The Race to 2030
Moldova and Ukraine believe Europe is running out of time. Much of the EU still acts as though time is abundant.
Moldova and Ukraine want to join the EU by 2030… but the EU isn’t so sure. The growing gap in rhetoric highlights the different geopolitical assumptions of the parties and a changing idea of what the EU is and can be.
Since Moldova (and the EU) collectively exhaled following the victory of pro-EU parties in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, there’s one question I get more than any other, and it goes something like this “Moldova / Maia Sandu keep talking about joining the EU by 2030, do you think they really mean it?” or “that’s not realistic right?” or “what happens if reality doesn’t match this rhetoric?”
To be clear, these questions are not coming from Moldovans but from citizens of EU countries - some diplomats, some journalists, some analysts and some working for INGOs.
Since I get this question many times each week I thought it was time to share my thoughts here. This article is in the “Perspective” section and is therefore best understood as my opinion and analysis of the situation. I believe it is an informed one, but while I may characterize how different parties view the big questions at hand I want to stress that I’m sharing my analysis and not speaking for anyone else.
We’ll first look briefly at a recent letter from Chancellor Merz on a new enlargement mechanism and then dive into how these statements and approaches are driven by very different analysis of the current geopolitical situation.
Merz’s Letter
Last week German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a letter to EU leaders advocating for a new approach to EU enlargement with regard to Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans. The letter promptly leaked and brought the debate about EU enlargement into the foreground.
In his letter, Chancellor Merz calls EU enlargement a “geopolitical necessity” and starts from the premise that “We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union.” He writes that the process is much too long and that “I am convinced that we need a new dynamic for Ukraine as well as for the Western Balkans and Moldova.”
Justifying the need for a new dynamic he writes:
“It is obvious that we will not be able to complete the accession process shortly, given the countless hurdles as well as the political complexities of ratification processes in various Member States1. However, with a view to the peace process, we do not have time for further delays. It is now time to boldly move on with Ukraine’s EU integration through innovative solutions as immediate Steps forward.”
In reality, the letter argues for more of an EU-shuffle: some steps forward, a few steps sideways and some backwards. This comes in the form of a new idea called “associate membership” which Merz advocates for Ukraine. Here’s how it would look:
Immediate opening of all negotiating clusters with Ukraine
Participation in EU institutions as an observer without voting rights - including the European Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, etc.
Full member state commitment to Article 42 security guarantees
Step by step application of the EU Acquis and EU budget framework
Snap back mechanism to withdraw privileges in case of backsliding
Chancellor Merz advocates for this political arrangement for 2 primary reasons:
Ease of implementation, he writes: “It would not require the ratification of the Accession Treaty according to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union nor any Treaty changes, but merely a strong political agreement.”
Wartime necessity, he writes that “It will help facilitate the ongoing peace talks as part of a negotiated peace solution.”
What About Moldova?
In this letter Moldova is vaguely lumped in with the other candidate countries, specifically those in the Western Balkans, with a promise for future work to accelerate the accession process. This would de facto separate Moldova and Ukraine by placing Moldova in the traditional slow-lane while creating a new kind of waiting room for Ukraine2.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy immediately rejected the formulation writing on X: “There can be no complete European project without Ukraine, and Ukraine’s place in the European Union must also be complete - full and equal.” He later sent a letter to EU leaders emphasizing that Ukraine is pushing forward on reforms and writing:
“We are defending Europe - fully, not partially, and not with half-measures,” (…) “It would be unfair for Ukraine to be present in the European Union but remain voiceless,”
Asked about Merz’s letter at the GLOBESEC Conference, President Sandu responded more cautiously saying:
“We see that this is a proposal and we are following the discussion. I am not against gradual integration as long as it does not substitute full membership. At the moment, the Republic of Moldova is following the process for full membership, and our commitment is to prepare the country by 2030. We are ready to discuss these ideas, but the ultimate goal is full membership. We hope that this proposal will not delay the process and will not substitute the concept of full membership,”
“Don’t rush” vs “What are we waiting for!?”
This letter is only the latest attempt by EU leaders to find some shortcut or geopolitical fudge to figure out how enlargement can work. It follows European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos’ recent “reverse enlargement” idea - basically Moldova and Ukraine join the EU now but gain both rights and responsibilities piecemeal as negotiations conclude and reforms are done. This formula is favored by Ukraine but was rejected by a number of member states.
That fact, as well as the plain language of Merz’s letter show us what the real problem is - some EU members are just not sure whether or not they want Moldova and Ukraine at all (not to mention the other candidates). Diplomatically this is usually hidden behind 3 official “concerns”
Security - how can Ukraine join the EU while at war? how can Moldova join without reintegrating Transnistria? etc.
Reforms - the process of joining the EU is really long! Moldova and Ukraine simply aren’t ready.
Viktor Orban - “we all want enlargement but Orban is blocking it” etc
It has become quite clear that these are just excuses. Not that the concerns aren’t real - but they aren’t the core problem. Chancellor Merz proposes Article 42 security guarantees without membership and before the war ends. Reverse enlargement takes care of worries about reforms not happening. Viktor Orban is gone.
Why are we stuck still? why are no negotiating clusters open?
Meanwhile, Moldova and Ukraine are barreling full speed towards 2030. Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration Cristina Gherasimov recently announced progress on clusters 4 & 5 in Brussels. Even while negotiations are not officially open, Moldova is working through the process with EU institutions unofficially. Both Moldova and Ukraine are very set on that 2030 timeline.
How can we understand these conflicting approaches?