic crisis is not a sign of Russia losing interest in the region. Supporting Transnistria has gotten more expensive and Russia orchestrated an energy crisis in the region last winter. This was not a sign of losing interest or pinching pennies - it was calculated to create pressure on Chisinau3 and as a warning to Sheriff. The region’s economic crisis is real, but it should not be over interpreted - as point #1 attests, Russia’s main interest is and always was security related.
There is little organic demand for reintegration (on either side of the Nistru). Transnistrians may be angry with their “authorities,” but that does not equate to trust in Chisinau or a desire to be part of the EU4. Russia works very hard to prevent the development of this kind of demand (putting pressure on Romanian language schools in the region, etc). Because the region is a closed and highly controlled media space, residents there are subject to constant propaganda and have little access to other points of view. Meanwhile, in the rest of Moldova people are used to the status quo and are unlikely to be enthusiastic about the huge costs of reintegration.
The local elite is insecure and unsure what to do. They are weighing the risks and fully understand that they are stuck between Moldova, Ukraine, the EU and Russia. They don’t know yet whether Moldova joining the EU is going to be a real thing5. Finally, their physical security is a serious concern. In Putin’s world “traitors” get the harshest treatment of all - whether that is drinking radioactive tea or falling out of windows. Elite defection to Moldova to support reintegration would certainly be seen as treason.
Transnistria is more valuable to Russia now than ever before. With Russia loosing most of its economic and political leverage in Moldova, the Transnistrian problem gains extra significance. The Kremlin’s goal is to keep Moldova out of the EU. Transnistria can be used to create a perception that Moldova is not safe and that it brings too much baggage to be accepted as a member state.
Taken together, this all means that even with a power dynamic that has shifted in Chisinau’s favor, the situation is extremely complicated.
“Convergence”
Informally, I’ve heard Moldova’s new approach to the problem called “convergence.” The idea is that, as Moldova is converging with the EU, Transnistria must converge with Moldova.
What this means in practice hasn’t yet been spelled out in detail. The government is working right now on an official strategy and all relevant departments have been tasked with creating their own convergence plans. The basic idea though is to extend government services and regulations across the region bit by bit. The goal is to provide the same public services to residents regardless of location and to build up support within the region for joining Chisinau.
To some level, this is already happening without the government’s help. In the first 10 months of 2025 residents of Transnistria have increasingly crossed the river for government services - such as surgical operations (5600+ operations in 10 months costing 127 million lei), 45,000 driver’s registrations, social benefits (pensions, child care, etc) in excess of 26 million lei just in Q1 2025. Over 20,000 Transnistria residents cross the river daily for work in Moldova.
Crisis and deteriorating conditions in the region and causing residents to rely more and more on Moldovan government agencies and systems. The strategy is to meet this moment of demand with intention and a long term vision towards integrating citizens into the broader Moldovan civil space.
Flipping the Script
A strategy based on “convergence” is a reversal of the sequencing that has been pursued for the last 30+ years. Official negotiations on a solution to the Transnistrian conflict have always basically envisioned the following 3 step process:
Agreement on a political solution for reintegration.
Finding the money to implement it.
Solving the practical problems of reintegration (economics, security, justice, finance, etc).
The official negotiations, which took place in the 5+2 format6 since 2005, have never progressed beyond point #1. To massively simplify a complex issue, Moldova has been willing to offer the region a special autonomous status (similar too, or stronger than, that granted to Gagauzia). On the other side, Russia has proposed solutions that would redraw the Moldovan constitution as a federal system. Thus, the current unitary republic would be split into 3 federal states - Transnistria, Gagauzia and the rest of Moldova. Under Russian proposals (including the very famous Kozak Memorandum), this would be an asymmetric arrangement with Transnistria and Gagauzia (< 18% of the population) getting a majority of the seats in a new upper house. This arrangement would allow Russia a strong voice and effective veto in Moldovan legislation - particularly foreign relations.
Opinions differ on how close the sides have come over the years, but the fact is that no political solution has been found that meets all parties’ goals. With the convergence strategy set to start from the bottom and work backwards, they are trying to create the conditions on the ground that would facilitate an eventual political solution (namely, public support and demand for one) and bypassing Russia’s ability to gum up negotiations. In this way, Moldova will lean into the moment of economic crisis for the region with 1+1 negotiations7 on concrete issues.
When Does Convergence = Reintegration?
Not quickly. As Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri recently stated, the government is seeking to de-couple the issues of EU integration and Transnistrian re-integration as much as possible. Recall, he said:
“We will do everything possible to ensure the reintegration process is dynamic and produces results. At the same time, we understand that it requires a longer period than we allot for the start of accession negotiations and, possibly, for EU integration. We will, frankly, try to separate these two processes,”
All 27 EU member states have stated publicly that Transnistria cannot be an impediment to Moldova’s integration. What that means is not fully clear. The Moldovan government is keen to keep these issues separated so that Russia does not have an effective veto on accession.
The Moldovan authorities want to see real progress on convergence before moving towards discussion of a political settlement. The conditions for what I heard called “sustainable convergence” haven’t been spelled out anywhere officially, but in my conversations the following ideas kept coming up:
Demand: Real demand for reunification on both sides of the river.
Media access: Transnistrians need to be brought into the fact-based information space (for years).
Political parties: All parties must be legally allowed to operate in Transnistria - opening offices in the region, running campaigns and holding public events. Political participation (for years) is a pre-requisite for opening polling places and integrating the nation’s political scene.
Economic convergence: Integrating banks, financial systems, pension systems, telecom companies, etc is a very expensive problem. It will take time and require major investments and an enabling security environment8.
A demobilization plan: If the Russian army leaves, that still means there are a large number of people from the Transnistrian “army,” police and other security forces that need to be dealt with. Sudden dismissals of people with weapons training has a history of going poorly. But can you keep them? Moldova has taken 4 years to vet judges, what would they do with thousands of demobilized soldiers and police?
De-oligarchization: The oligarchs must exit. Some mechanism for the sale / purchase of their assets must be found. Moldova will not allow a new, richer, set of oligarchs to enter the country’s politics.
These conditions and challenges mean that talk of simple or quick reintegration is misguided. If there was comprehensive political will on both sides of the Nistru to reintegrate the country, then you could imagine a messy process of “figure it out as you go.” But without any political will towards that end (at all) the Moldovan approach assumes a gradual but constant process of converging.
What are the Alternative Approaches?
Many outside of Moldova who see a “window of opportunity” are quite clearly not talking about a long-term process of aligning social programs. I want to turn towards a few other approaches that come up in discussions (and from reader’s questions), and why they fail to meet the needs of the moment.
Option 1: The Military Solution
The Moldovan government only supports peaceful solutions to the conflict. Reporting from earlier in the war indicated that Ukraine may have pressed Moldova for permission to “solve” this issue by force. Permission that Moldova firmly refused. If pro-Russian forces had won the recent parliamentary elections this topic may have resurfaced. As I understand it, Ukraine is satisfied with the security situation now and is supportive of Moldova’s approach. Bottom line - no one wants this.
Option 2: Forced Economic Collapse
In the previous article, I laid out how Moldova, Ukraine and the EU have gained enormous leverage over Transnistria’s economy and energy system. The idea is that, under these current circumstances, Moldova (and partners) can force Transnistria to the negotiating table and demand serious concessions in order to bring about reintegration - on Chisinau’s terms. This theory has several serious flaws, namely…
Russia values the military position and security leverage - not their civilian population. If this pressure results in mass depopulation of the region and just a little military base - they can live with that. More critically, they can make this into a humanitarian crisis by not allowing people to leave. Russia is (clearly) not above using civilians as leverage.
Rapid reintegration is NOT in Moldova’s interest. With Russian soldiers in the region, and the other facts laid out in this article, there is no version of reintegration where Chisinau gets 100% of what they want. There will be negotiations and trade offs. Rapid reintegration will yield a Moldova that is overall subject to much greater levels of Russian control. Whether that’s through new oligarchs, residual “peace keepers,” constitutional changes or other mechanisms, the Kremlin will have its price and its goals are unchanged.
The moral issue. Intentionally collapsing the region’s economy and making poor people - who are effectively prisoners there - poorer, hungrier and colder, is not a good look.
Option 3: A Big Peace Initiative
Proponents of this idea suggest that the change in circumstances and leverage between Moldova and Transnistria mean it’s time for big peace initiative. The 5+2 format is dead so this would need some new structure. Ominously, this is sometimes suggested in the context of engaging America’s “Peace President” in the mix.
Leaving out the Trump part, officials I talked to rejected the idea that now was the time for big, international diplomatic initiatives. Here’s why:
Rapid reintegration is NOT in Moldova’s interest (see above).
Diplomatically, the question cannot be untangled from Ukraine. Russia’s security interests see Transnistria through both the lens of their wider empire building project, and through Ukraine and Moldova specifically. They won’t negotiate seriously until the war in Ukraine is settled - and very possibly not even then.
Russia’s position and regional posture is maximalist. In 2005 the Kremlin was content to undermine and infiltrate the democratic systems of Ukraine and Moldova. In 2014 they felt those tools slipping and moved to hard power. In 2022 they opted for the one guaranteed way to keep Ukraine in the fold - outright conquest9. The Kozak Memorandum was an unpalatable solution even for then President Vladimir Voronin in 2003. Given Russia’s current posture, and the much more pro-EU political climate in Moldova, what kind of agreement would the Kremlin be satisfied with? What starting point could possibly secure their interests? I haven’t spoken to a single expert that thinks Russia is interested in a deal here - the Kremlin wants Moldova, and Transnistria is a tool in that process.
Option 4: “Go with God”
Another option I’ve heard over the years is that Moldova should just let Transnistria be independent. One version sees this more as a threat - basically, threaten to recognize their independence so they deal. The thinking is that losing access to the EU market and Russian gas10 at the same time would bring them to the table. The second version takes the proposition more seriously - proponents would say “just let them go, be done with it and join the EU.”
This idea, which is rarely spoken of by people in Moldova, has huge problems. Namely:
It’s political suicide. The Moldovan public may not be yelling for immediate reintegration, but people do see Transnistria as an integral part of the country. No politician who proposes this, and deals with the fallout from the next points, would stay in office long. This includes all the pro-Russian opposition who also emphasize the need to unite the country, not to separate.
It supercharges the security nightmare. An independent Transnistria would either immediately petition to be annexed by Russia, or immediately call for an increase in Russian military deployments in the region. If this was allowed, it would become a true Kaliningrad in South Eastern Europe and pose a major threat to Ukraine and Romania’s security.
It burns bridges with the EU. Not only would the EU see this as an irresponsible move in the security space, but it would also likely trigger vetos of Moldova’s accession from states with their own separatist movements and enclaves (e.g. Spain).
In short, the problem isn’t that there is a separatist region in Moldova, the problem is that the Russians are next door. Recognizing Transnistria makes that much worse.
Conclusion - It’s Complicated
A lot of ink has been spilled, including by me, on how the launch of the full scale invasion made Transnistria’s status quo untenable. Economically, the region is starting to come apart and politically the balance of oligarchic and Kremlin forces that ran the enclave is under pressure. This means that change is coming and that Moldova and the EU will have a say in what it looks like. It does not mean that Transnistria will quickly or easily be returned to the fold.
This article is by no means an exhaustive list of all of the constraints and challenges that will have to be considered going forward. The fact is that the situation is far more complex than the small size of Transnistria, or Moldova for that matter, would imply.
Moldova’s approach of gradual convergence to lay the groundwork for an eventual reunification represents a realistic approach to a very hard problem. It rejects any attempts at a rapid reintegration as they are only likely to succeed on the Kremlin’s terms. A Moldova with new constitutional instability, a new class of oligarchs or with legitimized Russian military presence would become a danger to its neighbors and a source of regional insecurity.
At the same time, convergence and deliberate steps towards integrating social services and citizens experiences is not a “wait and see” strategy. For 30 years Moldova has largely relied on a series of internationally mediated diplomatic efforts to find a political solution and move from there. This new approach means that the country is starting by taking responsibility for finding solution to the myriad technical issues and step by step making a political solution something that could be implemented.
Chisinau has leverage here, and it likely to start using it more and more to integrate some services and open up Transnistria’s information space. But Russia’s security interests and potential to create problems are also very real.
We’ll likely see some elements of this strategy made public in Spring and if so we’ll dig into details then. The key ideas though seem to be clear - a deliberate convergence strategy running in parallel with EU integration, but unlinked from the country’s EU accession timeline.
Disclaimer: For reasons of simplicity I often use “Moldova” for the parts of the country under control of the constitutional authorities in Chisinau. I use “Transnistria” or, more often, the “Transnistrian region” to refer to the breakaway region. I avoid “right bank” and “left bank” because it can be confusing and doesn’t really account for the large elements of both sides of the river controlled by the opposite side. In reality, all territory in question is Moldova.
I’ve heard estimates that around 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers and border guards are occupied with deterring any threats from Transnistria.
Most citizens of Transnistria are Russian and Moldovan citizens. Russia has no problem causing them harm in geopolitical games since they know full well that Moldova will try and mitigate this harm and thus expend resources.
Though there are some indications that these numbers are rising, we can’t really know without real polling and free speech in the region.
Which makes sense as their whole region is a tool in a *very* intense Russian effort to make EU integration fail.
5+2 is defined as Moldova and Transnistria (parties to the conflict), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine and Russia (mediators), and the United States and the EU (observers). These talks broke down completely in 2022 as the idea of Ukraine and Russia jointly mediating anything went the way of the dodo.
Moldova + Transnistria
If technical talks on integrating the banks results in bankers from Transnistria getting threatened, then talks will go nowhere.
They may have miscalculated slightly…
Recall, free gas was always based on a fiction that Russia did not recognize the region’s independence and thus they were “charging” Moldova for this gas. This built up fictional debts that they would use as leverage.
That’s a great read, thank you! Do you have any plans to write a post on the ongoing reforms required for EU integration, and how successful or unsuccessful they have been?