The EUropean Peace Project in Moldova: Threat Perceptions, Priorities and Next Steps

Guest Analysis - February 19, 2025

Today Moldova Matters is sharing a guest article by Emma Marechal analyzing the EU-Moldova relationship in the context of Europe’s security crisis. Specialised in EU external action and neighbourhood politics, Emma is a long-term Moldova watcher, focusing on Moldovan politics in the context of its accession. Combining insights from Brussels and Chisinau, she offers a perspective pertinent to both capitals.

In Moldova, the EU is confronted with its classic struggle: that of the fate of what was originally construed as a ‘peace project’ in the face of war. Recent events have exposed and widened the chasm between the EU’s capabilities and comfort zone and the evolving security context. The EU is pulling out all its classical stops in support of the candidate country: enlargement negotiations, institution-building, all kinds of development aid, judicial reform, support for energy and cyber security. The big elephant in the room, however, is the disconnect between these actions and the possible need for deterrence. It all comes down to the EU’s threat perception of Russia, which still hasn’t entirely been settled among EU member states, pertaining to how the Russian regime behaves, what its long-term goals are, and how a potential near-future peace deal in Ukraine shapes its future (expansionary) endeavors. In this article, I take you through the EU’s approach to, and priorities in, Moldova as a function of its threat perception, how these are affected by the withdrawal of USAID, and the resultant blind spots of EU action. 

War not on their mind 

A gaping perception gap exists when talking to different people in Moldova: some are drawing up contingency plans, many are seriously contemplating their futures (where to raise the kids? Is there a future in Moldova?) in case things go south. For others, the shock from February 24th 2022 has mostly receded, taking on the stability of a new normal, however dreadful. Indeed, the hubris of Russia in the early days of the war has given way to a reality where Russian advances are arduous and slow. The danger is that the new power balance is changing resolutely more in favor of Moscow, now that Trump has entered the arena and is set on negotiating a peace that allows Russia the time to regain its strength to potentially return with a vengeance. 

The tendency among EU diplomats is that, though the possibility of war certainly exists in theory, actions are based on the assumption that it won’t happen. Instead, all bets are placed on enlargement, which is steadily advancing. Absorbed by the all-encompassing accession negotiations, little energy or resources are dedicated to plan seriously for what happens if.

The divergence in threat perceptions has to do with the structural-institutional confines of the EU. EU action in Moldova is concentrated on spheres that come naturally to the Union. These include enlargement policy and accession negotiations, political dialogue and reconciliation (between the left and right banks¹), and structural (democratic) support, in this case judicial reform for insulation against corruption. Hard political issues such as security (armament), or domains that hinge on speed, such as political communication, fall outside of its natural remit.

This is a trademark European weakness. The EU is biased against recognizing a security threat. A variety of factors explain this. The EU is in its essence a peace project. Examining and reacting to military and security threats are not its core business, the impulse having long been to outsource such questions to NATO. The EU’s threat perception is a function of the instruments it has available, which leads to a built-in blind spot. The EU cannot fully take seriously the threat of a Russian invasion in Moldova because it doesn’t have sufficient security capabilities to fight it. It is thus bound to rationalize in terms of the instruments it does possess. 

Secondly, the more ‘dovish’ threat perceptions are symptomatic of a structural issue of limited capacities that makes planning for the longer term future a second-tier concern, expounded by the above mentioned diverging perceptions. Threat assessment is the basis of strategy, informing the choice of priorities and how resources are to be distributed. Contrary to the fears of many local actors, the reality is that the imminent danger posed by Russia is not recognized to the extent that it would translate into immediate and qualitative militarization. To be sure, the actions the EU is taking - fostering resilience through energy security and the strengthening of institutions, ensuring fair elections, fighting cyber threats - are all done to counter Russia. Von der Leyen vows to be “clear-eyed” about “rogue Russia on our borders.”  But unlike many hawkish Moldovans, Ukrainians, or Baltic citizens who are certain in the belief that, unless deterred, peace in Ukraine will only buy Russia time to rearm and relaunch its aggression, this perception is far from collectively shared across the EU. There are still diverging views on how the Russian regime behaves, what peace in Ukraine will mean and how conditional European security is on the fate of Ukraine. 

Priority-setting to determine how to spend limited resources will thus be channeled towards immediate issues. The EU in Moldova, at pains to help tackle the latest of consecutive crises, is unlikely to focus on resolutely factoring in a hypothetical near-future threat and hurry along the structural militarization reforms necessary to meet it. The Union is an unwieldy apparatus of 27 democratic member states that require consensus on foreign policy. By nature this makes the block struggle to react in real time during a crisis. Making contingency plans, particularly when they require structural transformations and are of military nature, are as of yet borderline unrealistic for the Union.  

This is more than a mere blind spot, which brings me to the third factor playing into the EU stance in Moldova: the exposure to the institutional echo chamber of enlargement. Absorbed in accession negotiations, in a context of a decidedly pro-European president, government and a majority in parliament (till September at least), attitudes of EU diplomats are bound to be more optimistic when exposed to an apparatus working away tirelessly towards achieving incremental institutional and political progress. For the population, civil society, and journalists, anyone outside those circles, the security picture looks bleaker. These factors mean that relations with Moldova are executed through the lens of enlargement, rather than a security prism.  

This discrepancy in threat perceptions may look dire, particularly in the context of current developments - Trump’s withdrawal of USAID, his cozying up to Putin, the energy crisis, and the tanking popularity of PAS ahead of elections. On the other hand, EU action grinds on, building infrastructure, transforming the state apparatus, changing legislation, reorienting economic sectors. These actions are less flashy and harder to report on but are enacting structural, long-term change. At the same time, in the face of concerns for a Russian invasion, pointing out these changes tends to fall flat. 

That being said, there are concrete efforts taken by the EU to expand its military capacities. At the Munich Security Conference on the 14th of February, Commission President Von der Leyen again stated the EU “need[s] a surge in European defense spending,” proposing to “activate the escape clause for defense investments” so that “Member States to substantially increase their defense expenditure, in a controlled and conditional way.” This would foresee the loosening of the tight fiscal rules demanding a government deficit under 3% of GDP, for state investments in defense. A White Paper on Defence on the priorities of EU military investments presented by the Commission is expected on March 19th. This doesn’t yet deal with the fact that these decentralized national defense investments don’t translate into common European capacities that are interoperable and complementary. These developments on their own though stand no chance to deter Putin, with the wind in his back, bolstered by a friendly Donald Trump. Reactive militarization should not be conflated with creating a credible deterrence capacity. 

Military expert Franz-Stefan Gady urges the EU to crack the tough question, how important Ukraine is to Europe’s security. Only once this is settled, can the EU member states “begin to assess acceptable risks, develop a coherent military strategy, and craft operational plans that align with the continent’s limited military capacity.” He warns that “Without this consensus, any European troop deployment would risk disaster, offering little real deterrence as Russia could easily exploit internal divisions. acceptable risks.” 

The chief question is, are things now so alarming that the high threshold for major European action is reached? After Vance’s comments at the Munich Security Conference denouncing European democracies’ supposed distancing from fundamental values as the major security threat, and Trump’s exclusion of the EU in negotiations with Putin over Ukraine, the real question is whether the transatlantic partnership still holds. If not, this would be a dramatic overturning of the world order, one so damning to the EU that it may well take a qualitative leap. 

European leaders hold an emergency meeting after the Munich Security Conference. Photo source Emmanuel Macron instagram.

From USAID to EUAID? 

Trump’s return has not only upset the security situation, but has also seriously undermined the scale of US investment into Moldova. The EU and individual member states are already pouring considerable resources into Moldova, with the EU being the largest provider of financial assistance to the country. Two questions, however, merit asking. The first is, what happens now that USAID has ceased and the holes thus left?

The withdrawal of USAID has had major consequences across the country, rippling across sectors, affecting investment opportunities for businesses, civil society, and media actors alike, blowing holes in energy security and judicial reform efforts. The transatlantic allies worked towards largely the same goals, so the abrupt retreat of the US leaves many projects hanging that hurt EU interests as well. Financial support for the vetting of the judicial system was split between the allies, with USAID taking on the vetting of the prosecutors, while the EU tackling the judges. 

The bottom line is that the EU cannot replace the gaping hole left by USAID. The EU budget is set in multi-annual cycles, with development cooperation money portioned off according to specific thematic and geographical programs. When emergencies or unforeseen events occur, parts of the budgets can be reshuffled, but the EU is not in the habit of creating ad hoc new funds - particularly when the emergency in question is the wholesale withdrawal of (one of) the largest development actors in virtually every EU partner country and beyond. 

There are immediate humanitarian needs that require tending to - the delivery of life-saving medicines, or humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. As of yet, with pending legal battles in the US, it is unclear which, particularly humanitarian, US assistance will potentially continue. Any continuation will be marginal, certain to be the exception rather than the rule. 

Again, in the face of immediate needs, funding of projects with structural, medium- to long-term effects - such as fostering a pluralistic media sphere - is hard to prioritize. The EU’s priorities in Moldova are the following: justice reform, energy security, ensuring free and fair elections in third (for instance, through supporting the Central Electoral Commission), and media freedom in fourth place. Though, as media freedom and fighting disinformation has become inextricable from ensuring fair democratic elections, there is some potential for integrating support to the media under the umbrella of elections. 

Media freedom, quo vadis? 

Supporting media freedom as a precondition for democracy is a slow process, not prone to producing immediate fruits. It is necessary in any democracy, but reveals itself as a particularly blunt weapon in the face of constant meticulous Russian communication, and the successful uptake of Russian narratives among citizens. Moldova is one of the prime targets of Russian malign influence efforts. Citizens are digitally bombarded with disinformation and narratives seeking to sow distrust towards institutions and democracy as a whole, and the PAS-government in particular, and to derail Moldova from its European path by fanning anti-EU sentiment. Narratives painting the PAS government as a failure, and President Sandu as an autocrat bent on centralizing and abusing power, have already gained traction. Both the EU and US jointly funded media freedom and anti-disinformation initiatives. With the withdrawal of USAID, publications such as Ziarul de Garde, which exposed the vote-buying scandal in the October 2024 elections, lost out on critical financial support and are now knocking on European doors for alternative funding. Almost all independent media outlets in Moldova are facing serious budget shortfalls following the overnight removal of American support. Fighting disinformation is a notoriously uphill battle. This is not the time to let the reins loose when the discursive landscape is already favorable to Russia.  

The EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova is active in countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), targeting disinformation. Indirectly, the EU is involved in furthering media pluralism in Moldova, through funding projects by the Council of Europe. However, with no more US aid, many media organizations, journalists, and NGOs working on anti-disinformation, are left out to dry. Vance’s words “digital censorship” in Munich make clear that the US is out when it comes to funding anti-disinformation and cyber security efforts, and investigative media. Considering the EU’s priority structure and funding processes, small grants may be made available and some funding may trickle down from other projects to allow some media actors to keep the lights on, but structural support for longer-term functioning is not in the cards. The coming elections will be telling about the extent of the damage to the media sphere and of Russian success in shaping attitudes and electoral behavior. With the plethora of crises, and the need to step up its military capacities, the EU and member states will most likely only be able to provide marginal support to this sector, unless extensive lobbying occurs to this end. 

Visibility and political communication: Who takes credit? 

The second question that merits examination when it comes to aid to Moldova, relates to the visibility of EU efforts: is the EU getting the credit for its financial commitments? The visibility of EU investment and support has been a running issue for years. On that score, however, it seems that, in Moldova, the EU has been rather successful. Across Moldova, the EU flag or those of member states can be found on restored buildings, on schools, at the bottom of every third website and on recycle bins in the remotest of villages. 80% of Moldovans are found to be aware that the EU provides financial support to Moldova, particularly that injected into health, medicine and infrastructure. Whether this awareness extends to the breadth of EU investment, is unclear. 

In other EU neighborhood countries, such as Serbia, research has found that the majority of people attributed EU-built infrastructure to Russian donor generosity. This points to, one, lacking visibility efforts by the EU, and two, successful Russian disinformation to alter perceptions of foreign engagement. Indeed, in the left bank, researchers have found that “Russia continues to be seen as the main ‘patron’ of the region, though trust in its pacifist intentions started to decrease.²” Having said that, 67.7% of left bank residents interviewed agree that “the EU helps the Republic of Moldova a lot.³” At the same time, the Russian narrative that Transnistrian politicians are “getting rich from business dealings with EU countries,⁴” is supported by almost 56%. 

The EU as a whole, as well as the Delegation in Moldova, have put increasing emphasis and pressure on ensuring and amplifying the visibility of EU actions. While problems and room for improvement persist, efforts have been paying off. Such improvements in public communication laying bare EU support is a major welcome development. Local skeptics often ask, what will the lofty process of EU integration do for us?’ With EU projects springing up across the country, the effects to point to will be numerous and tangible, making real differences in people’s lives. 

The larger adjacent issue is one of political communication, which Russia has mastered like no other. While the EU invests, Russia talks; the danger is that the talk starts taking over, particularly in the looming elections. 

Put your mouth where your mouth is 

In contrast to the EU, Russia does not build roads or other kinds of vital infrastructure. In many ways, though, that has ceased to matter. Instead, Russia has mastered the communications game. The EU and Russia are direct opposites in their approach to Moldova. Russia talks, but doesn’t invest. The EU invests, but doesn’t talk - at least not sufficiently or loudly. Today’s digital world, though, rewards the loudest.

Political communication is notoriously not one of the EU’s fortes. The EU is slow in communicating, which makes delivering quick reactions, not to mention proactive communication, a challenge. Even when Trump called Putin to discuss peace in Ukraine before consulting Zelensky and without guaranteeing European presence at the negotiation table, immediate reaction by the EU was held off until the next day. Though the EU is not naive to the importance of political communication and is increasingly expanding its capabilities in the field, strategic communication at the European External Action Service is still understaffed and underdeveloped. Meanwhile, Russia has enjoyed far-reaching successes in the way its proposed narratives have become adopted into the mainstream, it has influenced elections throughout Europe, and sowed confusion and division on almost every political issue. The elections in the fall will show which approach pays off more. 

That isn’t to say that a victory by Eurosceptics would only be due to Russian narratives. The PAS government is criticized for being arrogant, and votes will likely reflect rising prices due to the energy crisis. Though in contriving the latter, Moscow had its whole hand in the pie. 

More of the same is no more 

EU attention on Moldova, measured through the frequency of high-level visits by European officials and an indication of EU priorities, has remained high. The EU has concluded energy deals offering millions in support, is supporting justice reform, and is spurring Moldova on in its accession process. As a partner country, copious funds are flowing in supporting many sectors. However, current geopolitical developments are worrying, their global nature making Moldova one amongst many political minefields that demand resources and attention. Much will depend on attitude-shifting around defense and security in Brussels. With Trump at the helm in Washington, EU leaders will be pushed to the brink to determine at last how much of a European security threat Russia poses in Ukraine - i.e. whether they believe peace in Ukraine will actually mean peace, or rather breathing space for Russia to prepare its next attack, and how far they think Moscow will seek to advance into the European core. 

This threat perception directly informs the fate of Moldova: if enough European governments subscribe to the theory that the chief cause of the war was Western provocation, suggesting that Russia will not resume its aggression after a peace deal, European rearmament will continue to stall. With the post-Soviet Baltic member states, and an Estonian High Representative, this interpretation is unlikely to reach a consensus. If Europeans settle on the belief that Russia may take up anew its onslaught in Ukraine and potentially beyond but stop at EU borders, (making the case for accelerated Moldovan accession,) rearmament may accelerate progressively in the face of an increasingly belligerent Russia. It then depends how much Europeans are willing to pay for the fates of Moldovans and Ukrainians - enough to build a credible deterrence to Russia? If the more wary voices have their way, and the Russian campaign is interpreted as the first of indefinite advancement unless deterred, the only option is to resolutely build European deterrence forces. 

While these discussions in Brussels unfold, the coming months promise a number of inflection points: will a far-right Germany further weaken the EU and its support for Ukraine? Where will Moldova and its accession stand after the parliamentary elections? Will there be a peace deal in Ukraine and more importantly, on what terms? Amongst the clouds of uncertainty, one thing is clear: for Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU, something will have to give. 

1. Right bank = Chisinau controlled, constitutionally administered Moldova. Left bank = the breakaway Transnistrian region.

2. Watchdog.md, “Social and Political Trends in the Transnistrian Region in the context of the Republic of Moldova’s EU Accession Process,” December 2024.

3. Watchdog.md, “Social and Political Trends in the Transnistrian Region in the context of the Republic of Moldova’s EU Accession Process,” December 2024.

4. Watchdog.md, “Social and Political Trends in the Transnistrian Region in the context of the Republic of Moldova’s EU Accession Process,” December 2024.