Weekly Roundup: New Schemes for Gas Delivery and Other Updates
January 23, 2025
The top story of the week remains the energy crisis in Transnistria1, but with energy the situation in the rest of Moldova remaining stable, other political stories have begun to return as work resumes after the holidays. We’re going to first dive into the increasingly confusing situation with Russia’s promise(?) to supply gas to Transnistria and then move on to other updates.
Energy Crisis Updates
January 20th came and went without any resumption of natural gas supplies to Transnistria. Earlier nods at this date in both Transnistrian and Russian sources seemed to imply a concrete plan to end this crisis after a set of political goals had been achieved. Now, as more and more stories roll in about increasingly complex “solutions” to the problem it remains unclear when residents of Transnistria will get heating back. It has now been more than 22 days since gas and centralized heating and hot water systems were turned off in the region.
On January 18th Transnistria’s energy company Tiraspoltransgaz sent a letter to MoldovaGaz requesting help transiting natural gas to the region. This came after the story we wrote about last week where a private company called Natural Gaz DC had suddenly indicated that they would supply gas to Transnistria. This letter recognized the Moldovan government’s position that by law only MoldovaGaz has the right to transport energy to the region. Transnistrian “leader” Vadim Krasnoselsky said:
“I address the leader of Moldovagaz, other leaders of Moldova, the Transnistrian region agrees and welcomes Moldovagaz's desire to deliver gas. We guarantee payment. Please, fulfill your promises,"
Here’s where things get technical. Moldova has offered to support Transnistria with 2 different mechanisms for acquiring gas:
GazProm delivers gas to Transnistria on the basis of existing contracts. This gas is transported via Turkstream to the Trans-Balkan pipeline and then across to Transnistria. In the last step of this journey the gas will technically pass through Ukraine and Moldova has been clear that this is not a problem.2
MoldovaGaz purchases gas for Transnistria on the European market after receiving pre-payment. So long as the Tiraspol authorities prove that they are able and willing to pay Moldova lends its purchasing contracts and market access to the region.
Transnistria is now proposing something different. They want to purchase the gas separately via a non-Transnistrian company and deliver it to the Moldovan border. Then they will pay MoldovaGaz to transit this gas across Moldova to them. At one point this “other company” was thought to be Natural Gaz DC. Later Russian news outlet Kommersant reported that it was a Cyprus registered company named Ozbor Enterprises. At this point there is no real clarity on what Transnistria (*ahem* Russia) actually has in mind.
Gas Pipelines and Bookings
As of January 21st GazProm has not booked any transit capacities in the Trans-Balkan pipeline for February. To understand how this booking works here is a map of the regional gas infrastructure provided by the Ministry of Energy:
On the map above you can see border transit points with the capacity available / on offer (Oferit) and the amount that has been reserved for February (Rezervat). Amounts indicated are in millions of cubic meters of gas / day.
Transnistria needs around 3 million cubic meters of gas / day to heat homes and power most of their energy.3 Kommersant reported that Russia may begin transiting gas along this corridor on February 1st based on their sources and the 3.1 million cubic meter / day booking at the Turkish - Bulgarian border. Moldova’s Ministry of Energy has stated that this is false and that this capacity was booked by international traders and not by GazProm. Critically similar reservations were not made at the Bulgarian - Romanian border or the Romanian - Ukrainian border.
Another complication is Transnistria’s statement that they will “deliver gas to the Moldovan border.” Technically, they need to book capacity at the Ukrainian border with the support of MoldovaGaz. The Romania - Moldova pipeline crossing does not have the capacity to supply both Moldova and Transnistria with gas.
Moldovan government spokesman Daniel Voda commented on the latest Transnistrian “proposal” saying:
"Every day, the Russian Federation and its regime in Tiraspol flood the information space with all sorts of information and scenarios about intermediaries, without supplying gas or reserving the capacity of existing pipelines. The solution is simple and can be implemented today - Gazprom can supply gas to Moldovagaz under a contract. Russia, through Gazprom, artificially creates solutions and problems that do not actually exist,"
President Sandu also commented on the situation saying:
"As far as I understand, the solution they described this morning does not involve buying gas on the market through Moldovagaz. Rather, it involves transporting gas that someone else buys and delivers to our border. And Moldovagaz transports it, as discussed earlier. From the statement by the Reintegration Bureau, we learned that state institutions will examine which companies are involved. Because Moldovagaz can only work with companies that do not violate legal norms. It is important that intermediaries are not on the list of those subject to international sanctions. The government and the authorized bodies will have to analyze the details of this new route and the companies involved. But this is not the route we talked about earlier, when we were talking about transportation from Gazprom to Moldovagaz. The details still need to be analyzed,"
From these statements and others from Moldovan officials it seems as if people are not sure what Russia / Transnistria are trying to do. Moldova’s clear position is that GazProm can simply transit the gas directly and that these intermediaries are unnecessary (and therefore suspect). Transnistria is saying that Moldova refusing to engage with this scheme (which they still have not fully explained) is Chisinau “politicizing” the issue and refusing to supply gas to Transnistria.
What is actually happening here is very unclear. Reports from Transnistria are that they will continue having gas for cooking and to supply critical infrastructure such as hospitals through January 31st. Since January 1st the region has faced more than 2400 power faults due to overuse leading to localized blackouts in addition to planned rolling blackouts. At least 47 house fires have been reported due to improper use of wood fire stoves or electrical faults and there have been 24 carbon monoxide poisonings leading to some fatalities (the exact number is unspecified). With unseasonably warm weather the region is coping but clearly facing serious strain as their “leadership” propose increasingly complex schemes using Cypriot companies.
While it is not *necessarily* related, a fascinating report came out last week on another substack worth reading about Russia’s hidden war debt. In it, author Craig Kennedy exposes an off the book financing scheme Russia has been using to fund their war while appearing to maintain budgetary stability. Kennedy discovered ballooning bad debt in Russian companies, including GazProm, and a potentially looming credit crisis. I’ll leave a link here for those interested:
Other Energy Crisis Updates
Here are the other top energy crisis related stories of the last week:
Moldova’s renewable energy sector continues to grow. On January 19th the Ministry of Energy announced that 20.59% of the country’s electricity consumption came from renewable sources - primarily solar and wind. This does not count solar power generation installed in homes, businesses or public buildings subject to net billing or net metering - these numbers are only reported monthly.4 This is a winter record (on a sunny day) and the Ministry estimates that in summer this production should be doubled.
Moldova’s overall energy mix in January so far has been reported. From January 1 - 20 the country imported around 60% of all power consumed at an average price of 126.75 euros / MWh5. Of the remaining, 30% of power was produced by Thermoelectric plants and 7.7% from renewable sources.
The government announced that the country will trigger the EU Civil Protection Mechanism for support. This mechanism is used by EU countries to coordinate responses to disaster situations such as floods or forrest fires. Moldova is requesting a 125 MW gas turbine for Thermoelectrica and 100 generators for health, education and social centers around the country. This move anticipates falling power production from the current configuration of the Thermoelectric plants in warm weather.
Construction on the Chisinau - Vulcănești power line is to be accelerated. This was announced by State Secretary of the Ministry of Energy Constantin Borosan after an inspection of the current progress. In the coming weeks more workers will be deployed to the construction sites in preparation for pouring foundations and raising towers at an expedited rate in warmer weather.
Politics, Security and International Affairs
Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:
President Sandu convened a meeting of the Supreme Security Council to discuss political and electoral corruption. The meeting, which was held on January 20th, was not announced in advance - a departure from past practice. Sources that spoke to ZdG claimed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the liquidation or reorganization of the 2 specialized prosecutor’s offices - the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office and the Prosecutor's Office for Combating Organized Crime and Special Cases (PCCOCS). Following the meeting President Sandu stated that a plan to “strengthen” the work of these offices will be presented in a week. She also stated that “When we talk about the ineffectiveness of the fight against political corruption, obviously we are also talking about the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office.” Opposition politicians and commentators have speculated that this could be a way to remove Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Veronica Dragalin who has been increasingly at odds with senior political leaders over the last year.
Maia Sandu launched a podcast. The President has started a new communications project which will be co-hosted by Natan Garștea, director of the Financial Stability Department of the National Bank of Moldova. Garștea is also the host of the History of Moldova podcast. In the first episode the President discussed topics of the energy crisis and laid out a plan to address listener questions in future episodes.
Alexandr Stoianoglo has announced that he will participate in parliamentary elections. The former Socialist candidate for president stated that he would neither join a party or start a new one but would create a political block of other opposition parties and a shadow cabinet. No concrete information about what parties he hopes to lead without joining them was made available.
Gheorghe Cotorobai was convicted of murder, rape and kidnapping in the case of the disappearance of Ana Maria. He was sentenced to life in prison and ordered to pay 2 million lei to the victim’s mother. Cotorobai professed his innocence at sentencing (going back on a previous confession) and pledged to appeal. We wrote about the shocking case of the kidnapping, rape and murder of 6 month pregnant Ana Maria last May.
The authorities have categorized all postal shipments from Ukraine as "classified as High Risk Cargo & Mail." This follows reports from earlier this month that the border police had identified a package with a toy car that contained “elements of an explosive device” at the Chisinau airport. This package was part of an air shipment from Ukraine to an unspecified destination.
President Sandu congratulated President Trump on his inauguration with a tweet on X stating:
The president clarified to the press that she did not get an invitation to the inauguration but that Moldova’s Ambassador and diplomatic staff in DC were present.
Pro-Russian politicians in Moldova all post glowing congratulations for Trump. Igor Dodon, Vasilie Tarlev and other politicians closely connected to the Kremlin all made highly congratulatory posts praising the incoming Trump administration. Editor of ZdG Alina Radu wrote an op-ed tracking how “Putin’s people” are lining up to seek Trump’s approval. In it she cites Moldova Matters’ investigations into the hiring of American PR firms to build connections in the US and get closer to the new administration. This is one of a series of recent articles trying to make sense of what Trump’s election is likely to mean for Moldova.
Moldova will not participate in Eurovision 2025. This decision was announced by the director of Teleradio-Moldova who stated that "This year's national selection highlighted certain challenges, including a decrease in public interest and the overall quality of the pieces and artistic performances." This will be the first year that Moldova does not participate since joining the competition in 2005. Teleradio-Moldova did not give clear reasons for the decision but stated that “substantial reform” is needed to the pre-selection process to allow for wider participation. They also mentioned the high cost of producing the show for the national candidate and stated that these resources will be used elsewhere. Moldova’s top 12 finalists had already been picked with live broadcast performances on January 18th. You can watch their performances here6.
Interested in something a bit lighter? Check out my recent post in my new Out of Place, Out of Context substack on the (mis)adventures of living abroad. In it I explore what it is like to learn a language by emersion and talk a little bit about how Soviet centralized city planning and mismanagement led to lots of towns that once had running water reverting back in time after the empire fell.
Disclaimer: As we’ve done before with articles about Transnistria we will sometimes say “Moldova” and “Transnistria” as a way to indicate the parts of Moldovan territory controlled by Chisinau and Tiraspol respectively. This is easier for most readers than “left bank” vs “right bank” and is simply a convienent shorthand. All territory in question is Moldova.
Ukraine has been less clear on this point.
The exception being MGRES power plant for export to Moldova. When the region was powering itself and able to export electricity Russia was supplying them 5.7 million cubic meters per day.
Private installations of solar (or wind) power on a house or business that are not intended for energy production as a primary business are subject to either net billing or net metering. Net metering means that each excess kWh put into the power grid gains 1 kWh on credit which could be used when the sun isn’t shining or wind ins’t blowing. The Ministry of Energy switched national policy to net metering last year whereby each excess kWh is compensated at the energy company’s production cost and this monetary credit can be used to purchase power at the energy company’s retail cost. This was meant to disincentivize over installation of home solar panels that were starting to destabilize the electrical grid. Previous installations were grandfathered in for a time so currently there are customers operating on both systems.
This compares to around 70 euros / MWh when Moldova purchased from MGRES.
My 2-cents is that none of these performances is better or worse than typical. In the past Moldova has had some outstanding acts and tends to punch above its weight in the contest. That does not seem to be the case this year but having “standard” (for Eurovision) entries seems an odd reason to cancel the competition - especially since they kinda implied it was because everyone was so bad. We’ll see how this plays out in the next week or so.
This is an interesting summation of events in respect to the gas situation. I hope Chisinau and Ukraine are sincere and helpful in getting it flowing into Transnistria again very soon.