Cyberattacks were a key enabling element of this strategy. In a new report published in collaboration with Watchdog I look at the role of cyberwarfare in the September 2025 parliamentary elections, and how Moldova’s cyberdefenders and their partners secured the vote.

The whole report is shared below with Moldova Matters readers, but you can also access it on the Watchdog site at this link.

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections took place against the backdrop of sustained Russian hybrid pressure on the country’s democratic institutions. In the months leading up to the vote, Moldovan authorities and independent investigators documented a wide range of activities linked to Kremlin-aligned networks. These included disinformation campaigns, illicit political financing, efforts to mobilize paid street protests and attempts to manipulate public perceptions of the electoral process.

Cyber operations formed an important component of this broader effort. In the year leading up to the election cyber operations primarily worked to support FIMI campaigns and circumvent website blocking. In the weeks before the election and throughout election day itself, Moldovan institutions faced a series of direct cyber attacks ranging from the compromise of home internet routers to large-scale distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting government infrastructure. These attacks were directed at systems supporting the Central Election Commission (CEC) and other critical digital services used during the voting process.

Cyberattacks aimed to disrupt election-day systems, slow the reporting of results, and create visible technical failures that might undermine public confidence in the integrity of the vote.

This report argues that cyber operations targeting Moldova’s 2025 elections should be understood not as isolated attacks but as part of an integrated hybrid campaign. Their purpose was to enable and amplify other political operations designed to contest the legitimacy of the election outcome. Technical disruption could create uncertainty, information operations could frame that uncertainty as evidence of fraud and organized protests could then transform these narratives into political pressure against the government.

The report is broken into four parts:

• Section 1 outlines Moldova’s evolving cybersecurity architecture and the institutional reforms implemented since 2017.

• Section 2 examines how cyber capabilities were used to support foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations targeting Moldovan audiences.

• Section 3 analyzes the cyberattacks directed at election infrastructure on election day itself.

• Section 4 examines how these cyber operations interacted with other elements of a broader hybrid strategy intended to undermine confidence in the electoral process.

While the attacks ultimately failed to disrupt the election in a meaningful way, they illustrate how cyber operations can function as enabling tools within larger political campaigns aimed at delegitimizing democratic institutions. Moldova’s experience therefore offers important lessons for understanding the role of cyber activity within contemporary hybrid interference operations.

Section 1: Moldova’s Cyber Landscape

Successive Moldovan governments have been working since 2017 to modernize the country’s cybersecurity infrastructure and defenses. This began with the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity law which created a national strategy and outlined the restructuring of critical institutions.

In subsequent years a number of institutions were reformed or created in order to coordinate and implement the country’s cyber defenses. The key ones were:

• Serviciul Tehnologia Informației și Securitate Cibernetică (Information Technology and Cyber Security Service, STISC). STISC was created in 2018 from the existing Centrul de Telecomunicații Speciale (Special Telecommunications Center, CTS). CTS was itself created in the 1990s to take over KGB-era secure communications infrastructure. Its mission remained focused on securing government communications and the maintenance of these legacy systems. When CTS was reformed into STISC the focus shifted from simply securing information to protecting the government’s entire cyber infrastructure. It is the agency primarily responsible for protecting government IT systems.

• Agenția pentru Securitate Cibernetică (National Cyber Security Authority, ASC). ASC was created in 2023 to oversee cybersecurity strategy, regulation and coordination. The ASC is responsible for aligning with EU cybersecurity frameworks and overseeing compliance by private sector actors who manage critical infrastructure - such as telecom companies.

• National Institute of Innovations in Cybersecurity “Cybercor.” Launched in 2024 with the support of the Future Technologies Project supported by USAID, the UK government and Sweden, Cybercor is an education and research center located in the Technical University of Moldova (UTM). Its mission is to train civil servants and to create a robust hiring pool of cybersecurity professionals.

During these years the Moldovan parliament passed a series of major laws related to cybersecurity. These aligned Moldova with EU directives and created inter-agency / inter-ministerial emergency response working groups. Critical infrastructure was identified and regulations were created to assure that cyber risk management and incident reporting mechanisms were in place in the companies operating that infrastructure.

According to Anatolie Golovco, Cybersecurity Advisor to the Prime Minister (February 2023 - present), a critical piece of this was the creation of well-paid civil service positions in these agencies1.

Since 2018, and in accelerating fashion since February 2022, these agencies have worked on 4 topline goals:

1. Consolidating and hardening government digital platforms and infrastructure. These were largely centralized under STISC.

2. Shifting focus from information security to infrastructure security.

3. Implementing the EU’s Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and coordinating with private sector critical infrastructure operators to ensure compliance.

4. Assuring a training pipeline of skilled cybersecurity professionals and attractive jobs to accommodate them.

It was these changes, as well as the ongoing support from Moldova’s security and development partners, that put the country in a position to identify and respond to Russian hybrid attacks that involved cyber operations. Moldova entered the 2025 election with a far more centralized and capable cyber-defense posture than in earlier years.

Section 2: Cyber as an Enabler for Information Operations

One of the key functions of Kremlin cyber operations was the furtherance of their Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns targeting both Moldova and other parts of the world. In Moldova, these FIMI operations were designed to shape the political environment ahead of elections and to provide tools for rapid dissemination of FIMI on election day and immediately after. Cyber operations acted as an enabler for these campaigns in the following key ways:

1. Evading Website Blocks - As the Moldovan (or European) authorities block websites or TV channels, Kremlin actors create workarounds. That included both replicating infrastructure and attacking user’s Domain Name Service (DNS) systems.

2. Hack & Leak Operations - Kremlin hackers breached the personal devices of Moldovan politicians and activists and leaked information selectively (and possibly after altering it). Hack-and-leak operations are visible, but we must assume that similar operations are happening invisibly at the level of espionage. Passing sensitive information to Russian proxies or using it to frame campaign and messaging strategy.

2.1 Evading Website Blocks

In response to propaganda being produced by the Kremlin in support of the war in Ukraine, the Moldovan government has taken steps to block certain TV stations and websites affiliated with the Kremlin and Ilan Shor. This has created a cat-and-mouse game as Kremlin cyber actors race to find ways around these blockages.

The most common way to block a website uses DNS, where the government orders Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to modify their DNS records to prevent users in that network from finding the IP address of the website they are looking for.

One example of this process was reported on in June 2025 when the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab (DFRLab) published a report detailing the new online2 TV channel Moldova24 (MD24). The TV channel had a variety of web addresses including moldova24.online, moldova24.org, moldova-24.live, etc. These, in turn, all directed users to the same website but could be switched out as the Moldovan government worked to block the DNS records. At the same time, DFRLab showed that the IP address behind these websites was also hosting dozens of other websites used to promote Ilan Shor and to spread Russian disinformation - including multi-lingual black propaganda services in French, Spanish, Croatian, Italian and more.

By July 2025 these tactics became more sophisticated. At that time anonymous advertising campaigns began promoting a new streaming platform called HaiTV. This application and website advertised the ability to access blocked Russian TV channels - which meant movie and TV options, as well as MD24, Russian propaganda channels and Shor channels. While the government quickly announced the blocking of this new site, it remained accessible in Moldova even weeks later due to sophisticated efforts to circumvent these blocks.

Ziarul de Garda reported that HaiTV domain was purchased and registered by the Moscow based, UK registered, Aeza International LTD. This company was responsible for creating and running a network called “Doppelganger” which Qurium had previously reported as using complex network infrastructure to both evade blockages and to substitute fake website clones for real sites. This involved cloning the Washington Post, FoxNews, Le Parisien and many many others.

In this cat-and-mouse game, Kremlin actors regularly used Western registered companies and Western infrastructure in order to bypass national level blocking. Via sophisticated manipulations of DNS records and the use of many intermediary domains their cyberoperations acted as enablers to the broader FIMI operations.

2.2 Hack & Leak

In addition to protecting FIMI resources by keeping them online, Russian hackers regularly sought to breach the computer systems or online accounts of Moldovan politicians, journalists and civil society actors. In the case of the 2022 “Moldova Leaks” Telegram hacks, this was designed to reveal unflattering messages and to create fear that the hackers had much more information than they shared.

The Moldova Leaks operation released the Telegram address books and chat logs for prominent government and civil society leaders one by one. The implication was that they were building to a major reveal (the blacked out figure) but that never happened and the site was deleted. In addition to the leaking embarrassing (and possibly manipulated) message exchanges, this slow build created paranoia around who would be targeted next and what more would be released.

In other examples, a cyberattack originating from the network of Aeza International LTD hacked official emails of TV8 and Moldelectrica. They then sent official emails to individuals and institutions containing disinformation messages.

It’s worth noting that Hack & Leak operations were also conducted by anti-Kremlin organizations (currently unidentified) and resulted in the dissemination of phone recordings of Moldovan politicians talking to their FSB handlers and troves of insider data into the Shor network.

Section 3: Cyberattacks on Election Infrastructure

The second major focus of Kremlin cyberattacks on Moldova’s elections was targeted at election day itself and involved an attempt to take down Moldova’s digital election infrastructure. While Moldovan elections are conducted entirely with paper ballots and hand counts, the country relies on important digital systems run by the Central Elections Commission (CEC) to conduct the elections and distribute the results.

3.1 Why Paper Elections Still Depend on Digital Systems

When a voter enters a polling station (in Moldova or in a diaspora polling place) they show their national ID card to a poll worker who verifies in the CEC system that this person is at the right polling station and eligible to vote. The voter then votes and places a paper ballot in a box, while the computer system notifies the central CEC servers that the person voted. This prevents the same person from trying to go to another polling place and vote again. Additionally, it updates a ticker on the CEC website showing turnout in real time.

This CEC website is detailed about voter turnout - showing vote by regions, demographics, etc. It also updates constantly and people are used to watching returns in real time on election day.

When the polls close, the paper ballots are counted by hand in the presence of election observers. Once the count is certified the totals are sent provisionally to the CEC server which publishes them on the website precinct by precinct. This also creates a “real time viewing” perception by voters who are accustomed to a rapid vote count after the polls close.

3.2 What the Attackers Were Trying to Disrupt

The attacker’s goal was to disrupt the CEC system in order to shake public confidence in the outcome of the vote. The aim was to slow down or fully disrupt the digital systems in order to force an all-paper process. This would slow but not stop voting or the vote count.

Without computer ID verification, voters would need to be checked against printed voter lists. This slows the process and removes the real time data transmitted to the CEC that people watch online on election day. This would similarly affect the vote count and reporting process which may drag out over several days.

To be clear, the attackers did not try to change vote totals or to otherwise directly impact the election results. The goal instead was to undermine faith in the elections and imply that someone else was manipulating the results. By slowing or disrupting these real time systems they could discredit the government - showing that they are not in control of critical infrastructure - and they could plant FIMI narratives about how the disruptions were because PAS was rigging the election itself. We’ll look at this broader hybrid attack landscape in Section 4.

3.3 How DDoS fit that objective

A Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) is a cyberattack designed to overwhelm a website or network service with a flood of illegitimate requests. The attacker instructs a huge number of computers or devices to all request the service at the same time (e.g. load a webpage). This causes the server coming under attack to either slow under the flood of requests or simply crash. Thereby the attack denies service to legitimate users who will be unable to access it.

The CEC’s election infrastructure is managed by STISC which houses centralized government servers and network infrastructure. On election day, DDoS attacks were directed at STISC infrastructure with the goals of taking down the CEC website and disrupting the VPN secure connections between the central CEC servers and the polling stations.

STISC did not act alone in defending critical networks and was supported by various outside actors including some companies. One example was CloudFlare which helped STISC defend election infrastructure against DDoS attacks. In a post election article they wrote:

“[O]n September 28, 2025, the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) experienced a series of concentrated, high-volume (DDoS) attacks strategically timed throughout the day. The attack began in the morning at 09:06:00 UTC and lasted for over twelve hours and ended as the official result reporting was underway at 21:34:00 UTC. In total, we mitigated over 898 million malicious requests directed at the CEC over the twelve-hour period.”

Defending against DDoS attacks generally involves identifying illegitimate incoming traffic and blocking it / filtering it out. This is easiest to do when the traffic has a common origin and is therefore less “distributed” - for example, Russian systems known to be used for cyber attacks. This gets much harder when the attack is coming from closer to home.

3.4 Weaponizing Home Routers and IoT

In order to make it as difficult as possible to defend against these DDoS attacks, Russian actors sought to compromise as many devices as possible inside Moldova. If the cyberattack was coming from Moldovan citizens’ homes, it would be very hard for STISC and partners to identify who is legitimately trying to access the CEC website and who is a malicious attacker. It could also mean that defending the CEC website would mean cutting off legitimate users.

On September 24, 2025 National Chief of Police Viorel Cernăuțeanu announced that “thousands” of home internet routers had become compromised. With just 4 days to go before the elections Cernăuțeanu warned the public that this network was to be used in a DDoS attack against the CEC and government systems, and stated that the authorities were working on it.

This entailed a minimum of tens of thousands of home routers with the total number remaining undisclosed. The compromise affected MoldTelecom systems using combo fiber optic modems and home Wi-Fi routers. It remains unknown how the routers were infected, but the purpose was clear. They served two functions:

1. Creation of a Local Botnet - The compromised routers then opened up the compromise of all the devices on that local home network. This particularly focused on Internet of Things (IoT) devices with weak security. According to Anatolie Golovco, in one example, they detected a wave of DDoS attacks from a Chinese brand of air conditioner that has a Wi-Fi connection.

2. DNS Spoofing / Traffic Re-Routing - The same router compromise also re-directed traffic to Russian network infrastructure. This meant that Moldovans wanting to load example.com would first travel into this malicious Russian network without ever knowing it. That would bypass Moldova’s website blocks on apps such as HaiTV, but it would also allow Russia to use DNS spoofing to replace the real example.com with a Russian clone. That would allow them to, for example, display their own CEC website to any users with hacked home router equipment.

It remains unclear how the attackers gained access to so many routers, but Anatolie Golovco believes it was most likely leveraging default passwords and other soft spots in security. He also noted that there was an additional element here of “social engineering.” No one wanted their home networks to be hacked, but lots of people wanted access to blocked Russian channels playing movies they like. Golovco noted that in every group of friends, or village, there’s someone who helps you reinstall Windows and fix your Wi-Fi. He suspects that some of these people were unwittingly compromising home equipment by modifying settings or installing software meant to get around blocks on popular movie / TV channels.

3.5 How Defenders Kept the Network Online

This attack ultimately failed. While many details have not been made public, we know a few details.

• Last minute updates. The government worked with MoldTelecom to push out a massive update to affected routers. Because these were combo modem-routers from MoldTelecom they are technically customer-premises equipment, legally owned by the company. This meant that Chief of Police Cernăuțeanu didn’t have to plead with citizens to update their routers, the company could do it en masse.

• Cloudflare and partners. STISC had many partners both in the private sector and in the form of foreign partners. Other than Cloudflare, most prefer to remain anonymous. Collectively these efforts responded in real time to incoming DDoS attacks and coordinated to manage and block attack vectors.

With a flurry of activity in the weeks before the election, as well as on election day itself, STISC and partners were able to keep the CEC infrastructure operational on election day.

Section 4: Hybrid Attacks - Undermining the Election Results

The likely political objective was not to change votes directly, but to create a disputed outcome. To do that, the attackers needed four things: technical disruption, apparent evidence of fraud, visible disorder and protest capacity.

The cyberattack would provide technical disruption and a discrediting of the Moldovan government’s ability to conduct elections. Let’s walk through the other elements of this integrated hybrid operation:

4.1 “Evidence” of Electoral Fraud

Kremlin networks organized multiple operations to sow doubt and provide alleged evidence of fraud by PAS and the pro-EU parties. One example of that was dubbed “Operation diaspora” and was designed to discredit votes from those in the diaspora.

Investigative journalists from ZdG infiltrated this coordinated operation to recruit unofficial “election observers” to watch polling places in the diaspora. This centrally controlled operation promised “salaries” of €300 - €500 euros per day and “bonuses” of up to €30,000 euros for video evidence showing vote rigging. In many cases, “observers” were given the option of the candidate whose campaign would allegedly register them with the CEC. These candidates were not selected from the pro-Russian opposition and they denied participation. Some of these “observers” who were confronted appeared confused and sheepish, including one confronted by the Moldovan Ambassador to Greece who admitted that things were proceeding in an orderly fashion. All observers were tasked with counting (via an app) each person who went into the voting booth.

In addition to this, online videos were released as part of information operations allegedly showing vote rigging. This included videos purporting to show election workers burning stacks of ballots stamped for the pro-Russian “Patriotic Bloc,” all implying that PAS was working to rig the elections.

4.2 Visible Disorder

On election day there were multiple threats against polling stations. Bomb threats were called against polling places in Brussels, Rome, Genoa (Italy), Bucharest, Asheville (USA) and Alicante (Spain). In Iași a man threw a tear gas grenade into a polling station. There were also many bomb threats against polling stations inside the security zone. Embassies and polling places had to be evacuated and checked by the police delaying some votes.

4.3 Street Mobilization and Escalation

Long before the elections the Shor network had made preparations for violent street protests. On September 22, 2025 the Moldovan authorities conducted more than 250 searches and made more than 70 arrests around the country targeting people planning for violent unrest. The investigation targeted people brought by the Shor network to Serbia under the guise of religious pilgrimages. There they were trained with firearms, armed drones and learned tactics to instigate street riots. The operation was overseen by Russian intelligence and searches turned up weapons, ammunition, explosives and other equipment. Police released a compilation video showing some of the arrests and evidence from the raids. Here are some screenshots from the video:

4.4 Protest and Stop the Steal

All of these elements were designed to be used to contest a close election and to discredit the democratic legitimacy of any pro-EU parties who came to power. In the months leading up to elections there was a constant drumbeat of statements from pro-Russian figures alleging that the elections would be rigged. Many of them cited supposed rigging of the Romanian elections and built on a stolen-election narrative that George Simion had been building there.

There is evidence that mass street protests against the elections were planned and police reported that on September 29th messages went out promising €150 euros for people to come to a protest and €50 more to “bring a friend.” The protest in question was organized by Igor Dodon, who denied the paid protest allegations. The event was being organized “without party flags” and was billed as the opposition defending victory that he said was assured.

Ultimately the protest was small, peaceful and lasted around half an hour. After a few speeches everyone just went home.

Each of the steps in this integrated hybrid campaign ultimately failed. The end result was lots of noise and many confusing headlines but no mass unrest. The failure of the cyberattacks against the CEC were one important factor in defusing the planned FIMI campaign. In the end, the small protests that occurred claimed that the elections were illegitimate but had few arguments to explain why and a very small organic turnout to hear them.

Conclusion

The cyber operations targeting Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections were not designed to directly alter vote totals or manipulate ballots. Instead, they were part of a broader hybrid strategy intended to undermine confidence in the electoral process and create the conditions for a contested political outcome.

Because Moldova conducts elections using paper ballots and hand counts, the attackers focused on the digital systems that support the voting process rather than the ballots themselves. Disrupting the Central Election Commission’s infrastructure could have slowed voter verification, delayed the reporting of turnout and results, and created visible uncertainty on election day. In such an environment, information operations could frame technical disruptions as evidence of fraud or manipulation by the government.

These cyber operations were therefore closely linked to other elements of the broader campaign. Disinformation networks sought to produce alleged evidence of fraud. Organized actors attempted to generate disorder around polling stations and in diaspora voting locations. Meanwhile, political networks connected to the Kremlin-aligned opposition prepared to mobilize protests contesting the election outcome. Each of these elements reinforced the others. Technical disruption could provide the initial trigger, information operations could shape public interpretation, and street protests could transform uncertainty into political pressure.

In practice, this integrated strategy largely failed. Moldovan institutions were able to keep critical election infrastructure operational despite sustained DDoS attacks and other cyber operations. At the same time, attempts to generate credible evidence of electoral fraud proved weak, and efforts to mobilize large-scale protests produced only limited participation. Without visible technical disruption or persuasive evidence of wrongdoing, narratives claiming that the election was illegitimate struggled to gain traction. Critically, the election was also not very close.

The events surrounding Moldova’s 2025 elections illustrate an important characteristic of contemporary hybrid interference campaigns. Cyber operations rarely operate in isolation. Their strategic value often lies in enabling or amplifying other political and information operations designed to challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In Moldova’s case, the resilience of election infrastructure prevented cyberattacks from creating the uncertainty needed for these wider operations to succeed.

As elections across Europe continue to face similar hybrid threats, Moldova’s experience highlights the importance of strengthening both technical defenses and institutional coordination. Cybersecurity reforms implemented since 2017 - along with cooperation between government agencies and outside partners - played a key role in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. While vulnerabilities remain, the 2025 elections demonstrate that coordinated preparation can significantly limit the impact of cyber-enabled hybrid attacks.

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This document was leaked, presumably directly to Soloviev, and is one of the most significant document leaks of this kind in years. It’s safe to assume that this leak was not an officially sanctioned trial-balloon by the Moldovan government2, so it remains an open question as to who leaked it and why.

Today we’ll take a look at this non-paper and see what it can tell us about the government’s plans for reintegration.

Read more

In this final piece we examine how the Kremlin is attempting to synchronize their faith-based messaging about Moldova with a larger ecosystem of Russian “anti-globalist” “traditional values” “anti-Sorosist” messaging. In particular we’ll look at how the contradictions and obvious falsehoods in much of this campaign create opportunities for those seeking to combat Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 4: Cross-Border Ideological Synchronization

The narratives and FIMI campaigns discussed in this series of articles represent both tactical efforts at political manipulation and strategic efforts to align with Kremlin-allies across the west. Putin’s Russia did not begin a conversation about “traditional values” vs “globalists” / “Sorosists.” This is language that they have adopted and adapted from existing western discourse. Figures like Brian Brown, who spoke at the Make Europe Great Again (MEGA) conference in Chișinău in July 2025, embody the long history of these connections. Brown is the President of the World Congress of Families, an organization that was co-founded by American and Russian intellectuals in 1997 to promote the “traditional family.” His involvement in influence campaigns around the Moldovan election, and much deeper involvement in support of George Simion in Romania’s elections, show the increasing ties between the religious right in the US, Romania, Moldova and Russia.

In spite of all of these connections, the strategy of aligning all of these groups with Russia’s geopolitical aims suffers from 2 major inconsistencies:

1. A deep aversion to Socialism / Communism amongst the religious right.

2. The complete lack of truth in the claims of “religious oppression” and the Orthodox-centric character of the allegations.

The Problem for the Socialists and People’s Republics

The narratives and campaigns discussed here are part of a broader re-alignment of politics across the region. Moldova’s Soviet-legacy Communist and Socialist parties have never been left wing and always took a center-right position in Moldova’s vague left-right spectrum. With the larger regional / global conversation about ideological politics and the era of power blocs over, this was a useful fudge. They could be both conservative and nostalgic for the (mostly) elderly voters who supported them.

In 2025 this ambiguity became a liability and Socialist leader Igor Dodon openly floated the idea of renaming the party the “Party of Sovereigntists of Moldova.” This potential move was calculated to align his party with Romania’s George Simion and the growing MEGA / sovereigntist movement in Europe. As recently as 2018 Dodon was calling Simion a “fascist,” but in May 2025 he had endorsed Simion’s presidential run and was musing about renaming his own party. Ultimately Dodon did not make the change, either due to party opposition, worries about giving up the Soviet nostalgia that they rely on, or simply due to a lack of time before the elections.

This exposed them internationally and opened up opportunities for PAS and pro-EU groups to message in ways designed to divide right wing talking points about Moldova. Moldova’s Ambassador to the United States, Vlad Kulminski, gave an interview to Fox News following the election where he stated:

“Essentially Russia tried to keep the Republic of Moldova within its orbit, and, in order to do that, it interfered massively in the recent parliamentary elections in the country. And Russia was backing a coalition of Communists, Socialists and Antifa against a center right government party.”

The false inclusion of “Antifa” in this mix only underlines how much electoral messaging is being framed in MAGA terms globally. This analysis about the Communists and Socialists made little sense in Moldova, but drove a wedge into arguments being made in these FIMI campaigns.

Another example of this comes from Conrad Franz’s trip to Transnistria. There he quickly absorbed his host’s propaganda about how there is perfect religious freedom in Transnistria and their portrayal of the region as an Orthodox paradise. At the same time, he noticed a major contradiction - statues of Lenin and Marx everywhere. In subsequent podcasts he explained how he sought to square that circle by putting the question directly to Transnistrian “President” Vadim Krasnoselsky. On the Counterflow Podcast Episode 383 Conrad Franz explained:

“But if you talk to the president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, he would say, and it’s like one of my favorite quotes of any politician and recently he said, “People accuse us of being a sliver of the Soviet Union. I say no. I say we’re actually a sliver of the Russian Empire.” And he’s like a huge imperial historian. And you look at all the new statues that have been built as opposed to the ones that were built under the Soviet times, and they’re all imperial. The biggest statue in Tiraspol is of Suvorov. One of the biggest statues they have is of Catherine the Great, who obviously is the one that initially brought all of this part of the world under Russia. The church is very prominent in town.”

Emphasis mine.

These contradictions create problems for their messaging campaigns and opportunities for those seeking to counter their message even in their own target demographics. But they are adapting and it is very possible that the Party of Socialists does rebrand, or is replaced as the primary Russian proxy by a “sovereigntists” party before the next elections.

The Real State of Religious Tolerance in Moldova

On its face the message that Christians are being persecuted in Moldova by the government and at the behest of the EU holds no water. The specific claim that the Orthodox Church, which claims 95% of the population as adherents is under assault by a secular, globalist, “satanic” government does not add up. If such a crime were happening it is clear that more people than Bishop Markell would be speaking about it. At the same time it is worth taking a look at the people who would be feeling religious persecution, if such a thing existed, namely, those who follow minority religious groups.

To get this perspective I spoke to multiple people in the Evangelical Christian community who agreed to be quoted as “missionaries serving in Moldova.” Evangelicals, representing Baptists, Pentecostals and other protestant denominations make up between 2% and 3% of the population. This community knows quite a bit about state oppression as many of the church elders got their start as bible smugglers or running covert churches during the Soviet period. Many of these churches began as household gatherings forced to hide from the authorities.

Modernly, the Evangelical community has many political differences but largely shares the concerns of the Orthodox church related to the EU. They worry about LGBTQ+ freedoms, abortion and they see the moral perspectives of Western Europe as alien to their way of life. Some segments of the community also adhere to conspiracy theories around COVID and vaccines that are highly prevalent in the Orthodox community. Where these agreements part sharply however is on Ukraine1.

The New Iron Curtain for Believers

One missionary I spoke with had knowledge of the religious situation across what he called the “New Iron Curtain” and explained it as follows: there are 3 levels of religious oppression in our region radiating out from Russia.

1. The Russian Federation - The 2016 “Yarovaya” law and its subsequent implementation has effectively banned religious freedoms. Churches have been closed, pastors have been arrested and currently sit in jail. Religious organizations outside of the Russian Orthodox Church are denied registration, and unregistered religious activity is equated with terrorism.

2. Belarus - Officially they mirror Russian law, but enforcement is less strict. Oppression is bureaucratic and legal and Evangelical churches are denied licenses. Pastors are sitting in jail but the oppression is not absolute and the church exists in the shadows.

3. Transnistria - The region’s “laws” also mimic Russia’s but the oppression is less than Belarus. The missionary I spoke with was not aware of church leaders currently being imprisoned, but noted that there is no official freedom to operate there. No evangelism is allowed and bureaucratic rules prevent gatherings and any official registration.

Asked to characterize the situation in Moldova he stated:

“Ukraine has the most religious freedom in Europe, after Ukraine is Moldova”

Asked to explain that assertion he cited examples of political correctness and what he viewed as limits on speech in various countries in Western Europe. He stated that Moldova and Ukraine are not like that, saying that the countries aren’t “anti-woke” because they never became “woke” in the first place. Asked about assertions by the bloggers and podcasters from this report about how Moldova is more oppressive of religious freedom than the Soviet Union he became apoplectic and did not feel that this statement even deserved response.

One of the missionaries I spoke to explained that the only persecution he had ever witnessed in Moldova was carried out by local priests of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. He explained that in the past these priests might hire local drunken brawlers to assault missionaries with the goal of drawing the police in and getting the missionaries removed from the town. But even that was more than 10 years ago.

For him, his church community was extremely cognizant of how their rights stand now. He said that during open prayer at his church…

“At least once every 2 weeks someone at our church will pray and give thanks for their freedom. They do not mean political freedom, they mean religious freedom.”

Narratives a Mile Wide and an Inch Deep

The contradictions in the messaging around religion in Moldovan politics present serious challenges for Russian FIMI as they continue to push a strategy of aligning and integrating messaging with European far-right and American far-right groups.

Their attempts to target messages at a figure like JD Vance rely on carefully phrased arguments in articles like the one in LifeSiteNews that mostly elide the tougher questions of religious freedom in a country and fully avoid the words “Socialist” and “Communist.” Messaging directed at ROCOR is much more explicit, but is aimed at a small (if highly mobilized) group within the US.

Speaking to Evangelical groups none felt that their churches had been targeted specifically with messaging around the elections. Most of those I spoke to felt that the majority of their community under 50 supported Moldova’s EU integration - though many had reservations. None knew of widespread support for the Russian war in Ukraine or for Moldova returning to the Russian world. None knew of a single instance of their community showing anything but open arms to Ukrainian refugees.

This mirrored actions early in the war by other religious minorities - including Catholics, Muslims and the Jewish Community, which all played outsized roles in refugee relief efforts relative to their community size.

It is plausible that this is the reason that figures like Brian Brown and Bausman’s Bloggers did not appear to engage with minority religious groups as part of their campaigns.

Series Conclusion

In the 2024 and 2025 elections Russia has run active FIMI campaigns targeting religious messaging inside and outside Moldova. They used sophisticated and evolving campaigns that were not simply tactical but were aligned with broader political narratives in Moldova, Europe and the US that Russia sees as sympathetic to their cause.

In Moldova, Shor-network actors adapted 2024 efforts at simple bribery of priests to create a complex network of paid “activists” and online infrastructure organized around the “Salt and Light” newspaper. This network mixed traditional religious content with covert religious messaging and overt calls to action - largely with AI developed pictures. They gathered millions of views and built infrastructure that mostly remains intact and ready for reactivation in future campaigns.

Outside Moldova these narratives were retooled to appeal to MAGA and MEGA figures with the apparent primary hope of triggering statements or social media posts by JD Vance or other senior American figures. Failing that, they spread anti-PAS, anti-Maia Sandu and anti-EU messaging through both main-stream right-wing media outlets and into niche but highly engaged groups like ROCOR. Much of the content produced in this campaign took place in the months after the elections with the most recent content about the trip coming in December 2025.

Strategically, religious messaging is one component of a larger Russian strategy of ideological alignment across right wing groups in the US and Europe. Activists and organizations such as the World Congress of Families have worked towards this goal for years and are now playing a role working to bring these politicians and communities together. Political culture war issues, LGBTQ+ rights and other “traditional family” topics provide fertile common ground for discussion or cooperation. At the same time, much Kremlin FIMI around Moldova seeks to extend this common ground to objectively untrue claims about religious persecution and lack of free speech. The experience of actual religious minorities, as well as the continued use of Soviet nostalgia, provide fertile soil for counter narratives and debunking of claims.

Looking forward, these networks - inside and outside Moldova - are likely to play an ever more key role in Kremlin FIMI. In a hybrid war of disinformation and propaganda that is increasingly targeted by population segments but unconstrained by borders it will be important not only to be aware of these campaigns, but to counter-program and to actively exploit the weaknesses of their narratives.

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This concludes a four-part Moldova Matters series based on a new report produced with WatchDog. Readers interested in the full analysis can read the complete report here.

In Part 3 we look at how the Salt and Light and other agents of Kremlin disinformation simultaneously worked to spread faith-based narratives attacking Moldova in English for Western audiences.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 3: Externally Facing Religious Themed FIMI

In January 2026 I authored a report for Watchdog titled “Externally Facing Influence Campaigns” that looked at case studies of Russian FIMI campaigns targeting western audiences. In it, Case 3: Bausman’s Bloggers, involved a previously unreported campaign organized by the Russian Orthodox Church to spread FIMI about Moldova in publications across the English speaking world.

Exposure of this campaign began on September 18th, when context.ro reported on the visit of American, Canadian and British “bloggers” who were being featured in Salt and Light publications. This delegation was organized by the Moscow Patriarch Department for the Church’s Society and Mass Media Relations so that participants could “get firsthand experience of our [Russian Orthodox] Church life—in Moscow, Moldova, and the Donbas.”

Here is a list of the participants listed by Salt and Light in their posts:

• Charles Bausman - An American with a long history of working as a Russian propagandist. He publishes content called “Fascist” and “antisemitic” by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Bausman entered the US Capitol on January 6th and fled to Russia soon after according to the New York Times. He was the organizer of this delegation alongside the Russian Orthodox Church.

• Conrad Franz - An American who hosts the “World War Now” podcast and Substack newsletter (24,000+ subscribers). Its tagline is “Covering the Third World War and political and religious realignment from the perspective of Christian prophecy and rising multipolarity.” Franz is a convert to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR).

• Buck Johnson - American from Texas, host of the Counterflow podcast. Also a convert to ROCOR, Johnson’s podcast combines Orthodox Christianity, masculinity and Libertarianism.

• James Delingpole - A British far-right commentator and podcaster, former editor of Breitbart UK, known for conspiracy-driven culture-war content, climate change denial, and repeated alignment with pro-Kremlin narratives and Russian state-adjacent media themes.

• John-Henry Westen - Canadian co-founder and editor-in-chief of LifeSiteNews. The site takes an ultra-traditionalist Roman Catholic approach to the news. The site is known for publishing mis- and dis-information and was permanently removed from YouTube in 2021 for promoting MAGA “stop the steal” content. Westen is close to the MAGA movement and was pictured visiting Mar-a-Lago in March 2025.

• Thomas Herman Ertl Jr. - Unknown. I have been unable to find any writer operating under this name.

I reached out to all of those listed above for comment (except for Thomas Herman Ertl Jr) but none answered. Buck Johnson did not actually travel to Moldova because he dropped out last minute for unspecified personal reasons. He did interview other members of the group when they returned for his podcast “Counterflow.”

Claims and Narratives

Following the trip these men produced a series of podcasts, articles and interviews about what they saw in Moldova. You can find a list of the articles in the last report, today we’re going to look at the common themes and narratives and how they tie to wider messaging from the Kremlin. Different publications emphasized different narratives, but most included some version of the following:

• Moldovan elections were rigged. Maia Sandu came to power via fraudulent mail-in ballots. PAS engages in voter suppression - e.g. Moldovans living in Russia had only 2 polling stations to go to.

• PAS and the EU promote an LGBTQ+ agenda. The EU is forcing Moldova to legalize same-sex marriage. Government benefits are being unfairly given to “LGBT teenagers” for political reasons - excluding more qualified straight children. Illegal methods are being used to force pro-LGBT policies on the population. The EU is forcing Moldova to legalize adoption by same-sex couples. The Ministry of Culture and Minister of Education have plans for “incremental integration” of LGBTQ ideology into curriculums. Etc.

• There is no religious freedom in Moldova. EU claims about religious freedom are lies. Moldova and the EU are purging the true church (often called the “canonical” church). Ordinary Moldovans are 95% orthodox but this foreign “globalist” ideology is being forced on them. PAS will ban the church within months if they win the elections, etc.

• Moldova is a police state that oppresses Christians. Priests told the bloggers about how their phones were bugged and they are followed by the “secret police.” Priests sitting in churches would make a shushing motion and point to the supposed locations of hidden listening devices. They claimed that police cut the electrical cables to churches in the middle of the night if they refuse to defect to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. The secret police threaten to beat priests. In one interview Conrad Franz states:

“you start to realize this is like a gangster state. Many priests told us that what they are experiencing right now is worse than some of the worst Soviet times—which is shocking to hear”

• There is no free speech in Moldova. Russian media is banned even when the “vast majority” of the population speaks Russian. Opposition media is banned and people are under physical and electronic surveillance. State security agencies blackmail opposition and priests and they are subject to arbitrary fines, travel restrictions and threats of physical violence constantly.

• The EU is interfering in Moldovan elections through the church. Romanian funding for priests in the Metropolis of Bessarabia (referred to as “EU funding”) limits their abilities to speak out on LGBTQ+ issues or abortion. Conrad Franz claims that priests are paid “60, $70,000 yearly salaries, which like that makes you like one of the richest people in Moldova” to defect. They state that Moldova is too small and poor to stand up to the massive financial interference coming from… the EU.

• Russia vs the EU globalists - a war of civilizations. The war, elections and all politics in Moldova and Ukraine is explained as ecclesiastical and civilizational with no concern for differing political systems, ideology, ethnic or linguistic differences, etc.

• Moldova is Ukraine 2.0. The church schism in Moldova is just like Ukraine but worse in terms of government attacks on Christians.

• Russia is awesome. Transnistria is awesome. Moldova is hell. Tiraspol is much nicer than Chișinău, there is no church oppression there and all experience freedom of speech and religion. Many participants traveled on to the Donbas and to Moscow leading to articles like James Delingpole’s “Believe it or not, Russia is great,” published in the Spectator. Speaking in a podcast Conrad Franz explained:

“If they [Moldovans] could only get good info they would see that staying in the Russian sphere of influence does not doom them to worse quality of life”

Franz was referring to how much nicer Tiraspol (allegedly) was than Chișinău and the need for all Moldovans to spend time in Transnistria in order to better understand the benefits of the Russian world.

Long-form - Not Social Media

Within Moldova, Russian FIMI focuses heavily on short-attention span scrolling platforms. TikTok, Facebook, Telegram - all rely on a compelling picture, short video and / or short text. The goal is to target a mass market audience that is already on these platforms with narratives and arguments tailored to make them stop scrolling and dive a bit deeper. The foreign facing FIMI from the Baussman’s Bloggers trip is structurally different. The output of this trip came in the form of articles in LifeSiteNews, the Spectator and other sites that dive much more deeply into these issues. The content and positioning differs based on the target audience but the assumption is that the readers are open to long-form arguments diving into issues of attacks on religious freedom or free speech, rigged elections or COVID / vaccine conspiracy theories. Moldova is slotted into this space as an example of the worst of the worst offender.

This is even more clear in the podcasts that came out of this trip. Many of these podcasts are very long - up to 3 hours in length. Moldova may not come up until 1-2 hours into the discussions or interviews. This content is targeting people who are already very much part of the community in question and inserting the idea that Christians in Moldova are under attack and that the Moldovan government is an arch example of their brand of political enemy.

Audience Analysis

While we don’t have listener or readership numbers or demographics from these publications, an analysis of the publications themselves and the arguments deployed in different places indicates that there are 3 main target audience groupings for this FIMI:

1. MAGA Leaders - specifically JD Vance

2. MAGA base voters and fellow travelers outside the US - specifically people focused on culture wars and former libertarians

3. Converts to the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR) and people in their media ecosystem

Articles such as Charles Bausman’s “EU’s Shocking Push for LGBT in Europe’s Most Conservative Christian Country – Moldova” in LifeSiteNews frame Moldova in a political context designed to appeal to religious MAGA voters in the US. Narratives focus on globalism and promotion of LGBTQ+ “ideology.” Bausman writes of “widespread electoral fraud using mail-in ballots” in a clear callback to the Stop the Steal movement that led him into the US Capitol on January 6th and led to LifeSiteNews being banned platforms like YouTube.

While narratives like this exist in all of the produced content, it’s worth zooming in on appeals to MAGA leadership and to ROCOR.

“Get this to the desk of J.D. Vance”

A major figure in the delegation’s trip to Moldova was Archbishop Markell of Bălți. He met with the delegation while they were in Moldova and across their many podcast discussions he appears to be one of the key sources for many of the “facts” that they are sharing. On September 22nd, 2025 Markell shared a video on X where he makes a direct appeal to Vice President JD Vance saying:

“The whole world knows that you advocate for traditional values, the traditional family and traditional Christian upbringing (...) In that sense, we are absolutely identical to you. We advocate for the same values which is precisely why the Orthodox Church in Moldova is persecuted.”

The video then pans away from his direct appeal to show Charles Bausman, Conrad Franz, James Delingpole and others sitting in his office reviewing papers of some kind. They don’t seem to have been told that they are part of some appeal video and have likely been included simply as props - showing known American “journalists” and bloggers with Markell.

In subsequent podcasts the members of this delegation frequently refer to the need to educate JD Vance on what is happening in Moldova. In episode 95 of his World War Now podcast, Franz says:

“He’s [Archbishop Markell] been doing his best to raise awareness, and he himself even told me he really thinks that if word about this can get to J.D. Vance, specifically, who we know J.D. in the past Vice President has spoken out against the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is a good sign that if we can potentially raise some awareness, get this to the desk of J.D. Vance, maybe even get this on J.D. Vance’s timeline. We know he follows a lot of people on X that we are familiar with. So if we could get eyes on this, make sure we spread this around, it would really do a service to suffering Orthodox Christian brothers that are never going to get their day in court, both physically in their country illegally or in the media that of course is going to side with their oppressors.”

In April of 2024 Vice Presidential Candidate JD Vance gave a speech calling out the “assault on traditional Christian communities” in Ukraine. He stated:

“That will be … our shame for refusing to use the hundreds of billions of dollars that we send to Ukraine as leverage to ensure and guarantee real religious freedom,”

His remarks in the context of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Schism drew the attention of church authorities and clearly made him a main target of efforts by Conrad Franz and others. In the same podcast Conrad Franz called on his listeners to contact their “local and federal representatives” to put pressure on Moldova, Romania and the EU.

Understanding ROCOR

Of all the participants of this delegation, the one who produced the most content before and after the trip was Conrad Franz. Following the full delegation’s trip to Moldova, he is the only one to speak or write about visiting Transnistria. He then traveled to visit churches in Russian-occupied Ukraine near the frontlines in Donbas, and then on to Moscow.

Franz and Buck Johnson are both recent converts to ROCOR. They are part of a huge wave of conversions to ROCOR taking place in the United States in the years since 2020 - particularly in Texas. Converts are overwhelmingly male and were initially drawn by ROCOR’s staunch anti-vax views. The phenomenon has been reported on by NPR, the BBC and the New York Times which wrote:

“Many of the young Americans new to the pews have been introduced to Orthodoxy by hard-edge influencers on YouTube and other social media platforms. Critics call the enthusiastic young converts “Orthobros.”

The “orthobros” are a growing part of the wider “manosphere” that drive their message with slick looking YouTube videos of priests pumping iron and discussing how converts can “increase their manliness to absurd levels?”

Orthodoxy in the United States has typically been limited to immigrant communities who build churches around those communities - for example, Greeks, Ukrainians and Russians. These new converts are massively swelling the number of Orthodox believers in the United States and bringing a very different flavor to the church. Even before this current wave, Orthodoxy drew a disproportionate number of White Nationalists including high profile figures such as Matthew Heimbach, the organizer of the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville Virginia. Heimbach converted to Antiochian Orthodoxy in 2014 but was excommunicated only a week later after he beat an anti-fascist counterprotestor with a large wooden Orthodox cross. He has since found a Romanian Orthodox group that accepted him.

It is worth noting that while ROCOR is not inherently antisemitic, more fundamentalist Orthodox converts in the US have a high level of overlap with antisemitic and Neo Nazi groups. That includes Charles Bausman (called a publisher of “Fascist” and “antisemitic” material by the Southern Poverty Law Center) and much of the content created following the blogger delegation in Moldova. Antisemitism, millenarian prophecy, talk of Satan (often as Maia Sandu) and similar themes run through many of the podcasts produced following this trip.

It is also worth noting that many of the ideas prevalent in this wing of ROCOR - including the slogan “Orthodoxy or Death” - are banned in Russia as extremist. Conrad Franz and many in this movement are monarchists who hope to see the return of a Russian Tsar after Vladimir Putin. It is ironic to note that some of their content, if produced in Russia and in Russian, would likely result in a close encounter with actual political, religious and speech persecution.

This article is Part 3 of a four-part Moldova Matters series. In the final installment, we examine how narratives developed in Moldova were repackaged for audiences in the United States and Western Europe — and what this reveals about a broader ideological alignment between Kremlin messaging and segments of the Western far right.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

This article is the second in a four-part series drawn from a new report published in collaboration with WatchDog on the role of religion in Kremlin-aligned influence operations targeting Moldova. While Part 1 examined the historical roots of Moldova’s Orthodox church divide, here we turn to the election campaign itself.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 2: The Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Elections

In addition to in-line links to investigations in the local press, this section draws heavily from the October 1, 2025 DFL report titled Targeting the faithful: Pro-Russia campaign engages Moldova’s Christian voters1 which is worth reading in full.

In May 2025 Journal TV exposed a Kremlin operation called “Matushka” which sought to use clergy members of the Moldovan Orthodox Church to influence the September parliamentary elections. This was really an extension and adaptation of existing operations targeting the EU referendum and presidential elections in 2024. In all cases, the goal was the same - to defeat President Maia Sandu and the PAS party and to turn the country away from the path of EU integration.

In 2024 the operation worked as follows:

• Priests and lay church associates traveled to Russia ostensibly to participate in religious pilgrimages. Once there, they were trained by Russian agents and members of the Shor-network in how to influence their parishioners‘ political views.

• Journal TV reported that around 900 priests and 200 lay associates received Russian MIR bank cards in this process. Ilan Shor’s organization Evrazia paid them $300 - $1000 / month via these cards as compensation for their political work.

• Shor-network handlers and Russian political operatives arranged followup calls with the priests to instruct them as to which politicians to support. Initially they were told to promote Shor’s candidate Victoria Furtună, then support was switched to Alexandr Stoianoglo in the second round.

The results of this scheme appear to have been mixed. Many priests happily pocketed the money, enjoyed their pilgrimage and then never spoke about politics from the pulpit. In essence, Moscow spent a lot of money but did not have tools to verify the results.

They changed tactics in 2025. Journal TV reported that 19 archpriests (Protopop) were invited to a pilgrimage in the Holy Land between March 30th and April 3rd 2025. There the Kremlin’s political organizers announced a new strategy. Instead of focusing on ordinary priests they created a grassroots network organized around trusted nodes at the archpriest level. This network was mostly laymen and laywomen and operated on a pay-for-results model. “Activists” would organize social projects and events and would distribute a new newspaper called “Salt and Light” (Sare și Lumină).

This network spread information online via various religious affiliated facebook pages and Telegram groups (including the official Salt and Light page) and offline with their newspaper and events.

Whether distributed as a newspaper, via social media or from the pulpit, the messages from this network were consistent. They consisted of a blend of inoffensive religious content and cloaked election messaging with a series of recurring themes. These included:

• “Moldova with Faith” versus “Moldova with Europe” - One campaign presented side by side pictures of orthodox weddings vs gay weddings, happy families vs promiscuous hippies and similar themes. In each case true orthodoxy was pitted against European integration which was presented as “moral decay.”

• Church Schism & Anti-Romania Messaging - The Metropolis of Bessarabia was consistently painted as a threat to believers’ religious rights. It was framed as a tool of Romanian nationalism, EU integration and western degradation (sometimes even presented as a slippery slope to protestantism or catholicism).

• Church “under siege” - They said that the Moldovan authorities are waging war on the Church. In this narrative Maia Sandu and PAS are trying to destroy true orthodoxy, take church property and lead believers into a godless and degraded EU. They suggest that the authorities are promoting the Metropolis of Bessarabia and attacking the Moldovan Orthodox Church to create a “Ukrainian scenario” whereby the state would play an active hand in fully driving out the Russian Orthodox Church and its subsidiaries.

• Direct Political Messaging - Readers were told that PAS was preparing anti-church laws for when they were re-elected and messages and videos openly promoted pro-Kremlin candidates. In one video, Archbishop Markell defended Bashkan Evgenia Gutsul and framed her imprisonment as a political attack on innocent religious people. This video was heavily promoted in their network. Other posts promoted Shor-network candidate Victoria Furtuna before her party was removed from the elections. On September 26 on the final day of the electoral campaign readers were told to “follow the star” with a picture of a ballot voted for the Patriotic Bloc.

Many of the posts involved pictures or graphics that were clearly developed with AI. The Salt and Light network extended onto TikTok, YouTube, OK, VK, Facebook and Telegram. Its content was further promoted by other pages, including regional church pages for various dioceses around Moldova.

In addition to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), these pages also included calls to action - usually asking readers to click a link and interact with a Telegram bot in exchange for “prizes.” These tactics were used to gather personal information on readers and watchers.

Posts gathered millions of views and tens of thousands of followers across the online social networks. It’s unclear how many Salt and Light newspapers were distributed, but photos and stories posted online show mass distribution in Chișinău apartment buildings as well as across villages. In one instance alone, Police seized 200,000 newspapers from a clandestine print house. Of those nearly 100,000 were religious papers, mostly Salt and Light in Romanian and Russian.

As of February 2026 this network is still operational. While many websites have since been blocked, and follower counts on social media have fallen, the pages are still actively posting content. Now most posts are religious and non-political in nature, but the network is active and capable of reactivating in future elections.

Church “Seizure” Provocations

In parallel with the FIMI propaganda operations, pro-Russian groups have staged a series of occupations and attacks related to churches and priests that have switched to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. This can involve a mob physically expelling a Metropolis of Bessarabia priest and his family from a church and occupying it. Violent issues like these generally stem from a dispute over property rights, with the mob claiming that the church building belongs to the Moldovan Orthodox Church and therefore cannot defect. As many churches are the property of the local governments or the Ministry of Culture, this is a more complex legal issue. The Moldovan government has sought not to take sides in these religious disputes, but the police are often pulled in to maintain order and ultimately side with whichever side the courts rule has the right to use the property.

This leads to scenes of violent confrontations with the police in the middle. Nuance about court orders and multi-year EU-level lawsuits are cast aside in favor of narratives spinning these confrontations as police organized church seizures. These incidents fuel local propaganda and are the nexus of a separate FIMI campaign focused on western audiences.

Taken together, these online and offline campaigns shaped an information space designed as a wedge between voters’ national and economic aspirations with the EU and their faith and traditions. These networks remain active and are capable of shifting back to political messaging in the future.

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This article is Part 2 of a four-part Moldova Matters series. In Part 3, we follow the evolution of these efforts and how the “Salt and Light” ecosystem was used to create English language disinformation targeting Moldova for believers in the West.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

This article is the first in a four-part series based on that report. Here we begin with the historical context that makes these influence operations possible: the existence of two parallel Orthodox church structures in Moldova. The Moldovan Orthodox Church, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinate to the Romanian Patriarchate.

Understanding how this ecclesiastical split emerged - and how it compares to the better-known church schism in Ukraine - is essential to understanding how religious narratives later became intertwined with election messaging and foreign influence campaigns.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 1: Understanding the Church Schism

In terms of self-identification, Moldova is among the most religious countries in Europe with 2.27 million people, 94.3% of the population1 self-identifying as Orthodox in the 2024 census. While the census does not break down affiliation within the Orthodox faith, Moldova has 2 different churches that represent different cultural and historical affiliations for believers. They are:

1. Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova - Often called the Moldovan Orthodox Church, this branch is an autonomous self-governing church within the Russian Orthodox Church that is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Moldovan Orthodox Church governs day to day operations locally but is canonically subordinate to Moscow and the head of the church, currently Metropolitan Vladimir, is officially confirmed by the Moscow Patriarch.

2. Metropolis of Bessarabia - This church is directly subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church under the Romanian Patriarchate. The church is headed by a Metropolitan, currently Metropolitan Petru, who is appointed and confirmed by the Romanian Holy Synod. Unlike the Moldovan Orthodox Church, the Metropolis of Bessarabia is not autonomous and is an integral part of the Romanian Patriarchate.

There are no firm estimates of membership in the 2 churches, sources generally cite 80% of believers belonging to the Moldovan Orthodox Church and 20% to the Metropolis of Bessarabia2.

A Brief History of the 2 Churches

Prior to the Annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire in 1812, the local Orthodox Church was integrated into the Principality of Moldavia which was under Ottoman suzerainty. The church was under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople but was locally integrated with Romanian as the primary language of daily life and Romanian operating alongside Old Church Slavonic

for church functions.

Following the Russian Annexation in 1812 the Diocese of Chișinău was created under the Russian Orthodox Church and administration shifted to St. Petersburg which began a process of Russification. The Romanian language was sometimes tolerated, sometimes sidelined, but the church was consistently used as a tool of imperial control and integration.

In 1918 the Moldavian Democratic Republic was created and then quickly voted to form a union with Romania. Following this, in 1925, the Metropolis of Bessarabia was formally established to govern the church in the region under the control of Bucharest. Throughout the period of Romanian control (1918 - 1940) church life was re-Romanianized.

Following the Soviet Annexation of Bessarabia (1940) and then during Soviet control after WW2 the Orthodox Church entered the turbulent world of Soviet state-church politics. After initial waves of suppression, Stalin introduced limited toleration during the Second World War and following the war the church was allowed to function within strict state control, including KGB infiltration of the clergy.

The modern church schism dates from Moldovan independence in 1991 when the Metropolis of Bessarabia once again became active and began contesting legitimacy with the Moldovan Orthodox Church. Both churches claimed historical legitimacy by leaning on different historical interpretations and political traditions. The Moldovan Orthodox Church attempted to ban the Metropolis of Bessarabia with state support from successive governments in the 1990s, but lost in the European Court of Human Rights in the case Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova which forced legal recognition of the Romanian church in Moldova in 2001. Since then both churches have legally operated in the same territory.

Linguistically, the Metropolis of Bessarabia operates exclusively in Romanian. The Moldovan Orthodox Church also primarily operates in Romanian (which it calls “Moldovan”) but also operates Russian speaking parishes in parts of the country with majority Russian populations.

Growing Schism (2023 - Present)

While geopolitics began to fuel the schism with the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014, the full scale invasion in 2022 acted as a major shock to the status quo. In Moscow, Patriarch Kirill has framed the war as a civilizational struggle and has openly supported Russia’s war of aggression and conquest in Ukraine. This left the semi-autonomous Moldovan Orthodox Church institutionally tied to a war of aggression and believers and church leadership struggled to manage these geopolitical challenges.

Beginning in 2022 and accelerating in the following years, parishes began transferring from the Moldovan Orthodox Church to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. The growing schism burst into public attention in October 2023 when Metropolitan Vladimir, leader of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, wrote a letter to Patriarch Kirill which leaked to the press. In this remarkably frank letter, he laid out the challenges facing the Moldovan Orthodox Church and specifically cited the political pressure caused by the war. Metropolitan Vladimir noted an increasing exodus towards the Metropolis of Bessarabia and how the actions of the church in Moscow are forcing people to decide between their “Latin roots” and the clear ambitions to reincorporate the country into the “Russian World.” In the letter he pleads for additional funding and resources to offset growing costs associated with energy prices and competition with the Metropolis of Bessarabia who, he claims, pay priests €800 - €900 euros / month in addition to healthcare and a pension.

While the hierarchy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church remains opaque, there are publicly 2 competing factions with different approaches to politics and geopolitics. Metropolitan Vladimir has publicly tried to chart a pragmatic course while remaining closely tied to Moscow3. More aggressive is the Bishop Markell of Bălți and Făleşti, who pushes aggressive Russian talking points and appears frequently in Kremlin organized Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns (as we will see below).

Factors Driving the Schism

Here are some key factors driving parish-level decisions on defections to the Metropolis of Bessarabia:

• History & Proximity - Parishes in communities with stronger Romanian identity ties - particularly along the Prut river - were among the first to switch.

• Geopolitics - Russia’s war in Ukraine and the bellicose rhetoric from the Patriarch has caused both priests and parishioners to switch allegiance due to a crisis of conscience.

• Politics - The Moldovan Orthodox Church has repeatedly been drawn into schemes by the Kremlin and Shor-network to become involved in Moldovan elections. Political speeches from the pulpit have anecdotally driven away parishioners who are uncomfortable mixing politics and spirituality.

• Money - The Metropolis of Bessarabia is a direct funder of their parishes in Moldova. According to expert Andrei Curararu, salaries for priests are closer to €300 euros / month, rather than the propaganda claim of ~€900 (or much higher as we’ll see below). But this number disguises a different relationship with the church organization. In the Metropolis of Bessarabia resources flow downward from the center through the bishoprics and to the parishes. In the Moldovan Orthodox Church funds flow upward with a portion of the “fees” gathered for church services being directed towards the upper echelons. Thus, regardless of monthly salaries, it may be more lucrative for a priest and local parish to be part of the Metropolis of Bessarabia as they are more able to keep their “earnings.”

• Opportunity - The hierarchy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church is opaque and many priests feel that they do not have opportunities for advancement. Some switch to the Metropolis of Bessarabia because they feel that their own careers will advance more quickly.

Of these factors, Andrei Curararu says that top-down motivations of priests are more common in the decision to switch allegiance than bottom-up movements of parishioners. Motivations are complex, but neither church is “reformed” in the western parlance and parishioners exercise limited democratic functions within church decision making.

Opposition to switching churches is often rooted in tradition and the calendar. While a majority of Moldovans self-identify as Orthodox there are no solid numbers as to how many go to church regularly. Many, likely a large majority, are culturally orthodox and primarily interact with the church through family milestones (births, deaths, marriages) or through holidays such as Christmas and Easter. The Moldovan Orthodox Church uses the Julian Calendar while the Metropolis of Bessarabia uses the Georgian Calendar. As such, a change between the churches requires people to re-order their holiday calendar and change traditions that they have often celebrated all their lives.

Role of the Church in the Community

For western readers, it is important to note that the Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Metropolis of Bessarabia have a lot in common both structurally and theologically. On the question of EU accession, the Metropolis of Bessarabia is considerably more pro-EU than the Moldovan Orthodox Church which largely aligns with the Kremlin’s anti-EU position. But that is not because they differ on key issues - e.g. LGBTQ+ rights, “traditional values,” etc. The Romanian Orthodox Church has many of the same anxieties but has seen the process of EU integration firsthand and knows that it is not directly threatening to their church. They may pursue many of the same culture wars but they do so within the EU’s infrastructure.

Both churches draw on the same elite and same seminaries and schools. Both churches see their role in their communities as the keepers of tradition and ritual and as enforcers of community rules. Neither church shows aspects of the reformed traditions of Western Europe, including democratization of parish governance or a role in the community’s social welfare. It is worth stressing that during the great crises of these past years - COVID lockdowns and the 2022 Ukraine Refugee Crisis - neither church played an organized role in providing supplies, donations or aid to those in need. The schism is about hierarchy, language and history - but not about theology, or the role of the church in community life.

Comparison with Ukraine

Many Kremlin FIMI narratives compare the church schism in Moldova with the parallel upheaval in the orthodox church in Ukraine. They are not similar and it is important to quickly explain why. Here is a short comparison:

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This article is Part 1 of a four-part Moldova Matters series based on a new report published in collaboration with WatchDog. In Part 2, we examine how religious messaging was mobilized in Moldova during the 2024-2025 elections and how networks of clergy, activists, and online channels helped translate theological language into political influence.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

I spent quite some time going through the ~80 files where Moldova is mentioned and looking for indications of local politicians (oligarchs) or other clear connections. Before getting into it, let’s exclude a few things:

• The files showed no evidence that Epstein ever came to Moldova

• There are no apparent connections with Moldovan politicians or other known local figures

With that said, Epstein exchanges messages about Moldova with 3 different people in 2 very different contexts. They indicate that he is both aware of the country in terms of politics / geopolitics, and that the country figured somehow, even if peripherally, into his recruitment of women.

This release by the Justice Department is not the last of the Epstein files, so even though we don’t have much now let’s take a quick look in order to understand the scope of what we do know so far. We’ll start with the connections to a major EU diplomat and then move to a conversation with an unnamed “facilitator” / recruiter for Epstein’s sex trafficking network.

Messages with Miroslav Lajčák

Read more

This report draws on articles and reports by the local press, think tanks, original reporting and past investigations by Moldova Matters. It documents Kremlin “grasstops1” influence operations targeting elite networks in the United States and Europe. Through a series of case studies I look at how western institutions, legal structures and companies are weaponized against the very democracies that allow them to exist.

This is the first report of its kind to specifically focus on this type of campaign. Lots of (excellent) work has been done on how social media has been weaponized to spread disinformation to voters in the Moldovan election cycle. Far less attention has been paid to the networks and organizations being used to target western politicians in order to convince them that Moldova cannot and should not be allowed into the EU.

You can read the full report online right now at this link:

Externally Facing Influence Campaigns

In this article, I’m sharing a section of the report that I want to particularly highlight for Moldova Matters’s readers. It’s an original investigation into a pre-election “delegation” of American, Canadian and British far-right influencers that I’m calling “Bausman’s Bloggers” - named after the man who helped organize this event, Charles Bausman.

Mr. Bausman has quite a history and has been called “anti-semetic” and a “fascist” by the Southern Poverty Law Center, and a “Russian Propagandist” by the New York Times. Bausman has called himself a “political refugee” in Russia, where he spent some years apparently avoiding charges related to his participation in the January 6th insurrection at the US capital2.

Read on for the story of how Mr. Bausman wound up in Moldova right before the September elections, and how members of his delegation are still spreading disinformation about Moldova in publications as recently as December.

Quick Definition:

FIMI = Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference

Case 3: Bausman’s Bloggers

Prior to the 2025 parliamentary elections the Moldovan press reported on an operation dubbed “Matushka” whereby the Shor network recruited Orthodox Clergy to influence devote voters to vote against parties supporting EU integration. One element of this campaign was a physical newspaper and digital social media presence called “Salt and Light.” On October 1st, after the election, the Digital Forensics Lab (DFL) wrote an article analyzing one aspect of this campaign involving foreign influencers. They wrote:

To reinforce the narrative that the Moldovan Orthodox Church is “under siege” by the pro-European government, Salt and Light invited a group of conservative bloggers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada to Moldova. The visit was heavily promoted on their Telegram channel and amplified by Moldova24 (MD24), a television outlet previously identified by DFRLab as part of the Ilan Shor network and reliant on RT’s digital infrastructure.

This strategy aims to lend legitimacy to pro-Kremlin talking points by showcasing endorsements from foreign voices, framing the situation in Moldova as part of a broader geopolitical struggle. One post claimed: “The church schism in Moldova is now being discussed not only inside the country… Journalists and bloggers from the US, UK, and Canada, after seeing the situation with their own eyes, admit: events are unfolding according to an alarming Ukrainian scenario.” The campaign went further by attempting to appeal directly to US Vice President JD Vance to “intervene and help defend the traditional Church.”

The visit of the “bloggers” was first reported by context.ro on September 18th - immediately prior to the elections. Their report is primarily based on a Telegram post from the Salt & Light channel. Both reports focused on how the visit of this group was designed to lend credibility to Kremlin talking points in the Moldovan elections. That is true, but there was also a foreign targeted FIMI campaign that has not previously been reported. The following is original work produced for this report.

The Journalists & Bloggers

Here is a listing of the people who Salt and Light claim joined this trip:

• Charles Bausman - An American with a long history of working as a Russian propagandist. He publishes content called “Fascist” and “antisemitic” by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Bausman entered the US Capital on January 6th and fled to Russia soon after according to the New York Times. He was the organizer of this delegation alongside the Russian Orthodox Church.

• Conrad Franz - An American who hosts the “World War Now” podcast and Substack newsletter (24,000+ subscribers). Its tagline is “Covering the Third World War and political and religious realignment from the perspective of Christian prophecy and rising multipolarity.” Franz is a convert to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR).

• Buck Johnson - American from Texas, host of the Counterflow podcast. Also a convert to ROCOR, Johnson’s podcast combines Orthodox Christianity, masculinity and Libertarianism.

• James Delingpole - A British far-right commentator and podcaster, former editor of Breitbart UK, known for conspiracy-driven culture-war content, climate change denial, and repeated alignment with pro-Kremlin narratives and Russian state-adjacent media themes.

• John-Henry Westen - Canadian co-founder and editor-in-chief of LifeSiteNews. The site takes an ultra-traditionalist Roman Catholic approach to the news. The site is known for publishing mis- and dis-information and was permanently removed from Youtube in 2021 for promoting MAGA “stop the steal” content. Westen is close to the MAGA movement and was pictured visiting Maralago in March 2025.

• Thomas Herman Ertl Jr. - Unknown. I have been unable to find any writer operating under this name.

Salt and Light used confusing variations of many of the “journalists and bloggers” names. They also made a mistake, as Buck Johnson did not actually come to Moldova. On his podcast he later spoke about being invited on the trip by Charles Bausman but dropping out at the last minute for unclear personal reasons.

In an interview with orthochristian.com, Conrad Franz is introduced as follows:

“Conrad was invited to Russia by the Moscow Patriarch Department for the Church’s Society and Mass Media Relations, to get firsthand experience of our Church life—in Moscow, Moldova, and the Donbas.”

I reached out to all the trip participants (except Thomas Herman Ertl Jr.) for comment about who funded the trip and what it entailed. None responded. In subsequent articles and podcasts none directly state who paid for the trip, but multiple participants explain that it was organized by the Russian Orthodox Church.

FIMI Produced

In a future report I will be looking at the role of faith based groups in Kremlin FIMI operations around the Moldovan elections. In that report, we will look at key themes, messaging and the roles played by various individuals, witting or unwitting, in Kremlin information operations. For now, here is a listing of the content produced by these individuals referencing Moldova and their trip after the fact. All of this material is in English and most came out well after the Moldovan election. This implies that the blogger delegation had a dual purpose: 1) to support the Romanian and Russian language FIMI operations reported by DFL above, and 2) to produce longer term content for highly specific audiences in the English speaking world.

• LifeSiteNews, “EU’s Shocking Push for LGBT in Europe’s Most Conservative Christian Country – Moldova,” article by Charles Bausman (Sept. 30, 2025)

• Counterflow Podcast Episode 383, “A Report on Russia, Moldova, and the Church, with Conrad Franz,” Host Buck Johnson interviews Conrad Franz (Oct. 8, 2025)

• World War Now Podcast, “BREAKING: MOLDOVA PERSECUTING ORTHODOXY! Church Targeted by State! ON THE GROUND REPORT, ” Hosted by Conrad Franz and co-host Dmitriy Kalyagin (Sept 20, 2025)

• The Spectator, “Believe it or not, Russia is great,” James Delingpole (Sept. 25, 2025). Reprinted in part in The Irish Sun (Sept. 28, 2025)

• Delingpod, “Conrad Franz,” podcast host James Delingpole interviews Conrad Franz, (October 14, 2025)

• Delingpod, “Dick Delingpole,” podcast host James Delingpole lets his brother Dick Delingpole interview him about his trip to Russia (October 17, 2025)

• Delingpod, “Charles Bausman,” podcast host James Delingpole interviews Charles Bausman about their trip (October 21, 2025)

• Orthodox Christianity (orthochristian.com), Part 1: “ORTHODOXY WILL BE PREACHED AND SPREAD AS THESE FATEFUL DAYS UNFOLD” Part 2: “PERSECUTION IN MOLDOVA

• Conrad Franz talks about his trip to the pious land of Moldova,” articles chronicling a 2 part interview of Conrad Franz by Nun Cornelia (Rees) (Dec. 12, 2025)

With the last interviews and articles coming in mid December, the English language output from this election time visit to Moldova may not yet have finished.

High Level Meetings and Clear State Organization

In his interview on Orthodox Christianity dot com, Conrad Franz is introduced as having been “invited to Russia by the Moscow Patriarch Department for the Church’s Society and Mass Mediа Relations” (...) “to get firsthand experience of our Church life—in Moscow, Moldova, and the Donbas.“

From various articles and interviews it is clear that the Russian Orthodox Church, through the department listed above, issued the invitations for this trip. Charles Bausman coordinated the trip itself and may have been the one to select the participants.

After their travels to Moldova, the group apparently split apart. Conrad Franz went on to travel to Transnistria which he stated was “not part of the tour because there is no persecution there.” While there he met with Transnistrian “President” Vadim Krasnoselsky. From there he went on to Moscow and then to the Donbas where he toured frontline positions and churches.

Charles Bausman and James Delingpole also went on to Moscow after Moldova. In their podcasts they speak of meetings with “high level ministers” and with Deputy Chair of the State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy.

The level or organization and facilitation by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, as well as the rapid dissemination in the Shor network, imply a coordinated effort. But that does not imply (necessarily) that any individual who participated played an entirely knowing role. We’ll discuss this more in Section 2 and in a future report on the role of religious groups in election related FIMI.

Once again, I encourage you to check out the whole report - you can find it online here:

Externally Facing Influence Campaigns

The Story…

On January 12th Ukrainian English language outlet Euromaidan Press published an article that basically alleged the following:

• On January 1st 2026 Moldova and Ukraine coordinated to completely close the borders with Transnistria

• Russian troops are now trapped in the region and cannot go in or out

• A 100% economic blockade has been imposed and no travel in or out of the region is permitted

• Moldova has strengthened internal control measures, introduced strict border controls and closed land and air access to the region

Euromaidan Press claims (in their retraction and apology) that their article itself was “based on analysis from the video channel Reporting from Ukraine.”

Longtime Moldova Matters readers will probably see a few issues with the claims above. Rather than explain myself, let me quote from an excellent (if exasperated) post from Irina Tabaranu, journalist and founder of Zona de Securitate, the top outlet in Moldova for reporting on Transnistria. She writes:

“Everything presented there is nonsense. Ukraine closed its border along the perimeter of the Transnistrian region on February 28, 2022. On January 1, 2026—as stated in the article—there was nothing left to close; the border was already closed. The rotation of Russian troops has been halted since 2014 and has not been resumed.”

She went on to castigate local Moldovan news outlets for parroting this story without bothering to confirm it. Then she continues about the idea that Moldova “tightened controls” and closed the border completely writing:

“Moscow controls the peacekeeping mission on the Dniester, which has 15 military posts along the river and would have intervened if any additional post [from Moldova] had appeared or if any road had been blocked.

Cargo vehicles are circulating, people are traveling by public or private transport as usual. Where do you get such information? IT IS JANUARY 12—WOULDN’T ANYONE HAVE SPOKEN UP IF ACCESS TO AND FROM THE TRANSNISTRIAN REGION WERE BLOCKED?

You have the opportunity to see the reality on the ground with your own eyes.

Please question everything you read online and tag your friends who have reposted the false claim about the supposed “blockade” imposed by Chișinău on the Transnistrian region.

Please inform yourselves from trustworthy sources that cite real institutions and officials, with first and last names, and that refer to documents and decisions that are easy to verify. Articles on such important topics, without an author and a clear source, can only be premeditated rumors with far from honest aims..”

The all caps bit was her emphasis not mine, but it echos my own feeling when I was reading incoming message. The idea that something as seismic as a total and coordinated blockade would be unreported in Moldova for 12 days is pretty improbable - right? Like, at least one of the 20,000 Transnistrians who come to work in Moldova every day would have mentioned something? or the untold number of others who come shopping? or the HUGE number of people from both sides traveling back and forth for the holidays?

In any case, rest assured that if Moldova and Ukraine start a war of sorts with Transnistria I’ll write about it in a timeline faster than 12 days.

All of that said…

A lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on…

This story flew. One X post I found had more than 547,000 views, 2,100 reshares and 270+ comments. It sported a community note explaining the retraction, but that hardly mattered to the many people who ran with it further. Ukrainian English language outlet1 United24 also wrote up the story and did not follow the retraction - meaning that posts about their story are still spreading without those semi-helpful community notes.

The original video that Euromaidan based their article on remains on youtube and has more than 480,000 views at the time of writing.

We’ve seen this situation before and we need to see the pattern that’s emerging.

Moscow Wants Transnistria in the News

In the English language press specifically. Recall, in December Ukrinform wrote an article about how Transnistria was preparing for war - and at Moldova Matters we wrote how that wasn’t true. Back in March 2024 a much bigger news cycle broke into just about every English language outlet from CNN to the NY Times to the Guardian to CNBC. It was also completely untrue as we wrote at the time.

I don’t want to cast dispersions on Euromaidan news - they did a good job with a quick correction. They even quoted Moldova Matters as saying “that sensationalized reports about Transnistria have previously been planted to ‘inspire panic in newsrooms that are not well informed about Moldovan affairs.’”

So they admitted that they got rolled and promised that they are reviewing their editorial process. No such luck from Ukrinform, United24 or another of the influencers I saw running the with the story.

The problem here is that there is an improbable alignment between Ukrainian patriots (and outside supporters) and the Kremlin here. Hardline, especially really-online (aka NAFO), Ukraine supporters cheerlead a tough line on Transnistria. Meanwhile, the Kremlin sees Transnistria as an invaluable security asset with the primary goal of keeping Moldova out of the EU. Messaging is key here - if they can make Moldova look unstable or like a security threat to the rest of the EU then they are undermining Moldova’s EU accession.

For every one NAFO bro who cheers war with Transnistria tens of thousands of citizens in Spain and France will just say “Moldova really seems like too much trouble right?” The goal is to make Moldova seem unsafe and out of control of its own territory - and the people spreading these fake stories play right into this game.

I wrote about the security situation in detail before the new year:

A Simple Rule of Thumb…

When you’re wondering about a sensational story spreading around the internet about Moldova I would use these basic rules:

1. Did it originate in local Moldovan press?

2. Is that source trustworthy?

Any story being printed by an outlet in Kyiv or Washington or anywhere else that claims to have bombshell information about Moldova from 2 weeks ago better be backed up with a 2 week media storm in Moldova about said bombshell. I don’t know of a single case where a news outlet outside of Moldova got a big Moldova story before the local press. So when in doubt - check ZdG, Zona de Securitate, Newsmaker, Agora, TV8 or one of the many other amazing local news outlets.

Quick Note: All the links in this article are to past Moldova Matters articles from the year unless otherwise noted.

July - A Month That Passed Like a Year

Despite the official campaign being more than a month away, it was clear that from the start of July the election was in full swing. Irina Vlah began the month by gifting the world her insane rap video “PAS, давай, до свидания!” (“PAS Goodbye”) (link to video on facebook).

The EU began ramping up clear support for Moldova with the first EU-Moldova bilateral summit in Chisinau. The summit was considered a major foreign policy success with Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu summing it up as proof that “Moldova matters.”

Meanwhile, the border police blocked 195 “athletes” from Russia and Belarus from entering the country, calling them a “high risk to national security.” Attempts by Russia to infiltrate trained people into Moldova would only accelerate in the run up to elections.

Citing National Security, Romania banned Moldovan citizens Ion Ceban, Vasile Tarlev and Natalia Morari from entering the country - effectively banning them from the entire Schengen zone for 5 years.

This was great timing for Moldova Matters, because in late June and early July I published parts two and three of my investigation into Vasile Tarlev’s lobbying contracts in Washington DC. After more than 6 months of parsing tax returns, FARA filings, talking to sources and attracting personal smears from Mr. Tarlev’s people, I finally closed the book on the main unanswered questions of the whole affair. This might have made more of a splash1, but July was not done with us yet.

Ilan Shor gathered his political forces in Moscow under the banner of the Pobeda (Victory) Bloc and announced that their electoral program - Moldova should be annexed by Russia. They nominated Bashkan Gutsul to lead the party list and she accepted from her jail cell a short while after. Meanwhile, new journalistic investigations linked Shor to paramilitary training camps in Bosnia and Serbia.

Meanwhile, Igor Dodon (Socialist), Irina Vlah (Heart of Moldova), Vasile Tarlev (Future of Moldova) and Vladimir Voronin (Communist) agree to officially create the Patriotic Bloc. While 3 of the party leaders chose to celebrate this with words about “sovereignty” and removing PAS from power, Mr. Voronin struck up a far more pessimistic tone and indicated that he thought the project was more or less doomed2.

The mandate of parliament ended mid month and all eyes turned towards elections when…

Surprise!! Plahotniuc is Detained in Greece

In another “no one had this on their bingo cards” moments of 2025, the Moldovan police announced on July 22nd that the Greek authorities in Athens had detained 2 Moldovan citizens - Vladimir Plahotniuc and Constantin Țuțu. Journalists quickly reported on the luxury villa he was hiding at in Athens, the dozens of IDs and fake identities, new details on Plaha’s Kremlin connections and early questions about how he might fight extradition (or try to get extradited to Russia instead). Meanwhile, Plahotniuc returned to social media to share his musings with us on facebook, and Veaceslav Platon returned to Telegram as the UK authorities released him on bail.

Surprise!! It’s MEGA time in Chisinau!

Another surprise was when we all discovered that Europe’s far right Make Europe Great Again (MEGA) leadership had all converged in Chisinau for a conference on July 28th. The news broke when American Christian fundamentalist Brian Brown was denied entry at the airport. Brown, who leads the World Congress of Families and has extensive contacts with the Trump administration, Russian government, Romanian far right, and many other Christian far-right groups around Europe, ultimately was let into the country following pressure from the US Embassy.

At the conference, George Simion spoke about how Moldova was really part of Romania and Brian Brown accused the Moldovan government of being communist.

MEGA Chisinau 2025’s website was basically a burner site, but no real information but headings like “Road Trip” followed by “lorem ipsum…” and other placeholder text. The entire event seemed to be a thinly veiled astroturfing event designed to promote Moldova’s pro-Kremlin and Shor-linked political groups while generating anti-PAS headlines.

Warnings of “Unprecedented Intervention”

As July came to a close, President Sandu chaired a meeting of the Supreme Security Council and warned of unprecedented interference in the elections by the Kremlin. She stated that this came in the form of 3 captive factions being run by the Russian government, namely “The Sovereignists,” Shor and his parties and False Pro-EU Parties.

Not everyone liked this PAS vs the world approach - even among the pro-EU and anti-Russia community. It was a major debate over the summer as people worried about there being zero potential pro-EU coalition partners for PAS and despaired at the party winning a new mandate on its own. I wrote a piece unpacking this political reality on the pro-EU flank and traced this history of PAS in the process. Here’s a link:

July - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

August - The Shadow Campaign

At the start of August I took a short vacation in the spirt of seeking a little calm before the storm. As such I missed out on a few fun stories like Maia Sandu stealing / buying sperm from Neil Patrick Harris and Elton John (not real stories of course). As Russian propaganda got weirder, a ZdG report from inside the MEGA conference highlighted the fact that no one managed to anticipate questions like “who paid for this?” (to which there were no answers).

On August 5th Bashkan Gutsul was found guilty and sentenced to 7 years in prison. This verdict was in a sense shocking - the justice system had actually held someone accountable for political corruption. We know that the pressure on the judge and prosecutors was immense. They received death threats and photos of decapitated bodies to their phones constantly. SMS threats were sent to their colleagues and families inviting them to the official’s funerals. One judge had a funeral wreath delivered to her door.

With the official campaign due to start at the end of the month, a sort of shadow campaign continued. Romanian President Nicușor Dan visited Moldova for his personal family vacation and spent time with President Sandu and visited with Moldovans at festivals.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Voronin seemed intent on torpedoing the Patriotic Bloc. While his colleagues appeared in suits to announce their blocs formation, he came in sandals and what might be charitably called “casual Friday” attire.

Voronin followed this up by a, shall we say, “candid” interview where he told journalist Anatolie Golea that the famous Kuliok (bag) given from Plahotniuc to Dodon contained €860,000 euros. He also noted that Plahotniuc was upset because it was supposed to contain €1 million and he wasn’t sure who stole the rest. The whole story is insane and well worth a read. In addition to the actual news, it inspired what was my worst prediction of the year - that this election would be Voronin’s Last Rodeo3.

Also in August the US State Department released their 2025 “Human Rights Reports” which departed radically from past practice and were called “Neither Objective, Nor Consistent” in a case of charitable understatement. It appears a 25 year old Senior Policy Advisor kinda just made up a whole new approach to human rights… basically, if you are friends with Trump you can do no wrong. So that’s a very 2025 moment. I wrote about the reports, and why this new “approach” is dangerous for Moldova and other small countries.

Also in August, Moldova Matters published the deepest dive to date on Ilan Shor’s crypto ventures and how they were being weaponized against Moldova. This article came about after my previous article in June resulted in a wave of tips from various groups working on tracking crypto sanctions relief. Speaking personally, this was also around the time that the pace of work and reporting was becoming completely overwhelming. Soo…

Also in August, I became a Moldovan citizen. Being a full member of my adopted country marked a personal milestone and is major honor. Rather improbably, it also turned into a bit of a news story so I wrote a reflection on that as well.

In mid August Ilan Shor attempted to organize what he called a “permanent protest” and he promised to pay protestors who occupied central sections of the city €3000 euros / month. The government denied permission for these events and after some brief street clashes, and the arrest of some people in Labubu and Pikachu costumes, the whole affair fizzled out.

On August 27th Moldova celebrated 34 years of independence. This was marked by an unprecedented visit by 3 European leaders, French President Emmanuel Macron, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. They joined in independence day events and sent a clear signal that Europe supports Moldova’s EU trajectory.

Marking Independence day, President Sandu put out a video message where she said (in part):

“Everything you do means Moldova. When you feel safe, Moldova is safe. When you act freely and independently, Moldova is free and independent. When you choose the right path, Moldova is on the right path. Moldova lives through you. Through every hand that works. Through every heart that loves. We forge the path of Moldova.”

On August 29th the election campaign officially began.

August - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

September - The People Vote

To say that September was a busy month for the Moldova Matters team (aka me) would be a massive understatement. I approached the campaign and election time with 2 parallel workflows. On one hand, I was keeping readers informed about the latest news and reporting. On the other, I was aware that a lot of people were tuning in to Moldovan elections for the first time - so I wanted to publish a lot of explainers to give this whole event context.

On that front, we took a deep dive into polling in Moldova and where it falls short, looked at the actual mechanics of parliamentary elections themselves, and took a deep dive into the the party platforms and promises of the main players (part 1, part 2). I also wrote a piece called “Who I’m Watching in the Parliamentary Elections” to outline who I thought those main players were and what outcomes I thought were possible. It wasn’t a prediction per-say, but it holds up well. Finally, on the big picture front I wrote an article about the types of hybrid information attacks / propaganda that were being used. It looked both at Russian efforts like “Kanzlerdaddy” and potential black propaganda being conducted by someone in support of Moldova.

On the narrative front, September started with a stunning ZdG investigation called “The Kremlin's Digital Army.” Journalist Natalia Zaharescu, went undercover as part of an online team spreading Kremlin propaganda. Amazingly, Zaharescu, who won the European Press Prize for infiltrating Shor’s network last election, just stayed embedded. Shor’s people forgot to remove her cover identity from their database and simply reached out again to see if she wanted to get paid to undermine this election too.

Meanwhile, President Sandu was on a whirlwind tour working to make the case that EU countries must focus on defending their democracies - “with teeth, and together.” She made this case in a major speech to the European Parliament.

In Moldova, the information space was basically chaos. Citizens were getting calls that were “push-polls” implying violent outcomes for the country if it joins the EU. Online propaganda was off the charts and on the ground police were conducting daily raids to interdict money used in voter bribery networks. Lithuania banned Irina Vlah from the country for 5 years essentially labeling her a Russian asset.

In addition to writing this newsletter, I was in meetings almost daily with international journalists, election observation missions and others writing or reporting on the elections. One of these was a mission with the McCain Institute who conducted a pre-election mission and met with basically everyone in the country. Their ultimate report was stark. Author Laura Thornton wrote:

A key takeaway from the mission is that “influence operations” is an utterly inaccurate term to describe what is happening in Moldova. Russia is engaged in a multi-vector war not only to thwart Moldova from its democratic trajectory toward European Union (EU) membership (…) and bring to heel in Russia’s sphere of influence but also to threaten broader security in Eastern Europe and geopolitical alignment.

Meanwhile, Greece released Plahotniuc associate Constantin Țuțu. We’ll come back to his weird story later.

In mid September ZdG, the BBC and NordNews all released investigations based on undercover operations in the Shor network. Teams of journalists infiltrated different parts of this sprawling network, but amazingly were even together in the same room at times. Their work further exposed the vast web of money and effort being focused on destroying Moldova’s democracy.

Not to be outdone, Bloomberg published an investigation based on some leaked documents showing the Kremlin’s plan to take over Moldova. They had the random but fascinating detail that Igor Dodon had used the security services to spy on his political enemies while president. Dodon then added Bloomberg to his list of participants in the global “Sorosist” conspiracy.

On September 22nd President Maia Sandu chose to address the country. In it she warned that “our sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and European future are in danger.” She ended with an appeal to citizens saying:

“The danger is great, but our strength must be greater. Let us be worthy of our Moldova! Let us not sell it to thieves, nor allow others to sell it! Let us show the world this Sunday that Moldova is not a piece of land to be traded for thirty pieces of silver, but our sacred home.”

That same day, officers of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), aided by the police, conducted mass raids at 250 locations across the country. The raids targeted a Shor network that had brought people to Serbia in July for training with firearms, bomb making and the use of drones. Investigative outlet Cu Sens had previously reported on the growing network of paramilitary camps set up by Shor and the Kremlin. 74 people were detained.

Meanwhile, the court of appeals suspended Irina Vlah’s “Heart of Moldova” party, effectively removing them from the elections. The Patriotic Bloc quickly reshuffled their party lists, and wily survivor Vladimir Voronin managed to push himself and his people waaaay up the list.

As if there wasn’t enough drama, on September 25th Vladimir Plahotniuc landed in Chisinau in handcuffs and was turned over to the police4.

On Sunday September 28th Moldovans went to the polls at home and around the world and voted decisively to continue the country’s European path.

Congratulations poured in from across Europe5 as people showed genuine shock that Moldovan voters had resisted so many attempts to sway (or terrify) them and had sent a strong rebuke to the Kremlin.

Igor Dodon did not celebrate and called on all opposition parties to come and protest what he called a rigged result. Only he and Shor-backed politician Vasilie Tarlev attended and after a few speeches to a moderate sized crowed everyone went home.

Police and journalists from Newsmaker later reported that those who attended had been contacted with an offer of €150 euros to protest with a €50 euro bonus to “bring a friend.” It was a final reminder in this election season that Kremlin efforts to spark mass street protests with bribes had completely failed.

September - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

October - Who is Alexandru Munteanu?

After the insane pace of September I took a few days off to reflect, harvest grapes and make wine and pickles. Then I published my reflections on the election outcome.

As state institutions went about the step by step process of certifying the election and parties started forming factions in parliament, President Sandu was asked how come efforts to counter voter bribery were more successful in 2025 than 2024. She said that in both elections the police worked effectively to counter these efforts, but that in this election they had the full support of prosecutors6. Basically, after the shock of 2024, all state institutions were focused7 on this fight and in 2025 and they prevailed in protecting the vote.

President Sandu attended the European Political Community Summit in October and gave a forceful speech at the 35th anniversary of the Venice Commission. In both she spoke with a new mandate for EU integration, and with a dire warning of the need to protect democracies while defending democratic principles

Much of the story of October was about PAS candidate for Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu and his work forming a government. This all started with people asking, “who is Alexander Munteanu?” as Moldovans and foreigners alike scratched their heads and tried to google him. He quietly spent the month forming a prospective cabinet and preparing for a vote of confidence.

Meanwhile, parliament self organized into official factions. The only really interesting part of that was the Patriotic Bloc imploding. Voronin’s Communists decided to form their own faction, announcing this by a very weird video where he sticks his tongue out at journalists for a long period of time.

Eventually Dodon’s Socialists also left the block. That left Vasile Tarlev as the only member of the Patriotic Bloc, leaving it defunct and making him an independent. That means that parliament has an unprecedented 6 party factions + Vasile Tarlev.

On Friday, October 31st parliament voted in the new government.

Also in October, Plahotniuc lackey and bodyguard Constantin Țuțu returned to Moldova via a bewildering series of illegal border crossings, missed flights, lies from his lawyers and general confusion. He apparently wanted to sneak into the country and publicly surprise everyone with his presence8. When he tried to bribe the border guard he was promptly arrested - discovering how much had changed in the 6 years since his boss ran the country.

After the chaos of September a month of winemaking and parliamentary wrangling and Constantin Țuțu’s shenanigans was just what the doctor ordered.

October - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

November - Meet the Ministers

Moldova Matters started November with a series of articles looking at the new government and ministers. First we started with a deep dive into the government’s program to see what they planned to do and how it stacked up against past programs. Then we did a 2 part Meet the Ministers series (Part 1, Part 2) looking at who’s in, who’s out and what it all means.

As the new ministers began meeting their teams, police and prosecutors continued making arrests and bringing cases in relation to election subversion efforts. Some politicians that had been close to Shor seemed to try and distance themselves in public statements. Others just began slipping away - in many cases leaving judges to pronounce their sentences to an empty courtroom.

The biggest stories of the month of November revolved around security. Multiple drones violated that country’s airspace and crashed decoy drones were found in Northern Moldova and west of the country in Romania. Also, border guards stopped and searched a truck trying to cross from Moldova to Romania that was filled with weapons - specifically, Soviet made surface to air missiles and anti-tank missiles. All of this launched dozens of new conspiracy theories.

Most concerning of all was the “28 Point Ukraine Peace Plan.” This plan, which was apparently written by the Russians, leaked to the press and then inexplicably embraced by Trump as the US plan, was deeply disconcerting to all of Europe. The feeling in Europe that the United States was no longer a reliable ally (and perhaps a hostile country) will be the dominant theme of December as well.

November - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

December - Europe’s in a Pickle

As more drone incursions caused the Chisinau airport to close, Ilan Shor announced that he’s closing up shop in Moldova. Some mayors of the former Shor Party followed suit and resigned or simply vanished (often one step ahead of an arrest warrant). Some read this as the Kremlin giving up on Moldova (nope) or as Shor having lost the trust of the Kremlin (also nope). His network started popping up in Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Hungary - countries notable for all having upcoming elections.

The biggest news of the month in Moldova wasn’t about Moldova. It was the new US National Security Strategy that never once identifies Russia as a threat, but spends a LOT of time attacking Europe. I wrote an analysis of this situation, and about why Europe needs to realize that the former Trans-Atlantic relationship is never coming back:

Otherwise, December has been about Transnistria, with some fake news about their military mobilizing just to keep us on our toes. I wrote 2 pieces this month looking at Transnistria in the context of late 2025. I looked at how the inherent contradictions that in the region’s economy and “government” are starting to unravel - and what that means for Moldova. Then, I reported out a story on how Moldova’s government views reintegration and what their new strategy is.

After that, the holiday season started and the only real news in town was where to find the best Izvar (mulled wine).

December - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other stories from the month:

Goodbye 2025…

… you shall not be missed. As the world drunkenly staggered from polycrisis to omnishambles, Moldova experienced one of the toughest years in the country’s history. Everything that could go wrong did go wrong. But a lot of things went right too.

The fact that this Year in Review series stretched into 2 articles tells you a lot about how many significant events happened this year. Writing these articles I cut many multiples of what I included even as I refreshed my memory on story after story that would have defined a normal year. A person could write a whole book about this last year in Moldova9. At a time when it feels like things are going wrong all around the world, something went right in Moldova this year. It was a hard year, but sitting here in December 2025 I can tell you that people feel more safe, less scared and more optimistic than a year ago. You can also feel a certain pride in the air when people gather to discuss these events.

I have no doubt that 2026 will bring loads of new challenges. The ongoing global “situation” will continue to bring real challenges for small countries - especially those on the edge of war. But as we prepare to bid 2025 farewell, I find in Moldova a growing sense of confidence looking forward. And I can’t think of a better way to end a year than that.

Some of this directly impacted Moldova, but most of the year’s news was focused on stories and challenges closer to home. The war in Ukraine did not end in 24 hours and grinds on with continued uncertainty about its duration and ultimate outcome. Moldova’s September elections were easily the highest stakes political event in the country’s young history. Russia’s failure to dictate the outcome of this vote has secured Moldova’s European trajectory and the year ends with President Sandu and the PAS party ascendant. That said, the year was extremely challenging and the future remains uncertain.

Today we’re going to take a look at the major events of the year on a month by month journey through 2025. Writing this article left me shocked at just how much happened this year and how many unexpected twists and turns there were. I hope you enjoy this yearly roundup of 2025 - a year that upended geopolitics around the world and a year in which Moldova faced some of the greatest challenges in the young nation’s history.

Quick Note: All the links in this article are to past Moldova Matters articles from the year unless otherwise noted.

January - Energy Crisis

At 7 am on January 1st Ukraine stopped all transit of Russian natural gas through its territory. At that hour, Transnistria1 cut off central heat and hot water to all residential buildings in the region. All industrial enterprises except those making critical food products closed and furloughed their workforces. The MGRES power plant successfully switched over to coal reserves but rolling blackouts were immediately implemented to conserve power.

The cutoff of electricity supply from MGRES resulted in skyrocketing prices in Moldova, but no power outages.

The Transnistrian “authorities” hoped that limited rolling power outages would allow them 50 days of electricity with the coal reserves. This didn’t account for people rushing out to buy every space heater in the region (and many from Moldova) in the first days. By January 5th the grid was buckling with 4+ hour rolling blackouts and failing water supply systems.

As the situation deteriorated, a parallel information war was ongoing with the goal of assigning blame for what was happening. Chisinau blamed the Kremlin, who in turn blamed Chisinau and used their considerable propaganda and disinformation infrastructure to lead the charge. At the same time, it was far from clear what was actually going on at all. I weighed in on this on January 10th with an article unpacking various theories and explaining how the Kremlin was using a crisis of their own creation to pressure Moldova, Ukraine and Europe as a whole. I also explored why Moldova was so unprepared for this crisis - even though it was clearly foreseeable and people like me wrote about it as a looming challenge as early as January 10, 2024.

On January 15th, Transnistrian “leader” Vadim Krasnoselsky announced that he had just returned from a clandestine trip to Moscow and that the crisis would soon be over. All signs pointed to January 20th as the day that the gas would start flowing again. But twists and turns, lies and propaganda, continued and that day came and went with no conclusion to the crisis. By January 29th the residual gas in the pipelines was nearly spent. All month it had only been used for household cooking and for heating hospitals - but even at this low rate of usage, time eventually ran out. Then, Moldova announced 2 concrete moves to aid the region. First, they loaned Transnistria 3 billion cubes of natural gas in order to stabilize pressure in the gas lines. Second, the EU prepared a multi-stage bailout. First was a €30 million euro grant to cover energy consumption from February 1-10. Following that, they proposed a two-year aid package to support energy resilience in the whole country.

While it looked briefly like the crisis was at an end, things again took a turn with new announcements that the complicated plan for buying gas in exchange for electricity was not actually workable. January ended with the loan of gas staving off a total collapse of Transnistria’s energy system, but no resolution.

Also in January, the Trump Administration moved to freeze all foreign aid programs in line with a day one executive order. Initially, this was thought to mean a freeze on all new programs, but word shortly arrived that all employees of all USAID funded projects were to put down their pens and stop work immediately. The DOGE era had begun.

On a personal note, in late January I became the target of a Kremlin smear campaign. My December 2024 investigation into Vasile Tarlev’s US lobbying efforts drew the attention of some pro-Kremlin actors who wrote lots of bad things about me on websites that turned out to not have many readers. I responded to this with a piece at the time.

January - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other fun stories from the month:

February - The USAID “Chainsaw”

February began with a resolution of the energy crisis. Moldova’s gas loan and promises of continued EU support, allowed electricity generation to resume. By February 3rd consumers had hot water and heat, schools were being reheated and planning to return to class and rolling power outages stopped. The region began the process of repairing a lot of burst pipes, and Transnistria’s leaders thanked both the Moldovan government and EU for the support.

Initially, this created a series of “firsts” in the Moldova-Transnistria relationship. Transnistria agreed to discussions on human rights in the region and allowed the broadcasting of Moldova’s state news channel for the first time. Inspections of industrial sites were carried out and it seemed that EU aid would lead towards more progress in the relationship. This ultimately didn’t happen, as Russia started a new and convoluted scheme for supplying the region with gas via various shell companies. I wrote at the time how the bluffs, leverage and unanswered questions of the crisis meant that the immediate problems had passed, but not been resolved.

In parallel, Mayor Ion Ceban announced the creation of the “Alternative” Bloc which brought together a group of pro-Russian politicians that appeared to be less than the sum of its parts (and was).

Also, the freeze of US foreign aid turned into a “chainsaw” and Moldova’s pro-Kremlin politicians had a field day. As Elon & DOGE live-X’ed their destruction of the Federal government, Kremlin proxies spread ever more insane fever dream conspiracy theories. With USAID being called a “criminal organization” by US politicians, Igor Dodon and others started claiming that all those funded by USAID projects in Moldova (independent media, NGOs, industry associations, etc) were themselves criminals.

Also in February, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation. It was the first time a Romanian president had ever resigned and it signaled an ever deepening political crisis in the country.

Weeks Where Decades Happen

At the Munich Security Conference, Vice President JD Vance shocked America’s NATO allies by clearly stating that they are a bigger threat than Russia is. As Moldova reeled from the destruction of USAID, Donald Trump called out Moldova by name in a speech to Congress. This started yet another round of gleeful attacks on “Soros structures and USAID” from pro-Kremlin talking heads.

I wrote my most controversial article of the year (as judged by the number of unsubscriptions it generated) to try and break this all down. Reading it from today’s vantage point I think it holds up well.

As the 3rd anniversary of the full scale invasion passed, Moldova was in a precarious political situation. USAID was gone and the US-Moldova relationship was unclear (at best). Romania was in the throws of a full scale political crisis with hard-right forces that are hostile to Moldova, Ukraine and the EU ascendant.

In the midst of all this fun, Moldova Matters turned 4.

March - MEGA and Ilan Shor

In March Moldova Matters published a series of original investigations targeting Ilan Shor’s new lobbying efforts and agents of influence in Washington DC. In this series (Part 1, Part 2), jointly investigated and written by myself and Emma Marechal, we look at how Shor politician Victoria Şapa launched lobbying efforts in Washington DC with the support of Spanish PR / Lobbying firm Fortius Consulting.

This series highlighted the growing links between the Shor network and MAGA / MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). It also showed how the lack of transparency and lobbying regulations in the EU allowed this clandestine activity to fly under the radar of most investigative journalists. The series also coincided with the total breakdown of American transparency regulations as the Trump administration announced that they would no longer be enforcing the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). That doesn’t mean that it’s no longer law, and many firms continued to comply with the law as we saw in later 2025 investigations. Fortius did not, marking one of many criminal acts in the United States that has gone unaddressed in the past year.

The investigation also showed how Victoria Şapa lied on her asset declaration forms when running for office in Moldova - a crime that has also not been investigated to date2.

The biggest news of March, globally and in Moldova, was the shocking Zelenskyy - Trump - Vance press conference in the Oval Office. An exchange that built on the shock and fear of the Munich speech and resulted in the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas to state:

“Today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader. It’s up to us, Europeans, to take this challenge.”

EU leaders Antonio Costa and Emmanuel Macron rushed to shore up support for Moldova following these events with high profile visits and speeches. This pattern of Europe rallying to support Moldova in this critical year carried on through and after the September elections.

March was also an interesting month in terms of Moldova’s justice system. UK law enforcement arrested Veaceslav Platon, though his fight against extradition is now dragging into 2026. Shor MPs Alexandr Nesterovschi and Irina Lozovan were both convicted and sentenced in cases of corruption and illicit party financing - but they were gone before the sentence was read out. Both fugitives are assumed to be hiding in Transnistria to this day.

This latest failure of the Moldovan justice system resulted in real changes. In late March Bashkan Gutsul was detained at the airport while attempting to leave the country. The Moldovan authorities seemed determined not to be made fools of again.

March - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other fun stories from the month:

April - “Liberation Day”

Happy “liberation day” to all those who celebrate. April began with the head spinning announcement that the United States was starting a global trade war.

At the time, I was one of the first in Moldova to cover the bad math and blatant lies underpinning the announcements of the “discounted reciprocal tariffs.” I later found out that this was probably one of my most read articles ever… but not as I would have liked it. Former President of the Constitutional Court Alexandru Tănase plagiarized my article and released it in multiple news outlets as his opinion. I didn’t have that on my 2025 bingo card.

My post on Linkedin about that same article unexpectedly went super viral with more than 24,000 impressions and 240+ comments. I detailed the unspooling madness of this comment thread (“why don’t you move to Moldova if you like it so much!??!” etc) in an article for my other substack.

Later on we published a dive into the trade numbers between Moldova and the US that clearly showed the sloppy and economically illiterate basis for these tariffs.

Meanwhile, the shifting sands of the global order were becoming truly worrying in Moldova. Romania’s far-right “sovereigntist” parties were clearly aligning themselves with the new Trump Administration (and Russia). In a moment of real peril I wrote about Moldova’s new regional security situation:

Mayor Ceban followed this new trend of trying to associate with MAGA when he appeared alongside Donald Trump Jr. at a conference and posted “Make Moldova Great Again.” Late April also saw the announcement that Moldova will go to the polls on September 28th for parliamentary elections.

April was also a big month for news in the justice sector. Following her detention at the airport on March 25th, Bashkan Gutsul was arrested. At the time, myself and others wrote about how the arrested, released to house arrest, release to judicial control, just plain released - cycle was likely to continue. I was wrong. Bashkan Gutsul remained in jail through the end of her trial, after which she moved to Prison 13 to serve her 7 year sentence. That little sprint to the airport was her last move as a free woman.

Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) announced that fugitive MP Alexandr Nesterovschi escaped justice to Transnistria in the back of a Russian embassy car. They detailed how a coordinated and complex Russian operation allowed the Shor network MP to escape right ahead of his prison sentence.

Also in April the country became aware of Vito Perez Gonzalez - aka “El Plaho.” Interpol had announced that Plahotniuc was using a Mexican passport as one of his fake identities leading to much fun on social media.

Finally, the country was rocked by a major scandal where an amnesty law was used (abused?) to let multiple extremely dangerous criminals out of jail. The details are extremely complicated, but ultimately PAS MP Olesea Stamate, the author of the bill took the fall. She was expelled from the PAS party and a recent glance at her facebook page suggests that she continues to take this with humor and dignity.

April - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other fun stories from the month:

May - Maia Sandu Abandons the Tightrope

The month of May was all about the Romanian elections. Romania has long been one of Moldova’s most stalwart supporters inside the EU and a major bilateral partner. Not to mention the bonds of common language and history, and the fact that a HUGE number of Moldovans are dual citizens. So things were tense in the buildup to Romania’s May 4th first round of the do-over presidential elections.

Călin Georgescu was barred from running, leaving George Simion as the standard bearer for the far right. He rebranded himself as a “sovereigntist” and sought to stress his alignment with Donald Trump and the MAGA movement - at one point appearing on Steve Bannon’s podcast. Simion is the founder of the MEGA movement and has been banned from both Moldova and Ukraine for advocating annexing all of Moldova and parts of Ukraine.

When Simion won the first round of elections in a landslide, people started getting quite nervous. 91,000 Moldovans3 turned out in the election and overwhelmingly supported centrist Bucharest Mayor Nicuşor Dan. Only 12% voted for Simion. Nicuşor Dan took second place overall by an extremely narrow margin - Moldovan votes clearly put him over the top.

The vote caused political crisis in Romania as the government collapsed. Polls showed Simion winning the second round by 10 points or more. Fear of a Simion victory caused a run on the banks.

In 2022 Politico called Maia Sandu “the Tightrope Walker,” implying that she had to carefully balance in a position between larger outside powers. In May 2025 Maia Sandu abandoned the tightrope and forcefully came out in support of Nicuşor Dan. As a dual citizen, she had every right to speak about the election outcome, but as a President, she courted enormous risk if Simion won.

In the 48 hours before the election George Simion launched a massive online “stop the steal” campaign. He alleged that the Moldovan government was somehow rigging Romania’s elections. He ran a Romanian language social media campaign, but also called-in to MAGA podcasts and media shows by Steve Bannon and Jack Posobiec to accuse Maia Sandu and the “globalists” of rigging the election. In an unusual final campaign push, Simion traveled around Europe getting endorsements from far-right figures such as France’s Marine Le Pen, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, MAGA US Congressman Andy Ogles and a host of lesser known people including Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin.

On May 18th Romanians went to the polls and elected Nicuşor Dan in a major upset. Moldovan-Romanian turnout surged from 90,000 in the first round to 158,000 in the second, with 88% of votes going to Nicuşor Dan. High turnout drowned out the “stop the steal” campaign and massive crowds filled the streets of Romanian cities waving EU flags. Simion initially declared victory, but even he conceded as the numbers rolled in. Crowds in the streets chanted “Russia, don't forget, Romania is not yours!”

Within Moldova, the narratives of election fraud were spread primarily by Shor network candidate Victoria Furtună and Democracy at Home Party (PPDA) leader Vasile Costiuc. They spread claims of voter fraud “at the behest of criminal networks, USAID and Soros.”

May - Outside the News:

In case you missed it, here are some other fun stories from the month:

June - All Eyes Turn to Moldova

In early June, President Maia Sandu traveled to Odesa Ukraine to attend a regional summit. There, she attended a trilateral meeting with President Zelensky and President Dan.

Their meeting underscored the fact that Moldova’s regional security situation had substantially improved with the outcome of the Romanian elections. The next threat to the region’s security would be from the upcoming Moldovan elections.

Prime Minister Recean began speaking of the high stakes of the coming election by stating that Moldova had intelligence that Russia intended to deploy 10,000 soldiers to Transnistria. He and other government figures explained that if a pro-Russian government came to power soldiers could be infiltrated via commercial flights in civilian clothes. Once they crossed into Transnistria there would be more than enough equipment for them there.

President Sandu also spoke of the high stakes at a forceful speech in Munich in late June. She called on Europe to wake up to Russia’s hybrid threats and reiterated the need for support in securing democratic elections.

Amidst growing ties between the Shor network and Romania’s far right, hybrid attacks against the Moldovan election began to gain steam. By the end of June Moldova Matters reported on Shor’s new crypto currency, A7A5, and the huge financial infrastructure being stood up to interfere in Moldova.

Finally, Moldovan politicians Igor Dodon (Socialist), Irina Vlah (Heart of Moldova), Vasile Tarlev (Future of Moldova) and Diana Caraman (Communist) all traveled to the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. Officially, they were there to “negotiate” with Russia on energy prices. In reality, we saw the first sign of the forming of the Patriotic Bloc for the election. Once again 4 pro-Kremlin parties had come together in a formation that was substantially less than the sum of its parts.

That’s it for part 1 of the 2025 Year in Review. Stay tuned for part 2!

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A Window of Opportunity for Reintegration?

I recently wrote an article looking at the recent “elections” in Transnistria and the changed power dynamics between Chisinau and Tiraspol1. In it I lay out a political, economic and geopolitical landscape that means the status quo in Transnistria cannot hold.

With Transnistria weaker than ever before some see this as a moment of opportunity. Why not “solve” the Transnistria problem now and enter the EU without all this baggage? Given the region’s collapsing economy isn’t now a good time to apply pressure and force change?

This article will dive into how Moldova plans to approach reintegration and how talk of economic collapse leading to a window of opportunity may not present the full picture.

For those who missed the previous article, here’s a link:

Setting the Baseline

Before discussing strategies and approaches to potential reintegration, here are some baseline facts and assumptions that are driving decision makers’ approach to the problem:

1. Russia views Transnistria as a regional security asset. Russian uses the region to influence Moldova and its troops there are most often seen in that context. At the same time, Russia views them as an important regional asset given NATO deployments in Romania and because they pin down Ukrainian troops who guard the border2.

2. The Economic crisis is not a sign of Russia losing interest in the region. Supporting Transnistria has gotten more expensive and Russia orchestrated an energy crisis in the region last winter. This was not a sign of losing interest or pinching pennies - it was calculated to create pressure on Chisinau3 and as a warning to Sheriff. The region’s economic crisis is real, but it should not be over interpreted - as point #1 attests, Russia’s main interest is and always was security related.

3. There is little organic demand for reintegration (on either side of the Nistru). Transnistrians may be angry with their “authorities,” but that does not equate to trust in Chisinau or a desire to be part of the EU4. Russia works very hard to prevent the development of this kind of demand (putting pressure on Romanian language schools in the region, etc). Because the region is a closed and highly controlled media space, residents there are subject to constant propaganda and have little access to other points of view. Meanwhile, in the rest of Moldova people are used to the status quo and are unlikely to be enthusiastic about the huge costs of reintegration.

4. The local elite is insecure and unsure what to do. They are weighing the risks and fully understand that they are stuck between Moldova, Ukraine, the EU and Russia. They don’t know yet whether Moldova joining the EU is going to be a real thing5. Finally, their physical security is a serious concern. In Putin’s world “traitors” get the harshest treatment of all - whether that is drinking radioactive tea or falling out of windows. Elite defection to Moldova to support reintegration would certainly be seen as treason.

5. Transnistria is more valuable to Russia now than ever before. With Russia loosing most of its economic and political leverage in Moldova, the Transnistrian problem gains extra significance. The Kremlin’s goal is to keep Moldova out of the EU. Transnistria can be used to create a perception that Moldova is not safe and that it brings too much baggage to be accepted as a member state.

Taken together, this all means that even with a power dynamic that has shifted in Chisinau’s favor, the situation is extremely complicated.

“Convergence”

Informally, I’ve heard Moldova’s new approach to the problem called “convergence.” The idea is that, as Moldova is converging with the EU, Transnistria must converge with Moldova.

What this means in practice hasn’t yet been spelled out in detail. The government is working right now on an official strategy and all relevant departments have been tasked with creating their own convergence plans. The basic idea though is to extend government services and regulations across the region bit by bit. The goal is to provide the same public services to residents regardless of location and to build up support within the region for joining Chisinau.

To some level, this is already happening without the government’s help. In the first 10 months of 2025 residents of Transnistria have increasingly crossed the river for government services - such as surgical operations (5600+ operations in 10 months costing 127 million lei), 45,000 driver’s registrations, social benefits (pensions, child care, etc) in excess of 26 million lei just in Q1 2025. Over 20,000 Transnistria residents cross the river daily for work in Moldova.

Crisis and deteriorating conditions in the region and causing residents to rely more and more on Moldovan government agencies and systems. The strategy is to meet this moment of demand with intention and a long term vision towards integrating citizens into the broader Moldovan civil space.

Flipping the Script

A strategy based on “convergence” is a reversal of the sequencing that has been pursued for the last 30+ years. Official negotiations on a solution to the Transnistrian conflict have always basically envisioned the following 3 step process:

1. Agreement on a political solution for reintegration.

2. Finding the money to implement it.

3. Solving the practical problems of reintegration (economics, security, justice, finance, etc).

The official negotiations, which took place in the 5+2 format6 since 2005, have never progressed beyond point #1. To massively simplify a complex issue, Moldova has been willing to offer the region a special autonomous status (similar too, or stronger than, that granted to Gagauzia). On the other side, Russia has proposed solutions that would redraw the Moldovan constitution as a federal system. Thus, the current unitary republic would be split into 3 federal states - Transnistria, Gagauzia and the rest of Moldova. Under Russian proposals (including the very famous Kozak Memorandum), this would be an asymmetric arrangement with Transnistria and Gagauzia (< 18% of the population) getting a majority of the seats in a new upper house. This arrangement would allow Russia a strong voice and effective veto in Moldovan legislation - particularly foreign relations.

Opinions differ on how close the sides have come over the years, but the fact is that no political solution has been found that meets all parties’ goals. With the convergence strategy set to start from the bottom and work backwards, they are trying to create the conditions on the ground that would facilitate an eventual political solution (namely, public support and demand for one) and bypassing Russia’s ability to gum up negotiations. In this way, Moldova will lean into the moment of economic crisis for the region with 1+1 negotiations7 on concrete issues.

When Does Convergence = Reintegration?

Not quickly. As Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri recently stated, the government is seeking to de-couple the issues of EU integration and Transnistrian re-integration as much as possible. Recall, he said:

“We will do everything possible to ensure the reintegration process is dynamic and produces results. At the same time, we understand that it requires a longer period than we allot for the start of accession negotiations and, possibly, for EU integration. We will, frankly, try to separate these two processes,”

All 27 EU member states have stated publicly that Transnistria cannot be an impediment to Moldova’s integration. What that means is not fully clear. The Moldovan government is keen to keep these issues separated so that Russia does not have an effective veto on accession.

The Moldovan authorities want to see real progress on convergence before moving towards discussion of a political settlement. The conditions for what I heard called “sustainable convergence” haven’t been spelled out anywhere officially, but in my conversations the following ideas kept coming up:

• Demand: Real demand for reunification on both sides of the river.

• Media access: Transnistrians need to be brought into the fact-based information space (for years).

• Political parties: All parties must be legally allowed to operate in Transnistria - opening offices in the region, running campaigns and holding public events. Political participation (for years) is a pre-requisite for opening polling places and integrating the nation’s political scene.

• Economic convergence: Integrating banks, financial systems, pension systems, telecom companies, etc is a very expensive problem. It will take time and require major investments and an enabling security environment8.

• A demobilization plan: If the Russian army leaves, that still means there are a large number of people from the Transnistrian “army,” police and other security forces that need to be dealt with. Sudden dismissals of people with weapons training has a history of going poorly. But can you keep them? Moldova has taken 4 years to vet judges, what would they do with thousands of demobilized soldiers and police?

• De-oligarchization: The oligarchs must exit. Some mechanism for the sale / purchase of their assets must be found. Moldova will not allow a new, richer, set of oligarchs to enter the country’s politics.

These conditions and challenges mean that talk of simple or quick reintegration is misguided. If there was comprehensive political will on both sides of the Nistru to reintegrate the country, then you could imagine a messy process of “figure it out as you go.” But without any political will towards that end (at all) the Moldovan approach assumes a gradual but constant process of converging.

What are the Alternative Approaches?

Many outside of Moldova who see a “window of opportunity” are quite clearly not talking about a long-term process of aligning social programs. I want to turn towards a few other approaches that come up in discussions (and from reader’s questions), and why they fail to meet the needs of the moment.

Option 1: The Military Solution

The Moldovan government only supports peaceful solutions to the conflict. Reporting from earlier in the war indicated that Ukraine may have pressed Moldova for permission to “solve” this issue by force. Permission that Moldova firmly refused. If pro-Russian forces had won the recent parliamentary elections this topic may have resurfaced. As I understand it, Ukraine is satisfied with the security situation now and is supportive of Moldova’s approach. Bottom line - no one wants this.

Option 2: Forced Economic Collapse

In the previous article, I laid out how Moldova, Ukraine and the EU have gained enormous leverage over Transnistria’s economy and energy system. The idea is that, under these current circumstances, Moldova (and partners) can force Transnistria to the negotiating table and demand serious concessions in order to bring about reintegration - on Chisinau’s terms. This theory has several serious flaws, namely…

• Russia values the military position and security leverage - not their civilian population. If this pressure results in mass depopulation of the region and just a little military base - they can live with that. More critically, they can make this into a humanitarian crisis by not allowing people to leave. Russia is (clearly) not above using civilians as leverage.

• Rapid reintegration is NOT in Moldova’s interest. With Russian soldiers in the region, and the other facts laid out in this article, there is no version of reintegration where Chisinau gets 100% of what they want. There will be negotiations and trade offs. Rapid reintegration will yield a Moldova that is overall subject to much greater levels of Russian control. Whether that’s through new oligarchs, residual “peace keepers,” constitutional changes or other mechanisms, the Kremlin will have its price and its goals are unchanged.

• The moral issue. Intentionally collapsing the region’s economy and making poor people - who are effectively prisoners there - poorer, hungrier and colder, is not a good look.

Option 3: A Big Peace Initiative

Proponents of this idea suggest that the change in circumstances and leverage between Moldova and Transnistria mean it’s time for big peace initiative. The 5+2 format is dead so this would need some new structure. Ominously, this is sometimes suggested in the context of engaging America’s “Peace President” in the mix.

Leaving out the Trump part, officials I talked to rejected the idea that now was the time for big, international diplomatic initiatives. Here’s why:

• Rapid reintegration is NOT in Moldova’s interest (see above).

• Diplomatically, the question cannot be untangled from Ukraine. Russia’s security interests see Transnistria through both the lens of their wider empire building project, and through Ukraine and Moldova specifically. They won’t negotiate seriously until the war in Ukraine is settled - and very possibly not even then.

• Russia’s position and regional posture is maximalist. In 2005 the Kremlin was content to undermine and infiltrate the democratic systems of Ukraine and Moldova. In 2014 they felt those tools slipping and moved to hard power. In 2022 they opted for the one guaranteed way to keep Ukraine in the fold - outright conquest9. The Kozak Memorandum was an unpalatable solution even for then President Vladimir Voronin in 2003. Given Russia’s current posture, and the much more pro-EU political climate in Moldova, what kind of agreement would the Kremlin be satisfied with? What starting point could possibly secure their interests? I haven’t spoken to a single expert that thinks Russia is interested in a deal here - the Kremlin wants Moldova, and Transnistria is a tool in that process.

Option 4: “Go with God”

Another option I’ve heard over the years is that Moldova should just let Transnistria be independent. One version sees this more as a threat - basically, threaten to recognize their independence so they deal. The thinking is that losing access to the EU market and Russian gas10 at the same time would bring them to the table. The second version takes the proposition more seriously - proponents would say “just let them go, be done with it and join the EU.”

This idea, which is rarely spoken of by people in Moldova, has huge problems. Namely:

• It’s political suicide. The Moldovan public may not be yelling for immediate reintegration, but people do see Transnistria as an integral part of the country. No politician who proposes this, and deals with the fallout from the next points, would stay in office long. This includes all the pro-Russian opposition who also emphasize the need to unite the country, not to separate.

• It supercharges the security nightmare. An independent Transnistria would either immediately petition to be annexed by Russia, or immediately call for an increase in Russian military deployments in the region. If this was allowed, it would become a true Kaliningrad in South Eastern Europe and pose a major threat to Ukraine and Romania’s security.

• It burns bridges with the EU. Not only would the EU see this as an irresponsible move in the security space, but it would also likely trigger vetos of Moldova’s accession from states with their own separatist movements and enclaves (e.g. Spain).

In short, the problem isn’t that there is a separatist region in Moldova, the problem is that the Russians are next door. Recognizing Transnistria makes that much worse.

Conclusion - It’s Complicated

A lot of ink has been spilled, including by me, on how the launch of the full scale invasion made Transnistria’s status quo untenable. Economically, the region is starting to come apart and politically the balance of oligarchic and Kremlin forces that ran the enclave is under pressure. This means that change is coming and that Moldova and the EU will have a say in what it looks like. It does not mean that Transnistria will quickly or easily be returned to the fold.

This article is by no means an exhaustive list of all of the constraints and challenges that will have to be considered going forward. The fact is that the situation is far more complex than the small size of Transnistria, or Moldova for that matter, would imply.

Moldova’s approach of gradual convergence to lay the groundwork for an eventual reunification represents a realistic approach to a very hard problem. It rejects any attempts at a rapid reintegration as they are only likely to succeed on the Kremlin’s terms. A Moldova with new constitutional instability, a new class of oligarchs or with legitimized Russian military presence would become a danger to its neighbors and a source of regional insecurity.

At the same time, convergence and deliberate steps towards integrating social services and citizens experiences is not a “wait and see” strategy. For 30 years Moldova has largely relied on a series of internationally mediated diplomatic efforts to find a political solution and move from there. This new approach means that the country is starting by taking responsibility for finding solution to the myriad technical issues and step by step making a political solution something that could be implemented.

Chisinau has leverage here, and it likely to start using it more and more to integrate some services and open up Transnistria’s information space. But Russia’s security interests and potential to create problems are also very real.

We’ll likely see some elements of this strategy made public in Spring and if so we’ll dig into details then. The key ideas though seem to be clear - a deliberate convergence strategy running in parallel with EU integration, but unlinked from the country’s EU accession timeline.

Even as stage-managed elections go this was a dull affair. Of the 33 seats in the Supreme Soviet, 21 of them were uncontested. The rest of these single member districts had regime-approved opposition candidates who dutifully lost badly. Officially, there was record low turnout in the elections at only 26.01%. This didn’t matter of course because there is no threshold under which an election is considered invalid.

Ironically, Transnistrian elections are well known for inflated turnout. Public sector employees and employees of the Sheriff corporation are turned out en masse. Is the low turnout a sign of a lack of enthusiasm? No.

The reason that there is no electoral threshold is that it eliminates the need to have the uncomfortable conversation about what the actual population of the region is. Voter turnout was over 102,000 persons. The 26% turnout figure is based on the last census count of 475,000 residents… in 2015. Even if that was accurate a decade ago, most current estimates land closer to 250,000.

These “elections” were clearly no such thing. There was no free press and no real opposition parties. Zona de Securitate noted that the last real attempt at an opposition, Oleg Khorzhan’s Transnistrian Communist Party, is now defunct. Oleg Khorzhan was arrested, imprisoned for 4 years, released and then murdered in summer 2023.

So why even write about it? Much of the Moldovan press barely bothered. My reason for focusing on Transnistria today is simple - these might very well be the very last “elections” to the very last Supreme Soviet. There is real reason to believe that Transnistria will not exist in its current form when this term of office ends in 2030.

On October 30th, Moldovan journalist Evgeny Cheban wrote a piece for Carnegie that started with this paragraph:

“The Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria is disintegrating, no longer able to survive in the same way that it has for decades. Economic and political change in the region is inevitable. Ultimately, there are two possible paths: the withdrawal of Russian troops and reintegration with Moldova, and the transformation into a Russian military outpost with no economy and few inhabitants. The path that Transnistria ends up taking depends not only on Tiraspol and Moscow, but also on Chișinău.”

Today we’re going to check in with Transnistria ahead of what is sure to be another difficult winter in the region. In this article we’ll…

• Look at recent reports showing the region’s economy and the quality of life for its inhabitants are in a nosedive.

• Review how the power dynamics between Chisinau and Tiraspol have changed in recent years.

• Dive into Transnistria’s political clans and look at the history of Sheriff and its shadowy owner.

• Scrutinize arguments about what motivates these clans and how Moldova could wedge their interests.

• Look at the tough choices Moldova will face and potential outcomes.

Transnistria Falls Apart

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For those unfamiliar, to be “in a pickle” is an English language idiom equivalent to “between a rock and a hard place” or, simply put, in a difficult situation.

In addition to writing this newsletter, I spend a lot of time meeting with journalists, think-tankers and diplomats. Most of the time they picking my brain on Moldovan politics and policy, but over the course of the last year the question I have gotten most is some version of this: “When is the US / Europe relationship going to return to normal?”

The question comes in many forms and is often couched in some kind of kremlinology whereby the asker is trying to parse through the various factions within the White House. Most of the time they aren’t looking for answers, so much as nuggets of reassurance and hope. For some evidence that this is an aberration and things will soon return to the way they were before. So when is the US / Europe relationship going to return to normal?

It isn’t.

Whatever consensus on NATO, transatlantic security, trade and alliances existed before is gone. As we’ll discuss, the Republican party is now quite hostile to Europe. Meanwhile, the Democratic party is consumed by domestic affairs. Eventually a new normal will emerge from this massive political realignment in the United States. I don’t know what it will look like, but I know it will not resemble what came before.

One example of this is USAID. If a future president wanted to bring it back they couldn’t simply recreate what was destroyed. New laws would need to be passed and a new argument would need to be made to the American people about why this is a good use of taxpayer dollars. There would be no broad consensus, meaning this would be an almost exclusively Democratic project. What would that USAID look like? I’m not sure, but I know it wouldn’t be the same as the old one.

Right now the Trump administration is speaking consistently and clearly about their views on Europe. Yet, my reading of the news and my own interactions with people working in European governments shows that the message is somehow not getting through. There is lots of concern, but not enough recognition that things are never going back.

The future of Moldova, Ukraine and the rest of Europe depends on a recognition of this fact and bold moves to rebuild a security architecture that can deter outside enemies.

Today we’re going to take a look at the new US National Security Strategy and why the clock is ticking on European security.

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If you missed Part 1 in this series you can read it here:

This article is probably not going to fully load in your email (lots of pictures). Just click on the title of the article to open it on the website (or in the Substack app). Also, if you aren’t interested in every ministry, use the links below to jump to the ones that you are most interested in!

Part 1:

• Cluster 1: Foreign Affairs & Transnistria

  • Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration

  • Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs

  • Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration

• Cluster 2: Economics, Finance and Regional Development

  • Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Economic Development and Digitalization

  • Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development

  • Minister of Finance

  • Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry

  • Minister of Energy

Part 2:

• Cluster 3: Social Welfare

  • Minister of Education and Research

  • Minister of Labour and Social Protection

  • Minister of Health

  • Minister of Culture

  • Minister of the Environment

• Cluster 4: Power Ministries

  • Minister of Internal Affairs

  • Minister of Defence

  • Minister of Justice

Note: You’ve probably noticed that the ministry names above are sometimes quite long. In Moldova Matters I typically abbreviate them for simplicity’s sake - e.g. the “Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Economic Development and Digitalization” is the Minister of Economy. When strictly necessary I’ll use the full titles in this article, but will mostly try and keep the short form when possible. Sorry for the inevitable occasional confusion.

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“We need a government that prioritizes development, attracting investment, and increasing the competitiveness of the economy. Only then will we be able to improve people’s living standards and strengthen the rule of law,”

Prime Minister Munteanu has made it abundantly clear that his government will prioritize economic development. So who is in this government? and who will be responsible for carrying out this agenda?

The new cabinet has 16 members, 8 of whom are holdovers from the last government and 8 who are new. We’re going to go through each of the 16 members of the cabinet with a brief introduction and, when warranted, a short analysis of what their appointment might signal. This is a lot of information so we’re going to split our article into 2 parts. We’ll cluster them thematically as follows:

Part 1:

• Cluster 1: Foreign Affairs & Transnistria

  • Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration

  • Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs

  • Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration

• Cluster 2: Economics, Finance and Regional Development

  • Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Economic Development and Digitalization

  • Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Infrastructure and Regional Development

  • Minister of Finance

  • Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry

  • Minister of Energy

Part 2: (Coming later this week)

• Cluster 3: Social Welfare

  • Minister of Education and Research

  • Minister of Labour and Social Protection

  • Minister of Health

  • Minister of Culture

  • Minister of the Environment

• Cluster 4: Power Ministries

  • Minister of Internal Affairs

  • Minister of Defence

  • Minister of Justice

Note 1: The clusters above are my own and don’t reflect an official structure. Also, don’t read too much into the ordering. I’ve chosen to put Deputy Prime Ministers at the top of each section and then to more or less order the others at random.

Note 2: This article is probably not going to fully load in your email (lots of pictures). Just click on the title of the article to open it on the website (or in the Substack app). Also, if you aren’t interested in every ministry, use the links above to jump to the ones that you are most interested in!

Note 3: You’ve probably noticed that the ministry names above are sometimes quite long. In Moldova Matters I typically abbreviate them for simplicity’s sake - e.g. the “Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Economic Development and Digitalization” is the Minister of Economy. When strictly necessary I’ll use the full titles in this article, but will mostly try and keep the short form when possible. Sorry for the inevitable occasional confusion.

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So that explains my silence until now. Today, I’m going to share my top 11 takeaways from this election (in no particular order). Next Monday we’ll have a Weekly Roundup to catch up on the post election news. After that, I have little doubt that I’ll be returning to more takeaways from this momentous election again.

Before starting, I really recommend the recent episode of the Brussel Sprouts Podcast from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Former Ambassador William Hill and Laura Thornton, senior director for global democracy programs at the McCain Institute, joined the hosts to break down the election results. I thought it was a great listen with 2 incredibly insightful guests.

Ok, so let’s jump in.

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Last Saturday in Part 1 we looked at how the top 4 parties in the election approached their party programs. In it I wrote about how they each structured and approached their campaign platform and what the top-line themes and focus are. Today we’re going to dive into 5 policy areas and see what each party says about them. But first, if you missed Part 1 I suggest starting there:

I’ve decided to approach this topic from the following 5 areas:

• Economics / Infrastructure

• EU Integration / Geopolitics

• National Security

• Justice and Corruption

• Miscellaneous (a grab bag of additional interesting, fun or weird things)

The parties themselves have different organizing principles for their programs as we discussed in Part 1. I’ve chosen these focus areas for a few reasons. Firstly, they encompass the main issues that the parties themselves are putting forward. Each has a different focus, but in these 5 areas we see their main arguments come through.

Secondly, I’ve focused on areas that are of the most interest to international readers. Within Moldova, education policy would certainly trump national security policy in any poll, but it is less salient for people who don’t have kids in Moldovan schools (as I think few of my readers do). Finally, whether or not polls might indicate a greater or lesser public focus on certain policy areas, I think these 4 (+misc) constitute the big ideas that will ultimately decide the election.

Ok, let’s dive in.

Economics / Infrastructure

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In Moldovan politics, as in most democracies, parties and candidates produce a program of action, or party platform, describing what they want to do if elected. In parliamentary democracies like Moldova this is an outline of the party’s priorities and could serve to indicate how they plan to govern IF they were to win an absolute majority in Parliament. Since it is extremely rare in Moldova for a party to win an absolute majority, the party program is just the first of two important programs in an election. The second is the “Government Program” which is compiled and presented to parliament by the party or parties that form a Government, either alone or in coalition. If two parties form a coalition, they merge their programs based on which party takes which ministry and so forth. So it’s important to realize that while these are the promises of one party, they are rarely very binding as this is only one step in a long process of getting to power.

In theory, each party creates their party program in some democratic fashion where their members bring forward their priorities and lay out a vision. In practice, parties have wildly different approaches to their program and structure. PAS has typically used their program as a campaign tool - laying out actual promises to voters. This is more unusual than you would think as the Socialist and Communist parties have traditionally put out encyclopedia length policy documents with random manifestoes peppered throughout. Back when the Shor Party existed, he basically didn’t put out any program at all.

So to start, let’s dive into the how the parties approached the program and what they emphasize as their top-line policies. We’ll look at what their main argument is and how they pitch their program to voters. Then, in Part 2 of this series we’ll dive into some key policy areas and see what each party says.

For reference, I’m going to focus on the parties that I wrote about 2 weeks back as the top 4 that I’m watching in this election. If you want to go back and look at which parties are real contenders check out that article:

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The purpose of this post is to encourage you to read their work, but I thought I’d pull out a few quotes from their piece and share my thoughts as well. Here’s part of the top-line summary:

“A key takeaway from the mission is that “influence operations” is an utterly inaccurate term to describe what is happening in Moldova. Russia is engaged in a multi-vector war not only to thwart Moldova from its democratic trajectory toward European Union (EU) membership (approved by a narrow majority in a referendum last Fall) and bring to heel in Russia’s sphere of influence but also to threaten broader security in Eastern Europe and geopolitical alignment. By investing hundreds of millions of dollars through cryptocurrency and illegal financial schemes, the Kremlin has coopted major political contenders and infiltrated the Church, information space, and voters. The Moldovan government and civic actors have struggled to fight back in this asymmetrical fight.”

I think that the clarity of this paragraph is excellent and helps accurately describe the situation. In this newsletter we often write about “hybrid war” and I fear that we become accustomed to this term in such a way as to mask the key word - “war.”

The piece zeros in on the fact that the Kremlin is waging a war against Moldova - just not a war utilizing bullets and bombs (for now). It also accurately paints a picture of the stakes - Moldova’s democracy is threatened, but by seeking to overthrow it the Kremlin hopes to destabilize the security situation in the whole region. The stakes are high outside of Moldova as well - which is one more reason that Moldova Matters.

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The piece goes on to directly call out the lack of American involvement in pushing back on Russia’s aggression. For many years the United States was Moldova’s single most impactful supporter - especially when it came to supporting democratic development. That is done now. She writes:

“Another finding is that while European representatives acknowledge the stakes of this election and have clearly taken the side against Russia by supporting only pro-EU parties with no links to Moscow, U.S. officials assert the U.S. has “no dog in this fight.” In fact, through the elimination of foreign aid, the U.S. is undermining Moldova’s efforts to defend against Russia. In every single meeting, Moldovans described how the cuts in U.S. support have been, in the words of one journalist, “a gift to Russia,” with estimates of USAID cuts at over 150 million dollars. Essential work debunking Russian narratives, providing accurate information on elections, the EU, Ukraine, and the economy, monitoring illicit financing, and bolstering civic resilience has stopped. One media group said that while it still received funding from the State Department, it was told the funding couldn’t be used for work countering Russian disinformation.”

Thornton goes on to make various recommendations in the piece related to restoring and increasing American involvement in the conflict stating:

“U.S. policymakers need to understand the consequences of these elections and should be drastically increasing our cooperation with the Moldovan intelligence community, bolstering funding and technical assistance for civil society and media, and enhancing sanctions against cryptocurrencies and illegal financing schemes and individuals. Our engagement on the frontlines is needed not just to stop another domino from falling into the Kremlin’s sphere, but to protect ourselves. Supporting democratic Moldova directly serves U.S. interests.”

In addition to analysis, the mission met with various key players in the election and presented some illuminating quotes. Here is one from the Audiovisual Council which is partially responsible for securing Moldova’s information space:

“As Liliana Vitu, head of the Audiovisual Council of the Republic of Moldova said, ‘Our efforts to build resilience, offer truthful information, and combat Russian hybrid warfare are important but the fight against Russia is completely asymmetrical. We are bringing a butter knife to a gun fight. But it is our duty to keep building democracy while defending it.’”

Finally, while meeting with various politicians, the mission spoke with Renato Usatii and he perfectly summarized why his party’s participation in the elections is so difficult to pin down in terms of either domestic political goals, or geopolitics. Here is how he described his party’s position on various issues:

“He told the delegation that his party is non-aligned and describes the party’s platform as ‘just me, I am the program.’”

Once again, the piece is very good and I really recommend reading it in full. Traditional foreign policy perspectives within US think-tanks have gotten scrambled in recent months and years, and there are more and more pieces written in prestigious publications that I would say “smell bad.” We’ve seen pieces that look like they could have been written by Kremlin propagandists and it is no longer a safe assumption that major American think tanks follow the national values that someone like me grew up with. It is heartening to find the right or left, there are those who still see clearly what Russia is trying to accomplish in this part of the world - and why it must be stopped.

Here’s one more link to Laura Thornton’s piece for the McCain Institute. Enjoy.

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