Since February 2022 I’ve written a lot about Moldova’s precarious security situation. Actually, even back in 2021 I was writing articles trying to parse out what the direct threat to Moldova might be from the rapidly changing geopolitical situation. All of this analysis was based on a few core assumptions - spoken or unspoken:
Moldova’s defenses are weak: Moldova’s geography, economic situation, small military and domestic politics all pose a major challenge should an aggressor be on the border.
Odesa is key:Ukraine is effectively Moldova’s shield against direct Russian aggression and the city of Odesa in particular is the key to Moldova’s security. If Odesa is Ukrainian, Moldova is safe. If Russia takes the city, Moldova will almost immediately be in a conflict and facing long odds.
Romania is an a key supporter: Most Moldovans don’t really think that Romania will go to war to support the country. At the same time Romania is seen as Moldova’s staunchest ally both in terms of EU integration and in the event of a major crisis.
In a nutshell, Moldova is surrounded by 2 countries that are friends / allies and are major supporters of Moldova’s foreign policy goals. What has changed in the last 6 months is that this is no longer assured - and Romania appears to be the weak link.
Today I’m going to take a look at some updates from the Romanian elections, how Moldova is reacting and also zoom out to look at the wider regional insecurity west of the Prut1.