The film looks at the sweep of the 35 years since Moldovan independence and how Russia has sought at every turn to mainta…

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This article is not a report on the event, it’s an op-ed serving as a reflection on my thoughts after 2 days attending the sessions and talking with participants over coffee. My impressions from the event pull in multiple directions. On one hand, it was clear that MSF is a maturing institution that is representative of Moldova’s efforts to adapt to its complicated security role. On the other hand, it was abundantly clear that people are less and less sure where the United States stands in the global security order.

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MSF Comes into Its Own

This 3rd edition of the Moldova Security Forum showed an event that felt mature and institutional. I did not attend the first edition, but I did attend last year. That event was very well organized and featured some substantive conversations which helped shape my thinking of the security environment at the time. This year MSF built on that foundation but felt noticeably more institutional, with a feel of it becoming a part of Moldova’s calendar of events.

That itself is really interesting and highlights how much questions of security have come to dominate the country’s politics and international affairs. At some level that has been true since February 2022, but events like this show an institutionalization of the approach to topics like Black Sea Security and Moldova’s security relationship in the region.

Moldova as a Security Provider

President Maia Sandu gave the opening speech for the forum where she argued that Moldova is no longer simply a security consumer, but a critical security provider for the region. You can watch the whole speech (in English) online here.

In her speech she argued that Moldova has become a critical part of the regional security architecture. She highlighted that Moldova’s 1,200 km border with Ukraine is the longest friendly border that Ukraine has, and she explained the stakes of Moldova’s recent elections saying:

“A Moldova in Moscow’s hands would turn more than half of Ukraine’s borders hostile. It would leave Ukraine exposed from the southwest, pull its troops away from the front, and bring Russian pressure to the Prut River, which is the border of the European Union and NATO. This was Russia’s plan.”

The President also spoke of Moldova’s support for Ukrainian refugees, and stated: “If this winter in Ukraine proves as hard as everyone expects, we’re ready to welcome as many as need to be in safety.”

In her speech she stated that Russia spent “close to 2% of our [Moldova’s] GDP” to influence Moldova’s elections in 2025,1 and explained that as the Kremlin tests these tactics here, Moldova can share experiences with partners. She cautioned that while the application of these tactics was “brutal” in Moldova, other countries should expect them to be more subtle.

In conclusion, President Sandu argued that Moldova will be an asset in the European family saying:

“A Moldova left in a gray zone gives Russia a permanent lever against us. Russia has tested our resilience in elections. It keeps testing us with drones, missiles, and lies. Each time, Moldova has held. And many of you in this room helped us.

But a small country on the edge of Europe can only hold the line for so long without the protection of a larger family. Moldova is a security provider today. Inside the European family, we will be a stronger one. Thank you for your interest and for your support.”

Naming the Adversary vs Muted Language

Between sessions, participants sipped coffee, traded business cards and discussed points and ideas that had been presented on the panels and in the keynotes. While there were a number of topics that seemed to grab the crowd’s attention (Transnistria, drones, etc), it was US Ambassador Joseph Mark Burkhalter’s speech that seemed to draw the most controversy. You can watch it online in its entirety here.

Ambassador Burkhalter began by highlighting the challenges Moldova faced, from drones to election interference to cyberattacks, and called them “unacceptable to any nation and unacceptable to the United States.” He spoke of America’s support for Moldova’s democracy, independence and territorial sovereignty - including in the country’s airspace.

Following nearly 2 years without an American ambassador, and with almost zero American presence at last year’s MSF, these statements recentered America’s long standing support for Moldova. They were taken by many as a strong signal of support and that’s largely how they were reported in the local press.

At the same time, Ambassador Burkhalter, when speaking of adversaries, stated:

“and we know who our adversaries are by the way” (...)

“on the note of the adversaries, we know who they are, they know who they are, but even better, they know that we know who they are”

It was lost on no one that I spoke to that these adversaries were never named. Later, in the panel that followed, journalist Teri Schultz posed a question to former Prime Minister Dorin Recean asking about information attacks carried out by “adversaries” to plant false narratives. Mr. Recean replied directly stating:

“Look, we have to name that adversary, and it is Russia.”

Schultz, somewhat offended, responded that she was only non-specific because she wanted to group in Iran and China as well - presumably referring to the larger disinformation environment and not Moldova specifically. There is no indication that Mr. Recean was responding to Ambassador Burkhalter, but it showed a real split on the stage with some participants willing to be specific, and some guarding their words.

This was only one example of Ambassador Burkhalter’s speech using notably muted language about Russia. After praising the work of America’s “special envoys” and explaining that President Trump truly wants to see the war end, he also stated the following about first lady Melania Trump’s efforts:

“and the first lady, Melania Trump, whose efforts recently have ramped up, if you noticed, to work seriously on the project of hers, that is dear to her heart, that deals with the children of the war, and many of the lost children of the war.”

This drew intense anger from Ukrainians I spoke to. They noted that Ukrainian children are not “lost” in a forest somewhere waiting to be found - they were stolen by Russia in a state sponsored campaign. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova for this war crime.

The next day, Friday, October 9, the United States sanctioned the ICC, hours after a former ICC judge won the Nobel Peace Prize for her work promoting human rights.

Dislocation and Our Unrecognizable World

My biggest takeaway from the 3rd edition of the Moldova Security Forum was to reflect on how it highlighted just how unrecognizable our world would look to younger versions of ourselves.

On one hand, diplomats and policy professionals from all over Europe came to Chisinau to discuss regional security in the context of Russia’s war and increasing hybrid aggression across Europe. For Moldova, membership in the European Union is the focus of the nation’s security policy. This was also the key organizing principle of many of the panels and discussions at MSF as participants heard about the country’s plan for reintegration with Transnistria and discussed Russia’s enormous efforts and expenditure to try and keep Moldova away from Europe.

In parallel, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was giving a speech in Athens laying out a new vision for Europe. In it, he discusses how “we find ourselves at a crossroads. Because the next decade and the decisions we make will write the story of the next century.” Ambassador Burkhalter quoted that line in his speech, noting how important it is to make those decisions. But what are those decisions? Rubio explained:

“Under President Trump, the United States has made its choice. We choose the unapologetic pursuit of national power”

He went on to outline a vision of Europe that involved much stronger nations that are free of “global bureaucracies.” It is no coincidence that this is the only way he referred to the European Union, and that Ambassador Burkhalter made no mention of support for Moldova’s European aspirations.

Further north, on October 7-8 in Vilnius Lithuania, the #Disinfo2026 conference was being held. This annual meetup of people working to combat disinformation found itself in the crosshairs of the Trump Administration. The conference planned a panel titled “USA as a FIMI threat: adapt, acknowledge, push back.” This panel was to feature 3 speakers - all American citizens, including a former CIA officer. The US State Department leaned on the countries supporting the conference to withdraw - resulting in the EU, Lithuania and Canada dropping their sponsorship of the event. France refused to withdraw its support.

Speaking to the Guardian, Nina Jankowicz, former US official and former Executive Director of the Biden Administration’s Disinformation Governance Board, commented saying:

“What this amounts to is a purported defender of free speech at the state department using the enormous power of the US government to try to pressure Americans from criticizing their government,”

The panel in question was focused on how Europe could counter disinformation threats without the United States, and on the possibility that the United States could itself be a disinformation threat to Europe.

Would the United States interfere in European countries’ internal affairs? More and more reporting says yes. Very recently, US Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle was reported to have bragged about being behind the collapse of the Romanian government2. Her lawyer has disputed this account.

Also in the last few weeks there have been reports from Polish media, citing unnamed sources, that President Trump had privately spoken with a senior member of the governing coalition in an attempt to reconfigure Poland’s government to align with his own far-right political preferences.

None of this is truly new, and follows from stated aims of “The Need for Civilizational Allies in Europe” and announced plans for the US State Department to finance politically aligned groups in Europe.

The story isn’t new, but holding a conference panel to discuss it is apparently a bridge too far.

Back in Moldova, Ambassador Burkhalter noted in his speech areas of clear cooperation like the construction of the “Trump Liberty Line.” This is the new name for the $130 million high voltage line that the United States is funding to connect Moldova with Romania. Undoubtedly, the United States remains a key partner for Moldova, Ukraine and the whole region. But sitting at MSF you could feel that people did not really know how to understand that partnership anymore.

Speaking to Moldovan friends, levels of disillusionment with the United States vary from concern to deep betrayal. In his speech, the Ambassador stated:

“some in this world run from their friends when they have challenges or have needs, but I’ll tell you that the United States runs towards our friends.”

I saw people shaking their heads at this statement. Then, on Friday, Donald Trump announced that the United States was suspending sanctions and may be about to start buying diesel fuel from Russia.

These actions will do almost nothing to impact the American economy or the price of diesel3. The amounts cited for immediate release by Russia cover less than half a day’s consumption in the US. The money however is very real for Russia. Experts cited by the New York Times estimate that, under this deal, the United States would inject $4 billion into the Russian economy. Even greater gains would follow if the Trump administration successfully pressures Ukraine into stopping their attacks on Russian refineries.

Ukraine and Russia are in an economic war of attrition and the United States just changed sides.

Why?

To which friends are we running?

Who again are our adversaries?

How might “they know that we know who they are?”

Some Final Thoughts

My experience of the Moldova Security Forum this year was generally very positive. Some sessions were more enlightening than others and moderators didn’t always manage to wrangle guests who chose to ignore the questions and pull out a written speech from their pockets. But, while there is always room to improve, it is clear to me that MSF is becoming an institution through which Moldova will engage with its role in an ever more complex regional security situation.

At the same time, I could not help but feel that the discussions I had and listened to were describing a rapidly deteriorating world.

During the forum, a Moldovan friend, Vlad Șuleanschi messaged me a link to Secretary of “War” Pete Hegseth explaining that the United States is about to revive public executions. On December 3 the US military plans to execute Nidal Hasan, who murdered 13 people at Fort Hood in 2009, by firing squad. According to the Pentagon it will be live-streamed. Vlad was horrified.

Over the weekend, the defense attaché at US Embassy Chisinau, Marcel Bolboaca-Negru, published a personal essay on this platform stating that he supports the execution of Nidal Hasan and does not oppose making it public. He goes on to caution that public executions should not become spectacles. I struggle to think of one that wasn’t a spectacle by design.

In his essay he shares memories of the public execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu and argues that we should spend less time thinking about the humanity of the condemned and more time considering their victims.

If you had told me 5 years ago that an American diplomat would invoke a 1989 revolutionary tribunal to support a public execution in the United States, I would not have believed you.

In a different conversation, Vlad recently described to me his utter disillusionment with the United States of 2026. At the same time, he spoke about how important American values and moral leadership had been to him when he was younger. He had admired this country that helped support fledgling democracies like Moldova and stood up for human rights around the world.

Now he asked me, was it a lie all along?

The headlines themselves tell a story. In the first, Moldova is caught in the middle of a great power struggle, in the second, in a battle for Europe’s future. In neither, is there any implication that Moldova has any agency, nor that the country might be interested in choosing its own future. A lack of agency is very much a theme of this article.

This article made me furious when I read it and multiple friends wrote to me with similar thoughts. I’ve decide to share my own opinion here in the Perspective section of the newsletter because I think this piece highlights a specific type of sloppy journalism that can do real reputational damage to a small country like Moldova.

The article opens with the line “One gray morning last fall I visited Andrei Morari and Ecaterina Samonii at their home in Chisinau, Moldova’s unassuming capital.” Right away we get the core idea both visually and in text - everything is “gray.”

Mills opens with a discussion over tea with Andrei and Ecaterina about the 2025 Parliamentary Elections that had just taken place 2 days before. They express frustration with the choice between PAS and the Patriotic Bloc and the geopolitical choice between Moscow and Brussels. Ecaterina tells her “There should be a middle for Moldova, just to be Moldova.” In addition to the grayness, this indecision and rejection of the East-West dynamic is a running theme of the article. About their home, Mills writes:

“Their home was scattered with keepsakes, including a small statue of Lenin that Andrei had brought back from Moscow, where he’d lived for a time as a history student.”

I’ll come back to statues of Lenin later, but if you read this article knowing nothing else about Moldova you would assume that they are *everywhere.*

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Andrei Morari and Ecaterina Samonii

Mills opens and closes her essay with this couple and their frustrations about Moldova’s East-West dilemma. They are pictured above alongside the article title. That photo does quite a lot to set the tone of the article - rural, old fashioned clothes, Soviet vibes, etc. When Andrei leaves for work and Mills continues to chat with Ecaterina over tea you get the impression that Andrei is off to work in a tractor factory or something. The “gray” is easily transferred to their lives in the minds of a reader.

That does quite a disservice to the subjects. Ecaterina is a fashion designer who had debuted a new collection 2 months before this interview. Andrei studied TV and film directing and is a passionate photographer. Given this information, we can see that photo above as someone choosing a Soviet Chic style, not someone going off to work in a tractor factory. Very much modern hipsters and not people frozen in time.

I’m able to find out so much about Andrei and Ecaterina because they were 2 of the 4 protagonists of a DW Documentary released in September 2025 called “Moldova’s young people at a crossroads - Between Russia and the EU.” In it Andrei is shown to be pretty cynical (if well informed) about politics. He is from Transnistria but cannot go home because he refused military service, he worries about the cost of living and is considering emigrating to Europe.

This documentary, which explores the same themes as this photo essay, highlights the problematic choices that Mills is making in 2 ways. Firstly, Andrei has very specific reasons to be disillusioned. He has to literally sneak through fields to see his family in Transnistria and discusses not knowing his identity - certainly not Moldova, not really Transnistrian, mostly he considers himself Russian. His concerns are real, but not representative.

Secondly, that documentary focuses on 3 sets of protagonists with different approaches to the challenges in their lives. One is an activist - relentlessly trying to make Moldova live up to her values and expectations. Another is a simple guy with a passion for music - he is a DJ and is trying to introduce his village to a new sound while looking for options to continue living in his home country.

Mills chose to focus on the couple that was deeply disillusioned and planning to emigrate. She also chose not to give us pretty important context about everything from how they dress to what specific (and understandable) experiences formed their worldview.

Wait, Where is Russia?

One of the most startling aspects of this article is what is missing: any discussion of Russia’s hybrid attacks on Moldova or the role the Kremlin plays in this story. The article treats both Russia and Europe as destinations and Moldova as standing (confused) at a fork in the road. She writes about how the “ambiguous” referendum on EU integration suggests a “complex picture,” implying that the country is evenly split. She does this without noting the fact that Russia bribed more than 100,000 voters and spent over $100 million dollars interfering in the 2024 referendum.

Mills interviews a man named Dmitri Ianul in Gagauzia who she identifies as a “teacher and former journalist.” He tells her how the explosions at the Ukrainian port of Reni near his village wake him and his wife up at night. Dmitri is pro-EU but explains that his neighbors are very pro-Russian and they refuse to believe that drones crashing outside of their town are Russian, suggesting that “they were decoys launched by pro-European politicians to justify a national pivot away from Russia.” He tells her that his neighbors plan to leave for Russia if Moldova joins the EU because:

“They worried the bloc would use Moldova as a dumping ground for Europe’s waste and transform the country with L.G.B.T.Q. propaganda and that people would no longer have the right to farm their own land.”

But Mills never asks the question - why? Why might people believe such things? Why might they reject their own experience of drones crashing nearby for narratives about false flags?

Russian influence, information warfare, hybrid attacks - the article never touches on these topics.

Spectators vs Actors

In this telling, Dmitri Ianul is telling a sad and confusing story. His neighbors are unable to see what is right in front of them and this “teacher and former journalist” can only relate how mixed up the world is. We are again given a picture of disillusionment.

But Frankie Mills missed something else that is really important - when his neighbors talk about pro-EU politicians, they are talking about Dmitri Ianul. He is not simply a “teacher and former journalist,” he is an elected politician - a detail this article leaves out entirely.

He is the President of the Cișmichioi Local Council and a prominent pro-EU figure in Gagauzia who actively works to attract EU funding and support to his region and town. Dmitri Ianul is not a spectator, he is an actor. Someone who is fighting to make change in a part of the country subject to the highest bombardment of Russian propaganda. Someone who is trying to rebuild local infrastructure and convince his neighbors about a brighter future that is possible.

Rather than discuss this, or explore why he is such a supporter of the EU in an area with so many pro-Russian voters (and how he keeps getting elected), we move on to a reflection on how everywhere Mills traveled in Moldova, “it was apparent that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine didn’t necessarily make joining the European Union more appealing.”

It is genuinely hard to tell whether Mills was trying to actively downplay pro-European sentiment, or if the whole article is just so pessimistic that she naturally highlights the downsides.

A Country With a “Soviet past”

The article describes Moldova as “Wedged between Romania and Ukraine, with a population of around 2.4 million people and a Soviet past.1” In her telling, Mills leans into that Soviet past hard. She talks about Andrei having a Lenin statue in his house, and then features photos of a giant bust of Lenin and another one of Stalin. Both busts are photographed at the Soviet Open Air Museum and both have dilapidated abandoned buildings in their background. Like all the other photos, the sky is overcast and everything is gray.

Readers without much context will think that Moldova is swimming in statues of Soviet dictators. That could not be further from the truth. Most Lenin statues were long gone when I got here back in 2012. They moved to statue parks or museums or just to the trash. Gagauzia and Transnistria are exceptions, which is why tourists go there for pictures.

I remember in 2013 when a friend of mine in the Peace Corps told me how the Lenin statue in Donduseni was decapitated during the night. The mayor didn’t know what to do with that, and while he hadn’t wanted to remove the statue he certainly didn’t want to pay to have it fixed either. Whether by policy, or vigilante action, Lenin was gone from most of the country long before the war began in 20142.

This is just the most visible of a more subtle decision that you can see across these photos - there is absolutely nothing modern about Moldova. Not buildings, not cars, not people. Frankie Mills chooses to give us a photo of 2 young people who want the country to join the EU. Here is who she selected:

With all respect to Stefan and Dumitru and their sartorial choices, this is not a representative look in Moldova post 1999. Finding 2 kids who chose to dress like a 90’s gopnik was a choice Mills made. If you went down the road in Chisinau looking for a pro-EU voter you would have to talk to hundreds, maybe thousands of people before finding this outfit.

Working Backwards

The article is part of a series for the Times call “The New World Disorder” which purports to be a “series exploring the disintegration of the postwar international system and how countries are adjusting as America steps aside.”

Now, readers can feel free to disagree with me, but I didn’t see anything like that in this article. How countries are adjusting implies agency and decision making. This article spent much more time talking to elderly teachers sadly putting pins in maps to indicate where their students emigrated to.

On her website, Frankie Mills states that she tells “stories about displacement” and that she is “interested in exile; especially how people create a sense of belonging and meaning when in limbo.” That tracks well with this story. She focuses on Ecaterina and Andrei because they speak a lot about displacement. Recounting her conversation with Ecaterina, Mills writes:

“We talked about the complications of navigating everyday life in a country with two widely spoken languages, Romanian and Russian, and the isolation felt by those who speak just one.”

It’s worth noting here that “those who speak just one” refers almost exclusively to Russian speakers who chose not to learn Romanian. Meanwhile, all Romanian speakers also know Russian3 - a minority language that is not the national language.

This is a very human portrayal of Ecaterina and her sense of dislocation. That is a personal story - but it is not Moldova’s story.

I think that is my main frustration with this essay. Nothing in this story is outright false - the NYTimes fact checkers did their jobs - but it is absolutely not sharing useful information with readers about Moldova in 2026. It shares a narrow set of stories, often without important context, and paints an exceptionally bleak picture against a backdrop of gray skies and statues of Soviet dictators.

It’s like a photo essay of a small town in Appalachia focused on poverty and the opioid crisis - except that 99% of the readers have literally no other images in their mind of America. In such a case, you aren’t painting a picture of that town, you are telling the world about a country, and you are doing a disservice to the readers if you don’t know that.

Geopolitically, this article fundamentally mistakes the choice that it sets out to explore. We are given the impression of Moldovans standing at a fork in the road leading to 2 different destinations - Moscow and Brussels. But Moscow is not a destination - Moscow is actively trying to come here4. Russia is spending hundreds of millions of dollars trying to capture Moldovan politics while spending billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives trying to conquer Ukraine. Should they succeed at that, only a fool believes they would stop at the Dniester river.

Finally, the overwhelming “gray.” The picture being painted here is bleak and I have to believe that is intentional. Again and again this essay introduces characters and places that are gray and one dimensional. It lets the reader fill in the blanks and see the “post-Soviet” hellhole that their stereotypes will easily plug into this content. But Ecaterina is a fashion designer with some really cool work to show off. This country is full of color and energy. People here talk about the future and every year things improve - better roads, better restaurants, better parks and places to spend time with family and friends. Sometimes the government makes things better, as often, improvements come in spite of their efforts. Moldova is complicated but fundamentally focused on the future.

To conclude, here are some pictures I took in September 2025. I’m providing them to prove that in Moldova the sun does shine from time to time. I live in a village and I did not find people despairing about the future, nor were there statues of Lenin or Stalin anywhere to be seen. People made wine and went fishing. In Chisinau people went to trendy cafes and walked along modern streets and through beautiful parks.

Most importantly, the sun shone brightly.

I’m not saying that there aren’t gray days and people who are pessimistic. I am saying that this article did a terrible job of painting a picture of a whole nation.

I come down very heavily on the side of - no they are not. And they never have been. People often find “politics” and “politician” to be dirty words. It’s not hard to understand why - the news is always full of stories about corruption and personal enrichment in politics.

The antidote to this rather dark view of politics has become the “technocrat.” The idea is this - a political party wins power but then turns over key parts of governance, even the prime ministership, to an outsider without political ambitions.

The problem with this should be fairly obvious - “politician” is a job title just like “plumber.” Just because a person had a bad experience with a plumber does not mean that they call an HVAC specialist the next time their toilet leaks.

You call a better plumber.

Technical expertise is valuable, but governing is inherently political. Moldova’s repeated search for apolitical prime ministers produces leaders who lack either democratic legitimacy, political skill, or both.

The Myth of the Technocrat

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For most of three decades, Moldova entered Western conversations as a problem to be managed: small, poor, divided, with a breakaway region and a Russian garrison. That Moldova is gone. The country that opened the first cluster of its EU accession negotiations this June, that twice in two years beat back the most aggressive election interference in its history and that broke its dependence on Russian gas, is something else. Moldova is a partner. I spent a week in late June making exactly that argument in Washington, at the State Department, on Capitol Hill, at the Stimson Center, The Atlantic Council and The World Justice Project. The visit fell on the 36th anniversary of Moldova’s Declaration of Sovereignty, a useful reminder that sovereignty in our neighbourhood is not a date in a textbook but a choice re-made under pressure. The encouraging news is that the argument is landing.

What matters about Moldova’s turn West is not only its direction but the manner of it. Moldovans chose continuity in 2024 and 2025 while Russia spent more than $100 million to buy votes, fund proxies and flood the information space, and they chose it with Russian troops still illegally stationed on national territory and a war next door. A choice made under duress is sturdier than one made in comfort. For Washington, the implication is liberating. Moldova is not contested ground that demands careful neutrality. It is an aligned country, where the democratic preference of Moldovans and the strategic interest of the United States point the same way.

The argument lands because the partnership has a record, not a wish list. It is not charity. It is a security partnership with shared burdens. In April 2024 Moldova imported American liquefied natural gas for the first time, removing the single most powerful lever Moscow had held over Chișinău for a generation. It ran two national elections under hybrid assault without the public losing confidence in the result. It dismantled key parts of the financial machinery of Russian influence. None of it was free, but all of it was cheap against the alternative, and the support behind it has stayed bipartisan, reaffirmed in Congressional resolutions backed by both parties on the Hill.

The case for staying engaged is, at heart, about what Moldova contributes rather than consumes. Moldova is an emerging security provider, not just a security consumer. A stable, Western-anchored Moldova denies Russia a second front on Ukraine’s flank, a land bridge toward Odesa and the Black Sea and a propaganda victory that a nation can be dragged back once it has chosen the West. Modest, targeted cooperation buys down a far larger and costlier risk. This is the plain logic of peace through strength: stability is held by raising the cost of aggression, not by conceding to it. By that measure Moldova is among the cheapest deterrence investments available to the United States today. The contest, after all, is no longer mainly about tanks. It is hybrid, and the front line runs through citizens’ phones and electricity bills.

No file is more misunderstood abroad than Transnistria. It is too often read as a frozen conflict awaiting some grand external mediation. That framing is comfortable and wrong: it casts Moldova as a problem for others to solve and quietly hands Moscow a veto over our future. The reality is that Moldova owns this process and manages it peacefully, lawfully and on its own terms. What Moldova asks of its partners is not mediation but backing its agency, its reintegration efforts and sustaining the international pressure that holds Russia to its own commitments. Moscow committed at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its forces and munitions from Moldova and has ignored that promise for more than two decades. Until it complies, the shared task should be to keep making the illegal presence steadily irrelevant and costly, while preserving peace, development and protecting ordinary people on both banks.

This is also why the way the war in Ukraine ends matters so much to us. No country in Europe wants a just and lasting peace more than Moldova. But peace on the wrong terms could raise our risk rather than lower it, by freeing Russian capacity and reviving old ambitions along the Black Sea coast. The same resolve that has kept this war from spreading must carry through any settlement. Small states are not spectators to great-power bargains. We are usually the first place their consequences are felt. Moldova should therefore be a stakeholder in Europe’s security architecture, not a footnote to it.

There is a wider lesson in Moldova’s experience that Washington and Brussels would do well to study. A small democracy with limited means has shown that Russian hybrid interference can be beaten rather than merely endured, when investment in resilience comes early and elections are defended deliberately. What worked here, hardened cyber defences, stronger financial intelligence and a public increasingly inoculated against disinformation, is exportable to other front-line democracies. Moldova is not only a place to defend. It is a place to learn from.

Energy ties the whole argument together. Every cargo of American LNG that reaches Moldova is two things at once: a gain for our security and a market for U.S. energy. Pair the bipartisan POWER Moldova Act with grid interconnection through Romania and new generation at home, and the lever Russia has used most often simply stops working. With a 750-mile border with Ukraine, a secure, EU-integrated Moldova is also a natural platform from which American firms can help rebuild it.

I left Washington with more friends and a clearer sense of what comes next. The task is not to persuade anyone that Moldova deserves sympathy. It is to build on an alignment that already exists. A Moldova that completes its reforms, joins the European Union by the end of this decade and helps anchor stability in the Black Sea region is a lasting asset for the United States and Europe alike. A reliable partner, a growing market and a contributor to the security of a neighbourhood that has known too little of it. That is the partnership we came to advance and one I am now confident we can deliver together.

Iulian Groza is Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE), an independent think-tank in Chișinău. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova, responsible for European integration and international law. His work focuses on EU accession, foreign and security policy, the rule of law and democratic resilience.

Today I want to share my perspective on this reform. My biggest takeaway is that this reform contains some of the boldest tax ideas Moldova has proposed in years - but it is being pursued through a rushed process, at a difficult geopolitical moment, without the institutional support needed to get a reform of this scale right

Too much, too fast, too little process…

This reform has a REALLY fast implementation timeline. The documentation states that the new rates should be in effect on this timeline:

• October 2026 - “food products, public catering, eCommerce”

• January 2027 - “medicines, cars, accommodation”

• April 2027 - “energy resources”

October is right around the corner and the Ministry of Finance must envision rapid movement on this legislation in order to meet that timeline. Right now this is just a proposal. It must finish public consultations, get approval by the government, passage by parliament in 2 readings, promulgation by the President and publication in the official gazette. After that, common sense dictates that time is left for vendors to update accounting software and for companies to adapt. With parliament scheduled to leave on Summer recess at the end of July that does not leave a lot of time.

To this end, the reform was announced on June 11 with a public comment period open until June 19 - that’s only 6 working days.

Veronica Sirețeanu, Deputy Director of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) and former Minister of Finance (February - December 2023), stated that while the allotted time complied with the law, it does not conform with the scope of this reform. She stated:

“Such a project would have required a minimum of 20 working days. For such a complex document, which contains changes with a transversal impact on the economy, this interval does not allow for a deep analysis and the formulation of well-founded positions”

Specifically she and AMCHAM have called for consultations by thematic blocks and for quality dialogue over speed.

I fully agree with that and note that it’s normal for thematic working groups to go through large reforms step by step before opening a whole legislative proposal up to public consultations. This isn’t just about getting input from the private sector and civil society - it’s also a mechanism to coordinate with the other ministries. It is telling that Minister of Economy Osmochescu has been silent on the reform except to note that they have not yet calculated the inflation impact.

It is more notable that the Minister of Health concluded that the reform will “destroy the healthcare system” on June 22 - well after the end of the official comment period. If it took the Minister of Health more than 6 working days to figure that out, I think we all deserve more time to digest a reform of this size.

This is about stability and confidence… not just taxes

In their 2025 election platform PAS promised fiscal stability. Specifically that tax policy would be changed (at most) once every 2 years and that they would present a…

“predictable fiscal calendar for the next 4 years, consulted with the business environment, civil society and social partners”

In this legislation’s current form, restaurants and hotels will see their taxes on non-alcohol products more than double by October. Energy taxes increases are being pushed until April, but that is more about waiting until after the cold season than anything else. This plan envisions rapid, sweeping changes.

More importantly, the 4 year plan is lacking and we don’t even know the 2 year plan. The Ministry is explicit in calling this the “Fiscal Policy 2027” and in the same press release states that a whole new Fiscal Code is coming. This larger reform will be developed over 2026-2027 with the goal of implementing it in 2028.

While they don’t explicitly unpack what the relationship between this reform and the larger 2028 goals are, they are implied in the structure. This document talks a lot about eliminating special tax regimes but doesn’t actually do that at all. So presumably companies operating under a Patenta or the IT Parks law have some big changes coming - but what are they, and when?

Where is the Prime Minister?

In Moldova it is sadly not unusual for ministries within the same government to publicly clash. The reasons here are complex but at a core level different ministries will pursue their own interests and portfolios when there is no central instruction or guiding principle to direct and / or coordinate them.

Rarely do these conflicts spill into the public like this and I have never seen it on such a huge issue. Comprehensive tax reform, whether in 2027 or by 2028, is an issue that touches every citizen in the country and every aspect of governance. That begs the question - where is the PM?

In late February Prime Minister Munteanu made an offhand comment about raising VAT for restaurants that set off a firestorm and caused Finance Minister Gavrilita to walk it back - explaining that restaurants are not being targeted and that a much larger reform is underway. Tacitly the message appeared to be that the PM did not know what he was talking about.

Since then we’ve heard nothing from him on this issue. Since June 11 he has not made any public statements, social media posts or press releases. No statements in support of his Minister of Finance, no explanations to the public about why rewriting the entire tax code is important, nothing.

When Prime Minister Munteanu was brought in out of almost total obscurity from the business community there was some hope that he would bring a private sector management style to government. Specifically, that the infighting between ministries would stop and people would start pulling in one direction towards EU accession.

If this is a management style, it is inspired by Lord of the Flies. If it isn’t one, it is simply neglect.

Diving into the Substance

Alright, enough about process - let’s talk about substance. There is a lot to like in this bill and a lot that I really worry about. I’m going to break these into the good, the bad and the ugly.

Read more

Since Moldova (and the EU) collectively exhaled following the victory of pro-EU parties in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, there’s one question I get more than any other, and it goes something like this “Moldova / Maia Sandu keep talking about joining the EU by 2030, do you think they really mean it?” or “that’s not realistic right?” or “what happens if reality doesn’t match this rhetoric?”

To be clear, these questions are not coming from Moldovans but from citizens of EU countries - some diplomats, some journalists, some analysts and some working for INGOs.

Since I get this question many times each week I thought it was time to share my thoughts here. This article is in the “Perspective” section and is therefore best understood as my opinion and analysis of the situation. I believe it is an informed one, but while I may characterize how different parties view the big questions at hand I want to stress that I’m sharing my analysis and not speaking for anyone else.

We’ll first look briefly at a recent letter from Chancellor Merz on a new enlargement mechanism and then dive into how these statements and approaches are driven by very different analysis of the current geopolitical situation.

Merz’s Letter

Last week German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a letter to EU leaders advocating for a new approach to EU enlargement with regard to Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans. The letter promptly leaked and brought the debate about EU enlargement into the foreground.

In his letter, Chancellor Merz calls EU enlargement a “geopolitical necessity” and starts from the premise that “We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union.” He writes that the process is much too long and that “I am convinced that we need a new dynamic for Ukraine as well as for the Western Balkans and Moldova.”

Justifying the need for a new dynamic he writes:

“It is obvious that we will not be able to complete the accession process shortly, given the countless hurdles as well as the political complexities of ratification processes in various Member States1. However, with a view to the peace process, we do not have time for further delays. It is now time to boldly move on with Ukraine’s EU integration through innovative solutions as immediate Steps forward.”

In reality, the letter argues for more of an EU-shuffle: some steps forward, a few steps sideways and some backwards. This comes in the form of a new idea called “associate membership” which Merz advocates for Ukraine. Here’s how it would look:

• Immediate opening of all negotiating clusters with Ukraine

• Participation in EU institutions as an observer without voting rights - including the European Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, etc.

• Full member state commitment to Article 42 security guarantees

• Step by step application of the EU Acquis and EU budget framework

• Snap back mechanism to withdraw privileges in case of backsliding

Chancellor Merz advocates for this political arrangement for 2 primary reasons:

1. Ease of implementation, he writes: “It would not require the ratification of the Accession Treaty according to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union nor any Treaty changes, but merely a strong political agreement.”

2. Wartime necessity, he writes that “It will help facilitate the ongoing peace talks as part of a negotiated peace solution.”

What About Moldova?

In this letter Moldova is vaguely lumped in with the other candidate countries, specifically those in the Western Balkans, with a promise for future work to accelerate the accession process. This would de facto separate Moldova and Ukraine by placing Moldova in the traditional slow-lane while creating a new kind of waiting room for Ukraine2.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy immediately rejected the formulation writing on X: “There can be no complete European project without Ukraine, and Ukraine’s place in the European Union must also be complete - full and equal.” He later sent a letter to EU leaders emphasizing that Ukraine is pushing forward on reforms and writing:

“We are defending ​Europe - fully, not partially, and not with half-measures,” (…) “It would be unfair for ​Ukraine to be present in the European Union but remain voiceless,”

Asked about Merz’s letter at the GLOBESEC Conference, President Sandu responded more cautiously saying:

“We see that this is a proposal and we are following the discussion. I am not against gradual integration as long as it does not substitute full membership. At the moment, the Republic of Moldova is following the process for full membership, and our commitment is to prepare the country by 2030. We are ready to discuss these ideas, but the ultimate goal is full membership. We hope that this proposal will not delay the process and will not substitute the concept of full membership,”

“Don’t rush” vs “What are we waiting for!?”

This letter is only the latest attempt by EU leaders to find some shortcut or geopolitical fudge to figure out how enlargement can work. It follows European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos’ recent “reverse enlargement” idea - basically Moldova and Ukraine join the EU now but gain both rights and responsibilities piecemeal as negotiations conclude and reforms are done. This formula is favored by Ukraine but was rejected by a number of member states.

That fact, as well as the plain language of Merz’s letter show us what the real problem is - some EU members are just not sure whether or not they want Moldova and Ukraine at all (not to mention the other candidates). Diplomatically this is usually hidden behind 3 official “concerns”

1. Security - how can Ukraine join the EU while at war? how can Moldova join without reintegrating Transnistria? etc.

2. Reforms - the process of joining the EU is really long! Moldova and Ukraine simply aren’t ready.

3. Viktor Orban - “we all want enlargement but Orban is blocking it” etc

It has become quite clear that these are just excuses. Not that the concerns aren’t real - but they aren’t the core problem. Chancellor Merz proposes Article 42 security guarantees without membership and before the war ends. Reverse enlargement takes care of worries about reforms not happening. Viktor Orban is gone.

Why are we stuck still? why are no negotiating clusters open?

Meanwhile, Moldova and Ukraine are barreling full speed towards 2030. Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration Cristina Gherasimov recently announced progress on clusters 4 & 5 in Brussels. Even while negotiations are not officially open, Moldova is working through the process with EU institutions unofficially. Both Moldova and Ukraine are very set on that 2030 timeline.

How can we understand these conflicting approaches?

Check Your Geopolitical Assumptions

Whenever I’m asked about Moldova’s 2030 target date it is usually by someone believes that it is unlikely to be met. They often voice one or all of those concerns listed above, or just vaguely allude the fact that “these things take time.” The idea behind the question is electoral politics in Moldova - basically, if Moldova does not join the EU by 2030 will people lose faith? can PAS or some other pro-EU government keep the candle of hope alive?3

I believe that Moldova’s focus on the 2030 target and political positioning around it are fundamentally based on a set of geopolitical assumptions. While Brussels views a technical process around enlargement, Chisinau is seeing a race against a deteriorating regional and global order. To be clear, this is my own articulation, but I think it encompasses the view from Moldova’s position on the map4:

1. When this war ends, there will be no small neutral nations on the periphery of the new Russian imperial project. The Kremlin has been absolutely clear, in word and deed, that it will not tolerate Ukraine or Moldova joining the European Union5. It has also been absolutely clear, in word and deed, that it does not recognize Ukraine’s right to exist and plans to reincorporate the territory into Russia. It is as clear that either Moldova would follow or be re-relegated to the status of a puppet state.

2. Europe’s security order is unraveling and EU membership is a security guarantee. NATO’s future is (at best) unclear6 and core assumptions about European security are fading or already gone. Iceland will soon hold a referendum on EU membership with the explicit goal of joining the European security bloc - an action that is driven by threats from the United States against Greenland. That a founding member of NATO should seek other security arrangements is its own tell.

3. The world security order is unraveling. The post-1945 liberal world order is crumbling. The United States, Russia and China are all acting like aggressive imperial powers7 and in mid-2026 the situation is getting worse by the month. The EU’s role in the world is as yet undefined.

4. The clock is ticking on the EU. The bloc’s current organization and self conception is not prepared for this new geopolitical reality. The US (mostly) isn’t hostile to Europe - it simply no longer cares8. The EU has been utterly unable to shape the (now non-existent) Ukraine peace process or to play any meaningful role in wars on its doorstep in Israel / Palestine, Lebanon or the Gulf. At the same time that European security is under serious pressure, AI and economic threats from China are looming as well9. Europe’s current configuration has been proven woefully inadequate for these challenges - even as these crises escalate.

These geopolitical assumptions are paired with a decision that has clearly been articulated by Moldova’s leadership - the country will not return to the Russian Empire under any circumstances. Given that imperative, and the fairly bleak picture painted above, Moldova is a small boat looking for safe harbor in a hurricane - and that harbor is the EU.

No Illusions About 2030

A close reading of the public statements put out by Moldova’s leadership - particularly those in English - makes it clear that they understand the challenge. In its current form with the current accession rules, 2030 is the longest of long shots. So why publicly promise that date to the electorate?

The underlying assumption is that the situation will change.

In effect, Moldova’s sprint to 2030 is a train racing down the tracks towards a canyon without a bridge. The hope is that the bridge is built when we get there.

Can the EU Change?

After I explain this logic to my questioner I usually ask them how their country’s leadership view’s the geopolitical landscape. What assumptions they are operating under and what the EU will be in 5 years. In many cases people shake their heads and say some version of “they just want things to go back to normal.”

That’s not going to happen, and while the last year has woken a lot of people up to that fact, many are resisting the clear implication - that Europe must change.

In her remarks in speeches around Europe President Sandu has been one of the voices seeking to shake other leaders awake so that they can respond to the threat. She has not been subtle and has clearly stated that if Moldova does not join the EU and people become disillusioned, then pro-Russian political forces could come to power. In 2010 that might have been a diplomatic inconvenience. In 2026 or 2030 that will mean a troop buildup and a new Kaliningrad in South East Europe.

This also underlies some of her rhetoric on union with Romania and she has clearly stated that this topic will need to be revisited after 2030 if EU accession stalls10.

The message is clear - Europe must now view the world as more than a common agriculture policy and rules about fishing rights. It needs to make geostrategic choices.

Four Freedoms

Europe primarily functions as a single market and this market is based on 4 freedoms: the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. The implementation of these freedoms has required an “ever closer union” - at least in some areas. These freedoms have so fully shaped the thinking of many politicians in Europe that EU enlargement is fully bound up in their implications.

But what about the other four freedoms?

In January 1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt gave his State of the Union address with an eye to preparing the American people for the coming war. He proposed 4 fundamental freedoms that belong to people "everywhere in the world," namely:

• Freedom of Speech

• Freedom of Worship

• Freedom from Want

• Freedom from Fear

These were meant as an articulation of the values of the United States and the democratic nations that would stand as a clear repudiation of the promises of fascism.

Some parts of Europe have taken these freedoms for granted under the benevolent military and diplomatic umbrella of the United States. Sitting in Moldova in 2026 the EU’s 4 freedoms are a promise of a more prosperous future. But the EU also represents FDR’s 4 freedoms against a power to the East that seeks very explicitly to repeal them all - "everywhere in the world."

I don’t know if Moldova will join the EU by 2030 as a full member, or whether one of the compromises and political fudges will find some way to bring in Moldova and Ukraine under another mechanism or name.

But I do think that a solution will be found. The European Union has always been a peace project that placed values at its core. As the Union faces colossal challenges it will face hard choices about how to protect those values in a changing world.

I have faith in the ability of people and institutions to change - particularly when there is little to no other choice.

9

For a deep dive into the whole topic I highly recommend this article:

Noahpinion

Europe is under siege

The map above is a depiction of The Deluge, a historical event in which the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth — which had been a major European power — was defeated and destroyed under the combined assaults of Russia and Sweden in the 1600s. After having its power broken, Poland was…

Read more

a year ago · 992 likes · 280 comments · Noah Smith

Each year Reporters Without Borders (RSF) publishes a global press freedom index that assesses nations on a 0 to 100 point scale - taking into account legal protections for journalists as well as other factors including intimidation and censorship. Countries are ranked and broadly grouped into 5 categories - “Good,” “Satisfactory,” “Problematic,” “Difficult” and “Very Serious.” The 2026 index is quite a warning - global press freedom is at a 25 year low. For the first time in the history of the index 50% of countries globally fall into the categories of “Difficult” or “Very Serious.”

In this time of retreat for freedom of speech and the press around the world, Moldova stands out as a rare good news story. The country climbed 4 places to rank at 31 globally. That puts Moldova as the only EU candidate country ranked as “Satisfactory” and the only country in the region with that rank - surpassing Ukraine (ranked 55), Romania (49), Bulgaria (71) and others.

The ranking puts Moldova in the middle of Europe and far ahead of the United States (64) which RSF notes is “experiencing a significant and prolonged decline in press freedom.”

Good Signals - But Still a Challenging Situation

In Moldova there is a sense of pride that the nation has managed to climb the ranking in a year that saw some of the most profound attacks on both the country’s information space and democracy as a whole. The fact that Moldova ranks higher than numerous EU member states and all EU candidates is rightly a point of pride and a real accomplishment in this context.

At the same time, Moldova’s independent press faces huge challenges. Marking the occasion ZdG writes:

“the free press operates in an increasingly complicated environment, marked by increasingly frequent misinformation, pressures, and limited resources”

These challenges - especially in the context of information warfare, were also highlighted by President Sandu’s statement on the day where she wrote:

“A democracy can endure only if there are courageous, fair, and dedicated journalists. On the occasion of International Press Freedom Day, I thank all media professionals in our country who, through their efforts, have contributed to strengthening resilience and defending democracy, in the face of unprecedented attacks on the Republic of Moldova’s right to decide its own future.

It is encouraging that the seriousness of our press is reflected in the evolution of the Press Freedom Index of the organization “Reporters Without Borders” (RSF), where our country has risen this year by four positions, reaching 31st place. We have thus achieved the best score among countries seeking accession to the European Union and are the only country in the region classified as “satisfactory.” However, there is still much work to be done, especially in countering increasingly sophisticated tools used to spread falsehoods and disinformation aimed at manipulating public opinion.

Freedom of expression cannot be equated with the freedom to spread lies, and protecting the truth remains a responsibility of society as a whole. To defend our values, it is essential to build strong cooperation between the press, institutions, and citizens—based on trust, mutual respect, and an unequivocal commitment to democracy and the common good.”

It is critical that Moldova’s free and independent press be strong enough to hold the government to account and to provide citizens with factual information in the context of Russia’s ongoing attacks on the country’s information space. Among the biggest challenges to this is what ZdG called “limited resources” - a turn of phrase that greatly understates the challenges that media organizations face.

In Moldova, the most sustainable independent media organizations rely on grants for around 70% of their operating budgets. Many smaller investigative or regional media outlets rely on grants for more than 97% of their budgets. The destruction of USAID and serious damage to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) by DOGE in the United States removed core institutional funders in this space. In 2025 the European Union as well as member states rushed to fill these funding gaps in the context of Moldova’s elections.

This very needed support only highlighted how fragile the finance of Moldova’s independent press is. With global crises popping up almost weekly, there is no certainty that 2026 will see the same level of support. Long term, media organizations know that funding of this kind will fall greatly when Moldova joins the European Union and no longer has access to funding from development partners in the same way. This year’s RSF Press Freedom Index was a great sign of Moldova’s progress, but serious challenges remain.

How You Can Help

In 2025 I co-founded a US NGO (501c3) called the Moldova Resilience Fund (MRF) as a way to support independent media and civil society organizations that support Moldova’s democratic resilience.

Since launching in November, MRF has raised $39,800 from 43 donors and distributed $11,500 in flexible grants to local organizations. You can read a report on our activities in the MRF Q1 update on our website here.

While MRF is a new organization with an all volunteer executive board, we have been busy meeting with media organizations and NGOs in Moldova to figure out how a small player like us can have the biggest impact. Members of our team have also been meeting in the United States with diaspora groups and individuals who care about Moldova’s democratic future to discuss ways that they can get involved. Based on these discussions, we’ll be announcing more of our 2026 programming soon - if you want to stay in the loop sign up for our mailing list here.

Right now, the Moldova Resilience Fund is the only tax-deductible 501c3 organization in the United States that raises money specifically to support local organization in Moldova that provide fact based coverage of important events, conduct investigations and otherwise support the country’s civil society in these challenging times. If you find this cause important - consider making a donation to the Moldova Resilience Fund here:

Make a donation to MRF today

For US citizens or residents donating to a 501c3 like MRF is often the most convienent way to support a cause you believe in. But giving directly to local organizations that you want to support is also a really good option. On the MRF website we’ve compiled a list of some of the independent media organizations that we feel have the highest impact because of their fearless coverage and detailed investigations. MRF subscribes to these organizations on Patreon and shares the list to encourage those who want to make a monthly small dollar donation to do so directly - you can view our list as well as links for how you can support them here.

Other Ways to Help MRF

The Moldova Resilience Fund is a startup - and we’re always looking for dedicated people with out-of-the-box ideas for how we can be more effective. MRF will expand our board this year and we’re specifically looking for people with US non-profit experience willing to provide strategic advice - and for people with a background in providing on-the-ground support for independent media organizations in places like Moldova.

If you have ideas, want to get involved or otherwise want to reach out - drop me an email here:

david@moldovaresilience.org

Final Thoughts on World Press Freedom Day

As I reflected on the RSF index and what World Press Freedom Day means in 2026, my mind was drawn to the cascade of bad news we are getting from a world that keeps slipping deeper into crisis. These are truly unprecedented times - wars are spreading at the same time as social media pumps disinformation into our national and international discourse. This disinformation fuels the profits of social media companies at the same time as legitimate advertisers pull their placements with independent media in favor of facebook, YouTube and Tiktok. This is a vicious cycle that starves the free press of resources at the same time as it fuels disinformation.

Against this backdrop, we are also contending with a new age of AI that promises to fundamentally disrupt how we interact with information - with both positive and negative effects.

The role of independent journalists doing public interest reporting and investigations has never been more important. I’m not the sort of person who romanticizes this work - and I know that far too many journalists are not reporting without fear or favor and are themselves driving agendas. But I also know that the hard work that goes into uncovering the truth in a complicated world has a profound positive impact on our democracies. In Moldova, there is a vibrant free press that has made a huge impact in a time of hybrid war and democratic backsliding globally.

So for me, today is a day to honor those who do the work - but also to support them.

Sincerely,

David Smith

It was recently announced that the Republic of Moldova is joining the “Coalition of the Willing” for Ukraine. This is a development worth explaining more clearly both in terms of what it means and why it is a smart decision for our country.

First, in simple terms: the “Coalition of the Willing” brings together states that aim to support Ukraine. Most are European either members of the European Union, such as France, Germany, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, or non-EU countries like Norway and the United Kingdom. Some are NATO members, others are not. The group also includes key global partners such as Canada, Australia, and Japan.

The shared objective is clear: to build security guarantees for Ukraine once peace is achieved, ensuring that the country does not find itself in the same situation again. Why does this matter for us, in the Republic of Moldova? For several very concrete reasons.

First, there is the geopolitical dimension. Europe is taking on an increasingly prominent role in Ukraine’s security, and key decisions are being shaped within flexible formats such as this one. By participating, Moldova is present at the table where the future of the region, our region, is being discussed. We gain access to information, coordination, and real conversations on security. It is the difference between observing developments from the outside and actively shaping them. I support the latter approach.

Second, the Republic of Moldova brings real value. Our military are highly trained in demining. In post-war Ukraine, demining will be one of the most pressing challenges. This is about saving lives, restoring normalcy, and enabling reconstruction. Moldova can make a direct contribution here. We are not only participating, we are helping in practical terms.

A third element relates to technology, particularly drones. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated their importance. Drones are used not only for security purposes but also for agriculture, monitoring, and civil response. Through cooperation, Moldova can learn quickly, adopt best practices, and develop its own capabilities. This translates into stronger protection and better preparedness for the future. For a small country, this is a smart direction.

Fourth, this is about sovereignty. The Republic of Moldova is acting in line with its own interests and strategic documents. It is building its security step by step and deepening cooperation with Ukraine from training to defence industry cooperation and intelligence exchange. This reflects a mature and planned approach. Neutral countries such as Ireland and Austria are pursuing similar paths.

Finally, there is an economic dimension. Ukraine’s security has a direct impact on regional stability. A stable Ukraine means fewer risks for the Republic of Moldova across the economy, investment climate, and infrastructure. Participation in such formats also supports diversification and strengthens our international positioning. It forms the basis of a responsible foreign policy, promoted by the Presidency.

The decision itself is sound. The natural next step is to ensure broader public understanding within the country. The discussion on concrete actions should be brought into Parliament. Members of Parliament need to be clearly informed about the action plan and the next steps. This strengthens transparency and limits space for misinterpretation or manipulation, which has already surfaced in public discourse. Just as Moldovan military professionally defuses dangerous explosives and contributes to peace, political leaders and responsible institutions are called upon to communicate clearly and engage all parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces in an open dialogue. This helps ensure that a beneficial decision for the country is properly understood by society.

The reasons are outlined above, but the broader point remains simple: the Republic of Moldova has chosen to be present where the region’s security is being discussed. It has chosen to contribute with what it does best, within its constitutional framework. That deserves to be explained more often.

Daniel Vodă is an Associated Senior Expert in foreign policy and strategic communication at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). He previously served as spokesperson for the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova.

Some of my thoughts and memories about Moldova’s April 2009 protests which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary elections.

I remember my lunch on April 5, 2009, because I never finished eating those crispy fried potatoes with pickled tomatoes. It was still Great Lent, ahead of Orthodox Easter on April 19th, during which my family observed a strict 49-day diet that excluded meat, dairy, and fish.

“Who did you vote for?” my mother asked.

To this day, after voting in four Moldovan and two Romanian elections, I have never had my family ask me that question. It has never quite been a topic of conversation in our family, not because it is a secret, but because there is a degree of trust in each other’s judgment. Election day has always been a huge event for my family. My mom has been a poll watcher for over a decade, likely since the 2011 local elections. I recall getting back from summer camp during the coldest rainstorm of June, waiting to see her because it was my first time away from home. She was running the mobile ballot box and stopped by for five minutes to hug me when she happened to be in the neighborhood. Equally, during the electoral season, we always gathered in front of the TV to watch the debates and interviews. As I grew up, I became increasingly impatient to vote. When I was 16, my Facebook post urging people to vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections went viral, with a few media outlets sharing it. I exercised my right to vote for the first time just hours before boarding my one-way flight to Canada, during the 2020 presidential election. But to this day, I can’t forget that bitter feeling, paralyzing my mouth, and the pit in my stomach, growing slowly as I lay there trying to sleep, while the TV was playing in the background, showing the election results.

“Why does it matter?” asked my grandmother.

My grandmother was born in the middle of World War II, when Moldova was already bleeding red. She would rarely talk about the Soviet Union, even when I asked her to. She spoke about the kolkhoz and the early-morning harvesting of tobacco leaves, the boarding school where she worked as a custodian and overnight guardian, and her unhappy marriage that left her grey-haired at 30.

My grandmother did not look up as my mother started scolding her. Whenever difficult conversations arose, she would stare into the distance, and after a while grow prickly, taking umbrage at every little thing. My mother, on the other hand, leaves the room when a conversation gets heated, to avoid saying something she might later regret. I found her on the stairs leading to our terrace, which opens onto the main street of our village. You could see anyone passing by, but also the grand forest unraveling across the long, stretching hills. I sat next to her for a while without saying anything. I was not angry at my grandmother, but I could understand my parents’ frustration.

The aftermath of those elections saw the most violent protests in Moldova’s history since gaining its independence. Like most of the countries in the Soviet Union, Moldova gained its independence without bloodshed. Between 1991 and 2009, it was only the casualties during the war in Transnistria in 1992 that represented a dark page in the country’s history.

The next day, there was fire on the TV. I remember seeing young faces and the police with their tall riot shields and nightsticks. To this day, I can’t quite stand the view of a cylindrical baton despite its purpose. I remember the fire. On the stairs of the Parliament Building and inside the Presidential Palace.

It all happened very quickly or, perhaps, incredibly slowly. Or maybe, all at once? After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic states moved swiftly to rebuild their political and economic systems through lustration and shock therapy, overhauling everything at once rather than pursuing gradual reform. Moldova, like many other former Soviet republics, opted for a more gradual approach. That was mainly because the political system was largely inherited by the Old Guard, who clung to power. The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), led by Vladimir Voronin, was one such example.

I thought about this as I was writing the date in my notebook at the beginning of my Post-Communist Transformations class. Coincidence or not, on April 7th, we covered the Color Revolutions and transitional justice. One of the assigned readings states that, in Moldova, “the ten years that politicians spent debating lustration, starting in 2000, allowed the communist elite to retain and convert its economic and political clout” (Vacroux 2018, 357). And memories started playing out before my eyes, moving through time, bringing me back to our black, box-shaped TV bought in 1996. I was 6 in April of 2009. But there is something about seeing a revolution for the first time that makes the memory untouchable. There is something about your parents’ fury and the red segment growing on the screen longer and longer as the Communist Party gains more and more votes.

PCRM had been in power since 2001. Moldova followed the pattern of a post-communist comeback, in which the old regime returned in the second or third election after independence, despite the initial victory of non-communist candidates. This has been the case in many former communist countries, such as Hungary, where the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), led by József Antall, won the 1990 election. Still, four years later, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the successor to the former ruling communist party, won an absolute majority, securing 209 of 386 seats. In 2001, PCRM secured 71 out of 101 seats in the Parliament. At that time, Moldova was a parliamentary republic in which the legislature elected the head of state. PCRM, holding the parliamentary majority, thus unilaterally elected Voronin as the president.

Communists maintained power in the 2005 elections as well, winning 45.98% of the vote and 56 seats. However, they fell short of the 61-seat supermajority required to elect the president on their own. Voronin was re-elected with the support of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD), which had been one of his more vocal opponents, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), and the Social-Liberal Party (PSL). And on the night of April 5th to 6th of 2009, we went to bed knowing that the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) had counted enough votes to declare PCRM’s victory.

But the next morning, after CEC processed 96.51% of the tally sheets from polling stations, PCRM emerged with 49.94% of the vote and 60 seats, and young protesters began gathering in the Great National Assembly Square (Piața Marii Adunări Naționale), claiming the election was rigged and demanding a rerun.

The independent Moldovan newspaper Ziarul de Gardă reports that the message communicated online to bring people together was: “Young people declare April 7th a day of national mourning in the Republic of Moldova.” The political opposition also amplified this message, calling for a boycott of the election.

The protests started peacefully, with participants holding signs reading “Better dead than communist”, “Wake up, drugged homeland”, “No to election fraud”, “Down with the communist clan”. Thus, in the afternoon of April 7th, the central Chișinău saw at least 30,000 protesters rallying against the election results. As the day turned to evening, the protest grew increasingly violent.

The protesters first started throwing stones into the Parliamentary and Presidential buildings, which later escalated into full-scale fire as they stormed the buildings. Moldova’s PROTV’s coverage wrote about Voronin’s portraits being set on fire while the protesters chanted “Fight, Resist, I am anti-communist!”

While the protests turned violent with the destruction of state property, a young student, Dragoș Musteață, hoisted the European Union and Romanian flags on the Parliamentary and Presidential buildings. Later, he’d recall his act as one through which he wanted to signal that the buildings “belonged” to a European future rather than the communist regime, theoretically removing the incentive for protesters to vandalize them. The protests saw the Romanian (and EU) flags with a frequency perhaps last seen in the late 89s to early 90s, when the pan-Romanian movement gained incredible momentum.

In the evening, the Moldovan police fired rubber bullets at demonstrators in the Square to disperse them, also deploying tear gas and water cannons. Many protesters were also severely beaten by police. This escalated into intense altercations between police and protesters, with at least 193 demonstrators, mainly students, being detained. Seventeen years later, Marian Macovei, who was 32 at the time and ended up physically paralyzed in the following years as a result of the police brutality, would recall the basement of the Buiucani Police Station, where he was taken, as the “corridors of death.” Many of those detained suffered violent mistreatment while in police custody.

At the same time, the PCRM was busy pointing fingers at the political opposition, accusing the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Our Moldova Alliance of organizing a “coup “ that formed a human shield of students, high school students, and pupils, whom they instigated to come to the square. But the blame did not stop at the Prut, as the Moldovan communists also accused Bucharest of attempted coup d’état, given the omnipresence of Romanian symbols during the protests. While the unionist movement that sought to merge Moldova and Romania together never quite disappeared, it most certainly weakened in the late 90s. The sudden resurgence of unionist sentiment added another pressure point for the communist regime. The communists moved swiftly: the Romanian Ambassador to Moldova, Filip Teodorescu, and counselor Ioan Gaborean were expelled, visas were reinstated for Romanian citizens, and Romanian journalists were denied entry into Moldova.

On the other hand, Voronin immediately called Moscow, which in turn called on the European Union and Romania to intervene and prevent what he described as threats to Moldova’s sovereignty. For Lavrov, who even 17 years ago was still Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Romanian flags and Romanian slogans were being used as a “cover” to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty.

What happened to the political opposition that called Moldovans to take to the streets while comfortably shielded in their own residences? Vlad Filat, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), served as the Prime Minister from 2009 to 2013, and was sentenced to 9 years in prison in 2016 for passive corruption. Nevertheless, Filat was released at the end of 2019 through a compensatory appeal, which was implemented to address human rights violations within the prison system. At the end of 2025, Filat was placed on an international wanted list following a French court’s money laundering conviction.

Another opposition figure was Mihai Ghimpu, leader of the Liberal Party (PL), who served as acting President of Moldova and President of the Parliament for a year after the protests. I grew up knowing Ghimpu as the most vocal supporter of reunification with Romania, but also as the uncle of Chișinău’s mayor at the time, Dorin Chirtoacă. Chirtoacă took over the PL’s leadership at the end of 2018; however, the PL never returned to Parliament after the 2019 elections.

Serafim Urecheanu is a name I have not heard in a long time, but in 2009, he led Our Moldova Alliance, which, a few years later, merged with Filat’s PLDM. At last, he pretty much vanished from Moldova’s political landscape. Marian Lupu is a name one won’t hear often these days, but back in 2005, he was elected as the President of the Parliament as a PCRM member. After calling the April protests “an attempted coup d’état” organized by the political opposition, Lupu became part of it, serving as Moldova’s interim president from 2010 to 2012. Today, Lupu is remembered mostly for his ties to Moldova’s oligarch, Vlad Plahotniuc, who chaired PDM for three years before fleeing Moldova in 2019.

These figures greatly benefited from the protests, gaining general support. For that time, they felt like a breath of fresh air, and that’s why young Moldovans took it to the Assembly Square. They successfully marketed themselves as the carriers of the “European dream” by positioning themselves against the outdated, intransigent, and, ultimately, morally corrupt communists. Perhaps their perceived legitimacy rested solely on this contrast because, after the protests were cracked down on and the CEC confirmed PCRM’s victory once again, Moldova entered a deep political crisis of polarization, leaving the country without a president for almost 3 years. Because the head of state required a 61-seat supermajority that the PCRM lacked, the Parliament was so divided that it failed to cooperate on electing a president.

Certainly, the stakes were incredibly high in the past two elections, in 2024 and 2025. However, looking back, I can’t quite think of an election that has marked Moldova more than April 2009. This is the closest Moldova came to a revolution. Some call the protests the Twitter Revolution because the protesters mobilized online, but also because it was a youth movement, and Twitter at the time stood for youthful innovation and breakthroughs, which the Moldovan opposition wanted to be associated with.

Yet the Twitter Revolution, if you will, is not regarded in Western scholarship as part of the chain of revolutions in former communist states, starting with Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 and continuing with the Orange Revolution and later the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. If one insists on a narrow theoretical framework in which the label of “revolution” is granted only where there is some degree of continuity, Moldova’s April protests are not even considered part of the club of attempted revolutions that Azerbaijan (2005), Belarus (2006), and Russia (2011-12) share. I do find this omission significant because the protests’ organization, intentions, and consequences closely resemble those of a revolution. A revolution is typically led by a counter-elite, with high mass participation, occurring bottom-up, aiming at the fundamental transformation of the political class and the socio-economic system, and resulting in a new political class, new institutions, and new property relations (Lane 2009).

But I do not think the events of April 2009 represent a turning point in Moldova’s consciousness merely because they loosely fit the scholarly definition of revolution.

April 2009 was of paramount importance because it showed, and continues to show, that Moldova has not done its work on the transitional justice chapter. It is important to return to the fact that people mobilized following the alleged victory of the communists, a party that stands for so much suffering inflicted on Moldova. A party that brought not only a painful geopolitical rupture embodied by the USSR’s annexation of Moldova from Romania, but also a fracture in Moldova’s identity that remains difficult to reckon with. The Moldovan educational system is exceptional in the weight it places on the study of history, with particular attention to the Soviet Union and the damage it caused to Moldova through the Stalinist deportations, during which so many Romanian-Bessarabian families were callously persecuted and murdered, the demographic engineering, collectivization, and rapid industrialization, all of which have left deep legacies on the Moldova we live in today. And yes, victims of the communist regime are mourned and remembered. But transitional justice is two-dimensional: for it to be effective, perpetrators must also be punished and denounced. Today, this remains a difficult thing to do, mostly because a lot of time has passed.

Yet politicians proudly continue their careers wielding Soviet symbols, like the red star of the PSRM and the hammer and sickle of the PCRM. Moreover, they actively court Russia’s president, who, besides all the war crimes he is committing in Ukraine, wholeheartedly believes the dissolution of the USSR “was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

I think April 2009 marks the apogee of a contradiction in Moldovan national identity, which sought to resolve itself through the removal of the Communist Party. What complicates its aftermath is not the failure to achieve that aim, but the absence of meaningful and sustained reckoning with the violence and brutality of the protests. This left intact the same dynamic of the early post-communist years: victims are remembered, but few are held accountable. That unaddressed gap, I believe, is one of the many fault lines that run through Moldova’s identity. The first step to shrink this gap would be to fully declassify the files related to the April 2009 protests and continue the investigations into the gross human rights violations that occurred.

While the most immediate consequence of failing to deliver justice is the complete alienation of firsthand victims, the longer-term risk of leaving such trauma unaddressed is its diffusion into the broader public consciousness, which will fossilize over time into a collective victim mentality. A victim mentality at the national level manifests as learned helplessness, in which suffering becomes so central to a country’s self-understanding that it displaces agency. It is the difference between a nation that says “this was done to us” and one that also asks “what do we do about it.” Moldova has an abundance of the former and a deficit of the latter. Decades of deportations, forced collectivization, linguistic suppression, and political pressure by the Soviet Union and, later, Russia, have given Moldovans every reason to see themselves as a people acted upon rather than acting.

April has always been a particularly strange month for me. Running on cereals and bread during the last weeks of Great Lent, pruning the grapevines in our vineyard, planting potatoes and onions and garlic and everything else I can’t think of but that surely grows in my parents’ garden, and covering the tree trunks with slacked lime… And hoping, so desperately hoping, that the temperature will not drop overnight so the blossoming trees and the plants don’t freeze… And the air, saturated with pollen, grows stifling, the church bells ring and ring, and the swallows begin building their nests under the eaves of our house…

One of my favorite poems is T.S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” which opens with the line “April is the cruelest month.” Eliot’s wasteland is built on the ruins of World War I, where the cruelties of war emerge from the “forgetful snow” as it melts with the arrival of spring. The poem paints a blurry picture of loss, distortion, and disorientation: the tragedy has already occurred, yet the visceral, restless imagery conveys a sense of looming threat, as if the worst is still somehow ahead. I wonder whether we do something similar with April 2009 every time we return to it… whether memory, revisited enough times, becomes its own distortion. So much has happened in between, events that have reshaped how Moldovans see themselves and the world around them. But that feeling of something unresolved keeps haunting us, and maybe it grows a little stronger in April.

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On 7 April 2009, in the Republic of Moldova, one could see perhaps for the first time so clearly the rupture between society’s democratic instinct and the reflexes of a system that had failed to understand that history had already moved in a different direction.

For many citizens, especially young people, that moment was one of political and moral awakening. It marked the emergence of a generation that no longer accepted fear, lies, or geopolitical captivity. In essence, it was a pro-European revolution, captured in a slogan well known across Europe: “Refuse! Resist! I am anti-communist.”

But it was also a stolen revolution. Not because the European idea disappeared - on the contrary, it endured and grew stronger. It was “stolen” because the energy of that moment was not translated quickly enough into a strategic reconstruction of the state.

We experienced alternations of power, grand speeches, and historic promises, but delayed the difficult decisions for too long: cleansing institutions, breaking away from toxic dependencies, exiting geopolitical ambiguity, addressing the banking fraud, and dismantling a captured state.

This is why, following last year’s decisive parliamentary elections, the year 2028 is no longer seen merely as a technical milestone in the EU negotiation calendar. It is a test of maturity and social cohesion.

The President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, put it simply and clearly: foreign policy rests on three pillars: values, interests, and power. For the Republic of Moldova, this formula says a great deal.

We clearly have values and interests. Our values are freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human dignity. Our interests are peace, security, development, and accession to a space of prosperity governed by rules.

Power, in the hard sense of the word, is usually the privilege of larger actors. But this is precisely where the intelligence of a small state begins: the ability to turn cooperation into influence and diplomacy into relevance.

In this context, the recent vote by 60 Members of Parliament to withdraw from the core agreements of the CIS is a delayed but necessary strategic correction.

It is evident that we are not losing jobs by leaving the CIS. Moldova’s economy is already integrated with the European Union. Trade data shows that the EU is by far Moldova’s main trading partner: in 2025, around 67% of Moldovan exports went to the EU market, compared to just 4.5% to the CIS, of which only 1.5% went to Russia.

We are not losing markets. A healthy economy exports where there are rules, predictability, and respect for contracts. The wine and fruit embargoes, energy blackmail, and the use of trade as a political weapon have demonstrated the opposite.

Membership in the CIS has not protected us from Russian pressure, from ongoing cognitive warfare, from the instrumentalisation of Transnistria or Gagauzia against Chișinău, from attempts to polarize society along linguistic, identity, or religious lines, or from persistent attacks on our security.

Cooperation with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and others can continue bilaterally, pragmatically, based on mutual interest.

Georgia left the CIS in 2009 after the 2008 Russian invasion. Ukraine has drastically reduced its participation and has repeatedly withdrawn from agreements following Russia’s aggression, which began in 2014 and escalated with the full-scale invasion.

Why now? Because the economic, institutional, and political future of the Republic of Moldova lies where investments, development funds, credible standards, and reliable markets are—and that is in the European Union.

The EU Growth Plan for Moldova, worth up to €1.9 billion for 2025–2027, is concrete proof that Europe is investing in our transformation. In March 2026, Chișinău received a second tranche following the implementation of a new package of reforms.

This is the key point: the European Union offers the opportunity, but it is Moldova’s mission to turn it into reality.

The EU is more than economic benefits. It is a community of values - freedom, democracy, the rule of law.

This is why the 2028 deadline must be respected. Beyond political slogans, it represents a historic window of opportunity. Analyses by the European Initiative clearly indicate that 2028 is seen as the target year for signing the accession treaty, allowing ratification to follow within a realistic timeframe up to 2030.

Public support confirms this trajectory: a recent ATES poll shows that 62.1% of respondents in Moldova would vote for EU accession, rising to 84.3% among the diaspora.

The window of EU accession also points towards Romania. A recent statement from Bucharest by Romania’s President, Nicușor Dan, that Romania will continue to support Moldova’s EU integration and “the integration of our two economies” signals a shift in paradigm—from political support to real economic integration.

This means infrastructure interconnection, cross-border investments, energy cooperation, logistics, companies, joint projects, and tangible improvements in everyday life. Moldova thus becomes not just a subject of solidarity for Romania, but a strategic constant on both the public and private agenda.

Recent crises confirm this direction. Russia is well aware of Moldova’s vulnerabilities and exploits them, including through attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure that indirectly target our country.

Following strikes at the end of March, authorities in Chișinău warned of serious risks to energy stability, with Energocom managing a deficit of around a quarter of daily consumption.

This situation was overcome thanks to partners from Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland - four of which are EU Member States.

The direction is clear: interconnection with Romania, coordination with Ukraine, access to the European market, diversification, local sources, and renewable energy development.

Renewable energy usage in Moldova has experienced rapid growth, with installed capacity increasing 12-fold over the last five years, with an impressive 1 gigawatt registered in April. This is the path towards genuine energy security and beating already in 2025 Moldova’s own target of 25% renewable usage ahead of the 2027 deadline.

On the Nistru River, the lesson is equally clear. Contamination following Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure triggered an environmental alert across the basin.

Parliament explicitly condemned Russia, the Government activated emergency mechanisms including European ones available to candidate countries and institutions continue to document damages.

Here, Moldova’s diplomacy has a major mission: to transform an ecological crisis into a solid case of international accountability for transboundary damage.

In other words, diplomacy means linking our crises to European and international mechanisms of support, explaining why Moldova’s security is part of Europe’s security, and turning vulnerability into legitimacy and cooperation into results.

For a small country, smart diplomacy is one of the few forms of power available.

This is why 7 April 2009 must be read today not only as memory, but as a warning. A generation took to the streets then for a different future.

It would be unjust - and strategically irresponsible - to miss this moment again. Leaving the CIS alone will not solve everything. Nor can EU support replace our own internal effort.

But together, these developments show that Moldova has finally begun to align its compass in the right direction.

The slogan of the 7 April generation can now be updated:
“Refuse! Resist! I am a convinced pro-European.”

2028 is our obligation to those who believed in freedom on 7 April, to those who want security, jobs, clean water, stable energy, and institutions that respect them.

It is a national effort in which everyone must be called upon to contribute - so that, this time, we succeed together.

Daniel Vodă is an Associated Expert in Foreign Policy and Strategic Communication at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). Between 2020 and 2025, he served as Spokesperson for the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.

Most of the following newsletters are on Substack but not all.

Days Until the Hungarian Elections

Journalists Veronika Munk and Zoltán Szalay write this excellent newsletter counting down to Hungary’s April 12 parliamentary elections. Europe is holding its collective breath as Viktor Orban’s Fidesz faces opposition challenger Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party. This vote has the potential to shape issues related to Moldova and Ukraine’s EU accession as well as the geopolitical direction of the bloc as a whole. Munk and Szalay take you through the twists and turns of the extremely dirty campaign, highlighting Russian hybrid attacks and the increasing number of threats against journalists in Hungary.

Following the elections the newsletter will continue following government formation and covering the country’s major news developments.

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The Power Vertical (Newsletter / Podcast)

Brian Whitmore’s Power Vertical Podcast is one of the original great podcasts looking at Russia and its role in the former Soviet space. I was thrilled to join Brian as a guest in an episode right before Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections to discuss Russia’s hybrid attacks and election interference. Now the Power Vertical is on Substack as well, where you can get episodes and follow updates from the Power Vertical team.

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Ukraine’s Arms Monitor

Written by Olena Kryzhanivska, a Ukrainian defense analyst based in Canada, Ukraine’s Arms Monitor is a go-to resource for tracking military developments in the war in Ukraine. It combines detailed reporting on weapons and technology with sharp analysis of how the conflict is driving rapid innovation - particularly in areas like drone warfare. As Ukraine and Russia adapt in real time, this newsletter offers one of the clearest windows into how modern warfare is evolving.

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Goulash (VSquare)

Goulash is a newsletter from VSquare, an investigative journalism network focused on Central and Eastern Europe. It combines investigative reporting with sharp regional analysis - with a particular strength on Hungary and its wider influence.

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The Eastern Flank

Journalist Michał Kranz publishes this weekly newsletter focused on the top stories in Eastern Europe - which he defines as “all the countries east of Germany, Austria, and Italy, north of Greece and Turkey, and west of Russia, as well as Georgia and Armenia in the South Caucasus.” His newsletter is great for keeping up with the region, but I tune in for his analysis of how Eastern Europe impacts, and is impacted by, wider geopolitical events around the world.

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The Baltic Flank

While we’re on the topic of flanks - I recently discovered the Baltic Flank and have no idea how I missed it before. Written by investigative journalist Holger Roonemaa, the newsletter focuses on European security issues as well as Russia’s hybrid war against the West. While it casts a wide net, the main lens for the reporting and analysis is a focus on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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PolandWatch

Written by veteran journalist Stuart Dowell, PolandWatch is both a deep dive into Poland’s internal politics, and an analysis of its place in the wider region. The country’s complex political dynamics have foreshadowed many broader trends in European politics - including populism, democratic backsliding, migration challenges and more. It has also shown how a country can come back from the brink. PolandWatch is great for following these wider trends as they play out in the Polish and regional context.

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Brief Eastern Europe

Brief Eastern Europe is a regional newsletter covering politics and society across Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on connecting developments across countries. It’s part of the New Eastern Europe family which also has an excellent podcast called “Talk Eastern Europe.” Their newsletter is a great way to track the main stories around the region and also get solid opinion and analysis of key events.

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Balkan Brew

Journalists Rodolfo Toè and Tommaso Siviero write this excellent weekly newsletter looking around the Balkans and picking out some of the most interesting and impactful stories in the region. If you’re like me, the Western Balkans especially can feel hard to get a handle on politically. Balkan Brew helps me catch the most important stories and (often) notice how many countries are facing challenges similar to those we are seeing in Moldova.

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how we cee it

That’s CEE = Central and Eastern Europe. Journalist Tomas Hrivnak covers a range of stories in business, tech, and security facing the region. I’ve recently enjoyed a number of stories looking at defense sector investments and how regional security is being impacted by the war in Iran.

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Did I Miss Something?

If you’ve got some newsletters that help you make sense of the region that didn’t make my list - share them in the comments!

On March 27, 1918, Bessarabia, a former Tsarist province dating back to 1812, when the Principality of Moldavia was divided in two, united with the Kingdom of Romania. Bessarabia, unlike modern Moldova, had clear cut natural borders, stretching from the Prut River in the West and the Dniester River in the East, Habsburg Bukovina in the north and the Danube mouth, and Black Sea in the south.

The decision was made by Sfatul Țării, the local parliament, a quasi-representative body like many others in the national peripheries of the former Tsarist Empire. In the later parts of WWI, similar indirectly representative bodies were created at a time where war prevented direct elections. Such parliaments decided the fates of other provinces and fragments of empire - creating national states (e.g. Poland and Estonia), or recreating lost independent states out of pieces of the Russian Empire (e.g. Lithuania).

This is to say Sfatul Țării was broadly representative and held democratic legitimacy according to the standards of the time. Moreover, it had legitimacy to decide the future of the province. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and other Russian political parties as well as the province’s main ethnic groups were represented. They all recognized the Sfatul Țării as the supreme and legitimate institution of the province.

Since then, the legitimacy of Sfatul Țării’s vote on March 27, 1918 has often been questioned or contested with the argument that the Romanian Army controlled the province since mid January 1918. At that time, the Sfatul Țării had requested Romanian support in a situation of deteriorating security and rampant violence. Much of this was driven by the disintegration of the Russian Army on the Romanian front and the transformation of these units into Bolshevik raiding parties in the chaotic context of the Russian civil war.

With this background, on the historical day of March 27, 19181, 3 members of the Sfatul Țării voted against the Union with Romania and 36 abstained. Only 86 voted for, while 12 were declared absentees.

The divided vote speaks to the fact there was some room for freedom of the ballot. In one example, Ștefan Balamez, a Ukrainian who was one of the three voting against the Union, worked in the interwar period in various capacities in the Chișinău City Hall. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1940 in the aftermath of the Red Army’s occupation of Bessarabia and sent to Siberia where he died in 1942. This demonstrates not only was there freedom of the vote, but that it did not clearly map onto what we might now call pro-Romanian or pro-Russian lines.

The vote was contested mainly by the Bolsheviks, but also by the former Tsarist political class. These forces, though irreconcilable enemies on the battlefield across all of the collapsing Russian Empire, allied in a common front during the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920).

The Ukrainian political elites of all ideological stripes also vehemently contested the Union of Bessarabia with Romania as the province was perceived as part of ethnic Ukrainian lands2. This is in spite of all credible statistics (including Tsarist ones), showing that Ukrainians only made up around one quarter of the total population. Meanwhile, the Romanian-speaking populations3 made up around 50-60% of the province’s residents4.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania came as a surprise to the residents of the other regions on the right bank of the Prut river that make up modern-day Romania. Bessarabia did not have a privileged place in the Romanian discourse before 1914. Transylvania was the most coveted Romanian speaking territory due to many factors, one of them being the level of national consciousness among Romanians in the region. There were also major political differences. The Bessarabian peasants were more preoccupied with the land reform than with any nation-building agenda, and Romania as a Kingdom was perceived as a harbinger of landlords’ interests. Furthermore, the King, even though he converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy, was suspected of not being of their own faith.

The drive to unite Bessarabia with Western Moldavia (from which it was detached by the Russian Empire in 1812) and thus the Kingdom of Romania was driven by both internal and external factors. Even though Sfatul Țării was legitimate, it did not have resources and organizational capabilities to impose its authority outside the capital - and it sometimes struggled to control the capital itself. This was largely due to Bolshevik raiders and political fanatics sent from Odessa to spread propaganda and sow anarchy. This type of violent and chaotic situation was engulfing much of the collapsing Russian Empire as the Bolsheviks sought power at any cost.

Paradoxically, in this late stage of WWI, the sworn enemies in the Entente Powers and Central Powers managed to agree on this union. France, Great Britain and Germany all, for various reasons, recognized (or tolerated) the decision of Sfatul Țării of March 27, 1918. The United States neither endorsed nor opposed but chose to closely observe the process.

Within Bessarabia a sense of national identity had been growing - but with serious contradictions. Soldiers and elites serving on various fronts during the war had come to understand that they were linguistically the same as their brethren West of Prut River. At the same time, Bessarabia remained deeply Russified and even during the Sfatul Țării’s meeting of March 27th 1918 most of the discussions took place in Russian. This was because it remained the language of their education and most knew Romanian only at the vernacular level.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania made the century long process of Russification of the Moldavians of Bessarabia reversible. In the interwar period, they enjoyed full national rights and schools in Romanian with Latin alphabet. Rights were granted to minorities as well, including to education in other languages. In the economic sphere, in the south, sometimes the minorities (Bulgarians) enjoyed privileges in detriment to the local Romanian speaking population, such as fishing rights in the Prut valley.

The interwar gave a fresh life to Romanian language and culture and made speaking Romanian more and more prestigious and respectful. In Bessarabia, it was no longer simply a tolerated language that was limited in the public space. The language was lively and loved by the Moldavians / Bessarabians across ethnic groups, including by the Gagauz. The latter were – in contrast to the Soviet period – one of the most integrated ethnic groups in the Romanian cultural and linguistic milieu. They were also one of the most loyal ethnic groups to the Romanian state as they were not attracted by Bolshevik ideology and propaganda before, during or after the Tatarbunar insurrection of 1924 - the peak of Soviet hybrid war against interwar Romania.

Being part of Romania between 1918-1940 spared tens of thousands of lives that otherwise would have become victims of Soviet state terror - as happened in other parts of the USSR. This included the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), created on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924. This region served a similar role to modern day Transnistria, allowing the new Russia to maintain a claim on Bessarabia until they could come back in force.

In the MASSR alone, about 40,000 persons of all ages and ethnic backgrounds died during the Holodomor of 1932-1933, and about 5,000 were executed by death squads during the Great Terror of 1937-8. Tens of thousands more were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Life in interwar Romania was not paradise on earth either, it was the era of extremes all over Europe, but Romania did not practice state terror on the scale seen in the Soviet Union.

Note: Romania bears responsibility for its role in the Holocaust during World War II. Under the Antonescu regime, hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Transnistria, often in coordination with Nazi Germany. Among the victims were many Jews who were educated in, and closely connected to, Romanian language and culture.

A number of survivors later played a role in preserving elements of Romanian literary and cultural life in Soviet Moldavia after 1944. Their contributions formed part of a broader, complex process through which Romanian cultural identity persisted despite sustained pressures of Russification in the Soviet period.

Looking at 1918 Through a Modern Lens

The events of 1918 remain highly relevant in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. For some, the parallels appear striking: a moment of regional instability, uncertainty about borders, and the question of how small states can secure their future. In this view, unification with Romania is sometimes presented as a potential safeguard against renewed Russian aggression.

At the same time, the differences between 1918 and today are profound. The Union of Bessarabia with Romania was decided in the context of collapsing empires, limited state capacity, and a very different international system. Any comparable decision today would have to follow true democratic procedures, reflect the will of the population, and take place within a complex European and international legal framework.

In this context, occasional political statements in favor of unification - such as the expressions of personal support by President Sandu for a hypothetical referendum - should not be understood as signaling an imminent or likely political project. Public discourse on Union often operates at the level of identity and historical memory rather than concrete policy. In practice, there is limited political momentum for unification in either Chișinău or Bucharest.

Moreover, the regional security environment, while unstable, does not necessarily make Union more feasible. On the contrary, a deterioration of the security situation - such as a further Russian advance in southern Ukraine - would introduce significant risks and uncertainties. In such a scenario, Romania and its allies would likely prioritize stability and deterrence over undertaking a complex and potentially destabilizing political integration.

A more immediate and tangible challenge remains the unresolved status of the Left Bank, or Transnistria. As in the early 1990s, this issue is both a domestic and a regional security problem, now with broader European implications. Any sustainable solution would require the withdrawal of Russian forces and the demilitarization of the region, followed by a cautious and gradual reintegration process that does not undermine Moldova’s internal political balance or its European trajectory.

In this sense, while the legacy of 1918 continues to shape political imagination and identity, its direct replication under current conditions appears unlikely. The questions facing Moldova today are less about territorial reconfiguration and more about security, governance, and integration within the European framework - challenges that differ fundamentally from those of 1918.

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The Baltic Formula

In 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte sat down to redraw the map of France. He replaced a chaotic patchwork of feudal provinces with a clean grid of departments and prefectures, designed so that any citizen could reach the administrative centre within a day’s ride on horseback. Two hundred and twenty-six years later, long after the horses retired and the Emperor met his Waterloo, the French state still breathes through that same Napoleonic design.

The lesson for Chișinău is as clear as it is uncomfortable: administrative reforms are not policy tweaks. They are state architecture. Get them right, and they last for centuries. Get them wrong, and you live with the consequences just as long.

The current PAS government deserves real credit for touching this third rail of Moldovan politics. For decades, successive governments have stared at Moldova’s map, a bloated, Soviet-era patchwork of 898 tiny primării (city / town halls) and 32 redundant rayons (counties), and blinked. To propose consolidation in a country where “local identity” is often a polite euphemism for “local patronage” takes genuine political courage.

But courage is wasted if it is spent on half-measures. The reform currently under discussion, reducing the number of primării to around 300 and rayons to roughly 10, is a step forward, but a hesitant one. It risks falling into what might be called the Latvian trap: paying the political price of reform without actually solving the problem.

The Cost of Hesitation

Latvia has already run this experiment. In 2009, it reduced its 548 municipalities to 119. At the time, this was seen as bold. In reality, it was a compromise designed to soften local resistance. Within a decade, it became clear that many municipalities were still too small to function effectively. In 2021, Latvia had to go through the entire process again, reducing the number to 43. The lesson is simple: reform done halfway is reform done twice.

Moldova cannot afford that luxury. It is already sleepwalking into a demographic wall. Many rayons have lost over 40% of their population since independence. In places like Nisporeni, the state has quietly become the employer of last resort. Around 35% of the workforce are bugetari (state employees), outnumbering those in agriculture by a factor of three and industry by a factor of four.

This is not a development model. It is an expensive, fragmented waiting room for emigration.

The Baltic Formula

Moldova often speaks of the Baltic states as a North Star. But when it comes to the plumbing of the state, it prefers its own broken pipes. The Baltic formula is disarmingly simple: scale creates capacity.

Lithuania operates with just 60 municipalities for 2.8 million people. Latvia now has 43 for 1.9 million. Estonia runs with 79 for 1.3 million. In each case, the Soviet-style district layer, the equivalent of Moldova’s rayons, has been eliminated.

Georgia followed the same logic in 2006, under Saakashvili, consolidating rapidly, in his characteristic bold, top-down fashion, and abolishing the intermediate tier altogether. Ireland, with nearly 6 million people, functions with just 31 local authorities and no elected regional layer. Denmark retains regions, but with limited roles. Real power sits at the municipal level.

In Moldova, by contrast, a typical village primărie is a ghost ship and 60% of them don’t meet even the extremely low legal requirement of 1,500 residents. With a staff of five or six, a mayor, a secretary, a couple of accountants, there is no one left to design a wastewater system, apply for EU funding, or coordinate even a basic regional transport route.

Compare that to a Lithuanian municipality of 40,000 to 50,000 people, with over 100 to 150 professional staff, including departments dedicated to urban planning, infrastructure, investment attraction, and utilities.

The results are not cosmetic; they are foundational. In Lithuania, over 90% of households are connected to public water systems. In rural Moldova, that number is closer to 35%, with many families still relying on nitrate-heavy wells. The disparity in basic sanitation is equally stark: while Estonia has moved toward a high-tech, centralized waste management system that mirrors its digital prowess, Moldova remains scarred by nearly 5,000 unauthorized, open-air dumps that poison the local water table.

You just cannot build a 21st-century economy on 19th-century infrastructure managed by a 20th-century bureaucracy.

Leadership Over Logistics

One of the recurring objections to reform is that it is politically difficult, especially when it involves merging villages. That is true. But it is also beside the point.

The current “voluntary amalgamation” approach is, in essence, a polite request for people to vote themselves out of existence. It rarely works. Villages have weak coordination, strong local identities, and often long-standing tensions, administrative, political, sometimes even ethnic. Disputes over which village becomes the center are almost guaranteed. You cannot blame people for resisting this.

The solution is not to force villages into artificial unions. It is to change the unit of reform. Instead of merging villages with villages, Moldova should consolidate around existing rayon centers (county seats), natural economic, logistical, and cultural hubs. This creates scale while respecting how people actually live, move, and identify.

At the same time, local representation in villages can and should be preserved. The model already exists. Ukraine uses the starosta system. France has the maire délégué. Poland - soltys. Moldova can introduce a similar role, pretors, to handle local issues, while shifting real administrative capacity to the municipal level. This is not about erasing the village. It is about giving it a functioning administration behind it.

The Missing Ingredient: Fiscal Power

Structure alone is not enough. Without money, decentralization is an illusion. Moldova’s current system leaves local governments dependent and underpowered. To change that, fiscal decentralization must be part of the reform.

Allow municipalities to retain 50% of corporate income tax and 2 percentage points of VAT generated locally. This would immediately change incentives. Municipalities would compete, not for transfers from the central budget, but for businesses, residents, and investment. They would have a reason to issue permits faster, build better infrastructure, and attract employers. In short, they would behave like economic actors, not administrative outposts.

The Bottom Line

Today, Moldova is spending a disproportionate share of its limited resources simply to maintain its fragmented administrative structure. Even in larger communes, some 60% of local tax revenue goes not into development, but into paying the salaries of those who collect the taxes. It is a model of recursive futility.

If Moldova is serious about EU accession, this has to change. The country will need local administrations capable of absorbing large volumes of EU funding, managing complex projects, and acting as credible partners for investors. That requires scale.

PAS has done the difficult part by opening the discussion. Now comes the harder part: following through. If Moldova is willing to pay the political cost of reform, it should at least ensure the reform is worth it. So the question is not whether to reform, but how decisively. Doing it halfway risks repeating the Latvian experience - paying once now, and again later.

Administrative systems, once built, tend to endure. Moldova has the opportunity to design one that works for decades to come. It would be a pity to waste it.

Like many others who watched the buildup to war closely, I had bags packed and my car stocked in early February 2022. Predictions of the Russians taking Kyiv in 72 hours and the evacuations of Embassies in the Ukrainian capital drove most news cycles in that month. On February 15th, 2022 Moldova Matters switched to a “quick hit” format of short release articles addressing the deepening crisis1. Things felt imminent but we didn’t know when it would begin.

On February the 24th I remained glued to media reports of progress across the suddenly massive front line. That day I wrote two articles (one, two), and reading them back now they remind me of how uncertain and confusing that time was.

In Moldova, it was clear to anyone paying attention that Russia would not stop at the Moldovan border. In later years I spoke to a Moldovan Army Officer who served at the time who said that they expected to be engaged within 7 days. Even as counterattacks slowed the Russian army’s advance on Kyiv and Kharkiv, in the South enemy forces broke through rapidly capturing Kherson. By February 26th they were outside Mykolaiv - the last real obstacle in the advance on Odesa. But there they stalled.

Ukraine won the Battle of Mykolaiv, and the Battle of Kyiv, and in subsequent years has retaken Kherson and countless other towns and cities.

When I sip my coffee in Moldova and reflect that “we’re still here,” it is due to the courage and sacrifice of so many in Ukraine. In those early days it was far from obvious that Ukraine would turn Russia back in such critical battles. It was inconceivable, at least for me, that this war would still be raging in 2026.

Back in July 2024 I sat down for a discussion that turned into a 2 episode podcast with my friend and business partner Vlad Șuleanschi. We discussed what it was like to experience those early days and how people mobilized all across Moldova to support the sudden and overwhelming influx of Ukrainian refugees. Refugees who are still here in many cases and are now members of our communities. If you’re interested, here are the 2 episodes:

Marking Four Long Years of War

Today President Maia Sandu released a short video marking the 4th anniversary of the full scale invasion. She spoke in English - the video is available here:

Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu also released a statement saying:

“On February 24, 2022, I didn’t watch the war on TV. I was in Kiev. I woke up with the first explosions, the sirens didn’t even go off in the first few days, an airfield near my house was being bombed. In a few moments, the reality of millions of Ukrainians changed. They were forced to leave their homes in search of a safe shelter, and the war separated entire families, leaving behind pain and uncertainty,

Today marks four years since the Russian Federation has been waging a barbaric war against Ukraine. Four years in which the Kremlin has relentlessly bombed Ukrainian cities, hit energy infrastructure, and turned winters into a weapon against the people.

Russia has brought the war to the home of every Ukrainian and is killing innocent people to break the spirit of Ukraine. But the spirit of this people is invincible. All this time, I have seen the determination of the people not to abandon their freedom. I have seen the unity of a people that does not break, but becomes stronger and more united. I have also seen European solidarity – human solidarity – thousands of Ukrainian refugees met at the border by our citizens who fraternally opened their homes to them and offered them food and shelter.

(…)

Glory to Ukraine,”

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy marked the occasion with a series of videos and statements. In one, lasting 18 minutes and subtitled in English, he reflects on those early days of the war and shows for the first time the series of bunkers that the government operated out of when coordinating the defense of Kyiv and the rest of the nation.

Today, President Zelenskyy hosted European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa and the leaders of 9 European countries who traveled to Kyiv to show Western support for Ukraine.

This show of support was reflected by posts, videos and statements by European Embassies and diplomats in Chisinau, including the Embassies of Sweden, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Austria2, the United Kingdom, and others.

The US Embassy in Chisinau has posted no statements at the time of writing, instead featuring a profile of South Carolina as part of the 250th anniversary celebration schedule. They were also notably absent from any comment on last year’s 3rd anniversary.

Of all the posts, perhaps the most direct was the one from Romania’s Ambassador to Chisinau Cristian-Leon Turcanu. He served as Ambassador in Kyiv at the outbreak of war and wrote a lengthy post condemning the war, supporting Ukraine and reflecting on the change it wrought. All with this iconic art of the Moskva as backdrop.

“This is for the ones who stood their ground”

Russia’s defeat at the Battle of Mykolaiv stalled their offensive in the South and they have never come as close to Odesa - and therefore Moldova - as they did back in March-April 2022. Since that time Moldova has fended off mass hybrid attacks but not had to worry about Russian tanks crossing the borders.

Not while Ukraine hold’s its ground.

In those very early days it seemed as if Odesa would be a front line city in a matter of days. Many people, almost all women and children, crossed into Moldova seeking help during those days - and they got it. But back in Odesa people in the city prepared.

Reflecting on those days I’ll always think of this video - in which ordinary people fill sandbags from the public beaches for the defense of the city. The video shows the work as a band sets the rhythm and encourages the crowd playing “It’s My Life.”

Слава Україні! Героям слава!

“If we have a referendum, I would vote for the unification with Romania.”

In an hour long episode1 of the Rest is Politics “Leading” podcast, that line stood out. Moldova’s President Maia Sandu stated that, given the option, she would vote to unite her country with its neighbor and effectively eliminate her own elected position. This line has made waves inside and outside Moldova and led to a whole lot of confusion around the world. So let’s unpack what’s going on here a bit for the non-Moldovan audience.

A Unique Relationship in Europe

Moldova and Romania are neighbors that share a language and a lot of common history. The relationship between the countries doesn’t have any clear analogs elsewhere in Europe. In the middle ages modern day Moldova was part of the principalities that would later go on to form the Kingdom of Romania in 1881. But modern Moldova, historically called Bessarabia, was left out of this new nation because it had been annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. When that empire disintegrated in 1917, Moldova declared independence and a year later voted to unite with Romania. The countries remained united until the Soviet Union re-annexed Bessarabia as part of their secret deal with Hitler in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

There are a lot of people on both sides of the River Prut that look back to this period of greater Romania nostalgically. Romania allows anyone with Romanian ancestors who were citizens before 1940 to reacquire their lost citizenship. Currently, there are no precise, public estimates of how many people in Moldova are dual citizens, but it is likely somewhere between a third and half of the population. This count includes President Maia Sandu, Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu and many other politicians in the pro-EU camp.

Was This a Signal of a Change in Policy?

Short answer - no. In her interview Maia Sandu goes on to note that there is no popular demand for union and that it is not a realistic goal. She states that joining the EU is a realistic goal and that is what she and the government are committed to doing.

The context of the answer was important, the Rest is Politics hosts Rory Stewart and Alastair Campbell try to draw out a full picture of the people they interview starting with their childhood and early life. President Sandu was speaking about Moldova’s 1991 independence and how the swirl of ideas and movements included mass demonstrations for union. She noted that we’ll never know if there was a majority for union at that moment because no referendum was held. She answered the question in this context and made it clear it was a personal opinion and not a part of her political project or political ambitions.

Political Blunder or Careful Signaling?

That depends on who you ask. Union is usually considered to be the 3rd rail of Moldovan politics - you don’t touch this issue unless you have a political death wish. While small political parties have made their whole identities about union, most politicians recognize it is too divisive and far too unlikely to speak about. Maia Sandu has answered this question before in Romanian language interviews. She answered it exactly the same way, basically honestly giving a personal opinion. Some people find this refreshing in a politician, some find it to be a political blunder. If she did have a political calculus in the answer, the fact that she is not running for reelection may have played a role.

With that said, there is a case to be made that this was slightly more calculated than just that. When asked by the hosts to clarify why she would support it, President Sandu said:

“Look at what’s happening around Moldova today, look at what’s happening in the world. It is getting more and more difficult for a small country like Moldova to survive as a democracy and a sovereign country… and of course to resist Russia.”

For context we should go back to the Union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918. Contrary to what many modern unionists claim, this was not principally a nationalistic or ethnically driven process. At that time Moldova was substantially more ethnically and linguistically diverse than it is today. The urban centers largely spoke Russian and while the large majority of the population were Romanian-speaking they were spread out in smaller towns and agrarian communities. The first parliament, the Sfatul Țării, actually debated and ultimately chose to join Romania while speaking in Russian, underscoring how little nationalism played in the decision.

So if this wasn’t totally a national project what was it? It was a decision based on national security.

As the Russian Civil War raged in the east, Bolshevik units, often acting as rogue raiding parties, made more and more incursions into the new Moldavian Democratic Republic. They burned estates and villages, occupied rail links and began an attempt to overthrow the Sfatul Țării to replace it with revolutionary committees. In January 1918 the Sfatul Țării requested military support from Romania and the Romanian army quickly restored order. This led to a debate about what ultimate political settlement would ensure security and resulted in the vote for union in April 1918.

This is important context for the President’s modern remarks and for Moldova’s current situation. Both in 1917 and in 2025 there was no mass political movement for union. The option was and is popular with a segment of the population but nowhere near a majority. At the same time, a vast majority of the country would look for almost any solution rather than rejoin a Russian Empire. That was true in 1918 and it is true today.

Whether or not it was intended, President Sandu’s comments can be read as an implicit warning to the EU. She implied that while we are standing at the front door waiting to get in, if you don’t open it, then we might just climb through the window.

Anyone paying attention to the events of the past few years cannot help but conclude that when this ends there will be no small, neutral countries between the EU and the new Russian Empire. Unlike Ukraine and Belarus, Moldova does have this extra option to find itself on the right side of that divide - a kind of geopolitical “pull in case of emergency” lever. So while people should really not read much into President Sandu’s comments on a podcast, it is relevant to remember that this complex history informs how Moldovans view their options in an ever more dangerous world.

Thanks for reading this on Moldova Matters, or via the cross-post at World Briefing with Michael Bociurkiw. Consider becoming a free or paid subscriber to Moldova Matters to keep up with the most important news about this small but very important country.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document are of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the National Bank of Moldova.

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Moldova’s economy faces a persistent puzzle. Entrepreneurs start businesses regularly. In a good year, agricultural exports flow steadily. Yet the country’s productivity growth lags far behind its European neighbors. The problem is not lack of ambition, it’s that firms enter small and stay small, do not innovate and only rarely are able to cover the fixed costs of internationalization. Given the small internal market size, exporting is the most likely growth source. Several concrete mechanisms trap enterprises in low-productivity equilibrium, regardless of how hard entrepreneurs work or how good their business ideas might be. Lack of credit is only one part of the answer.

The Information Problem: When Nobody Knows Who’s Creditworthy

At the heart of Moldova’s growth constraint lies a fundamental information asymmetry. Banks need to know: Is this borrower reliable? Will they repay? What assets can secure the loan if things go wrong? In developed economies, these questions get answered through comprehensive credit bureaus, transparent financial statements, and enforceable collateral registries. In Moldova, these information channels are either broken or non-existent.

My survey of Moldova’s financial institutions (Constantinescu (2025)1) reveals how this plays out in practice. Survey participants, nine commercial banks and 54 non-bank credit organizations (OCNs), indicate they operate in essentially different markets. Not by choice, but because they are responding rationally to different information environments.

Banks concentrate on firms that can provide detailed documentation: 78% consider comprehensive financial statements critical for lending decisions, and 89% rate real estate collateral as very important. When you can’t easily verify a firm’s payment history, operational capabilities, or growth prospects, you default to what you can see and measure: buildings you can seize if the loan goes bad, and audited accounts that external professionals have verified.

OCNs occupy the space banks will not touch, functionally and geographically. Nearly half (48%) rely heavily on personal guarantees from business owners—essentially betting on the individual rather than the business. They evaluate firms through holistic assessments that incorporate “soft” information: most likely reputation in local communities, observed business practices, character judgments. This works for very small loans, but it’s expensive to scale and inherently risky.

The result? According to the World Bank Enterprise Survey, the 35-percentage-point gap between medium firms’ bank usage (50%) and small firms’ usage (15%) represents one of Eastern Europe’s widest disparities. The same survey indicates that ninety percent of small Moldovan firms rely exclusively on internal financing, growing only as fast as they can save.

The Shadow Economy Connection: Skills or Incentives?

Survey data in Figure 1 shows almost 80% of banks cite inadequate or absent Financial Projections as critical for rejection. The obvious story: firms lack financial literacy. But consider the entrepreneur’s view. Formalization brings immediate costs—taxes, compliance, fees—for uncertain benefits. When would you formalize? Only when credit access benefits clearly exceed taxation costs. Those profits come about when answering a nontrivial list of questions: Do I get higher sales in an uncertain environment? Can I access new markets? Are my production costs stable and predictable? That benefit rarely materializes in an environment with substantial exogenous shocks each year, affecting both lenders and borrowers.

Over half of banks and 40% of OCNs report that their lack of long-term funding constrains lending. Credit maturities rarely exceed 18 months because Moldova’s institutional foundations feel fragile. Property rights seem uncertain. Courts struggle with commercial disputes. Contract enforcement is slow.

Banks want formal documentation, but formalization is expensive. Firms would formalize for five-year growth capital, but credit extends barely past a year. Each actor behaves rationally given their constraints, the outcome is systematically bad for everyone. A series of flawed incentives become the driver of a two-tier credit market swirling forward the vicious circle of informality.

The Collateral Registry: Where Legal Theory Meets Market Reality

In theory, collateral registries solve a core problem: they create clear, enforceable property rights in pledged assets, expanding credit access beyond firms with real estate.

But approximately 30-45% of financial institutions report judicial enforcement as completely inefficient (more details available in Constantinescu (2025)). When recovering collateral takes months or years with unpredictable outcomes, secured lending becomes fiction. Banks stick to real estate, the one asset where seizure is somewhat predictable. Firms without real estate cannot access bank credit regardless of business fundamentals. Even successful firms remain trapped. As they grow and improve operations, they cannot properly signal improved creditworthiness because the collateral that would facilitate “graduation” to bank financing remains legally ambiguous.

The Lock-In Effect: How First Relationships Become Traps

Once a firm establishes an OCN relationship, that OCN accumulates private information about the firm’s payment behavior and operational capabilities. This relationship-specific information is not easily transferable to other lenders. The firm may then become informationally captive to that first lender. Even improvements such as increased revenues, professionalized operations, translate only modestly into better financing terms because they cannot be credibly and easily communicated to alternative lenders. The firm faces a binary choice: accept existing creditor terms or forgo external financing.

This explains Moldova’s peculiar enterprise structure: abundant small firms, very few medium-sized firms, and a handful of large firms (often foreign-owned or connected to international value chains). The missing middle is not missing because entrepreneurs lack ambition, it’s missing because the past legal and infrastructure setup led to an information architecture that prevented growth.

Beyond Finance: Why Credit Alone Won’t Fix This

Even substantially improved credit access cannot drive productivity transformation when firms lack innovative capacity to use that capital effectively. Moldova’s export diversification record tells the story. Between 2008-2023, Moldova introduced merely 12 new export product categories, contributing just $40 per capita. Compare this to Romania’s 33 new products ($244 per capita) or Lithuania’s 26 products ($361 per capita). The perceived financing gap may signal a broader innovation and internationalization gap.

Small firms lack resources for R&D, technical expertise to identify and adopt new technologies, and organizational capabilities to implement productivity-enhancing changes needed to export. Providing these firms with more credit will not automatically solve their innovation deficit, they may simply finance continued production using outdated methods, perpetuating low productivity even as debt burdens increase.

Starting From Strength: Why Agro and Biotech Make Strategic Sense

The financial constraints described earlier reveal only half of Moldova’s growth challenge. Even with improved credit access, firms need something more fundamental: the knowledge, capabilities, and market connections that transform capital into productive growth. This is where industrial strategy2 shifts from fixing financial plumbing to building productive capacity. Moldova’s path forward leverages what exists: agricultural know-how, food processing infrastructure, and fermentation expertise from wine production. These quaint traditions, with the right tech mix can turn into industrial capabilities with direct biotech applications.

Wine production requires precise fermentation control, microbiology understanding, and quality management systems. These capabilities translate directly into producing biofertilizers, probiotics, and enzyme preparations. Agricultural waste, grape pomace, sunflower husks, corn stalks, becomes valuable feedstock for biotech processes rather than disposal problems. Processing facilities can be retrofitted incrementally rather than requiring expensive greenfield investment.

This makes technology adoption divisible rather than lumpy. A wine producer can experiment with probiotic production using existing fermentation equipment, test markets, build expertise, and scale gradually. Compare this to semiconductor manufacturing or aerospace, where minimum efficient scale requires hundreds of millions in upfront investment. Agrotech allows firms to learn by doing without existential risk.

The territorial dimension matters too. Moldova’s agricultural sectors span rural regions that urban-concentrated IT strategies would bypass. Connecting these regions through upgraded bio and agrotech creates inclusive growth rather than exacerbating rural-urban divides. A dedicated IT element should be further developed, as it provides essential complementary capabilities to developing a knowledge driven transformation of the agricultural sector.

The Cluster Model: Why Firms Need Neighbors

Individual firms struggle to build the complementary capabilities modern industries require. A biofertilizer producer needs testing laboratories, specialized cold-chain logistics, and regulatory expertise for EU standards. Building all this in-house is prohibitively expensive. Geographic concentration of related firms creates shared infrastructure no single company could build alone. Testing facilities serve multiple firms. Specialized suppliers emerge. Knowledge spills through labor mobility and informal interactions. Ideally, universities and research centers may share research facilities with new startups (Editorial note3).

Clusters also solve the coordination problem in industrial upgrading. Firms invest when confident others will make complementary investments. But clusters don’t spontaneously appear. They need anchors, large innovative companies that stabilize cost and revenue stream of SMEs interacting with it.

Anchor Firms: Accelerating Knowledge Transfer

Global value chain integration becomes essential here. An anchor firm, typically a multinational with established networks, brings what domestic SMEs cannot build independently: proven processes, quality standards, market access, and credible knowledge about what works. When an anchor establishes operations, it creates a template. Suppliers must meet its standards, forcing capability upgrading. Trained workers eventually move to other firms or start their own, disseminating knowledge. Its success signals Moldova can execute, attracting additional anchors.

The learning is concrete. Consider a beverage multinational sourcing probiotic ingredients. Its Moldova supplier must meet precise microbial counts, stability specs, and delivery reliability. Meeting these forces investments in quality control, process documentation, and supply chain management. But the multinational also provides technical assistance, shares testing protocols, conducts training audits, and offers long-term contracts justifying investment. More critically, it offers access to international markets with proven niches. This is infinitely faster and less risky than learning by trial and error in export markets. The anchor already knows which markets pay premiums, what specifications they require, and how to navigate regulations. It absorbs internationalization risk while suppliers focus on execution.

Beyond Dependence: Building Autonomous Capability

Global value chain integration is not the endpoint. Firms successfully serving anchor requirements accumulate more than revenue. They build proprietary capabilities, develop technological understanding, and establish reputations for reliability. This accumulated capability enables eventual spin-out. The supplier that mastered probiotics for a beverage multinational can develop branded products. It understands production technology, has established quality systems, knows cost structure, and has proven execution. Most importantly, it has cash flow from anchor contracts financing product development without the desperate constraints strangling SME innovation.

Chilean salmon farming exemplifies this trajectory. Firms initially supported by Japanese and US collaborators, integrated as low-tier suppliers to multinationals, gradually absorbing technology and market knowledge. Over two decades, Chilean firms progressed from basic processing to sophisticated breeding, nutrition science, and proprietary genetics. Today they compete globally. Quite likely they couldn’t have reached that position without the protected learning environment global value chain integration provided. The same holds across several success stories in different industries and geographies4.

Moldova’s trajectory could follow a similar logic. Firms master biofertilizer production serving a multinational’s regional operations, then develop specialized formulations for Moldova’s specific soil conditions, eventually exporting proprietary products to similar territories in Central and Eastern Europe. The anchor relationship provides stability and knowledge transfer making this progression possible.

The path from financial exclusion to productive capability is not direct but becomes navigable. Fix information asymmetries trapping firms in credit constraints. Build clusters providing essential shared infrastructure. Attract anchors accelerating knowledge transfer. Create space for graduation from dependence to autonomy. Each step builds on the previous, addresses real constraints, and calibrates to Moldova’s actual capabilities rather than borrowed templates.

“The leader Putin failed to break”

That was the title of the article published on December 31st when the Telegraph named President Maia Sandu as their pick for World Leader of 2025. Senior Foreign Correspondent Adrian Blomfield traveled to Chisinau to interview her for the occasion.

The interview resulted in an excellent article which I highly recommend. He also interviewed her on camera and you can watch that interview on Youtube here.

The Rest is… Moldova!

My second recommendation is the most recent episode of The Rest is Politics podcast. Hosts Rory Stewart and Alastair Campbell traveled to Moldova this week to interview Maia Sandu for their second podcast “Leading.” That episode will be out on Monday and you’ll be able to watch it on Youtube or find it where ever you get your podcasts on the Leading feed.

On the same day as they interviewed Maia Sandu, Rory Stewart and Alastair Campbell also recorded an episode of their main podcast The Rest is Politics from Chisinau. The first half of the episode is dedicated to a discussion of whether or not Donald Trump’s actions in Venezuela indicate that the United States will soon annex Greenland1. The second half of the podcast is dedicated to a discussion of Moldova. It’s an excellent listen and we discover that 2 of Rory Stewart’s great grandparents were Moldovan!

You can find it wherever you get your podcasts or watch it on Youtube here:

Personally, a Pretty Cool Week

When he was in town in December I had the pleasure of meeting and chatting with the Telegraph’s Adrian Blomfield. As I’m basically the only foreign correspondent (of sorts) in Chisinau I’ve gotten to meet a lot of impressive and fascinating journalists over the years. This week though was quite a surprise as I got a last minute invitation by Rory Stewart to meet with him, Alastair Campbell and their team to discuss Moldova. I’m a huge fan of their podcast and a loyal listener since it launched in March 2022 so this was very cool.

“The Best is Yet to Come”

Finally, I hope that all of you are enjoying your winter holidays wherever in the world you are. In Moldova, we greeted the new year with a rather unexpected holiday wish(?) declaration(?) from the US Embassy. Here was their post:

This seems to be US Embassy Chisinau’s own special way of greeting the new year, as other Embassies such as those in Bucharest, Kyiv and Tbilisi took a slightly more traditional approach. Is it a prediction of the year to come in Moldova? I’ll leave that up to you to decide.

Once again, from me this time, Happy New Year and Happy Holidays. We’ll be back next week with a roundup of the news and we’ll resume our normal schedule.

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Moldova’s task is not to senselessly copy foreign reform packages but to construct an economic architecture grounded in its own comparative advantages and forecasting opportunities. World economic complexity has evolved from pencil manufacturing to globalization - with smartphone ubiquity and the integration of artificial intelligence in everything. The fastest-growing sectors no longer rely just on services, but require serious R&D investment. Moldova faces this context with three classical growth requirements: human capital, infrastructure, and investment.

Foresight: What Should Moldova Do - and What It Can Offer?

Moldova requires permanent inclusive economic foresight through mapping futures and identifying current and potential comparative advantages. Several are evident: low labor costs within the European space and available industrial zones from Soviet infrastructure. Moldova needs a clear picture for every citizen showing how agriculture, given high soil fertility potential, will modernize to EU productivity levels. This approach will help mobilize farmers with their communities, banks, and state to address widespread rural bankruptcy in Moldova. These become development assets when connected to future industries through planning across 5-, 15-, and 30-year horizons. This process should not be confined to government directives or business elites but must include diverse formats and involve all stakeholders. Ultimately, foresight will aid in responding to the question of what Moldova can supply for itself, the EU, and the world.

No one can schedule a full, robust long-term economic plan, but preparation for trends and risks is possible. All the countries that achieved rapid economic shifts Ireland, Scandinavia, Israel, and South Korea - began with foresight and positivistic synchronization, enabling future coordination instead of conflicts and frustration. This provided capabilities to recognize and exploit emerging opportunities while offering platforms for forming alliances with strategic partners to jointly invest in innovations.

New Industrialization

One of the key trends of the next decade is systematic reindustrialization (or new industrialization) with spatial development planning. Moldova needs a consortium structure that brings together actors from various sectors, a clear understanding of existing capabilities and human skills within the territory, and an analysis of expectations to attract major players as investors. Having well-prepared strategic plans makes it easier to attract industrial investors and partners, especially when infrastructure, workforce development, and regulatory frameworks are aligned with a robust and clear plan.

Moldova has an opportunity to participate in Ukrainian reconstruction by implementing smart infrastructure designs that meet domestic utility needs and support cross-border cooperation and solidarity efficiency.

The establishment of a kind of Development Foundation, Strategic Investment Fund, or Republican Bank merits consideration. It should be operated by independent professionals, as cumatrism1 (patronage-based) management would ruin it. A related initiative, also could be a private-public Export Agency that facilitates global sales and market access to the EU and new emerging economies, such as Africa and Asia.

Furthermore, Moldova can learn from successful FinTech modernizations in Latin American, Asian, Gulf countries, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Israel. It could establish itself as a new, transparent, and liberal European FinTech hub by adopting simple regulations and international expert oversight. This approach depends on reliable experts and organizations to guide the process, with the state providing support rather than direct control.

And one of the essential steps for Moldova, connected with FinTech, is to transform remittances into investments and strengthen domestic resource mobilization.

To have Democracy is not enough.

Market liberalization remains essential. Total factor productivity depends on optimal conditions. Moldova shows numerous Post-Soviet institutional traits and does not have impressive economic freedom, even when compared to regional peers.

EU integration automatically positions the government toward regulatory functions rather than enabling the spirit of enterprise and venture building. After 35 years of limited administrative success across different governments, even the current pro-European administration operates within a system that has discredited itself.

Therefore, Moldova must foster an environment of freedom and adopt an ecosystem approach for creative destruction, where development is driven by entrepreneurs from rural areas and local producers to high-tech startups and international players, rather than by centralized state institutional bounded cognition. Entrepreneurs are engines of growth when conditions do not constrain them.

Foreign aid does not make countries wealthier, but can provide an ecosystem for growth. The flypaper effect and rent-seeking exist everywhere; the question is whether conditions can be structured so that productive behavior becomes preferred for economic agents.

Moldova has the biggest proportion of shadow economy in the EU - but this doesn’t just mean that people are breaking the law. It means that the economic agents are trying to perform in the most effective way and that the market needs liberalization.

For example, the typical rural small private farmer works in grey conditions simply because he does not see other options for surviving. The government should ask the question not of how to suppress and get taxes to match new international bank requirements, but how to liberate it from barriers that citizens and businesses avoid, to not hinder their potency.

Mutual Benefits

The Pridnestrovie-Transnistrian question should transform into an economic opportunity through mutual value creation: international investment, privatization, and new industrial projects creating material incentives for cooperation on both banks of the Dniester. This deal automatically addresses energy instability and production cost in the region. Without resolution, this frozen situation will continue freezing Moldova’s broader economic potential.

Logistic hub

Moldova should dedicate all efforts to becoming a logistics hub within the Trans-European Transport Network. Moldova should advocate extending or developing new corridors connecting Scandinavia to Greece and Solidarity Lanes from Portugal - Central Europe to Donbas through Chișinău, Bălți, Giurgiulesti and Tiraspol. This is a unique moment when Moldova can change its logistical position on the world map.

This is possible only with the previous points implemented. Infrastructure must generate productivity rather than accumulate debt. Roads financed through loans without producing revenue deteriorate to a critical condition, requiring repeated reconstruction through additional borrowing. Fiscal illusion already affects Moldova due to populism.

The population should not decrease

It is essential to recognize that addressing demographic challenges: population decline, low birth rates, and migration, are critical for achieving sustained economic growth. Without intervention in systematic reasons of these issues, the prospect of ongoing growth becomes increasingly unattainable.

BANI Education

(BANI – another fashionable acronym means brittle, anxious, non-linear, incomprehensible | *Bani in Romanian/Moldovan means money)

Education reform requires stronger development of STEM disciplines and creative, adaptive skills needed in contemporary volatile conditions. Expert consensus confirms that early “Prussian” industrial mass educational systems no longer match modern requirements for personal and state success. The existence of a large, skilled diaspora, Russian anti-war migrants, solidarity from EU countries, and numerous professionals loyal to democratic Moldova all represent a significant resource.

One basic step could be to introduce a school course on entrepreneurship, finance, and economic literacy developed by international experts.

The budget should refocus from education for diplomas and prestige toward funding actual educational projects, generating capabilities for current and adaptive competencies, and affordable workforce requalification to new demands. Education development should be synchronized with market realities foresight-forecasting and an investment plan.

Solarpunk Stork

Moldova may never replicate Ireland’s case, Israel’s path to the “Start-Up Nation” or the experience of the “Asian Dragons,” but why Moldova can’t become the “Solarpunk Stork?”

*Stork in Romanian is “Barza” – one of the traditional symbols of hope and prosperity in Moldova.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion has relentlessly targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. What is often treated as a purely Ukrainian challenge however, actually presents a wider regional opportunity. Moldova, a country that has been moving to modernize its own energy sector and integrate with European systems, is well positioned to become a clean-energy partner for Ukraine’s recovery and a new platform for investors seeking exposure to Ukraine’s broader reconstruction but wary of the continued war-risk on the ground.

A sustainable energy recovery in Ukraine depends on the creation of a modern, decarbonized energy system capable of meeting new industrial needs, supporting municipal services and providing the reliability required. This task becomes even more urgent given the scale of destruction Russia has inflicted on Ukraine’s power generation and grid infrastructure. According to the Kyiv School of Economics, the energy sector has suffered more than US$56 billion in damage and losses, with at least US$50 billion in immediate reconstruction needs. A large portion of this reflects the catastrophic damage to thermal generation capacity and high-voltage transmission lines. Any long-term reconstruction strategy requires diversification, decentralization and integration with European power networks.

Against this background Moldova enters the picture. Over the last three years, Moldova has undergone one of the fastest energy-sector transformations in Europe. The synchronization of Moldova and Ukraine’s grid with the Continental European system in March 2022 was a pivotal moment enabling the country to operate independently of the old Soviet-era IPS/UPS network and opening the door to cross-border electricity trade. This has laid the technical foundation for deeper integration into regional markets. However, Moldova’s reform momentum did not stop there. In 2025, the government held its first major renewable-energy auction, awarding roughly 165 megawatts of wind and solar capacity and mobilizing close to €190 million in investment. The auction results signaled that global energy developers are prepared to invest in Moldovan renewables when regulatory clarity and grid access are assured. For foreign investors, this provides the region with a predictable offtake along with alignment with European market rules and opportunities for scale within the region.

The commercial case for Moldova comes more sharply into focus when viewed through the lens of Ukraine’s reconstruction needs. Moldova’s solar and wind resources are well suited to utility-scale generation. Projects developed today can meet Moldova’s rising domestic demand while creating the possibility of future exports into Ukrainian border regions once conditions allow. Moldova’s regional integration into future dry port, maritime cargo handling and infrastructure development projects require future energy sources. Between port redevelopment in Odesa Oblast, greater logistics connectivity in the Danube River Basin and improvements in transportation infrastructure across the Southern Bessarabia region reliability and speed matter as much as price and proximity becomes a powerful economic advantage.

Moldova is also well positioned to become a regional testbed for technologies that will be essential to Ukraine’s energy rebuild. As Ukrainian municipalities and local industry recover they will need decentralized power systems such as microgrids, battery storage, and smart-grid infrastructure capable of sustaining operations under stress. Moldova’s regulatory openness to innovation, demonstrated by the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) “Energy Sandbox” initiative provides a controlled environment where companies can pilot such technologies before adapting them into Ukraine with support from multilateral donors. This combination of policy receptiveness and Moldova’s manageable market size makes it uniquely attractive to companies specializing in grid modernization, digital energy management and storage solutions.

Beyond generation and storage, Moldova has the potential to host manufacturing and supply-chain activities directly tied to Ukraine’s reconstruction. The country’s free economic zones, competitive labor force and improving logistics links with Romania make it feasible to assemble solar panels, produce transformer components or manufacture other hardware that is costly to ship directly into Ukraine during or immediately after the conflict. Cross-border infrastructure plans backed by multilateral donors reinforce these commercial opportunities. Moldova and Romania are advancing the Isaccea–Vulcănești–Chișinău interconnection, a strategically important line backed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Recovery and Development (EBRD) that will significantly increase import and export capacity in the region. The project is part of a broader shift towards a more regional energy integration, and once completed, it will create the physical pathways needed to support both Moldovan exports and Ukraine’s future reconstruction demand. The involvement of international financial institutions such as the EIB and EBRD provides an additional valuable layer of confidence and accountability in the scale of these projects that should be encouraging to outside investors.

Moldova’s ongoing transformation is creating commercially interesting opportunities that are directly connected to Ukraine’s reconstruction without the associated risk of being located inside Ukraine. Companies that move early in generation, storage, manufacturing or frontier technologies stand to benefit from the dual tailwind of Moldova’s accelerating reform agenda and Ukraine’s urgent and ongoing need for reliable, modern energy systems. With renewed policy momentum following Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary election and growing investor interest, it has the capacity to become a clean-energy backbone for a more resilient region in its corner of Europe. For investors seeking both returns and access to Ukraine’s reconstruction story, Moldova offers a strategic entry point.

All through the month of December the Moldova Resilience Fund is raising money for Moldovan independent media outlets Zona de Securitate and Cu Sens. Moldova Matters exists because of the amazing work of local journalists who play a key role in supporting the nation’s democratic resilience against Russian hybrid attacks. Follow this link to learn more and for an opportunity to support this work.

Disclaimer: David Smith is a board member and co-founder of the Moldova Resilience Fund (MRF). Moldova Matters and MRF are entirely separate entities.