Fortius Consulting, Shor and MEGA
Investigations: March 12, 2025
A Spanish consultancy with deep ties to Europe’s far right is representing Victoria Şapa, an ally of pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor, in her efforts to lobby American lawmakers. This move raises concerns about whether EU sanctions are effectively limiting Shor’s campaign to destabilize Moldova. By all appearances, they are not - for sanctioned individuals, the ability to lobby and fund PR operations is not a dubious loophole, but the rule.
Shor, who is sanctioned by the EU, US, UK, and Canada for his role in Moldova’s largest financial fraud and for destabilizing the country’s political system, remains politically active from exile in Moscow. His associates, like Şapa, are now seeking political influence outside of Moldova: As Moldova Matters has reported, Fortius Consulting is representing Ms Şapa in the US. The consultancy’s activities promoting narratives about Moldova that align with the Shor-agenda suggest that they are also pursuing lobbying and media influence for Shor affiliates in the EU.
This investigation explores Fortius Consulting’s connections to Victoria Şapa and the hard-right ‘Make Europe Great Again’ (MEGA) movement, its role in shaping narratives about Moldova’s elections, and the legal loopholes that allow sanctioned individuals like Ilan Shor to continue political lobbying in the EU.
Who’s who: the key players
Ilan Shor is a pro-Russian oligarch sentenced for his role in the theft of over one billion dollars from 3 Moldovan banks. He is currently residing in Moscow, from where he coordinates electoral interference in Moldova - engaging in activities that range from vote buying and organizing protests, to perpetuating disinformation through Shor-owned channels.
Victoria Şapa is a childhood friend of Shor, and ran for mayor in Balti as part of Shor’s Chance party, before it was disbarred from running in elections.
Fortius Consulting is a Madrid-based strategic public relations (PR) and lobbying firm founded by Juan Angel Soto Gomez, a conservative strategist deeply connected to Europe’s hard-right political movements.
What is Fortius Consulting, and who is behind it?
The little-known consultancy firm was ostensibly founded in 2015. Offline and online activities seem to have picked up from 2023 onwards, and most hiring occurred in the last year. Fortius Consulting specializes in “strategic communication and social mobilization,” which essentially boils down to communication or media campaigns, networking and advocacy. In practice, this means working with right-wing political actors and organizations that advocate nationalist, populist, and conservative policies.
Its founder, Juan Ángel Soto Gómez, has deep ties to Europe’s hard-right ecosystem. He has spoken at multiple Conservative Political Action Conferences (CPAC)1, as well as the ‘Make Europe Great Again’ Conference organized by the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) and Romania’s hard-right Alliance for Romania (AUR) (which embraced the now-barred ultranationalist presidential candidate Calin Georgescu). He was in Washington DC for Donald Trump’s recent inauguration and attended the Hispanic Inaugural Ball.
Mr. Soto has previously worked as International Director at the Disenso Foundation2, a conservative think tank whose president is Santiago Abascal, leader of Spain’s nationalist Vox Party and of the hard-right Patriots of Europe3. The latter is a new European party group that unites the likes of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, France’s Marine Le Pen, and the Netherlands’ Geert Wilders. Soto’s latest appearances indicate that Fortius is well plugged into these circles, with transnational connections that span various far-right political parties across Europe.
Fortius, Moldova, and the Disinformation Ecosystem
Fortius Consulting’s links to Moldova first surfaced when Soto published an op-ed in El Debate on October 19th 2024, questioning the legitimacy of Moldova’s elections and its EU accession process. These criticisms were based on the claim that the Moldovan government barred European NGOs from monitoring the elections in the fall4. From this, he extrapolates that the Moldovan elections and democracy lack integrity. He further argues that the EU is straying from its democratic nature and exhibits selectivity: ”applying sanctions or severe measures in some cases, [while] in others it turns a blind eye to clear signs of democratic weakening”.
A day before Soto’s article, EU Reporter’s Colin Stevens shared the article “Moldova’s Election Commission blocks European observers ahead of crucial EU accession referendum”. The following day, EU Today’s Gary Cartwright published a nearly indistinguishable article entitled “Moldova’s Exclusion of International Election Observers Raises Concerns Ahead of Pivotal 2024 Elections”. The timing of Soto’s article—published the same day as similar reports in EU Reporter and EU Today, both outlets known for “pay-to-play” lobbying practices—suggests a coordinated effort.
A 2021 three-part investigation by Politico identified EU Reporter and EU Today, and their respective founders Colin Stevens and Gary Cartwright, as engaging in murky practices of “EU lobbying dressed up as journalism.” The two Brits are closely connected, often amplifying each other’s content to foster the impression of legitimacy and wide circulation. Moldova Matters has previously written about how PR companies affiliated with Shor have circulated disinformation via these media outlets.
The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab (DFRLab) has already picked up on this very cluster of articles undercutting the integrity of the Moldovan election, identifying EU Reporter and EU Today as “alternative European media spread[ing] pro-Kremlin narratives” and disinformation. As Daniela Calmis tracked, the story was subsequently picked up by eleven networks, in six different languages.
In 2024 alone, EU Reporter published 24 PR-planted pieces (undeclared as such) about Moldova, concerning Shor or his affiliates. This includes an open letter “written by politicians representing a wide spectrum of the opposition in Moldova” - in actuality the majority representatives of Shor parties. The letter, addressing European institutions - decries the “unimaginable dictatorship” in Moldova under the PAS government and denounces the disbarring of Shor-affiliated parties. The twelfth and last signatory was Victoria Şapa.
In his article Soto failed to mention one important point - his own association with half of the supposedly excluded NGOs.
The criticism on which this entire cluster of articles is based comes down to the claim that the Central Election Commission (CEC) blocked various European NGOs from observing the elections in polling stations in Europe installed for the diaspora. Further investigation shows that at least four of the eight NGOs that claimed to be “blocked” from election observation were directly linked to Soto. These include:
1. Fortius Foundation (founded by Soto)
2. Principios Foundation (founded by Soto)
3. Fundación Sociedad Civil (led by Soto)
4. Trezeno Institute (where Soto is an affiliate)
The other NGOs listed were the Académie de Géopolitique de Paris; The International Centre for Relations & Diplomacy; History Heritage Humanity; and Together for Future in Georgia. The latter has stopped working. Taking a closer look at the NGOs listed, DFRLab concluded that “many could not be identified online, some had been inactive for several years, and others, while still operational, did not publicly indicate any interest in monitoring the elections in Moldova.”
When contacted by Moldova Matters for clarification, Pavel Postica, deputy Chairmen of the CEC, acknowledged the receipt of the NGO’s applications. However, he stated that these were submitted shortly before the elections and they also failed to provide proof of electoral observation experience. This meant that they did not pass the preliminary verification stage.
Typically the CEC invites international organizations to observe elections in Moldova. They do take unsolicited applications and according to Postica evaluate them based on the applicant’s history of conducting successful observation missions and the organization’s financial transparency. Since these NGOs did not provide key information their applications were essentially incomplete.
Fotrius Consulting did not reply to multiple requests for comment regarding their representation of Victoria Şapa or details of their agreements to represent figures linked to Ilan Shor.
These applications to observe the elections were therefore at best a long shot and at worst spurious. Their failure neatly set up a disinformation effort, which Soto clearly participated in, to discredit the elections themselves.
The EU’s Lobbying Loopholes and Sanctions Gaps
While Shor remains under sanctions, neither EU lobbying rules nor the sanctions regime itself prevent European firms from working with him, his associates or promoting his interests. The EU regulatory framework is porous, marked by loopholes that allow activities like those conducted by Fortius to take place.
Loophole 1: Weak lobbying regulations, inexistent PR rules
Lobbying in the EU is notoriously intransparent. The EU introduced a Transparency Register demanding obligatory registration of any individual or entity, European or foreign, seeking to access and influence European institutions. The Fortius Foundation, as well as several of the entities listed as past partners or clients, are listed in the Register. However, the world of lobbying far bypasses this official channel. Public relations, social media and communication campaigns are critical levers of political influence by shaping public attitudes and discourse. MEGA is aware of the power of this - first on the agenda at the 2025 MEGA Conference was a discussion on “New Media Channels and their influence on politics and elections”. EU legislation, however, has not quite caught up: Unlike their American counterparts, where a Foreign Agent Registration Act filing has to be declared for any foreign individual, firm or government seeking to engage in lobbying, public relations, media or other activities seeking to influence policy or debate on American soil - Europe does not keep a tab on this.
The albeit rudimentary transparency requirements in place for direct lobbying to institutions transparency don’t exist for PR activities. If the reins are loose when it comes to lobbying, they don’t exist for PR firms or disinformation campaigns. No legal requirement exists in the EU laws that demands disclaimers to notify when content was paid for, to facilitate readers ability to distinguish between paid-for PR plants and independent journalistic content. Rather, it is left up to journalists’ own ethical codes, to which they choose to voluntarily abide, or not.
Loophole 2: EU basic sanctions regimes permit services for sanctioned individuals
Under the current EU sanctions regime on Moldova, Shor’s funds are frozen but he is not prevented from hiring consultants or influencing EU public opinion through intermediaries like Fortius. This is in contrast to US sanctions against Shor which are far more robust and include asset freezes, a ban on transacting with Shor or the Shor Party, travel restrictions and mechanisms for applying secondary sanctions against those attempting to undermine the sanctions regime5.
The EU sanctions against Shor stand in stark contrast to the elaborate 16-package sanctions regime imposed on Russia. In 2023 the EU erected a basic targeted sanctions regime towards specific Moldovan nationals “destabilising” the country. This regime is one-dimensional, only entailing the freezing of funds. It prohibits sanctioned individuals from accessing, transferring, moving or using any funds they have in the EU. Enforcement entails checking whether individuals aim to circumvent the ruling to get their hands on the funds anyways. They, however, remain free to enlist whichever services they desire in the EU - from legal services, to lobbying, to PR, as long as they steer clear of their frozen assets. While those under Russia sanctions are slathered with “multidimensional” restrictions including a prohibition on goods, services, imports and exports, as well as a travel ban and asset freeze, Moldovan citizens like Shor are only subjected to the latter. The road for political lobbying is left wide open for sanctioned Moldovan individuals, not to mention their affiliates.
To mark the three-year ‘anniversary’ of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the 24th of February, the EU further fleshed out the Russian sanctions regime with the latest package. 48 individuals and 35 entities “responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine” were added. This included targeting “third country nationals that supported the Russian war effort” (e.g. Chinese satellite imagery producers), and “actors responsible for circumventing EU sanctions, including through third countries.” It also took into account the risk of Russian propaganda:
“Responding to Russian propaganda remains also a priority. Alongside notorious Russian propagandists, the EU is notably listing NewsFront, and SouthFront, two outlets presenting distorted interpretations of history and manipulated information in line with Kremlin messaging while also targeting European and global audiences with distorted and manipulated information.”
Ilan Shor was not among the 48 new names. What this means is that he remains solely subjected to the basic sanction mechanism surrounding asset freezes. That is, despite his overt and well-established ties to Russia and his history of propelling ‘distorted information,’ he and other “pro-Russian actors” from Moldova, condemned by the EU, continue to enjoy a wide range of freedoms in the EU. Were Shor to be added under the Russian sanctions regime, it would be a different story.
In sum
Ilan Shor’s PR operations highlight how pro-Russian actors can and do operate within the EU’s lobbying ecosystem, to influence policy-makers and shape public opinion. This highlights a major gap in the EU lobbying, PR and sanctions legislation. PR and consulting companies representing Shor affiliates and participating in pro-Shor media campaigns, do not as such breach the law.
Despite spreading disinformation and mobilizing ethically questionable journalism, whether paid for by a sanctioned individual or their affiliates, the existing legal framework provides little to no restriction on such operations.
While the EU is straining to counter disinformation and foreign influence, it lacks a comprehensive framework to track and regulate the activities of PR and lobbying firms.
This story was reported and written by Emma Marechal. It was edited by David Smith.
On the Patriots for Europe site, Santiago Abascal is listed as the President, as part of the ‘Enlarged Bureau’. However, at official appearances such as at the European Parliament, Jordan Bardella has also been introduced as the leader of the Patriots.
At the time of writing there is still no FARA filing for the work Fortius is doing in the US. Because of this we cannot know who is paying for their work or whether or not this lobbying activity involves sanctioned individuals directly.
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