On the night of August 8, a drone crashed in a field near the town of Crocmaz in the Ștefan Vodă district. According to police the drone crashed into a tree around 2.5 m off the ground, exploded and started a brush fire. No one was injured or killed, but nearby houses sustained damage.

Crocmaz is a town located on the Dniester river immediately across from Ukraine. It is located near the border crossings of Palanca and Tudora and is very close to the Et Cetera Winery.

Prime Minister Tofan addressed the incident, saying:

“It’s good that it hit a tree and not a house. At the same time, we have damage almost 800 meters away - at some households, windows shattered from the impact. (…) We feel this war. We all know who the aggressor is in this case.”

“Missile-Drone”

Initial statements from the police, and remarks condemning the incident from President Sandu, indicate that this is the first crash in Moldova of a new generation of Russian drones.

For the past several years, Russia’s main attack drone was the Geran-2, an improved copy of the Iranian Shahed-136. Russia has been testing a new version, the Geran-3, which replaces the Geran-2’s pusher propeller with a jet engine. A second “missile-drone” entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 10 before departing towards Odesa one minute later. Local media reported this as a Geran-3, but reports on the Geran program indicate that the Geran-3 was a proof of concept model and is already out of production - replaced with the Geran-4, which uses a better Chinese turbojet engine. In either case, the Geran-3/4 has blurred the line between a drone and a cruise missile, offering substantially higher speeds, higher operating altitude and the ability to maneuver to evade threats.

New estimates indicate that jet-powered drones now comprise up to 2/3 of Russian drone attacks while Ukrainian intercept rates are falling.

The Geran-4 is itself giving way to the Geran-5, which is closing the drone-cruise missile loop with a design very similar to the original V1 flying bomb. Russia is effectively iterating its way from cheap loitering drones to cheap mass-produced, fully capable cruise missiles. This incident is Moldova’s first interaction with this new phase of the war.

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Other Security & Transnistria News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security stories of the week:

• Is a Polish former deputy minister of justice hiding in Transnistria? Polish radio RMF24 reported that former politician Marcin Romanowski, who is wanted on more than a dozen corruption charges, sent a petition to the Warsaw court with a return address in Tiraspol. Romanowski is facing up to 25 years in prison on charges of corruption, abuse of power and being part of an organized criminal group related to an alleged $40 million fraud when he was part of the Law and Justice government. In 2024, he fled Poland to evade arrest and was granted political asylum by Viktor Orban in Hungary. Following the fall of Orban, he vanished. Poland’s government has reached out to Moldova with a request to confirm his presence, and Poland’s ruling coalition called Transnistria “a new destination for politicians who have run into trouble with the law to flee.1” Moldovan police have confirmed that there is no evidence of Romanowski crossing the Moldovan border, and are taking steps to ascertain if he is in Transnistria.

• More Transnistrians are coming to Moldova for work. The first half of 2026 saw a 67% increase, to a total of more than 20,000, in the number of Transnistrian residents employed on the right bank. While the actual population of the region is unknown, this is likely to represent a considerable share of the total workforce2.

• Transnistria to pay VAT from September 1. A new draft resolution would levy VAT and excise taxes on 12 categories of goods from Transnistria by September 1. These include luxury goods such as alcohol, caviar, tobacco, fireworks, jewelry, etc. Taxes on five more categories, including critical raw-material inputs, are proposed to go into effect on January 1. Taxes on energy may be included from April to harmonize with the proposed changes in the rest of Moldova.

Water & Electricity Crisis Updates

On August 13, falling water levels in the Danube caused Romania to fully shut down its only nuclear power plant at Cernavoda. While Romania is quickly firing up emergency coal plants and asking users to conserve power, the country will still be a major net importer of electricity for the near term.

Right now experts estimate that Moldova will not run short of power, and neither country is actively discussing rolling blackouts or emergency measures. At the same time, the regional electricity market is coming under considerable strain, and Moldovan experts expect price increases.

Energocom announced that the company has finished purchasing natural gas for the winter and has contracts covering 76% of Moldova’s projected consumption from October 1, 2026 through September 30, 2027. This equates to 100% of winter consumption. These contracts were signed after 24 rounds of public tenders starting in July, and are not fixed-price but are based on formulas calculated on public indexes. Suppliers are still making purchases to ensure that Moldova will have 15% of yearly supplies in physical storage by November 1.

On the water front, the level of the Novodnistrovsk reservoir continues to fall rapidly. On August 11, the Dniester Commission decided to reduce outward flow from 85 to 75 cubic meters / second through the end of August. The goal is to stretch out the Dniester’s water reserves as long as possible since no substantial rain is forecast in the Carpathians in the next 2 months. Moldova’s authorities continue to ask people to conserve water as much as possible.

Other Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the other politics and news updates of the week:

• Teachers threaten protests as promised salary increases are delayed. Their union has stated that unless their salaries are increased on September 1 as promised by the former Minister of Finance, they will take action. The government has explained that these increases are directly tied to the tax reform, which has been delayed3. The Ministry of Education has promised clarifications in the coming weeks.

• RFE/RL Investigation - more trouble on state company boards. According to an investigation by Europa Libera, substantial numbers of state employees serve on the boards of more than 3 state-owned companies. Legally, the limit is 3 board seats. At the Public Property Agency (APP), a total of 60 officials hold a combined 219 board seats - averaging 3.65. At the Ministry of Economy, 68 employees hold an average of 2 seats each. In 42 of the 81 companies controlled by the APP, officials sat on both the board and the state oversight bodies. Numerous state employees are paid more for their board positions than for their official salaries. The Ministry of Economy responded by launching internal investigations and forcing resignations of anyone on more than 3 boards. Quick analysis in a footnote4.

• The Ministry of Economy presented a new investment law that defines strategic investment sectors including R&D, IT industry, semiconductor / chip manufacturing, electronics manufacturing, energy production and more. Investors putting a minimum of €10 million into one of these sectors will benefit from fast-track permitting and a 1 stop shop bureaucracy concierge service operated by the Investment Agency. Investments of over €20 million will benefit from free leases of state land for up to 49 years, and investments over €40 million will be able to enter into direct agreements with the government. Strategic investment sectors explicitly exclude armaments and dual-use technologies, which are subject to more complex regulations.

• 100 foreign workers relocated to dormitories after TV8 investigation. The investigation had found workers from Bangladesh and Nepal were housed in repurposed train sleeper cars in cramped and unsanitary conditions. The General Inspectorate for Migration has reported that inspections of the company resulted in new housing.

• Taraclia will become a municipality (like Chisinau and Balti). The Taraclia district will be dissolved and the town of Taraclia will become a municipality, directly absorbing some towns while converting others into official suburbs. Secretary General of the Government Alexei Buzu explained: “Because in Taraclia we have our citizens of Bulgarian ethnicity, we want to offer them this status, so that they have these powers including on aspects related to cultural programs.” The Taraclia district has approximately 26,000 residents with 10,000 in the town, of whom a majority are ethnic Bulgarians. Asked whether Bulgaria pushed Moldova to do this, Secretary Buzu simply noted that the Bulgarian government was part of the discussion.

• There will be a military parade on Independence Day. It will include more than 2,000 soldiers and security personnel from Moldova and partner countries, and will take place in the city center. This will include 150 Moldovan veterans and soldiers from Romania, Ukraine, Italy, France, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and the United States. In addition to the soldiers, around 100 military vehicles will take part in the parade. Asked my Moldova is putting its military in the center of this celebration, President Sandu replied that it will highlight recent defense investments, and underscore that “peace is paramount, and the security of our citizens is our top priority.”

That line opened the final paragraph of an article titled “Green China of Tibetan Plateau: Aba region as modern model of coexistence between people, tradition, nature” that was published on August 1 as a special report on Moldpres.

The article is written by Moldpres journalist Lilia Grubîi about her recent trip to “Aba,” the Mandarin name for the Tibetan region of Ngawa1, presenting how China’s development of the region is an example for the world.

The article is one of 10 in a series published by Moldpres since late May. Each is described as a MOLDPRES REPORT and none discloses who funded or organized the trip. In answer to questions from Moldova Matters, Moldpres stated that Lilia Grubîi’s travel, lodging and other costs for this trip were paid by the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association, an organization closely linked to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. They also confirmed that Moldpres has no policy requiring editorial transparency about press junkets organized and financed by foreign governments.

We will look into Lilia Grubîi’s reporting on Tibet, how it contrasts with independent reporting on the region and what the implications of the Moldpres policy are below. But first…

What is Moldpres?

The State Information Agency “Moldpres” is a Public Institution under the control of Moldova’s State Chancellery. What that means in practice is a bit hard to describe, as it combines aspects of a newsroom, a wire service, and a state publisher. According to their website, their main activity is to “provide accurate, equidistant, transparent information and to ensure pluralism of opinion.”

The institution has 3 primary activity areas:

1. Wire Service - publishing updates and press releases from the government and state agencies. This is done in Romanian, Russian and English and their website claims that they work to ensure the “dissemination of information (news, interviews, reports, photo reports) from the first source to foreign press agencies.”

2. Publisher of the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova - this publication is the state’s official gazette where laws, presidential decrees, government decisions, major court rulings, etc. are published. Laws only take effect once they are published in the Official Gazette.

3. Newsroom - the institution has reporters and journalists who publish original stories, photos and interviews. These are not separated on the site but mixed into the wire service and general news feed.

Moldpres is therefore a somewhat ambiguous entity. Part state agency subject to political control, part mass media organization.

In parliament’s pending mass media reform Draft Law 123/2026, aimed at aligning with EU regulation, Moldpres is given a unique position. Article 5(2) of the bill states that:

(2) The State and the central and local public administration authorities may not have the quality of founder, owner or entity exercising control over a media service provider, with the exception of:
a) public providers of audiovisual media services regulated by the Code of Audiovisual Media Services no. 174/2018;
b) providers of media services intended for children and the promotion of national culture, founded by the Ministry of Culture;
c) the Public Institution State Information Agency “Moldpres” founded by the
State Chancellery.

The Public Broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) referenced in Article 5(2)(a) is subject to substantial regulation in the Audiovisual Code that ensures editorial independence and transparent editorial standards. Moldpres, which is explicitly named in 5(2)(c), is not. Nowhere does Moldpres publicly disclose its editorial policies, its funding-transparency practices, or details about outside funding it receives.

When responding to questions, Moldpres representatives clearly struggled with the ambiguities of their organization. We’ll get to that below, but first let’s look at these articles and why they matter.

Tibet and “Ecological Civilization”

In her article, Lilia Grubîi presents a picture of the Ngawa (Aba) region of Tibet as an idyllic mix of traditional culture, modern development and ecological conservation. She writes:

“On this journey, the special MOLDPRES correspondent discovered that Aba is trying to find a delicate balance: economic development without destroying nature, tourism without degrading the landscape, modernization without losing traditions.”

The article describes large investments to restore wetlands, protect waterbirds, revive the local yak milk industry and encourage new tourism models - including collectivized community tourist companies.

At a high level, this is best understood as Communist Party of China (CCP) party messaging presented as travel journalism. The framing closely mirrors a key concept in “Xi Jinping Thought” called “Ecological Civilization.” As such, it is a key element of CCP ideology, formally taken up by the Party's Central Committee in 2018.

In response to questions from Moldova Matters, Moldpres stated that Lilia Grubîi’s reporting was part of a “professional internship program” and that:

“Participation in the internship did not involve editorial obligations. According to information provided by the journalist, no external entity requested the publication of any materials, and none intervened in their selection, drafting, or approval. The subjects published reflected the author’s own journalistic choices and covered fields such as technology, agriculture, ecology, and culture.”

This answer, as well as the content of the article itself, fails profoundly to grapple with exactly what is going on in Ngawa.

Ngawa (Aba) – a warning for the whole world

In her article, Lilia Grubîi praises the authorities promotion of tourism in the region, noting that:

“Tourism is allowed, but strictly controlled. Visitors travel along specially designed ecological routes, so that nature remains the priority.”

This is stunning in its failure to acknowledge that the “strict control” for which Ngawa is famous, is for the oppression of human rights. China has deployed one of the most extensive population monitoring systems in the world across Tibet, a system that Human Rights Watch has called “grid management.” This system breaks towns and villages in Tibet into segmented units which are monitored by party officials. Each individual living there is tracked - their opinions, communications and religious practices are all monitored. Checkpoints called “convenience police posts” involve regular mandatory phone searches for banned content.

Incredibly, Human Rights Watch has reported the wide scale DNA harvesting of residents against their will - including the mass collection from children while in kindergarten and villages where all boys over the age of 5 had their DNA forcibly collected.

Within Tibet, Ngawa is seen as a hotspot of resistance and an epicenter of oppression. Since 2009 more than 150 people have self-immolated in protest against Chinese imperial policies in Tibet. Of those, 40 have been in Ngawa.

According to a report by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC), journalists face serious challenges trying to independently report on the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The US Department of State cites this 2025 FCCC report in their own report on freedoms in TAR to Congress writing:

“Ninety-three percent of correspondents who attempted to travel to the TAR and other Tibetan areas of the PRC faced difficulty in reporting. While the government occasionally organizes press tours of the TAR, they do not provide opportunities to report independently.” …

“When U.S. journalists gained access to Tibetan areas, the Chinese government further suppressed their ability to report about Tibet by intimidating and preventing Chinese nationals from interacting with them. Group tours enabled the government to claim increased numbers and greater access to the region while maintaining strict control over the information conveyed.”

Emphasis mine.

So while the MoldPres correspondent may not have been under any official editorial obligations, the Chinese government assures that these trips are controlled in a way that shapes their outputs - especially for non-critical journalists.

As we can see in this story, they succeeded.

Is Moldpres Obliged to Report Funded Trips Transparently?

When I reached out to Moldpres to ask about this piece on Tibet, I wanted to understand a few things. Who paid for the trip? Did the sponsor exercise any editorial control? and Does Moldpres have a policy for disclosing sponsored reporting trips?

The initial response from the director of Moldpres highlighted the ambiguity of the organization itself. He stated that my questions, framed as a “request,” were sent to the relevant departments for review and that:

“We assure you that we will provide you with a response as soon as possible, in strict compliance with the deadlines and provisions of the legislation in force regarding access to information.”

This is a standard response from a state agency to a freedom of information request - but a very unusual response from a newsroom. The “legislation in force” typically allows for multiple weeks to meet information request deadlines. I pressed, noting that if Moldpres is unable to answer basic questions about its reporting and editorial policies I’ll simply note that in my piece. This caused a switch to “journalism mode” with Moldpres beginning to send answers.

On the 3 main questions:

Who paid for the trip?

Moldpres responded that “MOLDPRES journalist Lilia Grubîi participated, during the period May 11 – August 11, 2026, in an international professional internship program, with the agreement of the press agency’s administration” with the costs being covered by the “organizers from China.” After I pressed for a specific organization that paid, they responded that it was the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA).

Officially, the CPDA is an NGO, but in reality it is a part of China’s public diplomacy apparatus with close ties to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Did the sponsor exercise any editorial control?

Moldpres stressed that “Participation in the program did not involve any editorial or contractual obligation to provide content” and that the “published subjects represented the author’s own decision and focused on technological, agricultural, ecological, and cultural themes.”

That answers a narrow, contractual question, but somewhat misses the bigger picture. Across numerous articles, it is very clear that all of the perspective and quotes are drawn from a carefully choreographed process. This is explained at times in quotes like this one:

“As part of a documentary program for the international press, the MOLDPRES special envoy visited several Chinese companies active in sectors considered essential for the green economy”

Each article reads as if a story was laid out clearly for the journalist to report on. No articles indicate independent followup or contradictory perspectives to those presented by the “organizers” who are never named. No example is more clear than the uncritical reporting on Tibet.

Does Moldpres have a policy for disclosing sponsored reporting trips?

Moldpres repeatedly described this program as a professional development internship - not a press junket or funded reporting trip. They wrote:

“MOLDPRES does not currently have a policy requiring journalists to specify, in each individual article, the funding of study visits or professional mobility programs.”

Noting that this policy applies equally to “programs are funded by American, European, Chinese, or other international partners.” Moldpres also stated that:

“As far as we know, no similar policies exist at other private media entities either.”

I reached out to Alina Radu, CEO of Ziarul de Gardă (ZdG) to ask about their policies in this area. She stated that in all cases ZdG discloses their sponsorship and that this applies equally to any paid travel. However, she stressed that the first question is always about whether to accept a paid trip in the first place. According to Radu, ZdG never accepts trips designed to promote someone - whether a company or a government program. She stressed that they apply journalistic ethics to these decisions and differentiate between informational trips to Brussels sponsored by the EU and trips to visit a factory sponsored by the company that owns it.

Putting aside whether or not this was an internship or a press junket, it is unambiguously true that all of the articles produced in this series are promotional in nature (see footnote for links to the articles2). They promote Chinese companies, Chinese policies and China itself.

So whether or not there was an obligation to report the trip’s sponsor as a matter of Moldpres policy or journalistic ethics, there was an editorial choice made here. This choice resulted in a series of stories that uncritically presented a curated view of various aspects of Chinese policy to readers. Most notably, an article that omits, and in that omission whitewashes, human rights abuses in Tibet.

Why does it Matter?

Ngawa’s story is not really about wetlands, yak milk or eco-tourism. It is about what happens when a system built for oppression is allowed to write its own account of itself - and what happens when that account is published, unlabeled, by a state news agency of an EU candidate country, without a single word of independent scrutiny.

Moldova’s pending media law will soon draw a sharper line around who can own a newsroom and who must disclose their funding. Moldpres, carved out of that law by name, will remain outside of the accountability mechanisms that apply even to state broadcasters. Until that changes, Aba’s “lesson for the whole world” will keep circulating in Moldova’s press exactly as Beijing packaged it - with Ngawa and the warning quietly left out.

First though, an appeal - this all takes A LOT of time. If Moldova Matters provides you value, or if you just want to support the work - please become a paid subscriber. And if you are reading this for work - don’t forget, we have organizational subscription options as well.

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Heat and Drought Create Dual Crises

This week Moldova is facing a heat wave, but overall has seen a mild summer with one of the best years for agriculture in some time. But sustained heat waves and drought in the region have caused a dual water and electricity crisis that is quite literally flowing down stream to Moldova.

Crisis 1: Reduced Dniester Flow Threatens Chisinau’s Water Supply

A lack of rainfall in the upper Dniester (Romanian Nistru1) has reduced inflows to the Novodnistrovsk reservoir and caused it to fall to a critical level. On July 31 the Dniester Commission held an extraordinary meeting and agreed to reduce outflows from the reservoir from 100 m³/s to 85 m³/s. The current inflow rate is 30 m³/s, meaning that even with the reduction the reservoir is draining rapidly. The commission agreed to maintain this level for 2 weeks but will then need to reevaluate.

According to the Ministry of Environment, a critical problem is the Chisinau water intake station in Vadul lui Voda. This is a fixed intake and cannot adjust to critically low water levels.

The situation has led Environment Minister Gheorghe Hajder to warn that Moldova is consuming its strategic reserve and called on people to save water saying “Every liter saved counts.”

Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban initially rejected worries, claiming that the water level at the pump station is fine so long as the government does its job of making sure the outflow from the Novodnistrovsk reservoir remains adequate2. Minister Hajder shot back, criticizing Chisinau City Hall’s failure to modernize the pump station. Prime Minister Tofan intervened and answered Mayor Ceban’s simultaneous request for emergency pumps, stating:

“Providing citizens with water should not be a subject of debate and I will not accept its politicization. I have ordered the release of motor pumps from the stocks of the Material Reserves Agency (MAI) to support the works carried out by the Chisinau City Hall.”

The government has continued to supply pumps as the Chisinau authorities install emergency water feeds to the pump station. Simultaneously, Mayor Ceban announced the preparation of 213 water storage and distribution points around the city and noted that city authorities have 253 Eurocubes, 20 tank trucks and 45 specialized water units3 prepared to distribute water in case of disruptions. Additionally, technical water for irrigation and green spaces is being pumped from the capital’s lakes and from the Chisinau mine4.

Crisis 2: Reduced Danube Flow Sparks Electricity Crisis

At the same time, the Danube River is also seeing historically low water levels due to drought. This has created a major electricity crisis as Hungary almost fully shut down Paks, its sole nuclear power plant, and Romania shut down Unit 1 of its Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Both plants require river water to cool the reactors. Paks supplies over half of Hungary’s electricity, while Romania is facing a substantial electricity deficit.

This has created an unprecedented situation where Romania is relying on Moldovan energy company Energocom to supply imported electricity from Ukraine. At the same time Romania is taking radical steps to try to balance its grid. Acting Prime Minister Bolojan has called for voluntary reductions from households and industry, and announced that Dacia and Ford are closing their auto manufacturing plants in Romania through August 19 in order to save electricity.

At the same time, the Romanian military is attempting to divert the Danube in order to raise the water level at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant by a few critical centimeters. The army detonated Pârjoaia rock to partially redirect the flow, while the navy is working to sink barges and partially block one branch of the river in order to redirect water towards the plant.

The goal is to offset the continued fall of the water level and keep reactor 2 running.

Moldovan Government Response

Moldova is facing a critical electrical shortage each evening from around 18:00 - 22:00 during peak hours - especially after the sun sets and solar production goes offline. Romania has no electricity to supply, so Energocom is scrambling to purchase power from emergency supply at exorbitant prices. The National Crisis Management Commission (CNMC), chaired by Prime Minister Tofan, met on August 3 and put in place emergency measures. They have limited power exports during peak hours and called on households and companies to conserve power. Government buildings are reducing all non-critical power consumption and turning off fountains and decorative lighting. Companies are requested to do the same. Individuals are urged to avoid elevators between 06:00 - 09:00 and 18:00 - 23:00 in order to conserve power and avoid the risk of becoming stuck in an outage.

Similarly, the government has called on people to conserve water and asked farmers to irrigate overnight and according to specialized schedules.

Speaking of the dual crises, President Sandu called on people to conserve power and water and stated that while the government was working on mitigating the crises, “there are no magic solutions.”

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Tax Reform 2.0

On August 6, Prime Minister Tofan announced a second attempt at a major tax reform with a speech laying out principal elements of the reform as well as the government’s rationale for the changes being proposed. In that speech he started by completely rejecting the core philosophy of the previous tax reform laid out under his predecessor saying:

“I want to start with a simple idea: the way a country organizes its taxes influences the way its economy works. If we want more people to work legally, we need to tax labor in a way that encourages legal work. If we want companies to invest more, we need to leave them more capital for investment. If we want to discourage vices — tobacco, vaping, especially among young people, excessive alcohol consumption, gambling, if we want the environment not to be polluted by fireworks — this must also be reflected in tax policy.”

He went on to outline a set of measures that he claims will produce a tax code that is “simpler, fairer and more difficult to circumvent.” The core approach is to reduce taxes on labor and investments, raise taxes on vices and reduce exceptions. Summing it up, he stated that “our approach is not ‘raise taxes.’ Our approach is: put the accents right.”

A deep dive into the proposals will have to wait for a future article, but here are a few of the more important announcements:

• Payroll taxes: a 35% increase in the personal exemption. Increased from 29,700 lei annually to 40,000 (the previous reform proposal removed it entirely).

• 0% taxes on reinvested profits for companies up to 200 million lei revenue (current ceiling was 100 million).

• Raised tax on dividends from 6% to 8%

• VAT Changes: “Basic” food items5 and medicines remain at 8%, other foods, HoReCa and tourism up to 12%, electricity and gas to go up to 20% in April 2027 for energy consumed above a tax-free / low tax allotment per household.

• Sin Taxes: New 6% excise tax on gambling, 50% increase in excise taxes on vaping, new excise taxes on sugary drinks and energy drinks (rates not announced), new 25% excise tax on fireworks, progressively increasing excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.

• Temu / Parcels from outside Moldova: 20% VAT and 12 lei fix tax per package

• 50% increased taxes on bank profits: one year only for 2027

We will come back to this topic in much more detail later. But for now, there are a few important things to note. Firstly, this reform is slower, and the Prime Minister emphasized predictability as a key goal. Secondly, it is less rushed - there are 2 weeks for public consultations (rather than 5 days) for a reform that is less sweeping. Thirdly, Prime Minister Tofan has thrown his political weight behind it, and, through this speech and subsequent interviews is actively making the case for the reform.

It is explained as setting a direction and tone, with officials indicating a larger reform to the tax code is coming, presumably next year

LPA Reform Updates

Under the proposed Local Public Administration (LPA) Reform, towns and villages had until July 31 to commit to voluntary amalgamation. By that date, 761 of 890 mayoralties had begun the process, with around 430 finalizing plans and many others stuck or delayed in the process. Given this, the State Chancellery announced an extension of the deadline to August 31.

Recall, the goal of LPA reform is to incentivize small villages to voluntarily combine into larger entities. In exchange for this decision, the government is offering substantial infrastructure funding for towns that choose to combine voluntarily.

Frank Bracco, recently Country Director for the Tony Blair Institute in Moldova, published an interactive map showing the progress of this reform. I highly recommend it for anyone trying to get into the weeds on this process.

You can find it at this link.

At least 60 mayoralties have refused any participation in the process. Under the rules of the process, they risk “normative amalgamation,” aka being merged with their neighbors with neither a say in the process nor financial incentives.

President Sandu recently warned of this saying:

“I regret that several dozen city halls refused to participate in voluntary consolidation; residents of these communities will not be able to benefit from the financial resources provided by the government. The state will not leave anyone behind; all citizens deserve a decent standard of living. However, citizens should know that city halls that did not voluntarily decide to merge their administrations will be consolidated without financial incentives or the opportunity to choose which city halls to merge with,”

International Affairs

On July 30, Prime Minister Tofan made his first international trip, traveling to Bucharest and meeting with Acting Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and President Nicușor Dan. He spoke about Moldova’s important relationship with Romania both for EU integration and for growing the economy, making the pitch for Romanian companies to consider investing in Moldova.

While the government might have hoped this would be the international affairs story of the week… it really wasn’t. Instead, on August 3, the number one story in Moldova was about a delegation from the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which landed at the Chisinau airport on a mission to talk about agricultural cooperation.

According to the Kabul Tribune, this is a senior delegation from the Taliban’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, led by Deputy Minister Sadr Azam Osmani, which “traveled to Moldova at the official invitation of the Moldovan government to discuss expanding practical and technical cooperation between the two countries.”

This led to an explosion of criticism of the government and a race to figure out what was going on. It turns out that while they did not come at the “official invitation” of Moldova’s government (which does not recognize the Taliban), they did get officially invited via a process that has been reported to be both haphazard and embarrassing.

The process started when a Moldovan agricultural producer who currently exports to Uzbekistan began investigating expansion into the Afghan market. Under their rules, the Taliban require an official visit/inspection when starting up a new trade relationship. The businessman approached the Ministry of Agriculture where State Secretary Vasile Șarban decided to help, later explaining that “I believe it is right for the Moldovan authorities to take care of Moldovan economic agents.” He then sent an official request to the Ministry of Foriegn Affairs to facilitate this access and issue visas, which they did.

Apparently, at no point was the “Taliban Delegation” topic thought important enough to bring to the attention of either Minister. Also, because none of the men is individually under sanctions, neither Ministry was required to notify the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS).

Prime Minister Tofan called the situation “embarrassing and unacceptable” and explained that while all procedures were followed normally and according to the law, “An obviously sensitive case was treated as a routine administrative file. The result was a wrong decision.” He called on all officials to be more responsible, saying “We do not manage papers, we manage a country and we must be more careful when making decisions.”

The “delegation” stayed through their planned trip on August 7, presumably meeting with the businessman but without any official meetings or recognition from the Moldovan government.

Security & Transnistria

Here’s a roundup of the top security stories of the week:

• South Ossetian “representative” Vitalii Iankovski was photographed in Tiraspol. The “diplomatic representative” from a non-state to a non-state was previously barred from entering Moldova and declared undesirable for 5 years. Zona de Securitate reported that he attended events there and was conspicuously photographed on July 29. Moldovan officials have stated that they do not know how Iankovski managed to enter Transnistria. Vitalii Iankovski has both Russian and Ukrainian citizenship.

• Fragments of a Geran-2 drone were found in the village of Văleni. The crash of another Russian drone in a rural part of the Cahul district triggered the normal round of diplomatic protests.

Other Politics & News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) raised the base rate half a point to 7.5%. They cited the upward trajectory of inflation “caused by factors associated with consumer demand against the background of persistent supply shocks.” NBM estimated the annual inflation rate to have hit 6.51% in June, just above the targeted 5±1.5%. They now estimate that inflation will continue to rise through the end of 2026 and not return to the target range until Q3 2027.

• Parliament has approved a new draft electoral code in the first reading. The code would eliminate single member constituency elections in Gagauzia and return the region to a proportional representation system. The coming elections, scheduled for November 15, would still be on the old system with the new one coming into place at the next local elections in the autonomous region. Additionally, new processes are put in place to regulate and coordinate postal voting in elections.

• Ana Revenco resigned as director of the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (STRATCOM). She had run the center since she was appointed to start it in October 2023 and did not announce a reason for her departure. In a statement, Revenco stressed the distance they had come from a startup in the midst of crisis to what is now a “functional institution with a professional team and clear operating mechanisms." President Sandu accepted Revenco’s resignation and appointed Liliana Vițu as the new STRATCOM director. Vițu had just announced her resignation as the Director of the Audiovisual Council, which replaced her with her Vice Director Aneta Gonța.

“European Economy, Efficient State”

That’s the title of the new program, which opens with a vision statement about economic development saying that Moldova must be “the most business friendly country in Europe.” Before getting into how the new Prime Minister plans to accomplish this, it is worth noting that this document is long. Really long.

At 147 pages “European Economy, Efficient State” is just a few pages short of double the combined length of the 3 former PAS government programs. Here are links to my deep-dives into those past programs for reference:

• “Moldova of Good Times” (41 pages), Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita

• “Moldova: Prosperous, Safe, European” (21 pages), Prime Minister Dorin Recean

• “EU, PEACE, DEVELOPMENT,” (15 pages), Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu

In addition to being longer, this program is structurally completely different than its predecessors. In fact it reads like a document from an entirely different genre.

Prime Minister Gavrilita’s program was fundamentally a political document, it hewed closely to the PAS electoral program and reorganized those promises in terms of ministerial competencies. Recean’s program represented a hard pivot to refocus the government on national security in the context of the war and to remove lots of outdated COVID related activities. Munteanu’s program was notable for how short it was - there was no problem statement, analysis of the current situation or political rhetoric. It contained 16 thematic areas like “European integration” and “Affordable health” and then a short bulleted list for each area. These bullets were sometimes hard targets like “modernized 3000 km of roads” and often aspirations or ideas to be explored.

Prime Minister Tofan’s government program is an entirely different beast. It reads more like a results-based management framework. The document is filled with baseline metrics from 2024 or 2025 and then specific targets of where the government hopes to get by 2029. The implication is that Prime Minister Tofan has set targets for the ministries and he plans to hold them accountable.

Simultaneously, this is a clear invitation to the public to hold his government to its promises.

Structure

After setting out a vision, the program begins with a lengthy problem statement called “The Reality We Start From.” Anemic economic growth, labor shortages, shrinking tax base, a pension system under pressure, poverty, bloated bureaucracy, poor services, unequal access to infrastructure, climate change threatening agriculture, etc. Each of these problems is tied to opportunities that can be realized by major reforms, but the main threat is identified as “inertia.” The implication is that these problems have been known for a long time and never addressed, but that time is running out and they must all be tackled head on now.

Following this problem statement, the program sets out 5 priorities for the government as follows:

1. Relaunching economic growth

2. Accelerating accession to the European Union

3. An efficient, digital and accountable state

4. Security, justice and peace firmly defended

5. Increasing the quality of life and social cohesion through decent jobs and human capital

Each of these priorities is followed by 5-8 bullet points outlining actions to be taken in these areas. All together, this gets us 18 pages into the program and sets out a clear direction of travel. What comes next from pages 19 - 147 are sector specific policies in great detail. I’ve pulled out a few of them that are particularly interesting or highlight a new approach below, but first, let’s look at some…

Big Picture Takeaways

Here are a few high level takeaways from this program:

• It is very candid about dysfunction and failure. Each section begins with a blunt analysis of what is not working and then outlines steps to fix things. It does not shy away from calling out serious dysfunction and seems totally unbothered by the fact that PAS has been in power for 4 years. It’s a prognosis and plan of action - not a political whitewash.

• EU integration is not a chapter - it is the skeleton holding it all together. Every single section from Economics to Infrastructure to Culture is organized in terms of EU integration. The program does not treat EU integration as another task list, but as a process that will have impacts across every level of government and life.

• The focus is on quantifiable actions. Targets with specific dates for completion are all over this document. Deficits to fall by 2% of GDP by 2029, shrinking of rural to Chisinau schools math performance gap by 1/3, etc. The document is numbers heavy and spends a lot of time explaining where we are and where we are going.

• Initiatives are bundled for easier communications. In a number of cases very complex reforms and activities are bundled into big-name programs like “Model Schools,” “Tourism 2029,” a new “Country as a Service” digitization program, etc. The document is highly technical but also built around communicating the work that they plan to do.

• The approach changed, the content didn’t. Most of the promises and targets set out in the Munteanu program are unchanged. What is different is the level of detail, the figures and deadlines and the structuring of all of these reforms in EU integration terms.

• The “Once Only” Principle as a cross cutting theme. The program commits to move the government to a place where the state will only ever ask information from a citizen one time. While this sounds simple, it is the strongest commitment in this document to reducing bureaucracy and saving time. In essence, it envisions a common data storage system between all state agencies and levels of government. I’ll explain how this works in practice in a footnote digression1.

• Moldova - Small but Fast. That through-line is all over the document. The analysis is that Moldova is small, far behind its neighbors and lacking in any meaningful natural resources. Given that, the competitive advantage the country can build is speed. Simple regulations, highly digitized, easy to do business. This is how the Tofan government wants to make the country more competitive, grow the economy and deliver a European quality of life.

Taken together, this program does not outline a major new set of policies, it reorganizes the PAS electoral program and policies into a new framework. This framework is quantifiable, time bound and structured to invite accountability2 and bound by a real through-line.

If EU integration is the goal then a small, highly accountable and very fast state is how Moldova gets there.

Sectoral Policies

Read more

August is one of the best months to experience Moldova. The country celebrates two of its most important national holidays - Independence Day on 27 August and Limba Noastră (Our Language Day) on 31 August. During the final week of the month, Chișinău comes alive with free concerts, outdoor performances, artisan markets, food vendors, and cultural celebrations that attract visitors from across the country.

Independence Day marks Moldova’s declaration of independence in 1991 and is the country’s largest annual public celebration. While the official program is typically released only a few weeks beforehand, visitors can expect festivities centered around the Great National Assembly Square and Ștefan cel Mare Boulevard, including live music, family activities, exhibitions, and an evening concert featuring some of Moldova’s best-known artists. Museums, parks, and public spaces across the capital also host special events throughout the day.

Just four days later, Moldova celebrates Limba Noastră (Our Language Day), a holiday dedicated to the Romanian language, literature, and national culture. The atmosphere is noticeably different - more reflective than festive - with poetry readings, book fairs, folk performances, and cultural programs held throughout Chișinău and other cities. For anyone interested in Moldova’s history and cultural identity, it is one of the most rewarding days of the year to visit.

Beyond these national celebrations, August is packed with the year’s biggest music festivals, anime conventions, sporting events, food festivals, and outdoor entertainment. Long, warm evenings and a full calendar of events make it one of the easiest months to explore Moldova.

Featured Events

July 31 – August 2 | Anime Days at Shopping MallDova

One of Moldova’s largest celebrations of anime, manga, cosplay, gaming, and Japanese pop culture returns to Shopping MallDova. The three-day event features cosplay competitions, gaming tournaments, K-pop performances, workshops, artist booths, merchandise vendors, and activities for all ages. Admission is free, making it an excellent event for both dedicated fans and curious first-time visitors.

Location: Shopping MallDova, Chișinău
Admission: Free
For more information: Shopping Malldova

August 7–9 | Festivalul Lupilor (Festival of the Wolves)

Held against the spectacular backdrop of Orheiul Vechi, Festivalul Lupilor has become one of Moldova’s premier summer festivals. Visitors can enjoy live music from popular Moldovans such as Satoshi and Alternosfera, historical reenactments, camping, artisan markets, food vendors, workshops, and outdoor activities. Even for those who don’t attend the concerts, the location alone makes the trip worthwhile.

Location: Orheiul Vechi
Tickets can be purchased here: Official Site

August 8–9 | KULTURA: Moldova Auto Weekend

Arena Chișinău hosts one of the country’s largest automotive festivals featuring modified cars, classic vehicles, drifting demonstrations, exhibitions, motorsport displays, food trucks, music, and family-friendly activities.

Location: Arena Chișinău
For more information and tickets: Official Site

August 8–9 | La Plăcinte Festival

A celebration of traditional Moldovan food, music, and crafts held in the Botanical Garden. Visitors can sample regional dishes, enjoy live folk performances, browse handmade products, and experience one of Moldova’s best-loved culinary traditions. Live music will be performed by a long list of famous Moldovan singers such as Satoshi, Nelly Ciobanu, Pasha Parfeni, and more.

For more information, music lineup, and tickets: Iticket

August 15 | MIRAGE Festival

One of Moldova’s largest electronic music festivals returns with international DJs, immersive stage production, lighting effects, and an energetic late-night atmosphere. The event has become increasingly popular with visitors from across the region.

Location: Arena Chișinău
Tickets can be purchased here: Livetickets Site

August 22–23 | Summer Fest 2026

Summer Fest is Moldova’s largest contemporary music festival and one of the highlights of the country’s entertainment calendar. Thousands of visitors are expected for two days of live performances featuring international artists alongside some of Moldova’s biggest musical acts. Food courts, entertainment zones, and activities continue throughout the day.

Location: Botanical Garden, Chișinău
Tickets can be purchased here: https://summerfest.md

August 27 | Independence Day 🇲🇩

Moldova celebrates its Independence Day with concerts, military ceremonies, family activities, exhibitions, artisan markets, and evening entertainment throughout central Chișinău. Great National Assembly Square becomes the centre of celebrations, while many museums and cultural institutions organize special programs.

The official schedule is normally released during August.

For the official program (when released): Gov.md Website

August 31 | Limba Noastră (Our Language Day)

This national holiday celebrates the Romanian language and Moldova’s literary heritage through poetry readings, concerts, exhibitions, book fairs, and cultural performances. While quieter than Independence Day, it offers visitors an excellent opportunity to experience Moldovan culture and traditions.

The official program is usually announced during the second half of August but expect speeches and poetry recitals and events near the statues of famous authors such as the Mihai Eminescu statue in Stefan cel Mare Park.

Sports This Month

Whether you’re looking to compete or simply enjoy a local sporting atmosphere, August offers plenty of opportunities to get active or cheer on Moldova’s athletes.

August 6–9 | Balkan U22 Beach Volleyball Championship

Some of southeastern Europe’s best young beach volleyball players come to Chișinău for the Balkan U22 Championship. Matches are held throughout the day in a relaxed outdoor setting, making this an enjoyable event even for casual spectators.

Location: La Izvor Park, Chișinău
Admission: Free for spectators
For some information on this event: Fest.md

August 15 | Europe Triathlon Junior Cup

Young elite athletes from across Europe compete in swimming, cycling, and running during this international event. Held alongside Moldova’s national championships, it is one of the country’s highest-profile international sporting competitions.

Location: La Izvor Park, Chișinău
Official event information: Triathalon.org

August 29 | Dragonul de Aur Marathon

Finish the month by joining runners from across Moldova in the Dragonul de Aur Marathon with a course that will take you around the historic sites of Orhei Vechi. With marathon, half-marathon, and shorter race options, the event welcomes both serious competitors and recreational runners.

Location: Orhei Vechi
Registration and information: Run Moldova Site

Other Things Happening This Month

In addition to the headline events above, August is packed with smaller concerts, exhibitions, sporting competitions, and family activities taking place throughout Moldova.

Open-Air Cinema Nights

Throughout August

Several parks across Chișinău host free evening film screenings during the summer. Bring a blanket or lawn chair and enjoy classic films and recent releases under the stars.

More information: Fest.MD

August 15 | COMPOT Fest III

COMPOT Fest returns for its third edition with a full day of family-friendly entertainment, live music, interactive games, food, and activities for both children and adults. Organized to celebrate six years of the COMPOT brand, the festival promises a relaxed summer atmosphere with performances by guest artists, children’s entertainment, giveaways, and a wide variety of local food and drinks. Whether you’re traveling with family or simply looking for a unique summer event outside Chișinău, COMPOT Fest offers an enjoyable day in northern Moldova.

Location: Fazenda Event Venue, Sîngerei–Bălți Highway
Time: 2:00 PM
For more information: Official Site (Russian)
Tickets can be purchased here: ITicket Website (Romanian)

Museum Exhibitions

Throughout August

National Museum of History hosts a temporary exhibit “The Smell of Warm Bread” featuring tools used in the cultivation and production of grains in the Dacian civilization.

More information: Official Museum Page

As always, if you know of an event we’ve missed, let us know in the comments. We’ll continue updating our monthly guides to help readers discover the best of Moldova throughout the year.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

Moldova Matters has previously reported on USMI’s organization of the planned CODEL and their official request for a meeting with then Prime Minister Munteanu that referenced 4 members of Congress - Representatives Andy Harris (R-MD), Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA), Michael Cloud (R-TX) and Sheri Biggs (R-SC). In response to that original reporting, Representative Carter’s office responded that he “is not currently scheduled to attend.” Representatives for the other members of Congress did not respond to requests for comment and neither did USMI.

No CODEL arrived in Moldova on the scheduled dates and Moldova Matters can report that at least in some cases, USMI never reached out to notify those it planned to meet with of a cancellation or to try and reschedule.

What Happened?

With no comment forthcoming from either the named participants or USMI we don’t know for sure. It is possible that Moldova Matters’ reporting on USMI director Sam Alaverdov’s past financial sponsorship of a Moldovan politician linked to Ilan Shor, or the fact that USMI’s website features a partner list of Moldovan government entities, companies, NGOs and the Moldova UNHCR office that is substantially false, caused members of Congress to reconsider their participation.

Furthermore, because the members never traveled to Chisinau, House Ethics rules - which would have required financing and schedule details to become public 15 days after the CODEL’s return - will likely never be triggered, meaning the public may never learn how USMI planned to fund the trip.

Going forward, Moldova Matters will continue reporting on USMI’s activities, including its relationships with US-based institutions beyond this single delegation.

Following his swearing in on July 22, Prime Minister Vasile Tofan held his first cabinet meeting where he told the ministers to “tighten their belts.” He took particular aim at official travel, noting that “travel budgets are quite large” and stating that some of it is touristic in nature. He stated:

“I learned today that the Prime Minister approves all visits outside the country. (…) I want to tell you that I will be much more demanding in approving these visits,”

In the meeting he addressed public concerns about “unspeakable” public sector salaries. He stated that a new wage law is needed (and coming) that will codify salary rates as well as practices around bonuses. But that in the meantime, all ministers were instructed to “bring order” to the agencies and organizations in their portfolios.

Speaking about the tax reform, Tofan stated that “The first attempt to bring the tax reform to fruition was not successful, to put it delicately. In fact, it was a failure.” But he emphasized the need for a major reform of the tax system and directed the Ministry of Finance to publish a draft by August 6th. He told the assembled ministers that he would be involved in the process and personally responsible for this reform.

This drew a stark contrast with his predecessor who put out his first statement on the tax reform more than 2 weeks after he stepped down. In it he praised the professionalism of the reform, noted that it was approved by the IMF, compared critics to “amateur league” football players and generally punched back at critics1.

Prime Minister Tofan has also announcement members of his team, with former Minister of Finance Andrian Gavrilită returning to government as his chief economic advisor. Carolina Bogatiuc will be his chief of staff and journalist Dumitru Ciorici will be his press secretary.

Radu Musteața’s Turbulent 3 Days in Office

An early challenge for the Tofan government came when Journal TV published a picture of the brand new Minister of Agriculture, Radu Musteața, allegedly showing him at a Democratic Party (PDM) meeting. The story reported that the photo in question showed Musteața receiving his PDM membership card from PDM MP Nae Simion Pleșca. Allegedly, this occurred sometime in 2017.

This story mattered because it alleged that Musteața had joined Vladimir Plahotniuc’s PDM at the height of the oligarch’s state capture.

Minister Musteața adamantly denied this writing on facebook that “I have never led any territorial organization of a political party and I have not been a member of the Democratic Party.” He went on to repeat categorical denials in multiple statements and on TV interviews.

Prime Minister Tofan indicated that he believed Musteață and that lacking clear evidence contradicting his statements, “Radu Musteață has my full support.” This evidence soon began piling up with PDM’s successor party, PSDE stating that their records show that was a PDM member and had a party leadership position in Ciocana.

After 3 days as Minister of Agriculture, Radu Musteață resigned from his position claiming that he did so to protect the team and maintain trust, asking that the action “not be tarnished and eroded by false and manipulative information.” Effectively, he resigned while still denying the accusations.

Asked to comment, Speaker Igor Grosu stated that he believed Musteață when he said he was not a PDM party member and expressed regret that he resigned. The same day PSDE produced a copy of his signed application for membership and Musteață finally admitted that he lied. He continued to downplay his interactions with PDM as “insignificant” but admitted that he regretted that he “did not have the courage to tell the whole truth.”

This marks one of the shortest tenures of any minister in Moldovan history2 and a bumpy start for the new government. No announcement of a new candidate for Minister of Agriculture has been made to date.

Politics & News

Here’s a roundup of the other top politics stories of the week:

• Anti-corruption police (CNA) detain 3 in relation to MoldATSA scandal. At the same time the CNA conducted 25 searches in relation to alleged criminal decision making at the company - including violate public procurement, fake hiring competitions, unjustified salaries and bonuses and more. CNA noted that MoldATSA spent 9 million lei on staff trainings in the first 5 months of 2025 alone including 106,000 lei spent on sending a staffer to the UK for a beginner English course. Arrests targeted decision makers including the company’s Chief Accountant. Two of the 3 arrested are confined for 30 days detention while one is on house arrest.

• The government approved the “Restart in Education” reform aimed at centralizing school administration. Under the proposed law, all schools above the level of kindergarten will be subordinated directly to the Ministry of Education via newly established Territorial Education Agencies. Currently, schools are administered locally by district and municipal councils. Minister of Education Dan Perciun explained the reform as necessary for uniform standards and conditions throughout the country.

• The Model Schools network is expanding. Parliament approved an investment of €50 million euros to remodel 20 more schools in the regions. Of the investment, €40 million will come from the European Investment Bank (EIB) as a loan. This investment will bring the total number of schools in the program up to 90 and when renovations are complete will see 1 in 4 children in Moldova enrolled in a Model School.

• The government approved an anti-SLAPP law. The proposed law would create new protections against SLAPP lawsuits,3 allowing judges to rapidly throw out obviously unfounded claims, sanction those committing abuses by filing these suits and create protections for defendants of SLAPP suits to more easily recoup their legal costs. This law is designed to protect journalists and civil society activists and brings Moldovan legislation into line with EU directives.

• The government approved a legal framework for cryptocurrencies. It delegates supervision of the digital currencies and assets markets to the National Bank (NBM) and National Financial Market Commission. The framework envisions separate regulations for fiat-backed stablecoins, coins backed by other assets and “other” crypto currencies. Currently Moldova has no regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies effectively making them illegal in the country.

• 30 day State of Alert declared in the area of energy security. The government noted that commercial diesel stocks fell from 17.6 days supply at the end of June to 6.9 days on July 27. Fuel imports continue to be affected by the War in Iran as well as supply chain disruptions elsewhere - including Kazakhstan severely reducing outputs following Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil terminals. Uncertainty has caused prices to resume climbing after a few weeks of relative plateau, with diesel prices now 50.6% higher than pre-war (in Iran) levels and gasoline 29% higher. Under the state of alert fuel imports are expedited through special corridors and certain exports are prohibited.

• 30 day State of Alert declared in the area of water security. The alert comes in the context of reduced water levels in the Novodnestrovsk reservoir which is at a record low level for this time of year and is rapidly draining. If Ukraine restricts outflow from the reservoir it could substantially reduce the flow of the Nistru river, impacting Moldova’s water supply and threaten the provision of water to towns and even to Chisinau. The state of alert will increase monitoring of river flows and direct downs to switch to alternative water sources where available.

• On July 20 TV8 released their long signaled investigation into the real estate dealings of Alexandr Trubca. By the time of release, Tubca had already resigned from parliament but continues to deny wrongdoing. The investigation outlines how Tubca entered parliament 5 years ago with modest earnings and property and is today on the verge of becoming a euro millionaire. His increase in wealth comes entirely from an expanding property portfolio, mostly in the Chisinau suburb of Trușeni but also in Romania. In Trușeni, his companies have invested in 2 projects, one to build a 400 unit apartment building and another to develop 34 single family homes. TV8 reported that his partners include the recently resigned director of the Public Property Agency as well as PAS donors. Trubca struggled to explain the source of his funds, noting that for some projects he borrowed the investment money4 and others were funded from proceeds from the first project - though TV8 noted that this timeline does not match up and his company showed no revenues at the time of the second investment. Alexandr Trubca continues to deny wrongdoing.

The Rabbi and the Rocket Launchers?

Back in November 2025, customs officers at the Leușeni-Albița border crossing between Moldova and Romania discovered a large cache of weapons hidden inside a truck. This story prompted a wave of disinformation with Russian proxies alleging the smuggling of American Stinger missiles / drugs / all manner of other conspiracies (in fact, all the weapons were Russian / Soviet).

The truck driver is in Romanian custody and continues to assert that he did not know what was in the truck. Moldova arrested 5 additional alleged conspirators and one plead guilty this week, getting a 5 year sentence with 3 suspended. His name is Eugeniu Pralea and he was the courier who brought the weapons into Moldova from Ukraine. Documents related to his sentencing have shed light on the details of the case with some startling revelations. They include:

• Weapons: The shipment included 8 RPG-30 anti-tank grenade launchers, a launch tube for a 9K333 Verba anti-aircraft missile system, 18 9M133 Kornet laser-guided anti-tank missile systems and an entire Geran 2 drone (disassembled and with a defective motor).

• Smuggling from Ukraine to Moldova: The weapons were smuggled out of Ukraine from 2023 - 2025. Eugeniu Pralea was hired for this and claims to have accepted the job on the condition that the smuggled goods were neither weapons nor drugs. He claims to have been told it was electronic parts and / or goods related to humanitarian aid projects. He claims that no “arrangements” were made with Moldovan customs officers at Palanca because the shipments were broken into small amounts and never discovered.

• Destination - Israel: After being accumulated over 2 years and stored in a warehouse in Moldova, the weapons were wrapped in a special material meant to fool border scanners. The truck carrying them was destined for the port of Constanta in Romania and then on to Israel.

• Organizer - Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman: Eugeniu Pralea alleges that Rabbi Zaltzman organized the shipments from Ukraine to Moldova and onward to Israel.

Searches turned up multiple phone calls and text messages between the defendants and the Rabbi including pictures of the weapons and discussion about them. Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman has professed innocence and is currently in Israel. Prosecutors have not commented on whether or not he is being investigated.

Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman titles himself the “Chief Rabbi of the Republic of Moldova” and is a prominent figure in Moldova’s Orthodox Jewish Community based at the historic “Hay” synagogue. However, there is no official “Chief Rabbi of the Republic of Moldova” and the title is self-styled. The “Jewish Community of the Republic of Moldova5” released statements noting that the title of “Chief Rabbi” is self appointed and that he has “never been appointed, elected or confirmed in any religious leadership position within the Jewish Community of the Republic of Moldova by its statutory bodies.”

Other Security and Defense News

Here’s a roundup of the other security, defense and hybrid war news”

• Romania shoots down 3 Russian drones in 48 hours. For the first time since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, the Romanian air force has downed 3 Russian drones that entered its airspace - one in Buzău and 2 in the Danube Delta region. Romania expelled one Russian diplomat in protest against the incursions. President Sandu condemned the violation of Romanian airspace and stated that

  “Romania’s security is the security of the Republic of Moldova. We stand with Romania.”

• Moldova has delayed the imposition of VAT and excise taxes on Transnistria until September 1. The taxes, which were supposed to come into force on August 1, are being delayed due to the change in government. Transnistria’s “Foreign Minister” Vitaly Ignatiev recently refused to travel to Chisinau for a meeting in the 1+1 format on the tax changes stating that the issue is “not on the negotiating agenda.” Ignatiev has continuously refused to travel to Moldova for fear of arrest under a law on separatism - a fear which the Moldovan authorities call unfounded.

• Three Shor parties to be dissolved by court decision. The "Renaissance,” “Chance” and “Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova” parties were found to be successors to the unconstitutional Shor Party and have been dissolved. The Moldova Mare (Greater Moldova) party was suspended for 12 months. These rules mark wins for the Ministry of Justice, which petitioned for their dissolution based on referrals from the Central Election Commission (CEC).

• “Evrazia” declared an extremist organization. The decision comes from Moldova’s Court of Appeals and attaches criminal liability to Moldovan citizens - at home or abroad - which fund Evrazia or participate in their programs. The request for this designation came from Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) in July 2025.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• Indian President Droupadi Murmu visited Chisinau. This marked the first visit from the head of state of the Republic of India since Moldovan independence. In meetings with President Sandu they discussed economic cooperation, deeper cooperation in higher education6 and investments. She also participated in the first Moldova-India Business Forum which was organized by Invest Moldova.

• The United States drops all tariffs against Moldova (for now). On July 24th the Trump Administration imposed a sweeping new tariff regime on imports from more than 80 countries including the European Union. This new regime replaced the global 10 percent duty that had expired at midnight which itself replaced the “Liberation Day” tariffs that were struck down by the Supreme Court. This newest iteration utilizes the Trade Act of 1974 and is designed to combat countries that engage in “forced labor.” This join a patchwork of other tariffs, including some levied under a revived Smoot–Hawley authority7 as part of the ever changing trade policy of the United States. Moldova was not included in the recent announcements which targeted major trading partners and largely skipped smaller countries (for the time being). This means that the US tariff on Moldovan goods has gone from 31% (announced, not implemented), to 25% to 10% to 15% to 0% in the last year and a half.

Today we’re going to look at the new cabinet - who’s in, and who’s out - as well as the vote of confident and parliamentary debate. In a future, subscriber only article, we will look at Prime Minister Tofan’s program in depth. Running over 147 pages it is both ambitious, unusual and deserves a deep dive in itself.

Subscribe now

Meet the Ministers

While Tofan has come in with a major shift in tone and priorities, he is largely keeping the same team of ministers assembled by former Prime Minister Munteanu. No changes have been made to the key security and foreign affairs portfolios - and the changes that have been made largely prioritize experience and continuity rather than radical shifts.

Minister of Finance

Victoria Belous will return to the position of Minister of Finance. She previously held the office from July 2024 - November 2025 when she departed after having been elected to parliament. Andrian Gavriliță was appointed to the Ministry. Belous will now leave parliament and replace Gavriliță.

Prior to becoming Minister the first time, Victoria Belous worked for 17 years in the State Tax Service, working her way up through the ranks. Previously as Minister, her profile had been something of a studious technocrat and supporter of the status quo. In parliament, her profile shifted dramatically as she became a vocal proponent for reform and one of the most articulate members of the PAS faction on economic and fiscal issues. Last month, when MP Radu Marian stepped down as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Economy, Budget and Finance she took his place.

Andrian Gavriliță wrote a long facebook post after the change was announced writing “Unfortunately, being a minister is more than just theory, figures, understandings with the IMF, and rational decisions. It’s a deeply political role.” Referencing the tax reform that he championed, he blamed personal mistakes as well as very bad timing - referring to the MoldATSA scandal among others - for the media storm surrounding his last month in office.

Minister of Agriculture

Ludmila Catlabuga, who has led the Ministry of Agriculture since November 2024, will be replaced with Director of the National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) Radu Musteața. After graduating from the State University of Moldova with a bachelors in Chemical Technology and Biotechnology and a masters in Environmental Protection, Radu Musteața joined ANSA in 2013 and has held various positions before becoming the director in 2021.

Ludmila Catlabuga departed expressing hope “that the relationship and communication between the ministry and people in agriculture be no worse than the one we managed to build.”

Minister of Health

Alexandru Gasnaș will replace Emil Ceban as Minister of Health. Gasnaș had previously served as advisor to President Sandu in the field of health and as a State Secretary in the Ministry of Health. He is a neurologist, who has been both an associate professor at the Nicolae Testemițanu State University of Medicine and Pharmacy, and headed the department of Neurology, Internal Diseases and Epileptology at the Institute of Emergency Medicine.

Emil Ceban will return to the position of Rector of the Nicolae Testemițanu State University of Medicine and Pharmacy.

Minister of Culture

Dan Suruceanu will replace Cristian Jardan as Minister of Culture. Suruceanu has been the deputy administrator of the Chisinau Arena since 2023 and prior to that worked for at least some of his career at the National Museum of Arts1.

Presenting the Cabinet and Program in Parliament

On Tuesday July 21 Vasile Tofan led his proposed cabinet of ministers to parliament to present their governing program and ask for a vote of confidence from the legislature.

In parliament, Vasile Tofan started by stating the challenges ahead and noting that “There is no point in denying that we are going through a crisis.” He noted that the country faces simultaneous economic and political tensions but that there is a “single window of opportunity” in the coming years. He stated:

“I want us to find the balance between the necessary changes and the stability of the foundation together. Let’s make capital repairs, but let’s not shake the walls. We are not the first country to go through such challenges. Other small countries – Ireland, Estonia, New Zealand – have had such complicated moments and emerged victorious from them. I know that any comparison is not perfect, but such examples encourage us.”

Tofan went on to structure his address to the deputies around the 5 priorities outlined in his program of government.

Priority 1. Relaunching economic growth

He spoke of anemic GDP growth, ballooning imports and shrinking exports and “enormous” challenges including…

“… a small internal market, a declining population, a labor shortage, insufficient capital, an agriculture vulnerable to drought, and an economy that exports too much raw material and too little added value.”

Tofan stated that the government’s starting priority is to “bring back confidence” because “Pessimism is the most dangerous disease of an economy.”

Priority 2. Accelerating accession to the European Union

“The objective of the mandate is to be ready to complete the negotiations and prepare for the signing of the Accession Treaty by the end of 2028”

Tofan once again centered the goal of being prepared to join the EU in 2028. He stressed the need to open all negotiating clusters this year and to move rapidly through reforms. At the same time he emphasized that simply changing rules and laws does not improve people’s lives - and committed his team towards careful implementation so that people feel these changes.

Priority 3. An efficient, digital and accountable state

“Too often, the state asks the citizen to be more organized than it is.”

In his remarks, Mr. Tofan noted cases where state institutions make citizens run from office to office to resubmit paperwork that the state already has in its possession2. He spoke of overlapping responsibilities between agencies and programs and policies not based on results.

“The state must be smaller where it duplicates functions and stronger where it is indispensable – security, justice, infrastructure, education, health, and protection of the vulnerable.”

Priority 4. Security, justice and peace

“I lived in Kyiv. I know the sound of the missile alarm. I know how a Shahed flies and how a Kalibr hits. I know what it’s like to collect the shards of broken windows in the morning from the explosion of an Iskander 50 meters from your house.”

Tofan spoke of the “real and interconnected” risks that Moldova faces. Attacks against energy systems, cyberattacks, disinformation, organized crime and the war next door. He stated that “Constitutional neutrality does not oblige the Republic of Moldova to be weak” and tied investments in defense and law enforcement with a modernizing of citizen services3.

Priority 5. Increasing the quality of life and social cohesion

“Citizens do not live by macroeconomic indicators. They live by the salary they receive at the end of the month, by the bill they have to pay, by the waiting time at the doctor's office, by the quality of their child's school, and by the certainty that their parents will have support in their old age.”

Tofan spoke of the need to translate his plans for economic growth into good jobs and better public services. He laid out concrete targets for increasing employment rates by making the labor code more flexible while also maintaining protections for employees’ rights.

Debate and Vote

After delivering his speech, the parliamentary session moved to a Q&A format. From 12:20 pm until 8:27 pm Vasile Tofan answered questions about his team, his program and himself. Throughout he proved to have deft political instincts, addressing complex questions head-on while not falling into traps or going down topical cul-de-sacs. Compared to recent prime ministers, he seemed much more comfortable and confident speaking extemporaneously and he was consistently able to pivot questions back to his focus area - the economy.

Following the debate, parliament voted with 53 MPs for, 21 against and 21 abstaining. Two PAS MPs did not vote in support: Alexandr Trubca who recently resigned and whose seat has yet to be filled, and Vasile Grădinaru who previously submitted a request for absence for personal reasons. All MPs from Alternative, Democracy at Home and Our Party abstained along with 1 MP from the Socialists. The remaining Socialist and Communist MPs voted no.

Vasile Tofan is Sworn in as Prime Minister

On July 22 President Maia Sandu swore in Vasile Tofan as Prime Minister alongside his cabinet of minister. She emphasized EU integration as the clear agenda of the government and called on the new Prime Minister to keep the promises he made in parliament the day before.

Moldova has a new Prime Minister and government, we’ll return to follow their first steps in this week’s roundup.

On their website, USMI lists 10 companies, organizations and government entities in Moldova under the page “Our Partnerships.” On that page they claim that “USMI's work is made possible through a growing network of Moldovan and international partners” and suggest concrete cooperation writing:

“Together with our partners, we build the programs, connections, and civic infrastructure that a stronger Moldova requires”

Of those 10 partners, the National Olympic & Sports Committee (CNOS), UNHCR - the UN Refugee Agency in Moldova, the Handball Federation of Moldova, NGO Speranta 87 and the National Commission of the Republic of Moldova for UNESCO all denied knowledge of USMI and any official partnership with the organization.

A representative of Moldova’s National Olympic & Sports Committee (CNOS) responded writing:

“The National Olympic and Sports Committee of the Republic of Moldova has no formal partnership or any other form of association with the US Moldova Initiative. Furthermore, we are not familiar with this organization and have never provided our consent for the use of our logo or for the inclusion of our Committee among the partners listed on its website.

The use of the National Olympic and Sports Committee of the Republic of Moldova’s logo on this website was unauthorized and constitutes an improper and unauthorized use of our visual identity.”

Emphasis theirs.

Other listed partners - WKF Moldova, construction company Basconslux SRL, the Union of Sugar Producers of Moldova and Vinăria Bostavan (Purcari Winery Group) did not respond to requests for comment as of this article’s publication.

USMI also lists the Linella Supermarket chain and Commercial Director Maria Movileanu by name in their partnership writeup. Reached for comment, Maria Movileanu responded that she served as the parent company Moldretail’s Commercial Director until June 30, 2026, but that “I have no idea about this project” and that she is “not aware of this initiative.” She did not reply on behalf of the company.

These responses indicate a pattern. USMI’s website partner list appears to be substantially, if not completely, false. In at least 5 instances, partners were listed without consent or verification and in the case of UNHCR, their representative stated that their attempts to contact USMI to remedy this have not been successful.

USMI and Executive Director Sam Alaverdov did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.

The offices of Representatives Andy Harris, Michael Cloud, and Sheri Biggs - who USMI has listed as participants in the July 24–29 CODEL - did not respond to questions about USMI’s claimed partnerships or whether this new information affects their understanding of the trip. The offices previously did not respond to requests to confirm their attendance.

You can read Moldova Matters’ previous reporting on this CODEL here:

USMI Has an Unusual Schedule in Moldova

Congressional Delegations traveling to Moldova will typically schedule meetings with private sector representatives - especially American investors - to discuss economic cooperation between the two countries. These meetings would typically be organized by the American Chamber of Commerce in Moldova (AMCHAM).

Since this CODEL is privately organized, USMI exercises considerable control over who the members of Congress will meet while in Chisinau. Moldova Matters has confirmed that USMI did not reach out to AMCHAM for a meeting, nor did they contact the European Business Association (EBA), the Foreign Investors Association (FIA) or the Moldova Small Enterprise Alliance (AIM)1. Instead, they are meeting with private sector representatives via the “Traktor Business Community.”

Unlike the previously mentioned organizations, Traktor is not a business association2. It does not represent investors or local companies in dialogues with the government and it does not participate in the development of policy or reforms. Traktor is more like a club that organizes events and parties for their members3. Nor are there any indications that Traktor has American members or seeks to incorporate foreign investors. Multiple people familiar with Traktor’s work told Moldova Matters that it is a predominantly Russian-language group4 focused on networking and events organization.

Cristina Trucani, the Executive Director of Traktor, confirmed their participation in the delegation’s visit but stated that they are “awaiting further details about the meeting from the American side.”

What This All Means

On March 13, 2026 USMI launched their website stating that their organization “connects Americans and Moldovans through exchange, civic engagement, and the belief that real relationships change the world.” There is no evidence that USMI has done any activities in support of this aspiration so far. On their website, they list partners who they claim play key roles in their work. Of the 10 partners listed, 5 had never heard of USMI and flatly stated that their organization did not have any partnership with them. No “partner” confirmed a relationship with USMI at the time of publication.

The one activity that USMI has engaged in is the organization of a privately funded US Congressional delegation to Moldova, scheduled to arrive this week. With no prior activities, USMI has publicly presented only 2 mechanisms of verifying their credibility - their partners and their team. With half of their listed partners denying any connection, that leaves their team - namely, Executive Director Sam Alaverdov.

Prior Moldova Matters reporting has shown how Mr. Alaverdov privately funded political lobbying efforts for a Moldovan politician linked to sanctioned oligarch Ilan Shor. He was also listed on House Ethics Committee filings as the representative of a different NGO that financed a 2021 CODEL to Ukraine. That NGO reported neither income nor expenses in the year in question and it remains unclear who paid for the three members of Congress, family and staff to make that trip. You can read that reporting here:

Finally, USMI is not simply organizing plane tickets and hotels. They are substantially, if not totally, responsible for the organization of the meetings and events that these members of Congress will attend. The fact that they will be meeting the Traktor Business Community, but not the American Chamber of Commerce, highlights this discretion.

This Friday, July 24, USMI is expected to bring three members of the US Congress to Chisinau. If the trip proceeds as planned, an organization that appeared 4 months ago, has falsely listed partnerships in Moldova and is run by a man whose previous NGO reported serious financial discrepancies, including on a past CODEL, will organize travel, lodging and events for three elected representatives and will substantially frame their view of Moldova.

Moldova Matters will continue following the story and report on the CODEL itself if it arrives as planned.

Prime Minister Designate Vasile Tofan will present the composition of his government and their program to parliament for a vote of confidence on Tuesday July 21.

Since his appointment on Saturday, Tofan has been holding consultations with business associations, opposition political parties, civic groups and the interim government. He met with all 16 acting ministers to discuss the critical priorities for the next 12 months. No acting minister confirmed to the press that their job is safe and none has resigned so far.

In remarks so far, Tofan has signaled continuity - stressing that he would not disrupt ongoing reform processes such as the local public administration reform that he previously opposed publicly. In various remarks he stressed the importance of EU integration and building a growing and competitive economy as his top priorities.

Vasile Tofan turned 44 years old the day after his appointment by President Sandu. He and his wife welcomed their 4th child, becoming the parents of 4 boys, less than one month ago. Tofan has joked that his wife is not thrilled with his acceptance of this mandate but supportive.

EU Opens Cluster 6 with Moldova and Ukraine

On Tuesday July 14 the European Union opened negotiations on Cluster 6: External Relations with Moldova and Ukraine. For Moldova, this was made official at the 3rd Moldova - EU Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels with Moldova being represented by Interim PM Eugeniu Osmochescu. Cluster 6 contains 2 negotiating chapters titled “External relations” and “Foreign, security and defense policy.”

July 14 came to be called “Super Tuesday” as the EU held 4 intergovernmental conferences. While Moldova and Ukraine both opened a cluster, Albania provisionally closed 3 chapters and Montenegro provisionally closed 2. Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos named it “Super Tuesday” as she noted that no comparable step in EU enlargement had taken place since 2002. These moves come in the context of Hungary no longer blocking some aspects of enlargement after Viktor Orban’s defeat this Spring.

International Affairs & Security

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs & security stories of the week:

• President Sandu represented Moldova at the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) meeting in Paris on July 13. This is the first time that Moldova has participated in the CoW and marks a further commitment in support of the defense of Ukraine. In remarks, President Sandu stressed that Moldova is not the only neutral nation that participates and that Moldova joins “a group of countries, largely European, who have united their efforts to support Ukraine to reach a ceasefire and, subsequently, a just peace, which will prevent further aggression.”

• German Ambassador to Moldova Hubert Knirsch created a scandal when he suggested that Romanian and “Moldovan” might be different languages. In an interview on Jurnal TV, the Ambassador was asked about the topic of Moldova uniting with Romania with the interviewer noting that “we were once one country, we speak the same language, we have a common culture, traditions and religion.” The Ambassador noted that any decision on union belongs to the citizens of Moldova and Romania, but questioned the idea that the countries share a common language and religion. His formulation was interpreted by many in the public as saying that some people call the language “Moldovan” and some call it “Romanian” - turned into an explosive controversy. He clarified in a later video that he was speaking of the linguistic diversity of the country. The Ambassador received massive criticism online with some even suggesting that the Ambassador is a Russian agent. Ambassador Knirsch has apologized for not being “clear and precise” and promised to go on a listening tour to better understand the “concerns” raised1.

• President Maia Sandu attended the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Kyiv. There she advocated for more air defense support for Ukraine, more pressure on Russia and increased sanctions. She held bilateral meetings with President Zelenskyy, the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković and the Prime Minister of Slovenia Janez Janša. Moldova officially signed the Kyiv Declaration reiterating support for Ukraine in the war against Russia.

• Russia’s FSB claims to have foiled a drone attack in the Moscow region involving 2 Moldovans. In their press release, the FSB alleges a complex plot involving 35 drones transported from Slovakia hidden in crates of Spanish ceramic tiles. The alleged plot is complicated, and improbably involves Ukrainian Rapper “Kyivstoner.” The FSB alleges that 2 Moldovans, Victor Pîrlog (born in 1986) and Aurel Calos (born in 1995) participated in the plot and escaped. They claim that all 35 drones were launched but were intercepted by special technology before hitting their targets2. None of this has been confirmed and Moldova’s Ministry of Foriegn Affairs has requested clarification.

• On Monday July 13 a Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drone crashed in the village of Copanca in Căușeni. The Army confirmed that the drone entered Moldovan airspace during a large Russian attack on Odesa. On impact, the drone’s gas tank exploded, causing alarm the crash site was less than 50m from a residential house. When police and army sappers arrived they found that the 40 kg warhead had not detonated. PAS MP Artemie Cătănoi went to the scene and told the press that the elderly couple living nearby were evacuated with their pets. Army sappers successfully moved the drone to a safe place and detonated it. This all resulted in official protests and the summoning of Russian Ambassador Designate Oleg Ozerov to the Ministry of Foriegn Affairs for his 3rd note of reprimand in 4 months.

• On the same day, the Council of the European Union announced €120 million euros in new assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Moldova. These funds are for the purchase of air defense equipment, with a focus on medium range air defense. This brings total EPF support for Moldova to €317 million since the start of the full scale invasion, with past financing going to clean up Nistru river pollution,3 support Army sappers with disposing of new (and old WW2) shells and more.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top stories in politics (and scandal) of the week:

• PAS MP Alexandr Trubca announced that he is resigning from parliament on July 10. After previously trying to preempt a coming investigation by TV8 with a serious of facebook statements explaining his investments, the MP resigned while claiming that “Everything I said publicly remains valid.” PAS leader Igor Grosu specified that he resigned after conversation with the party faction but did not answer whether Trubca did it of his own accord. TV8 has stated that they will air their investigation on July 19, but previewed it by noting that when elected in 2021, Alexandr Trubca had a salary from a local NGO, drove a modest car and owed a substantial mortgage on his apartment. They state that he is now a “multimillionaire in real estate, with investments in Moldova and abroad” and TV8 promises “more irregularities related to the businesses of Trubca and his partners, including other PAS deputies and state dignitaries.”

• Energy prices are going up… again. As gasoline and diesel begin to rise again on news of renewed war between the United States and Iran, Energocom has requested that regulators at ANRE approve a jump in the price of natural gas from 14.42 lei / cubic meter to 20.93 lei (incl VAT) - a 45% increase. Acting Energy Minister Dorin Jungietu supported the change, noting that it is caused by the ongoing war against Iran and the spike in prices across Europe’s energy market. Energy expert Eugen Muravschi from WatchDog called the planned change “realistic” stating that previous projections for gas purchases from August - December were €404 / 1000 cubic meters. The price is currently at €623 / 1000 cubes. He explained that “In Europe, prices have exploded” and that as countries stockpile gas they may continue to rise.

USMI has sent meeting requests to various officials in preparation for the visit. The following is a request for a meeting obtained by Moldova Matters that was sent by USMI to the office of Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu prior to his resignation:

In this letter, USMI states that the CODEL includes Representatives Andy Harris (R-MD), Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA), Michael Cloud (R-TX) and Sheri Biggs (R-SC).

Reached for comment and confirmation of their attendance, the offices of Representatives Andy Harris, Michael Cloud, and Sheri Biggs did not respond by the time of publication. Representative Earl “Buddy” Carter’s office responded writing:

“Rep. Buddy Carter is not currently scheduled to attend.”

This response does not indicate whether Representative Carter had previously planned to attend the CODEL as indicated by USMI and since canceled, or never planned to attend.

While the letter is dated May 7, reporting by Moldova Matters has found that it was only sent to the Prime Minister’s office sometime in the last 2 weeks.

The CODEL is privately funded, meaning that travel and accommodations for members of Congress and any accompanying family members, staff, or other guests are paid for by a private organization rather than through ordinary government travel channels. While USMI is organizing the CODEL, the details of who is financing it are not currently public. House Ethics rules require pre-approval for privately sponsored congressional travel, followed by public filings after the trip disclosing the sponsor, itinerary, participants, and costs.

You can read Moldova Matters’ previous investigation into USMI and its founder here:

Sam Alaverdov’s Lobbying Efforts on Behalf of Vasile Tarlev

Before becoming the Executive Director of USMI, Sam Alaverdov1 was the subject of a Moldova Matters investigation into a lobbying effort on behalf of then-presidential candidate Vasile Tarlev. His previous NGO, alternately named the “American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Pridnestrovie and Moldova Inc.” and the “American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Ukraine and Moldova Inc.” - which went by the acronym ACFHCUM - signed a contract with American PR and lobbying firm Qorvis on behalf of Mr. Tarlev.

ACFHCUM and the US Moldova Initiative (USMI) are both registered at the same address - Sam Alaverdov’s house in Valley Stream NY.

ACFHCUM’s tax filings show years of almost zero fundraising and zero expenditures on charitable causes. In September 2024 ACFHCUM signed an $85,000 contract with Qorvis to enhance the reputation of then candidate Tarlev in Washington DC. While Tarlev’s trip to the United States never occurred due to visa issues, $45,000 of this contract was paid on September 30, 2024. While ACFHCUM was designated in the contract as the entity paying, reporting by Moldova Matters found that it was Sam Alaverdov who made the payment to Qorvis personally. Reached for comment on that previous story, and asked why his nonprofit had engaged this contract, Mr. Alaverdov replied simply “I like him.”

Vasile Tarlev has been widely reported as a part of Ilan Shor’s political network in Moldova. This reporting included multiple undercover investigations in Moldova, reporting about how Shor personally chose Tarlev as a candidate and Tarlev’s own party vice president asserting that Tarlev had joined Ilan Shor.

Unlike Ilan Shor, Vasile Tarlev is not subject to US sanctions and so there is nothing illegal about Alaverdov making this payment for him. The same cannot be said of Mr. Tarlev’s failure to report a large political contribution made on his behalf.

You can read Moldova Matters’ previous investigations into this lobbying effort here:

Sam Alaverdov’s 2021 CODEL to Ukraine

In August 2021 a different 501c3 nonprofit called The Humpty Dumpty Institute (HDI) organized a privately funded CODEL to Ukraine and listed ACFHCUM as the funder of the trip on their filings with the House Committee on Ethics. This trip brought Representatives Tony Gonzales (R-TX), Barry Moore (R-AL) and Troy Nehls (R-TX) to Kyiv so that they could “get a better understanding of the complexities of the region through meetings with the Ukrainian government, business, and cultural leaders.”

This was noted at the time as the most expensive CODEL in 2021 and cost over $46,000. Expenses included travel and accommodations for the Representatives, members of their families, congressional staff, HDI staff and Sam Alaverdov.

According to tax filings, ACFHCUM claimed neither income nor expenses in 2021. It remains unclear to this day who actually paid for this trip.

A person familiar with HDI’s handling of the 2021 Ukraine CODEL told Moldova Matters that the controversy surrounding that trip prompted HDI’s board to change its internal policy on future congressional delegations. According to this person, HDI later adopted a policy of partnering only with well-known, established organizations on CODELs. The person also said that Alaverdov later approached HDI about another congressional delegation, but HDI declined to work with him.

A Very Complicated CODEL

The controversy surrounding this 2021 CODEL continues to haunt HDI and the Members of Congress who attended. There was nothing unusual about the trip itself and no credible allegations of impropriety. The problem for this trip was The Humpty Dumpty Institute (HDI) where Mark Epstein - brother of Jeffrey Epstein - had served as a longtime board member.

The conspiracy theorist website “The National File,” founded by Alex Jones, published an article about the CODEL which latched on to the word “children” in American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Pridnestrovie and Moldova Inc and combined it with “Epstein” to create a wild array of conspiracy theories2.

This article, and the many that followed it, had no merit - but it did have impact. Representatives who attended the trip were harried by “journalists” in the halls of Congress with questions about the CODEL. This ecosystem continues to focus on this 2021 trip, HDI and Sam Alaverdov. Moldova Matters received an email this week with a new article published July 10 continuing in this direction3.

While the deep state allegations continue to have neither sense nor merit, these articles do grab onto the most salient question - how did a tiny cash-strapped nonprofit pay more than $46,000 for this trip? and where did the money come from?

Who Funds USMI?

Given both the financing of a lobbying contract for Vasile Tarlev, and ACFHCUM’s claim to have financed the 2021 CODEL while reporting neither income nor expenditure in that year, it is important to ask who is funding USMI’s planned CODEL to Moldova.

Sam Alaverdov and USMI did not respond to questions or requests for comment on this article.

In the 2 years since USMI was granted 501c3 public charity status by the IRS, they have filed Form 990 e-postcard for their tax returns. That is a simplified filing method for small nonprofits with under $50,000 in gross receipts. It does not provide any information about their actual income, expenses or donors.

USMI’s website also lists no donors and does not have any mechanism for people to donate to the organization.

On their website, USMI has a page titled “Our Partners,” which presents an odd list of entities in Moldova including construction companies, a major supermarket chain, some NGOs and the UN Refugee Agency in Moldova (UNHCR). Reached for comment by Moldova Matters, a spokesperson for UNHCR Moldova told Moldova Matters that the organization has no association with USMI.

Why it Matters

As the organizer of this privately funded CODEL, USMI has significant influence over the agenda of the trip. Unlike official government-organized travel, which is coordinated by the State Department, privately sponsored CODELs give the sponsoring organization the key role in shaping which meetings are requested.

In addition to their outreach to the Prime Minister’s office, and likely outreach to other senior officials, USMI will decide which civic groups, journalists, activists, religious figures and opposition politicians the attending Members of Congress will meet with while in Moldova. This gives Sam Alaverdov and the USMI team a lot of control over what messages those members will receive while in country.

This CODEL would only be the first step in USMI’s potential influence. According to their website, the organization aspires to be a bridge in American - Moldovan relations. The organization of a high profile CODEL would cement USMI as a player in the bilateral relationship.

With that as context, it is important to center Sam Alaverdov as the founder and Executive Director of USMI. His personal payment of $45,000 in support of Shor-linked politician Vasile Tarlev calls into question USMI’s presentation of itself as a supporter of Moldova’s European aspirations.

Further, his role in the 2021 Ukraine CODEL continues to raise serious questions. In particular, the fact that HDI chose not to collaborate with Mr. Alaverdov after that event - and the fact that we still do not know who paid for it - in spite of ACFHCUM being listed on Congressional Ethics filings.

If the trip proceeds as planned, House travel disclosures will eventually show the approved sponsor, itinerary, participants, and costs - but those filings will likely become public only after the delegation returns. Moldova Matters will continue following this CODEL closely and will report on these after-the-fact filings when available.

Following this announcement from PAS, Tofan posted on facebook writing:

“The Republic of Moldova has had many remarkable victories in recent years, and now we have the historic chance to become an EU state and to build a European and free future for our country and for all our children. This success depends on all of us - it was from this perspective that I accepted with great responsibility the candidacy for the position of prime minister proposed by PAS.

I understand the gravity of the moment, but also the real perspective of taking Moldova where it should have been 20 years ago. We have no right to miss this historic opportunity. I will devote all my energy, all that I have learned and know to make the country succeed and meet the expectations of its citizens.”

This morning President Sandu officially nominated Vasile Tofan as candidate for prime minister. At the event Tofan spoke saying:

“It is a great honor to be here. I do not see it as an achievement, it is a great responsibility, I am overwhelmed by this responsibility. I will do everything in my power to live up to the expectations of Moldovans. I look forward to getting to work as quickly as possible, to make the lives of Moldovans better,”

In his remarks he outlined 3 major priorities for his government as follows:

1. Restoring, building and strengthening trust: “Many people are disappointed. I will rebuild that trust by acting boldly and carrying out reforms.”

2. Restarting the economy: “We cannot improve people’s lives unless we restart the economy, and that work must happen on the ground. From my very first days, I will focus on restoring optimism among entrepreneurs. We need to bring that optimism back, so that people once again have a sparkle in their eyes.”

3. Politics, government and business are team sports: “None of this can be achieved alone. I am a team player, and I am coming in to build strong teams together. Everyone who is honest, courageous and hardworking will have an ally in me. Everything we do will be aimed at bringing Moldova into the European Union as soon as possible.”

Who is Vasile Tofan?

Vasile Tofan has an MBA from Harvard Business School and a Masters in Public Administration from Erasmus University Rotterdam. He’s had a long career in the private sector, working as a consultant for Monitor Deloitte, as a manager for Corporate Strategy and Alliances at Philips and now in a leadership role at Horizon Capital which he joined in 2012. There, as a Senior Partner on the Investment Committee he led Horizon’s investments in Purcari Winery, the Glass Container Company in Chisinau and Moldova Agroindbank (MAIB). He serves on the board of MAIB, Ukrainian IT company Intellias, AMCHAM Moldova, Startup Moldova and Media Alternative which owns TV8 and 1TV.

In addition to his business career, Tofan has been a consistent public advocate for economic reform. He is a co-founder of the Europa 2028 civic movement which brought together 28 economists, entrepreneurs and investors who are “united by the idea that Moldova can make an economic leap if we follow simple and effective steps, already tested by other small countries such as Estonia, Ireland, Singapore or New Zealand. The economy must dominate the political agenda.” The movement’s manifesto centers European accession by 2028 and the need for sweeping economic reforms to ensure that Moldova takes advantage of European integration and Moldovan companies are competitive within the bloc.

Following the 2025 parliamentary elections, Tofan was offered the role as prime minister but turned it down saying that he was unable to untangle himself from his corporate responsibilities and that no one should be wiling to entrust “the future of Moldova to a leader ready to abandon 22 companies and a team of over 51 thousand people”.

He is seen as close to former Prime Minister Munteanu and is alleged to have put his name forward when he turned down the role himself.

Analysis: What does this Appointment Signal?

Read more

This change was accepted and signed in a decree by President Sandu without comment. Interim Prime Minister Osmochescu then posted on facebook saying that he “accepted this responsibility with honor and full seriousness” and stating that his priority will be to ensure continuity in this period.

This unexpected switch came after days of confusion following Munteanu’s first resignation where he stated that he can no longer work according to his “principles and beliefs.” Asked what this meant by a journalist, he gave a confusing answer stating:

“(…) I understand that they expect a controversy. I tried not to look at social networks, but with one eye and from what those who looked told me, 90% of those scenarios that were circulated are not true. It’s a more complicated story. I think time will put things in order (…). My conscience is very clear, I did what I had to do, and now I continue my duty, as I said in my message. I will ensure a smooth, professional transition, we are in the process of European integration, we cannot afford to create controversial situations (…)”,

**Update: Immediately before publishing PAS leader Igor Grosu stated that Alexandru Munteanu's was in fact due to an heated discussion he had with Minister of Education Dan Perciun. Grosu stated:

“There were no discussions about the weather outside. There were discussions about policy. Yes, there was a topic related to fiscal policy - the way it was presented, the way responsibility for it was assumed, and the contradictory discussions that followed.”

President Sandu announced on July 9 that she had called all parliamentary factions to consultations on the appointment of the next prime minister. She will meet with opposition parties on Friday July 10 and with PAS on Saturday July 11. The Socialists, MAN and the Communists have all stated that they will boycott the consultations.

New Details in the MoldATSA Scandal

If you need to catch up - here are parts 1 & 2 of Moldova Matter’s coverage of MoldATSA:

On June 30 the National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) announced preliminary results from their assessment of the institutional integrity of the company MoldATSA. This assessment found that 33 employees were hired without a publicly announced competitive process, multiple employees maintained 2-3 paid positions at the company for long periods of time, arbitrary salary and bonus structures and other “significant deficiencies” in the recruiting and hiring process.

They also identified problems in the professional trainings purchased for staff. MoldATSA is a member of the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). This entitled employees to attend professional trainings from Eurocontrol for free - with MoldATSA only paying for travel and lodging.

But MoldATSA management, including then Director Dumitru Vangheli, regularly attended courses by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). These were much more expensive, with course + travel costing between 80,000 and 120,000 lei / person compared to 25,000 - 40,000 from Eurocontrol. Most troubling of all, Dumitru Vangheli traveled to 3 courses on the same topic in 2025 and in one case attended an IATA course in Singapore that was held 2 months before Eurocontrol held an identical course (for free) in Chisinau.

On July 5 the CNA updated their assessment with allegations of a possible deliberate fragmentation of public procurements from MoldATSA. By statute, the company needed to approve any purchase over 400,000 lei with their owner - the Public Property Agency (APP). Additional procurements must go through a public bid process unless they are very minor. CNA reported on the purchase of a 2 million lei security system that was broken into 14 separate contracts given to 3 companies. Many of these contracts were made on the same day and the CNA reported that 2 of the companies have the same beneficial owner.

Criminal investigations at MoldATSA are ongoing.

Political Fallout and Reactions

On July 1 President Sandu held a press conference to address the expanding scandal at MoldATSA. There she called for 5 immediate actions to be taken by the government:

1. Review how appointments are made to state companies and require SIS and CNA checks for candidates

2. Review all boards of directors, ban people from serving on multiple boards, recalibrate / regulate pay

3. Creating a plan for listing “minority stakes” in all state owned companies on the stock exchange to bring more transparency and international standards to their governance

4. Mandate annual publications of company reports, remuneration reports, external audit reports, etc

5. Break the APP into 2 parts - one to manage active investments (productive companies) and one to manage passive assets - such as land and the property of former state companies in liquidation

In the short term she called for a rigorous audit of all state owned companies and for people guilty of abuses to be held accountable “regardless of party, family or other ties.”

She also called on a review of all consulting contracts for government support staff hired by international partners. She stated:

“We will do a general clean-up, all those who broke the law will be punished. People from PAS should look around, make sure that all team members, at all levels, are still loyal to the values ​​that were the basis for the creation of the party of European values. We have an obligation to take the Republic of Moldova to the EU. It is too important a path and we have made too many efforts on this path to miss it. We need to clean up the institutions, especially among the leaders of these institutions, and restore people’s trust in our commitment to building a fair state and a free and European country,”

Asked about her cousin Anastasia Tăburceanu she stated:

“I can’t understand what happened in the case of Anastasia Taburceanu, I don’t recognize her, I can’t explain these things to myself. Unfortunately, in every family or almost every family there is a person who makes a joke that gives you a headache. I regret this. (…) I have always earned my honest salary and this was my message to everyone, including those in the family”

PAS Expels 4 Party Members

Party leader Igor Grosu apologized to citizens for the scandal at MoldATSA and called the ZdG investigation a “hard lesson.” He announced the expulsion of 4 members of PAS - Anastasia Taburceanu, Mihai Bondari, Petru Bondari and Lilia Coică. He also demanded that Petru Bondari resign as the director of the state enterprise Metalferos.

While Anastasia Taburceanu was clearly caught up in the MoldATSA scandal, the other 3 members expelled were related to a different scandal that has slowly unfolded in the town of Coșnița over the last year. This scandal, which we have not covered at Moldova Matters previously (see footnote1), involved a company owned (allegedly) by Petru and Mihai Bondari which purchased agricultural land by the entrance to the town and then re-zoned it for pit mining sand. The scandal is complex, and contested, but apparently PAS decided that it was time to take action as both of the Bondari brothers were involved in district level politics.

Petru Bondari resigned as the director of Metalferos, but denied wrongdoing and claimed that he sold the company implicated in the mining development in 2024. He was not accused of any wrongdoing at the state enterprise, but chose to heed Grosu’s call for his resignation.

Igor Grosu promised additional steps to win back trust saying:

“I know that anything we say now will be met with distrust and people’s revolt is natural. I understand that words are less credible and actions are needed to demonstrate that we have not deviated from the principles of integrity, fairness and honesty. And that is what we will do,”

More scandals and responses… and scandals…

Here’s a roundup of the latest scandals to rock the government and the responses taken to try and contain the growing crisis:

• NEW SCANDAL: On July 2 CNA officers detained Tatiana Nistorică, State Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture. On the same day they conducted searches at the ministry and detained a representative of a private company. Allegedly the company was trying to import animal feed from Ukraine but had been blocked by the National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) due to “irregularities found during the inspections carried out.” According to the CNA, the company bribed Tatiana Nistorică to resume imports. Nistorică had only been appointed State Secretary in February and previously had a series of highly respected roles in civil society - including as the President of the “Moldova Organic Agriculture Value Chain Alliance” (MOVCA). She is currently in pre-trial detention in Prison 13. Minister of Agriculture Ludmila Catlabuga has stated that the ministry is cooperating and is in the process of dismissing her.

• Parliament has created a Commission of Inquiry into the activities of state owned enterprises. The commission will have a mandate to investigate management and remuneration at these companies and will return to parliament with a report and set of recommendations in 60 days. The commission will consist of 11 members and be led by MP Dinu Plîngău2. In addition to Plîngău, the commission will include 5 additional PAS MPs - Vasile Grădinaru, Marcel Spatari, Victoria Belous, Alexandr Trubca and Marina Morozova. Opposition parties will each appoint 1 MP to the commission. This composition includes senior PAS members and a fairly independent chair signaling a strong process… but then…

• NEW SCANDAL: MP Alexandr Trubca and his “million-dollar investments.” TV8’s program Black Box is promising us information as to what those investments are on their Sunday broadcast. In order to pre-empt whatever this story is, Alexandr Trubca has put out a series of long facebook posts explaining a complex land deal he is involved in. The land is in the Chisinau suburb of Trușeni and Trubca claims that his company purchased this land but he is not actively involved in the business nor is he involved in any local council decisions around construction permitting. Then, we find that the former (as in resigned last week due to MoldATSA) director of the Public Property Agency (APP) also has a company that is also somehow involved in this land deal. Both men deny actively developing a business while in public office and both deny collaborating together on this development project - in which they (apparently) co-own land. We’ll have to wait until Sunday to find out more.

• Where were the whistleblowers? Last week we wrote about how former MoldATSA director Dumitru Vangheli’s friend in Canada knew that he had faked his CV, confronted him about it, (maybe?) used it to try and push Vangheli to repay a debt, and then just told no one about it until after the story broke. Now we found that Dumitru Vangheli’s brother, Anatoliy Vanheli, is a career diplomat and is currently serving as Moldova’s Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Apparently the fact that Moldova’s air traffic control system was being run by a pizza delivery driver was known to at least one public official.

• Anastasia Tăburceanu has returned 500,000 lei of her MoldATSA salary. This was announced on July 9 by Igor Grosu who noted that she will continue until it is fully paid back.

New Tactic - Blame Plahotniuc

On July 9 PAS leader Igor Grosu made a statement trying to put all of these unfolding scandals into context - the context of a deliberate campaign by Vladimir Plahotniuc. He stated:

“Beyond all these incidents, my preliminary conclusion: it is a campaign, the traces of this campaign lead to a cell at Penitentiary No. 13 ,”

This was echoed by Minister of Education Dan Perciun who wrote on facebook:

“It is obvious that we are witnessing a concerted attack from the oligarchic-criminal groups that have been hit hard in recent years, but which have nevertheless maintained their tentacles in Parliament, in the area of ​​influencers and through certain “press” portals. (…) If he loses on appeal, Plahotniuc will actually end up in the situation of serving hard years in prison. (…) The examination of the appeal begins on August 24. Until then, the goal is to completely discredit the government and send a signal of vulnerability to the judicial system: the power is wavering, are you sure you want to convict the capo di tutti i capi? This is the feeling of chaos that the criminal groups are trying to induce”

A few hours later Grosu apologized “to all honest journalists and the independent press” and thanked journalists for investigations that hold the government accountable. At the same time, he continued to accuse oligarchs “Plahotniuc, Platon, Shor” of amplifying these scandals to create “hate” in society.

I’ll leave my quick thoughts on this tactic in a footnote for those who are interested3.

Other News

The prime minister’s resignation (twice?) and the many unfolding scandals has mostly taken over the news cycle. Here’s a quick roundup of the other stories worth watching from the past week:

• On July 6 Moldova marked the “Day of Commemoration of the Victims of Deportations and Repressions of the Totalitarian Communist Regime” and the 85th anniversary of the Stalinist deportations. Unfortunately, the event was overshadowed by a protocol error whereby the announcer forgot to mention Interim Prime Minister Munteanu while introducing the President and Speaker of Parliament. Over the month of June more than 20,000 people visited the memorial train cars in Chisinau and Balti. If you’d like to know more about the history behind this event see this article by Cathy Byrd published by Moldova Matters last year:

• Completion of the Vulcănești - Chișinău “Independence Line” has been delayed again. Last year Prime Minister Recean promised the line would be in service in December 2025 in time for winter. Then it was delayed until June 2026. Now, it has been pushed back again until December 31, 2026. This was announced by the World Bank which is financing the project and said that “the estimated completion date was severely delayed by the contractor” - referring specifically to the contractor building out the Chisinau high-voltage substation. Overall work on the project has been rated “satisfactory” by the World Bank which announced a firm plan for completion with the contractor and a savings of $4 million dollars off the planned amount.

• TV8 Investigation - “Inhuman living conditions for more than 80 workers from Bangladesh and Nepal, employed in Moldova.” The investigation showed how up to 100 foreign workers were being housed in 8 sleeper train wagons that had been relocated onto the grounds of a factory in Chisinau. The company, which manufactures windows, argues that the living conditions are adequate, but a previous inspection by the General Inspectorate for Migration from July 2025 found that “foreign workers employed by these companies were housed in precarious and totally inadequate living conditions, especially in disused train carriages.” Following TV8’s investigation inspectors promised to return and do a repeat inspection.

• Roma Baron Artur Cerari passed away on July 4. His death caused an outpouring of support and warm messages on social media for the man who was the leader of Soroca’s Roma community since 1998. The title of Baron is expected to pass to one of his children.

• Moldova celebrates American Independence Day. On July 4 the Moldovan parliament was lit up with the American flag as was the Triumphal Arch. Fireworks were organized in the city center as well. Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu praised the partnership with the US writing:

“Step by step, we have built roads, modernized schools and kindergartens, expanded access to water and sanitation, and taken important steps to strengthen our energy independence and democratic institutions. For the Republic of Moldova, the United States is a trusted friend, standing by us when we need it most ,”

I come down very heavily on the side of - no they are not. And they never have been. People often find “politics” and “politician” to be dirty words. It’s not hard to understand why - the news is always full of stories about corruption and personal enrichment in politics.

The antidote to this rather dark view of politics has become the “technocrat.” The idea is this - a political party wins power but then turns over key parts of governance, even the prime ministership, to an outsider without political ambitions.

The problem with this should be fairly obvious - “politician” is a job title just like “plumber.” Just because a person had a bad experience with a plumber does not mean that they call an HVAC specialist the next time their toilet leaks.

You call a better plumber.

Technical expertise is valuable, but governing is inherently political. Moldova’s repeated search for apolitical prime ministers produces leaders who lack either democratic legitimacy, political skill, or both.

The Myth of the Technocrat

Read more

“Today I end my term as prime minister.

I accepted the proposal to be prime minister with a lot of responsibility and strong conviction that I can contribute to changing things for the better.

The moment I understand that I can no longer exercise my mandate in accordance with my principles and beliefs, I choose to walk away.

I thank all my colleagues - ministers, their teams and the people who worked professionally and faithfully.

I will continue to serve my country from whatever position I may find myself, irrespective of where I live or what responsibilities I may have, either in the public sector or private. I believe that duty to the country is not about a position, but about the commitment we keep.

Thank you!”

Emphasis mine.

This move came without warning and with no explanation beyond the cryptic allusion to his inability to “exercise my mandate in accordance with my principles and beliefs.”

His resignation triggers the collapse of the Munteanu government which came into office on October 31, 2025. In his 8 months leading the government, Alexandru Munteanu has remained a bit of a cipher. His team projected an image of quiet professionalism, rejecting normal public communications1 and largely avoiding any big announcements on reforms or legislative projects.

This public perception has come under increasing strain over the last few weeks against the backdrop of the MoldATSA scandal and the public backlash against the proposed tax reforms.

President Sandu’s Press Conference

Following the Prime Minister’s facebook post, President Sandu called a press conference for 11 am this morning. At the press conference she thanked the Prime Minister for his service and then immediately sought to debunk rumors about his departure saying:

“The speculation that ‘he wanted to fight against abuses and was not allowed’ is false. The Prime Minister had a free hand to lead the Government as he considered correct. He chose to leave,”

This was apparently in response to narratives circulating on Telegram stating that President Sandu gave the Prime Minister a list of “untouchables” in PAS who he was not permitted to remove - even in cases of corruption.

The President stated that “Mr. Munteanu is a good man” and that…

“I was convinced and I am still convinced that he has the best intentions, but I expected more involvement in complicated decisions, more presence to listen to people, to explain what kind of reforms we need to make and why we need to make them.”

Asked by the press what contradiction caused the Prime Minister to resign rather than compromise his beliefs, she stated:

“I don’t think there were any contradictions, at least these things were not expressed and exposed. Both Mr. Munteanu and I have worked and are working with honesty and integrity. (…) This week I had several discussions with the Prime Minister about the reforms that have aroused a lot of debate in society, especially the tax reform, but also the salary reform. I also believe that these reforms could have been developed, consulted on and explained better, so that we could obtain the support of citizens,”

She went on to state that there was no conflict with the Prime Minister on the topic of the fight against corruption or on the plans to restructure and reform governance of state companies. She stated:

“There was only one objection related to the interpersonal relationship with one of the members of the Government, there was a discussion about the interpersonal relationship with the Minister of Education,”

A reporter followed up asking if Minister of Education Dan Perciun could be a candidate for prime minister. President Sandu refused to comment, noting that constitutionally the next step is consultations with the parliamentary factions. She stated that during the process of identifying a new candidate for prime minister, Munteanu would stay on in a caretaker role.

What Happened With Dan Perciun?

Following President Sandu’s statements, Minister of Education Dan Perciun confirmed that he had a discussion with the Prime Minister on Tuesday saying:

"It is true, indeed, that I had a discussion on Tuesday with the Prime Minister, during which I expressed my thoughts on the subject of budgetary-fiscal policy, on how certain things that were not fully discussed in the Government were found in that policy and sparked very heated discontent in our society,"

He went on to state that discussions like this are necessary and useful and seemed to reject the idea that it contributed to the PM’s resignation. About his future ambitions he emphasized his desire to stay on as Minister of Education and continue developing reforms there.

What Comes Next?

While various opposition politicians have called for early elections, that is almost certainly not going to happen. President Sandu will begin consultations with the parliamentary factions next week and PAS, representing the majority, will have to agree on a candidate. This new candidate will need to form a new team of ministers and prepare a program of government for a vote of confidence in parliament.

How long this takes is a bit of an open question. Back in February 2023 Prime Minister Gavrilita resigned2 and her successor was named the same day. Within 6 days, parliament had voted in the new government of Dorin Recean. This situation had been building over some time and the actual switch of governments was a relatively stage-managed process.

President Sandu announced that she would start consultations with parliamentary factions next week. Prime Minister Munteanu’s resignation was, by all appearances, more unexpected, so most likely time is needed to identify a replacement.

If PAS identifies a unifying candidate over the weekend or early next week, then a new government could be sworn in relatively quickly. On the other hand, if there are divisions in the party and multiple candidates are angling for the position, this could be a more protracted process.

In the meantime, the outgoing Prime Minister acts in an interim capacity. The caretaker government has substantially limited powers and until a new PM is sworn in they cannot initiate or approve legislative initiatives3.

Analysis: Why Now?

Right now we don’t have any satisfying answer to that most important question. The morning’s events give the impression of an unexpected change but for the moment we don’t know anything concrete.

President Sandu’s remarks are telling however. She seemed to acknowledge that Munteanu’s technocratic, low-visibility approach had failed to build public support for the government’s agenda. They also showed at least some disappointment from her end on his engagement with the issues.

From my perspective, it has been very hard to get any real idea of what that agenda has been for the last 8 months. Over time, this has been chalked up by some to failures of communication. The disastrous rollout of the proposed tax reform showed it was something much more fundamental. Ministries were fighting in public and it became clear that highly consequential reforms had not gone through even the most basic coordination process. In the middle of this national argument about tax reform came scandal after scandal related to MoldATSA and the management of state-owned companies. Through it all, Prime Minister Munteanu was largely absent.

The role of the PM’s conflict with Minister Perciun remains unclear, but Perciun’s remarks on this “discussion” seem to imply that the tax reform was creating rifts in the government behind the scenes. Stepping back, the scandals at MoldATSA largely predate this government - with the key appointments made before he took office. The tax reform on the other hand is a political disaster more directly attributable to his decisions - either proactively or due to an overly hands-off approach.

Perhaps, Munteanu concluded that this job is not for him and it is time to give someone else a chance. Perhaps President Sandu, PAS or some subset of his ministers lost confidence in his leadership and encouraged him to resign. Perhaps there is another shoe yet to drop - either in the alluded-to conflict with Minister of Education Dan Perciun or with some new information related to the ongoing scandals at state-owned companies.

Right now we simply don’t know.

July is when summer truly settles into Moldova. School is out, outdoor terraces are full, and the country’s festival season is in full swing. The markets are overflowing with fresh produce, and this is a great month to visit Piața Centrală for strawberries, cherries, apricots, cucumbers, new potatoes, lettuce, radishes, and a wide selection of herbs. Tourists often venture into the countryside for pictures in fields of lavender or sunflowers, and there are many festivals in the villages and towns around the country.

No major public holidays in July

July does not bring a major public holiday in Moldova, which makes it a quieter month on the official calendar. Even so, the month is filled with cultural and community events across the country.

Events and Festivals

• Noaptea Sânzienelor – July 4
  One of the month’s most distinctive traditions comes early, with Noaptea Sânzienelor. This year, Castel Mimi is hosting a special evening program built around summer traditions, wine, and local identity. Tickets include three glasses of wine, a souvenir glass and a gift. Designated drivers and non-drinkers can purchase a ticket that includes lemonade instead of wine.

  Tickets and more information are available here.

• Lavender Festival – Ceadîr-Lunga, Gaugauzia – July 5^th
  The At Mount winery, far to the south of Moldova, hosts a Lavendar festival where you can take photos in the vast fields of lavender. Details are available here.

• IA Mania - July 5^th
  IA Mania remains one of the best-known celebrations of Moldovan village culture, traditional dress, music, and food. Hosted in the village of Ustia, near Criuleni, this festival includes live music, shopping for handmade goods, and a celebration of Moldovan culture. Tickets and information can be found here.

• Film and Histories Festival – July 3–6
  Mereni hosts the first edition of the Film and Histories Festival, with a program built around memory, identity, film screenings, and discussion. It is a thoughtful addition to the summer cultural calendar. The festival wraps up in Chisinau on the final day but the majority of the activities will be held in the village of Mereni. The Ministry of Culture provides a complete agenda on their site here.

• Te Salut, Chisinau - July 17-19
  The “Hello Chisinau” festival will give visitors a chance to learn about the history of Chisinau while enjoying food and live entertainment. The festival will be on the pedestrian street “Eugen Doga.” More information can be found here.

• Portuguese Festival “Setubal” - July 18 - 19
  The Botanical Gardens “Gradina Botanica” will host a free Portuguese-themed festival this month. With performance of Portuguese music and food from 10 different chefs, don’t miss this chance to sample Portuguese culture. Some details are available here.

• GurmanIA Festival - July 26
  Take a trip to the north of Moldova for this food festival in the village of Țarigrad. This year’s festival will be held on July 26 but if you would like to learn more about the event, read this description of last year’s festival here.

Concerts and Performances

• Jazz a la Paris, Authentique - July 18
  If you enjoyed DescOpera in the Old Orhei valley and the village of Butuceni, venture back to the village for the French-Moldovan Jazz concert. Featuring musicians from both countries, the concert is sure to entertain jazz fans. More details and tickets are available here.

• Other Smaller-Venue Concerts
  In addition to all the live music you can hear at the many festivals this month, there are many smaller concerts happening throughout Chisinau. For a list of the many concerts, check out these websites: iTicket, Fest, Afisha.

Cultural performances in Chișinău

The major cultural institutions go on a summer recess in July, but they will be back as summer draws to a close. Smaller theaters will still be performing. Consult the website for your favorite theater for schedules of these performances.

Sports

• Summer outdoor sports

  July is one of the best months of the year for hiking, cycling, running, and exploring the countryside. Orheiul Vechi, the Codrii forests, and Moldova’s wine regions are especially attractive during the summer season. While there are fewer organized runs during the hot month of July, other sporting events are occurring throughout the month.

• Marton la Fetesti (Fetesti Marathon) - July 4-5
  Far in the north of Moldova, the village of Fetesti will host an organized race - with 14km, half marathon and full marathon options. For details including a detailed map of the course visit Run Moldova’s site here.

• Prime Fighting Championship - July 11 - Chisinau Arena
  If you enjoy mixed martial arts, don’t miss this championship event on July 11th. Tickets and details are available here.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

For most of three decades, Moldova entered Western conversations as a problem to be managed: small, poor, divided, with a breakaway region and a Russian garrison. That Moldova is gone. The country that opened the first cluster of its EU accession negotiations this June, that twice in two years beat back the most aggressive election interference in its history and that broke its dependence on Russian gas, is something else. Moldova is a partner. I spent a week in late June making exactly that argument in Washington, at the State Department, on Capitol Hill, at the Stimson Center, The Atlantic Council and The World Justice Project. The visit fell on the 36th anniversary of Moldova’s Declaration of Sovereignty, a useful reminder that sovereignty in our neighbourhood is not a date in a textbook but a choice re-made under pressure. The encouraging news is that the argument is landing.

What matters about Moldova’s turn West is not only its direction but the manner of it. Moldovans chose continuity in 2024 and 2025 while Russia spent more than $100 million to buy votes, fund proxies and flood the information space, and they chose it with Russian troops still illegally stationed on national territory and a war next door. A choice made under duress is sturdier than one made in comfort. For Washington, the implication is liberating. Moldova is not contested ground that demands careful neutrality. It is an aligned country, where the democratic preference of Moldovans and the strategic interest of the United States point the same way.

The argument lands because the partnership has a record, not a wish list. It is not charity. It is a security partnership with shared burdens. In April 2024 Moldova imported American liquefied natural gas for the first time, removing the single most powerful lever Moscow had held over Chișinău for a generation. It ran two national elections under hybrid assault without the public losing confidence in the result. It dismantled key parts of the financial machinery of Russian influence. None of it was free, but all of it was cheap against the alternative, and the support behind it has stayed bipartisan, reaffirmed in Congressional resolutions backed by both parties on the Hill.

The case for staying engaged is, at heart, about what Moldova contributes rather than consumes. Moldova is an emerging security provider, not just a security consumer. A stable, Western-anchored Moldova denies Russia a second front on Ukraine’s flank, a land bridge toward Odesa and the Black Sea and a propaganda victory that a nation can be dragged back once it has chosen the West. Modest, targeted cooperation buys down a far larger and costlier risk. This is the plain logic of peace through strength: stability is held by raising the cost of aggression, not by conceding to it. By that measure Moldova is among the cheapest deterrence investments available to the United States today. The contest, after all, is no longer mainly about tanks. It is hybrid, and the front line runs through citizens’ phones and electricity bills.

No file is more misunderstood abroad than Transnistria. It is too often read as a frozen conflict awaiting some grand external mediation. That framing is comfortable and wrong: it casts Moldova as a problem for others to solve and quietly hands Moscow a veto over our future. The reality is that Moldova owns this process and manages it peacefully, lawfully and on its own terms. What Moldova asks of its partners is not mediation but backing its agency, its reintegration efforts and sustaining the international pressure that holds Russia to its own commitments. Moscow committed at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its forces and munitions from Moldova and has ignored that promise for more than two decades. Until it complies, the shared task should be to keep making the illegal presence steadily irrelevant and costly, while preserving peace, development and protecting ordinary people on both banks.

This is also why the way the war in Ukraine ends matters so much to us. No country in Europe wants a just and lasting peace more than Moldova. But peace on the wrong terms could raise our risk rather than lower it, by freeing Russian capacity and reviving old ambitions along the Black Sea coast. The same resolve that has kept this war from spreading must carry through any settlement. Small states are not spectators to great-power bargains. We are usually the first place their consequences are felt. Moldova should therefore be a stakeholder in Europe’s security architecture, not a footnote to it.

There is a wider lesson in Moldova’s experience that Washington and Brussels would do well to study. A small democracy with limited means has shown that Russian hybrid interference can be beaten rather than merely endured, when investment in resilience comes early and elections are defended deliberately. What worked here, hardened cyber defences, stronger financial intelligence and a public increasingly inoculated against disinformation, is exportable to other front-line democracies. Moldova is not only a place to defend. It is a place to learn from.

Energy ties the whole argument together. Every cargo of American LNG that reaches Moldova is two things at once: a gain for our security and a market for U.S. energy. Pair the bipartisan POWER Moldova Act with grid interconnection through Romania and new generation at home, and the lever Russia has used most often simply stops working. With a 750-mile border with Ukraine, a secure, EU-integrated Moldova is also a natural platform from which American firms can help rebuild it.

I left Washington with more friends and a clearer sense of what comes next. The task is not to persuade anyone that Moldova deserves sympathy. It is to build on an alignment that already exists. A Moldova that completes its reforms, joins the European Union by the end of this decade and helps anchor stability in the Black Sea region is a lasting asset for the United States and Europe alike. A reliable partner, a growing market and a contributor to the security of a neighbourhood that has known too little of it. That is the partnership we came to advance and one I am now confident we can deliver together.

Iulian Groza is Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE), an independent think-tank in Chișinău. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova, responsible for European integration and international law. His work focuses on EU accession, foreign and security policy, the rule of law and democratic resilience.

Last week I wrote 2 articles on the Ministry of Finance’s proposal to overhaul the tax system. If you didn’t catch them, you can find those articles here:

Since writing those article, Minister of Finance Andrian Gavrilită has been in a fighting retreat as pressure has built and parts of the proposed reform are abandoned one by one. On June 26 President Sandu called on the government to “take a break” regarding the tax reform saying:

"The tax reform must be done, but I think the Government should not rush. It must take a break, analyze the comments very well."

She called on the government to incorporate feedback and carefully analyze some of the most controversial elements such as VAT increases.

On June 28 opposition parties gathered a protest in front of parliament organized by PPDA MP Vasile Costiuc. Around 200 people attended, including senior members of multiple opposition parties including MAN, Our Party, PSDE and PPDA. Criticism came from many angles but mostly focused on the proposal to increase VAT on energy.

At the same time, government spokesperson Daniela Crudu announced that the reform is no longer moving forward saying:

“We have heard the various opinions and listened to the people. We have already announced that we are taking a break to rethink fiscal policy and the other proposed measures. In the coming period, we will review the proposals and continue extensive consultations, to identify a fair and sustainable formula for citizens and the economic environment,”

In an interview with ZdG defending the reform, Minister Gavrilită continued to stress that prices would not go up for “ordinary people” and explained that they are backtracking on aspects of the bill - either canceling provisions or extending the implementation timeline. In the interview he was asked how it was that the Minister of Health, who has stated that “This reform will destroy the healthcare system,” was not consulted prior to the bill being released to the public. The Minister replied that it was not consulted with the other ministries beforehand because there was no time.

Asked about the rush, Minister Gavrilită stated that he wanted to start consultations in March but they were delayed until the completion of a visit from the IMF. He stated that because of this delay, “only at the end of May did we agree on the principles and direction of reducing the budget deficit in a few years, so that we would have medium-term economic stability.” Asked if the reforms themselves were driven by the IMF he stated:

“The reform itself is not imposed, but the need to reduce the budget deficit and stabilize the state’s financial degeneration is a condition [of the IMF]”

Later, in another interview Minister Gavrilită stated that wage increases for public sector workers planned for September may need to be delayed without the tax law. He said that it was an IMF condition that new revenue would need to be found before raising salaries.

So, we now know that at least some aspects of the rushed nature of the reform was caused by the IMF. We also know that this huge reform was rolled out without serious consultation with other ministries1. This type of coordination would normally be managed by the Prime Minister - but he has still not made any substantive statements on this topic.

Where does the reform stand?

As of today, here is what we know about the planned changes. In the interest of keeping the main text tight, I’ll add some quick analysis in footnotes.

• Plans to tax wedding and birthday gifts will not be implemented2.

• No capital gains tax will be applied to the sale of primary residences. All other changes to capital gains tax and VAT for new housing will be delayed until 2028.

• HoReCa VAT will still go from 8% to 20% in October. VAT on food and agricultural products remains unclear and the ministry says that they are still considering what to do3.

• VAT for electricity, heating and natural gas will still go up in April 2027 after the heating season4.

• 0% tax on reinvested profits for large companies will be delayed (no date).

• No VAT hike on medicines

• Changes in salary taxes and structure will be delayed until 2028

This is still a moving target - the reform as it was proposed is falling apart in just about every direction.

MoldATSA Updates

The MoldATSA scandal continues to develop since I sent the latest update yesterday. Here is the latest:

• Anastasia Taburceanu’s work for the State Chancellory was funded by the EU. This was confirmed by the EU Delegation who stated that she was contracted under a project called “Reform Support Team” implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EU Delegation confirmed that she was contracted to “provided communication support to the State Chancellery and the Prime Minister’s Office” and that she resigned in June 2026. They stated that “The EBRD is evaluating the implementation of this contract. The Commission awaits the results of this evaluation to decide whether additional measures are necessary.” The confirmation came after the leader of the Moldovan National Party (PNM) Dragoș Galbur publicly alleged that Taburceanu was being paid €4,000 a month by the EU for her work at the State Chancellery. This would be in addition to her salary from MoldATSA. Galbur also alleges that she lives in Slovenia. Neither the sum nor details about where Anastasia Taburceanu lives have been independently confirmed.

• The Director of the Public Property Agency (APP), Roman Cojuhari, has resigned. He accepted that “The Public Property Agency is the institution responsible for monitoring the activity of Moldatsa” and stated that he was resigning due to the failures at the agency in this case and “to protect the image of the institution and the team.”

• The National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) have opened a criminal investigation and are conducting searches at MoldATSA today. The case is opened under articles related to abuse of power and abuse of office.

PAS party leaders have started to make public statements about the scandal and especially about the resignation of Radu Marian. Minister of Education and Vice-President of the PAS Party, Dan Perciun, called the situation at MoldATSA “systemic error, a failure to react on time and to adequately investigate the incoming signals.” He stated that “People’s anger is understandable and perfectly justified” and that “There is a need for a course correction both in the party and in the administration of the state.” Additionally, he and others have praise Radu Marian’s personal integrity and his decision to step down and take responsibility for a mistake.

That last part may seem like a positive spin on a politically disastrous situation, but it has some merit. Journalist Mariana Rata of TV8 wrote a post marking just how new and important it is that this investigation is having serious impact. She wrote:

“Four resignations!!! I can’t remember a single time in the history of the Republic of Moldova when a media investigation has led to four resignations.

I’ve written hundreds of investigative reports over my career, from 2007 to 2026, under every government during that period, but I’ve never seen this many resignations follow a press scandal. And that makes me happy.

It means we are living in a different kind of state now—a state where those in power are beginning to understand that they must answer to the people when they are caught doing something wrong. Because in a democratic state, power belongs to the citizens. You cannot lie to them, and you should not risk disappointing them.”

(…)

🚿 This summer has brought a cold shower for the government. I hope it turns out to be a cleansing and revitalizing one. We want to be in the EU by 2030!”

She went on to call for the next resignation to be that of Constantine Batin from Expo Business Chisinau. Batin was the subject of TV8’s recent investigation who bluntly rejected the idea that just because someone was under sanctions as a Russian arms trafficker he (Batin) should not do business with them.

Disinformation and (Dis)Union

Last week Moldova’s internet lit up with a new story - Romania’s lower house “tacitly adopted” a bill on the unification with Moldova. The story on social media was that Romania unilaterally approved union, and Moldova’s pro-Kremlin politicians quickly made statements:

Igor Dodon called it a sign of Romanian imperialism:

“it is regrettable that politicians in Romania have launched such an imperialist policy, which risks quarreling both countries. And it is shameful that politicians in the leadership of Moldova are silent or tacitly approve Romanian territorial expansionism”

Mayor Ion Ceban chose to blame PAS (insinuating they are behind the effort):

“We condemn any attempt to attack the values ​​enshrined in the Constitution of our country. (…) We do not sell our country and condemn any statement by politicians in the context of the destruction of the country. The people are the only ones who decide. PAS’s actions are increasingly obvious. Their goal is to do everything, through the actions they take, to reach a situation in which Moldova is a failed state.”

Russian Foriegn Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova:

"It's no secret that Bucharest is hatching plans to take over Moldova. This isn't news to us; we talk about it constantly. Now this situation has taken a turn for the worse,"

She went on to talk about how scandalous it was that no referendum was planned, etc.

To unpack this, we need to clarify 2 key points:

1) What is “tacit adoption” of a bill?

Under the Romanian constitution multiple entities have legislative initiative - including parliament, the government and even citizens (via a petition with enough signatures). They can all propose legislation which then goes to parliament which is split into an upper and lower house - called the Senate and Chamber of Deputies respectively. Each bill starts in one chamber, which considers the bill before passing it to the other chamber for a decision. Who is the first considerer and who is a decision maker depends on the topic. This setup leaves open the possibility of a “pocket veto” - aka one chamber simply choosing to ignore a bill and therefore killing it. To prevent this, and to encourage speed, any bill not voted up or down in 45 days is considered “tacitly adopted” by the first chamber and moved to the one that makes the decision.

The bill in question wasn’t remotely serious and was put in the stack of unserious proposals5. From there it was never debated or voted on and was therefore tacitly adopted by the lower house after 45 days. It then goes to the Senate who has no obligation to pick it up and therefore it will die there in a drawer somewhere.

2) Where did this bill come from?

This bill was proposed by the SOS Romania party which is led by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Diana Șoșoacă. This is her last month:

This is therefore a great example of an information warfare campaign. The Kremlin asked its proxy party in Romania to introduce nonsense legislation. They did, and now the Kremlin has spun up a HUGE messaging campaign attacking the legislation they produced and trying to pin it on PAS and the Romanian government6.

President Sandu reacted to questions about the bill saying:

“This is a document proposed by a Moscow agent, whose goal is to discredit the idea of ​​unification, and nothing more. It would be as if I came to parliament tomorrow with a legislative initiative to annex France to Moldova. Please, government, implement it. Unification isn’t happening that way, we all understand that perfectly well,”

Other Shor & Hybrid War Updates

Here are the other top stories in hybrid warfare and security news of the week:

• Moldova detained a Russian FSB officer. The alleged spy entered the country without diplomatic credentials, allegedly to visit monasteries and other touristic sites. In reality he was heading to Transnistria to collect information in the Security Zone according to the Security and Intelligence Service SIS. He is currently being held under 30 days preventative detention.

• President Sandu stripped Belarusian spy Alexandru Balan of his Moldovan citizenship. Recall, Balan was part of the April prisoner exchange with Belarus and Russia. RFE/RL also released a story this week alleging that Balan knew the names and identities of at least 7 Romanian undercover agents that he passed to Belarus. They also detailed the tradecraft he used to communicate with his handlers and how he was eventually uncovered.

• Flyone airline must be sold to new owners. That was the decision of the Council for the Examination of Investments of Importance for State Security (CEIISS) last week, who ruled that the airline needed to change owners in the next 90 days. The decision noted the proximity of the beneficial owners to sanctioned individuals. The airline is owned by Vladimir Cebotari who has been identified by SIS as a close associate of Vladimir Plahotniuc.

EU Accession Updates

We have a new section at Moldova Matters! For some time I’ve mostly put EU accession stories in the bucket of “international affairs.” That no longer fits neatly as the opening of negotiating clusters starts literally intertwining European and Moldovan law. So we’re going to try out a new section here and see how well it makes sense. Here’s an roundup of the top EU Accession stories of the last week:

• Hungary has put the breaks on opening new negotiating clusters. Prime Minister Péter Magyar has signaled publicly and privately that he opposes any fast track accession process for Ukraine, saying that it sends the wrong message to the Western Balkans7. The EU still hopes to open 2 more clusters this summer - Cluster 6: “external relations” and Cluster 2: “internal market.” Others could gradually reopen after. Romanian President Nicușor Dan explained what happened behind closed doors saying:

“Obviously, we would have liked this phrase [“accelerated process”] to remain, with regard to Moldova, but there were two conditions. There was a condition from Hungary, which said: “I don’t want this phrase for Ukraine” and a condition from many other states that said that “the language of Ukraine and the language of Moldova must remain the same”. And as a logical consequence, the language disappeared from both. It is a diplomatic moment, there are no practical consequences”

• The second Moldova-European Union Summit was held on June 22. The high level dialogue came with some announcements. The EU is preparing a €120 million euro package for the security sector in Moldova. An additional €11 million will be provided to strengthen Moldova against hybrid attacks and €17 million on border security initiatives. Additionally discussions on collaborating to build a med-tech cluster and other joint research initiatives have been initiated. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Moldova was 93% of the way through its commitments under the growth plan and if it finishes the remaining 7% could unlock an additional €503 million under this mechanism.

• EU is drawing up “gradual integration” plans. This was reported by Politico following both France and Germany circulating “membership lite” proposals and a general rejection of the “reverse enlargement” plan promoted by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. The plan would reportedly grant EU membership benefits step by step as countries hit certain benchmarks. The article noted how something similar was already going on with Moldova’s integration into the EU mobile roaming space, cultural support programs and Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). Ukraine and Montenegro have both indicated opposition to this piecemeal approach.

PM Munteanu Fires the Control Unit

On June 24 Prime Minister Munteanu announced that he would be firing the 2 members of the Control Unit - an unofficial advisory body to the Prime Minister that tracks the delivery and implementation of government decisions and the tasks given to the ministries. Both members, Vasile Bolduratu and Angela Rojcov-Ciofu, had been appointed under Prime Minister Recean in 2023. Announcing the decision he stated:

"The standards of professionalism, institutional loyalty and integrity must be higher than anywhere else. Following the assessments and information analyzed in the recent period, I have come to the conclusion that the activity and composition of the Control Unit no longer benefit from the necessary trust to exercise this function. I announce to you that the members of the Control Unit resigned from their positions this morning. Public functions are not a privilege, they imply responsibility, and when the necessary trust to exercise a function is lost, the right decision is to make changes. And that is what we will do",

No clarifications were made as to what “assessments” of “information” preceded this move and this was not in response to any public reporting about either person8.

Following the announcement, ZdG analyzed their asset and income declarations and found that each advisor earned a salary of around 44,000 lei / month. However, they each served on a number of boards of state enterprises where they got additional renumeration. Specifically:

• Vasile Bolduratu - board member of the Thermoelectric Company (central heat and power company), National Lottery, State Enterprise "Radiocomunicații” (broadcasting infrastructure), Cartuș (defense manufacturer), Chisinau Glass Factory and the Costești Hydroelectric Company

• Rojcov-Ciofu - board member of the Chisinau International Airport, Moldova Post, Cricova Winery, and MoldExpo center

Vasile Bolduratu was earning around 500,000 additional lei per year from his board places while Rojcov-Ciofu was earning around 300,000.

No more information has been made available as to why the firings happened now, but the timing is important. The Prime Minister made this announcement just as the government was starting to grapple with the MoldATSA scandal - which itself has highlighted the serious problems with how state owned companies’ boards are comprised.

Keep Cool Out There!

Moldova is facing the first heat wave of the year. From Jue 30 - July 1 the North of the country is under Code Orange (temperature highs of 36-38 C) while the Center and South of the country is in Code Red (39-41 C). The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has begun installing rehydration tents in multiple districts as a resource for those who overheat while walking in the city. The National Road Administration has also issued reminders that under Yellow, Orange or Red codes trucks over 12 tons are banned from driving on roads between 10 am and 8 pm9.

The Power Lines Have Names Now

… and they’re making progress!

On June 18 Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy Nick Pietrowicz presented Prime Minister Munteanu with the completed feasibility study for the Strășeni–Gutinaș 400 kV high voltage line. This line, which will be fully financed with support of the United States, is now called the “Liberty Line.”

On June 26 Moldelectrica signed a contract with the Turkish company SA-RA which won a tender to construct 45 km of the new 400 kV Balți–Suceava power line. When announcing this, Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu announced the names for all 3 lines as follows:

1. Vulcănești–Chișinău “Energy Independence Line” (scheduled completion December 2025, expected Summer 2026)

2. Strașeni–Gutinaș “Liberty Line” (feasibility study done, completion planned around 2030)

3. Balți–Suceava “Resilience Line” (construction planned over the next 24 months)

So we now have Independence, Liberty and Resilience connections, building and planned, connecting Moldova to Romania and the European energy grid.

That’s a positive note to end on after the craziness of the last week.

Also - thank you to those of you who recently subscribed. In this news environment it is no small thing to keep up with the flood of events and to keep proactive projects and stories moving forward. For those of you who have subscribed - my sincere thanks. For those who haven’t yet, please consider doing so. Your subscription makes the work behind this newsletter possible.

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Last week we covered how an investigation from ZdG uncovered serious issues with the state enterprise responsible for managing Moldova’s airspace - MoldATSA. Firstly, the company’s director Dumitru Vangheli lied on his CV about being an Air Canada Pilot (or being a pilot at all). Secondly, since he took over the company Mr. Vangheli oversaw a huge increase in salaries for employees MoldATSA. One of these employees was President Maia Sandu’s cousin Anastasia Taburceanu. While Dumitru Vangheli was fired by the Public Property Agency (APP) and Anastasia Taburceanu resigned with a promise to return her salary, the scandal was far from over.

Another Cousin of Maia Sandu Resigns

On June 26 Tatiana Batin, chief of staff to Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu, resigned. She is the sister of Anastasia Taburceanu and cousin to President Sandu. Speaking of the resignation, Igor Grosu stated:

“I believe this was an honorable resignation, connected to the incident involving her sister and the situation at MoldATSA. We worked together for four years, and I have no complaints about her professional performance.”

Tatiana Batin has not spoken publicly about her resignation and Speaker Grosu has insisted that it was triggered by her sister’s involvement in the MoldATSA scandal. However, on the same day, TV8 released a new investigation into Tatiana Batin’s husband Constantin Batin with some serious allegations.

TV8’s flagship investigative program Black Box PLUS found that Constantin Batin conducted business dealing with Latvian citizen Marks Blats, who was under US sanctions at the time. Later Blats was also sanctioned by the EU, UK, Latvia and Ukraine. Blats is identified as part of an arms trafficking and sanctions evasion network led by Igor Zimenkov. This network supplies military technology to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine.

For the last 2 years, Constantin Batin has served as the director of the Free Economic Zone Expo-Business-Chisinau. Two weeks before he was appointed to this position he “swapped” companies with Marks Blats - this was in 2024. Batin gave Blats the company Berlagr SRL, a small sewing factory with 13 employees and income of 4 million lei in 2023. In return, he received Ecotech Group SRL, a hazardous waste disposal company that had 16,000 lei of turnover in 2024. Confusingly, Ecotech Group SRL was founded by Batin in 2020 for Balts. He transferred the company to Blats before, then got it back in the 2024 trade, where he gave Blats a vastly more profitable sewing factory.

Constantin Batin told TV8 that it was valuable for Blats to take over a company with operating history1 and that he himself wanted to get into the waste treatment business but ultimately did not do so because he got the job at Expo-Business-Chisinau. Asked how long he had known Blats, he was initially evasive claiming that:

“I’ve been working with Israelis since 2005. Since then, hundreds of people from Israel have come through me.”

Mr. Blats is also an Israeli citizen. After further prevaricating Batin explained he has known him since 2007-2008. When asked if he knew that he was under sanctions he replied:

Batin: “I learned from you that he was under sanctions. To me, honestly, it doesn’t matter much whether he has sanctions or not. This in no way influences me materially or otherwise.”

TV8 Reporter: - “I think it should matter.”

Batin: “For you as a journalist, it matters that you found out the news. For me, it doesn’t matter. The main thing is not to appear in sanctions, you understand? I know what I’m doing and I’m responsible for my activity.2”

Three months after swapping companies, both men transferred both companies to an Israeli citizen named Nairner Michael. Asked about this Batin stated:

“I sold them to a Jewish man originally from Moldova who wanted to return to Moldova and start a business here,”

TV8 reported that this is not an accurate characterization of their relationship because Nairner Michael had previously managed companies for both Mr. Batin and Mr. Blats3.

The investigation found substantial evidence of other eyebrow raising transactions with Israeli citizens, including one instance where Batin bought a company that had declared real estate assets worth 2.5 million lei. He paid €50,000 euros for the company and immediately liquidated the assets for 4.9 million lei (~€243,000).

In statements so far people, have claimed that Tatiana Batin resigned due to her sister’s scandal and that the TV8 story only broke after the resignation. However, it broke on the same day and her husband is quoted extensively in the story - so they knew it was coming.

Asked to comment on the story the Presidency replied to TV8

"the head of state has 24 cousins. Of all of them, only 2 are in public positions, in which they have engaged legally, transparently and based on their own skills and desires. Each one follows their own professional path and works in certain positions with no connection to Maia Sandu's career."

TV8 found that actually President Sandu has 2 more cousins in state employment, one working for the State Enterprise for Forestry and one working for Moldelectrica.

Radu Marian Resigns Over Recommending Dumitru Vangheli

PAS MP and Chairmen of the Parliamentary Committee on Economy, Budget and Finance, Radu Marian, resigned his chairmanship today in the latest fallout from the scandal. Marian had previously admitted that he recommended Dumitru Vangheli for the post of MoldATSA director and stated that:

“We grew up in the same courtyard at the Old Post Office. We’ve known each other for a long time, but we weren’t friends. I don’t know where he went to school,”

He has apologized for this mistake multiple times in the last few days and explained that he was trying to promote qualified people from the diaspora to areas where the state was looking for specialists. He also apologized for not vetting his CV before the recommendation “Even though I didn’t hire him. And I wasn’t involved in the competition, nor in the decisions regarding Vangeli’s salary.”

In his resignation statement he wrote that his continued role as chairman was distracting from the project of pushing towards EU integration but that he would continue working as an MP.

Dumitru Vangheli - Pilot in Video Games

Meanwhile, the inconstancies around Dumitru Vangheli’s CV and his work in Canada are starting to become clearer. In a followup to their initial investigation, ZdG spoke with Tudor Răilean, a friend of Dumitru Vangheli’s since childhood who moved to Canada at the same time as him. There, they remained close, living in the same building and often working together. He shed some light on what Vangheli was really doing while claiming to attain a commercial pilots license, fly for Air Canada and run a series of successful companies.

At the time that Vangheli’s claimed he was taking commercial piloting courses at CargAir, he was actually working at a Montreal hotel - a job he was fired from for stealing a bag of glasses according to Răilean. After that he worked as a pizza delivery driver.

On his CV Vangheli claimed to operate a number of companies including GoRepas - a company that did airline catering and refrigerated logistics. According to Răilean Vangheli did not own this company but worked on the production line. The 2 men later became subcontractors and bought their own refrigerated truck to do deliveries. Through these and other arrangements Dumitru Vangheli came to owe Tudor Răilean around 30,000 Canadian dollars which he failed to repay. When Răilean sued him he discovered that Vangheli had declared bankruptcy and discharged his debts of 97,450 Canadian dollars.

So at various times when Vangheli claimed to be either an airline pilot or the CEO of various companies, he was alternately driving an Uber, working low level catering jobs or running a crypto mining operation. All the while he apparently stayed fascinated by planes and told Răilean that he was taking lessons via Microsoft Flight Simulator.

Răilean told ZdG that he returned to Moldova in 2024 after Vangheli was already working at MoldATSA. He sought a meeting with his former friend to ask about the money he was still owed, but only got an appointment when he told the receptionist that an old colleague from Air Canada was calling. Răilean asked about the reported millions of dollars he had in Canadian accounts and crypto and Vangheli spun a new tale - that his crypto were frozen. He said that he had invested them in a Russian professional video game team and that when the war started the funds were blocked. Asked if he would expose him, Răilean stated that he told Vangheli "Live your life in peace, I have no business. Shall we solve something with the debt?" He did not repay the debts.

As to the luxury cars he reported owning, Răilean told ZdG that Vangheli loved fancy cars and showing off money he didn’t have. On multiple occasions he bought luxury cars which he drove around for a few months before returning them.

Dumitru Vangheli did not respond to requests for comment from ZdG.

Analysis - What a Mess.

What started as a fabricated CV has now caused the committee resignation of one of the most prominent members of the PAS Parliamentary faction, the resignations of 2 cousins of the President, and left us with a number of unanswered questions.

Let’s start with what we do know - Dumitru Vangheli’s whole CV is a fantasy, or a lie. Some could argue that it was “fake it till you make it” gone awry. Others would argue that he’s a conman. In either case, there is zero excuse for those who hired him.

For that we look to the MoldATSA board of directors. On the same day that this scandal broke the Public Property Agency (APP) announced that former Prime Minister Dorin Recean was appointed to this board in an unpaid position. Answering a question about this fact, President Sandu said:

"I don't know why the Public Property Agency decided this way, but they decided to appoint him in this situation to clarify what happened there. But Mr. Recean was appointed after the scandal,"

So Recean was brought in by the APP to start sorting the issue out. This indicates that they knew they had a problem, though it might have only been from calls for comment from ZdG.

What is most perplexing right now is why this is the only change that has been made to the MoldATSA board of directors. They were the ones who oversaw the competition and selected Dumitru Vangheli for director. They were responsible for overseeing company finances and approving executive compensation. In almost every conceivable way the board has failed. But no one has resigned and APP not fired them either.

Then we add the fact that MP Radu Marian has resigned his committee chairmanship. As far as we know right now, his only role in this whole mess was to recommend Dumitru Vangheli as a candidate for the position. Vangheli was one of 3 candidates, and the others were qualified. One of them, Midrigan Vitalie-Silviu, went on to be Vangheli’s deputy director and is now the acting director. So whether or not Radu Marian made a recommendation, the choice to hire Vangheli was made by the board of directors… right?

Maybe not. As I wrote last time, Moldova has chronic governance problems with state companies. MoldATSA does not have an independent board in any meaningful sense of the word and all members are also serving in ministries or state agencies where they were appointed by PAS. Perhaps the board isn’t being held accountable because they aren’t really accountable.

Tatiana Batin’s resignation is more likely tied to her husband's parallel scandal than the optics of her sister being caught up in this one. Whatever the case, MoldATSA and its various sub-scandals has told us a few things definitively. Firstly, PAS has trouble inside its own house and some people close to power are profiting from those connections. These scandals are already extremely damaging for the party’s image and anti-corruption credentials. The big question now is who gets held accountable?

Secondly, this has highlighted the serious problems in the governance of state owned companies. A simply glance at MoldATSA’s board is enough to see that the members are neither qualified nor independent. The fact that they have not yet been held accountable suggests that no one really thought they were.

This scandal highlights an urgent need for corporate governance reform for state companies. That reform should put an emphasis on independent board members and put an end to the system where these jobs are used as salary top-ups for junior civil servants.

This coming week should tell us a lot about how those in power choose to react to this story. We’ll follow along and bring you updates as they happen.

Last week ZdG released an investigation into Dumitru Vangheli, director of the State Enterprise MoldATSA. Their investigation found that he won the job while presenting false aviation credentials on his CV. This initial investigation has now spiraled into multiple scandals that continue to present unanswered questions.

Dumitru Vangheli is (not) a Pilot

The initial investigation targeted MoldATSA Director Dumitru Vangheli who was appointed in 2025 after a competition organized by the APP. On his resume, Vangheli claimed to have gotten his ATPL pilots license from the prestigious CargAir Piloting School in St Hubert Canada (2011-2012). This is the highest grade of pilot’s license and would have licensed him to fly commercial airliners. It requires 1500 hours of flight time, as compared to 70 hours for a basic pilots license or 200 hours for a commercial license. Following this his CV claims he worked as a co-pilot for Air Canada (2012-2014) flying ATR-72 and Boeing 737 Next Generation planes.

None of this is true. ZdG found that he did attend some part-time flying lessons at CargAir in 2018 but did not even attain a basic pilots license. Air Canada confirmed that he never worked for them - and that they had neither ATR-72, nor Boeing 737 Next Generation aircraft in their fleets at the time.

When initially asked about these discrepancies by ZdG journalists he replied:

“You understand that these are secret missions, and they are not going to disclose them to you, because you are not the secret services,”

A few days later he responded to questions in writing in more detail, but avoided explaining any of the discrepancies on his CV or his public wealth declarations.

Dumitru Vangheli’s Companies are… Confusing

On his CV Vangheli claimed a founder, CEO or administrator role in 4 companies - 2 in Moldova and 2 in Canada. ZdG found evidence of 6 more companies in each jurisdiction connected to him. The common thread is that by 2026 all of these companies are defunct, closed or deregistered. Beyond that, the story is much more opaque. On his wealth and asset declarations he claims millions of lei and hundreds of thousands of Canadian dollars in dividends from companies that shortly after ceased to exist. He claims cash accounts equivalent to millions of US dollars spread across lei, Canadian dollars and virtual currencies. He also claims 6 cars - a Rolls-Royce Ghost, Lexus RX 450H, Tesla Model S, Ford Escape PHEV, Toyota Camry and Mazda CX5.

At the same time he has taken out loans from Moldovan banks totaling €640,000 euros against his home equity.

Vangheli also reported donating 40,000 lei to the PAS electoral campaign 2 weeks after he was appointed director. This would have been in September 2025 in the middle of the election campaign.

There is no clear indication of wrongdoing here, but the numbers certainly raise a lot of questions. The starkest of them however is his salary at MoldATSA… and not only his salary.

MoldATSA is a Very Lucrative Place to Work

Before he even became the director of MoldATSA, as acting director in 2024 salaries began going up, including his own. That year he received a bonus of 99,000 lei and a “work intensity supplement” of 39,000 lei. In 2024 his salary was reported as 64,000 lei / month. By 2025 this was 112,000 lei / month.

Huge salary raises were not at all limited to the company director. Numerous employees reported exceptionally large salaries and the average salary at the company climbed from 24,400 lei / month in 2020 to 63,500 lei / month in 2025. It was also in 2025 that Mr. Vangheli hired his girlfriend on Valentine’s day with a salary of 85,000 lei / month.

Explaining the salary increases, Vangheli stated that the company had become much more profitable under his tenure (which is true) and that it was important to pay air traffic controllers competitive salaries as they are professionally quite mobile.

While it is true the air traffic controllers are paid quite well, these salary increases went well beyond controllers and included junior accountants and operational staff as well.

Suspended and Removed

Following the release of the ZdG investigation the Public Property Agency (APP) first suspended and then dismissed Dumitru Vangheli. The APP has stated that his CV was not verified as part of the hiring process and was essentially taken on trust.

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Maia Sandu’s Cousin Benefited from a Large Salary at MoldATSA

Anastasia Taburceanu, cousin of Maia Sandu and former press officer for Prime Minister Gavrilita was also reported to work for MoldATSA. When approached by ZdG she sated that her salary was 25,700 lei / month but noted that she was also paid bonuses which she refused to specify.

RISE Moldova then produced an investigation showing that her effective salary for 2025 was more than 75,000 lei / month, a much larger figure which climbed to 120,000 lei / month in 2026.

Taburceanu explained that her job with the company was in communications and that she was managing a rebranding effort as well as marketing campaigns and a relaunch of the company website. At the same time, this is not her only job. RISE found that she had multiple consulting contracts with various think tanks in 2025 - at times being seconded to the government for various projects.

Most confusingly, when talking to ZdG she sated that part of her activity is promoting the government implementation of the EU Growth Plan. She stated:

“The Growth Plan is implemented by the Government, so what I do is for all ministries. I collect information from my colleagues in the ministries and work with them. And those in the ministries are also responsible for the final communication products. The terms of reference state that I provide services for the State Chancellery,”

Later to RISE she clarified that this work is separate, but she did not comment on her contractual relationship with the State Chancellery or what she is paid for that work.

Following these revelations, Anastasia Taburceanu resigned from MoldASTA and promised to return all bonuses and supplements above her basic salary that she received while employed at the company. She went on to state:

"I am sorry that, through my individual actions and decisions, people were affected who had no connection to the given situation ,"

President Sandu later weighed in on the situation regarding MoldASTA and her cousin saying:

“I had absolutely nothing to do with this hiring. I didn’t recommend her, I wasn’t informed, and I wasn’t consulted about it. I only learned from the media investigations published in recent days that she had been hired without a competition and about the salary she received. It’s obvious that no communications role could justify 120,000 lei. I simply can’t imagine what a communications officer could produce to warrant that kind of salary, just as I can’t imagine what a driver could produce to justify receiving 60,000 lei a month.

The only people who should receive high, internationally competitive salaries are air traffic controllers, because the safety of our airspace depends on them. Everyone else appears to have received unearned money. I don’t know what she produced, but in my view it is immoral to accept money that hasn’t been earned, and that money should be returned. In the worst-case scenario, if it cannot be returned to MoldATSA, then all of it should be donated to an orphanage, a nursing home, or another worthy cause. There are plenty of ways to ensure that this money goes where it is deserved, rather than where it was not.”

Analysis - What’s Going on and What’s Next?

While there’s already a lot going on here this scandal has the feel of not quite being over yet1. We’ll keep following this story in the weeks to come, but I wanted to end today with some context and by highlighting the things I’ll be watching going forward.

What is going on with Dumitru Vangheli?

There is a LOT going on with Mr. Vangheli. At best he lied on his CV about his piloting background. At the same time, the whole CV is very suspect looking. The dates and roles overlap quite a bit. He claims to have been studying Spanish and French at the same time as he was getting his ATPL pilots license, while simultaneously running a company providing food catering services to multiple airlines and Starbucks. Then, while claiming to be a pilot, he was also founding a startup and acting as the CEO. This company had 2 departments - one running refrigerated food logistics, the other also providing airline catering services.

It’s possible that the companies are real and he overlaid the piloting information on the CV to burnish it. It is also quite possible that none of this is real and Mr. Vangheli is either a conman or a fantasist. In any case, a cursory reading of this resume should have raised serious questions - and apparently it didn’t.

Is there a crime here related to the salaries?

This is one of the most important and most complicated parts of this story when it comes to political perception. Firstly, MoldATSA is self funding and clearly quite profitable. So no Moldovan tax dollars are implicated in these huge salaries. It would be reasonable to speculate that if the company was being run profitably then those profits would accrue to the state itself as the shareholder. So, by this logic, artificially inflating their salaries the management and staff were defrauding their shareholders.

But that is not true the case here. Under international regulations MoldATSA says that they may only pay out a maximum of 5% profit to its shareholders. Any additional profits, after expenses, must be refunded to their airlines themselves. So, provided this is accurate, the real question is whether or not these salaries were unreasonable expenses based on the company’s regulations and international norms. The APP has launched an audit of MoldATSA to investigate this and has decided to audit 21 other state owned company’s salary practices as well.

The bigger question might be about how these salaries were approved and how they were overseen, that takes us to questions of…

Governance of State Owned Companies

This is a long term problem for Moldova. The State Property Agency (APP) was quick to state that they do not set executive compensation at the companies they manage nor do they set employee renumeration policies. That is technically true, but skips the fact that the APP has a seat on MoldATSA’s board.

The board is theoretically responsible for this kind of oversight and a quick look at the board composition shows immediate issues. All the board members except for 1 are representatives of ministries or state institutions. State Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance or Economy, Infrastructure or the State Chancellory, etc. The one exception is former Prime Minister Dorin Recean who was appointed as an unpaid board member on the same day as the first ZdG story broke.

“Unpaid” is an important word there. The APP stated that Mr. Recean was appointed to “contribute to strengthening the framework for managing aviation security risks.” That is a solid fit with his resume.

Most board members of state owned companies are paid however. The fact that they are mostly given to junior ministry employees has often been used as a sort of salary sweetener. Raising public sector salaries in Moldova is politically really challenging, so the board seats on the more than 200 state owned companies provide a lot of opportunities for salary supplements.

I’m not saying that none of these or any other board members for state companies are unqualified. I am saying that these boards are in no way diverse or independent. This is a long term problem in Moldova and one that is very common regionally - especially in the former Soviet space. So while this scandal is a lot more complicated than “the board didn’t do its job,” it does highlight how these boards aren’t really fit for purpose.

Anastasia Taburceanu - what’s going on there?

Firstly, I think we can state pretty clearly what isn’t going on. This story has gotten attention because Taburceanu is President Sandu’s cousin, but there is no indication whatsoever that this hire was about nepotism. Anastasia Taburceanu’s CV is very impressive and her experience puts her in the top tier of communications and PR professionals in Moldova.

So while I don’t think this is a family / insider story, I do think there is a story to watch around her salary. It is legitimately difficult to imagine what job she could be doing for MoldATSA that would justify such a high monthly payment. Keep in mind - this isn’t a high paid consultant coming in to do a brand overhaul, this is a salaried employee. It would be hard to reconcile if she was working there full time… but she wasn’t.

Taburceanu stated that part of her work was in support of the government’s EU Growth Plan for the State Chancellery. She then tried to clarify to RISE that this was unrelated to her work at MoldATSA, but did not explain what her contractual relationship with the Chancellery is. RISE also showed that she had other contracts in 2025 - some with the government or funded by donors in support of government agencies.

What is clear is that her work at MoldATSA was in no way full time. That raises even more questions about the amount she was being paid. How this interacted with her role at the State Chancellery remains an open question.

All of this is made more significant because she immediately resigned and offered to return her bonuses - and because President Sandu called the payments “immoral.”

No version of this looks good and there is a lot we don’t know here. I will be watching this space in particular in the weeks to come.