Perspective: Moldova Faces Unprecedented Hybrid Aggression

Guest Article by Valeriu Pașa

This is a guest article by Valeriu Pașa, Chairman of WatchDog.MD, a think tank focused on building public resilience to disinformation and creating a favorable environment for democratic development in Moldova. It was originally published on the organization’s website on June 9th. The perspective and opinions expressed in this piece are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent the editorial perspective of Moldova Matters.

Buckle up. We’ve never seen hybrid aggression like this before! Only if we stay calm and clear-minded can we get through this and save our democracy and independence.

Try to imagine that everything we’ve seen in recent years was just a warm-up, a series of rehearsals testing different methods of psychological warfare and attacks on the state. But from June until the end of September, the real, full-scale hybrid war is coming. Compared to what’s about to hit us, last year’s events will seem like a light breeze; now the real tornado is on its way!

Here are a few key observations:

1. You’ve probably come across these weird comments on Facebook or Instagram. No matter what the post is about, the “commenters” twist the topic to mention high prices, LGBT issues, supposed fortunes of Maia Sandu, or imaginary “dictatorship” and “uprisings” against the “anti-people regime.” These comments are clearly awkward translations from Russian, and they often make no sense. They’re written from fake profiles, automatically managed by AI-assisted programs.

2. These online efforts are backed up by actions in traditional media too, with fake letters and made-up official orders circulating widely, just like before the last elections.

3. The creation of fake news is also supported by real-life activities. Gamified misinformation campaigns on sensitive topics have been tested before. It went quite unnoticed, but before the last presidential elections, children recruited by Shor’s people or directly by Russian services (there is essentially no difference between these two) went around Chisinau putting up fake street name signs with deliberately offensive or repulsive names (usually fascist figures from history). Later, fake “petitions” appeared demanding these names to be changed. This was small-scale but served to test recruitment methods. Following the same model, Russian agents like Valico and Prizenco recruited unemployed Moldovans and sent them to Paris to vandalize walls and stir up anti-Semitism.

4. Now it’s moving to the next level and there will be no limits. Last year saw widespread posters and T-shirts with anti-European messages. These were photographed and shown on Telegram, TikTok, and Facebook ads as “evidence” of public opinion, when in reality the kids posting them were paid small rewards for completing these so called “quests.” This year it’s gone further. Now we see photos of supposed posters in the city, except nobody really sees these posters in public, only in Facebook posts. One such example is a post circulating now that supposedly advertises participation in the Pride march. It is designed to be associated with the EU and PAS. The same well known manipulation techniques. They stuck it on, photographed it, then took it off and it doesn’t exist. But the “news” is circulating on the internet. Sponsored, obviously.

5. All of this is now directly coordinated by Sergei Kirienko, the deputy head of Putin’s administration. He’s cynical to the core. Power is his only value. In this worldview, recruiting the homeless or vulnerable people to stage “LGBT kissing scenes” in parks is nothing. Expect far more provocative stunts to be staged or at least spread as images online.

6. What happens on Telegram and Facebook is child’s play compared to TikTok. Real shit, as they say. The Russians learned that simply paying local influencers (as they did before past elections) no longer works because some are too toxic. Now they’re building their own influencers from scratch. We’ve noticed several new TikTok profiles, all young women, well-spoken, with studio-like setups, clearly well-trained, but we don’t know who they are or even if they’re in Moldova. They all deliver carefully prepared messages, likely reading from scripts just like the influencers recruited in the past. These videos are heavily pushed via algorithm manipulation, the same way they did with Calin Georgescu’s content in Romania. Some are repurposed on Telegram, Facebook, and Instagram too. They haven’t given up on corrupting known influencers either. Their recent fake tourism campaign with Caras and Co follows the same old pattern, just with Victoria Furtuna as the latest front.

7. Now they’re back with massive YouTube ad campaigns. To get 180K views from YouTube ads in two days costs at least 3000 euros. Soon we’ll be nostalgic for the old-style Platon and Solnishka content, because now they feature Tardea and tired jokes about “all the gays in the world rushing to deflower him after the election.” They ran the same line in 2020, 2021, and last year, and it still circulates because they know public memory is short. Meanwhile, social media platforms don’t even bother fighting disinformation anymore.

8. Any mistake, no matter how small, made by a government official will be blown out of proportion. And if no mistake happens naturally, they’ll manufacture one, like the fake “gun license” scandal stirred up within the Internal Affairs system. Meanwhile, don’t expect Moldovan authorities (especially in justice) to go after the dirty Russian money funding these operations. Don’t expect tax authorities to touch the vloggers who take cash-stuffed bags from Shor.

9. If ordinary fakes fail, they’ll start using subtle manipulations. They have dozens of “experts” gathered over the years through different channels (Platon, Shor, Plaha), old and new politicians, media mouthpieces, all ready to sell their voices to Russian interests to shape public opinion and steer campaigns. That’s why you’ll see the same people praising Shor in the morning and sharing him as “a pro-European Russophobe” in the afternoon. This machine can switch narratives instantly.

10. Worst of all, is when criticism of the government comes from legitimate sources. It’s a trap: either stay silent and lose credibility, or criticize the government and feed Kremlin propaganda. Moscow knows how to exploit Moldova’s biggest weakness: the absence of a strong, genuine pro-European opposition. Our democracy is not resilient. Normally, the loss of PAS’s rating should have led to the rise of other pro-European parties. Instead, we have the dangerous situation where PAS’s fall risks pulling down the entire support for the pro-EU option.

11. Big provocations are coming because Kirienko is not Kozak. They tried and failed in Gagauzia. The “big protest” fizzled out. But that means they’ll now focus on the ticking time bomb of Transnistria. The humanitarian crisis there wasn’t solved by partial gas deliveries in March, just delayed. Full energy cuts are still possible. Tiraspol’s economy is collapsing: no currency, no export revenues, no imports possible. Game over.

12. What will Moscow do? Force tens of thousands of Transnistrians to vote in Moldova’s fall elections, just like they’ll force Tiraspol’s regime to obey to their instructions. The separatist region will cause as many problems as possible for the Moldovan government, distracting it with artificial crises instead of letting it campaign effectively. We might see blackouts before the vote, even military provocations in the security zone, all to push 150,000-200,000 citizens on the left of the Dniester into supporting pro-Russian forces while sowing chaos on the right bank of the Dniester.

13. Add to all the above cyber-attacks, bomb threats, psychological harassment of journalists, every trick in the hybrid war playbook, all on a scale we haven’t seen before. Don’t forget Kremlin’s global manipulation campaigns. They also do not bypass the Republic of Moldova and shape public perception here.

14. And while we’re busy with these crises, Russia is quietly setting up its main strike, the September 28 election. They’ve run countless online and offline polls to test ideas: merging Socialists, Communists, Tarlev, and Vlah into a new bloc, seeing which propagandists are best known, etc. The “Pro-Moldova Platform” comes from the same script. We’ll soon see how they will arrange their pawns, what role they will give to Furtuna and other characters openly affiliated with Shor. Even Romanian networks are being used to grow “spoiler” parties that will steal votes from the pro-European camp (Filat, Costiuc, maybe others). The Kremlin’s main tool will be the Alternativa Bloc, designed to be the kingmaker force after the election, ensuring instability and derailing EU integration. Usatii’s position remains unclear; he can flip anytime. With so many puppet parties, the Russian machine will be able to order Shor to shift votes to any one of them at the last moment. A procedure that has been tried and tested in the past.

This hybrid aggression isn’t necessarily meant to make Moldovans pro-Russian. Kremlin’s goal is to make them confused, distrustful, anxious, unsure of the future. These are the effects of the psychological warfare that Kirienko’s polit-technologists are pursuing. Such a society can be easily divided and manipulated. That is to say, turned to their own will.

What should we do?

Some are calling for censorship and limiting certain rights. I do not think these are the right methods, nor do I consider them to be effective. Nor will they be carried through, yet, and we will be putting the American administration on our heads. Things must be prevented as much as possible. The most important thing is to keep our focus – the election results.

Here’s what matters:

1. Parliamentary elections have no second round. We need to treat this as if the final vote is in one week. Stay active, speak out, engage, comment, persuade, mobilize. Like you do before a runoff.

2. Don’t trust the polls. Even if they seem to favor the government now, they don’t reflect reality. Toxic propaganda and vote-buying distort everything. People lie or hide their views in surveys. This was clear last year. The problem isn’t polling companies. It’s fear in people’s heads. Realistically, PAS can hope for no more than 35-37 seats, even with strong diaspora turnout and no Transnistrian votes. Socialist+Communists+Vlah+Tarlev, with Shor’s help, will get at least 30. If Socialists go solo, they’ll get more. Alternativa: minimum 15. Usatii: at least 10. No other pro-European party will pass the threshold. Meanwhile, Kremlin proxies will steal another 2-3%. Bloc Impreuna is failing, stuck at 2-3%. If 100,000 Transnistrian votes and 50,000 Russian migrant votes arrive, it will be a disaster.

3. Don’t waste time debunking every lie. That only drains your energy. Instead, warn people: there’s a flood of lies and manipulation online and from politicians bought by Russia. That is exactly what you should tell them – that they are paid to lie and manipulate, to divide and alienate us. Do not directly try to combat a falsehood with rational argument. Manipulation targets emotions and not reason. Don’t call people who believe the propaganda stupid, aggravated etc. Show empathy, ask questions, let them speak. Don’t deny their right to an opinion. But by all means let them know that there is a lot of manipulation, show what petty interests these propagandists have behind them, where you have such arguments.

4. Hate speech not only fails to help the European cause; it serves its enemies. The sectarian, sometimes borderline discriminatory rhetoric of PAS’s most eager supporters nearly made Stoianoglo president last autumn. This problem cannot and will not be solved at the top of the ruling party, because there is no real leadership, no discipline, no proper organization there. But at the very least, we can pull some of the more aggressive PAS and other pro-European party supporters by the sleeve and remind them not to be Putin’s useful idiots in Moldova. With such behavior, plenty of ordinary, centrist-minded citizens are being pushed straight into the arms of Russian propaganda. And this is precisely the image that Moscow is trying to build for the pro-European forces, that they are xenophobes, extremists, and so on.

5. The division among pro-European political forces and the unseriousness of PAS could cost us everything this autumn. Criticism and differences of opinion are natural, especially since PAS’s governance has been far from flawless. But turning the political mission, ensuring EU accession, into a personal drama showcase at the expense of party and national interests is not helping anyone. Nor will the arrogance and superficiality of those in PAS bring them more votes. PAS needs fresh blood; you cannot remain a 30 percent party without at least two or three figures capable of delivering an engaging speech or handling a debate without looking ridiculous, arrogant, or off-putting. The genuinely pro-European parties must join forces, not tear each other apart. And we must put pressure on them to do just that, to demand they get their act together and do what is necessary, not just what they like. Right now, a damaging view prevails, that they will be voted for simply because there are no better options, as if holding voters morally hostage. But this will not work. Maybe you do not like this truth, maybe you are even right to think so, and maybe I agree, that there are no better alternatives, but the only opinion that matters is the voters. The “lesser evil” option will not convince them. Do whatever you want, but you are obliged to offer an electoral list and a campaign format that active citizens will not be ashamed to vote for.

6. Let us remember what is truly at stake. In the three years following the elections, Moldova is expected to join the European Union. This process can only be stopped from within Chisinau. EU membership will not bring milk and honey flowing down the Bic River, but it will open entirely new paths to prosperity. This is an achievement worth fighting for. Just as it is worth fighting to ensure that not even in theory can Putin drag us into his war with Ukraine. If there is even the slightest chance that a politician might take orders from Moscow, then it is in everyone’s interest, including those waiting for the Russians with bread and flowers, to make sure such people never reach power. Those of you reading this text, speak up!

7. The population of Transnistria is being held hostage precisely because it could become decisive in the elections. I said this seven years ago. For our sake and theirs, it would be better if their voting rights were suspended, just as it happens in other regions under foreign occupation. But this will most likely not happen, because such risks must be considered two years in advance, not two months before elections. Now we can only keep in mind that everything must be calculated starting from a deficit of two hundred thousand votes.

The situation is more complicated than ever. But the first step towards salvation is to recognize and become aware of the problem.

So here we are. Fourteen problems, seven solutions. Pardon the length.