Unfortunately, drone overflights, crashes and explosions in Moldovan airspace and territory are becoming so frequent and so dangerous that we’ll start highlighting them up front in the newsletter. Here’s this week’s report:

• September 26 (11:16 am) - Drone overflight in-and-out of South Moldova in the Transnistria region.

• September 26 - Drone fragments found on the outskirts of Volintiri, in the Stefan Vodă district. This was not linked to the morning’s overflight and the drone itself appears not to have been reported or detected in flight.

• September 30 (5:40 am) - A drone crashed and exploded in the countryside near the village of Hîrbovăț, Anenii Noi district. The explosion was caught on video by a home security camera. Police reported that the drone hit a large antenna tower 40 m in the air, exploded and scattered debris in a large radius.

• September 30 (10:26 am) - A drone was detected entering Moldovan airspace near the town of Lunga in the Dubasari district in Transnistria. It then turned north and headed towards Soroca, causing airspace closures in the Center and North of the country. Reports indicated that it was a jet powered drone moving at approximately 400 km/hr. It apparently exited the national airspace.

• September 30 (8:45 pm) - A drone crossed into Moldovan airspace in the northernmost part of Transnistria near Rezina. It then turned South and was lost from radar near Brănești, Orhei. Central airspace was closed in the incident and reopened at 9:07 pm. Local residents near Brănești called the police to report an explosion and police found the impact location close to the road connecting Ivancea to Brănești. Traffic was stopped in both directions as debris was cleared and the site was made safe. Tourists to Moldova will know this stretch of road well, as it connects the main North-South highway to Brănești (famous for its wine cellars) and on to Orhei Vechi. Police reported that the drone was a turbojet powered “Geran-type” drone.1

What Are the Authorities Doing About it?

Asked about the government’s response to the massive uptick in drone incursions and explosions, Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii stated that:

“We are in the process of implementing projects that will allow us to equip the National Army with systems capable of shooting down these drones or missiles,”

What this means in terms of strategy or capabilities remains unclear. Previous statements from the Ministry of Defense have indicated that Moldova does have limited tools to shoot down drones but that these are deployed to protect critical infrastructure. They also noted that Russian drone flights may partly be intended to test these capabilities and map them out.

Enter Igor Dodon. In the midst of the multiple incursions and explosions in populated areas on September 30, the former President and leader of the pro-Russian Socialist party posted these 3 photos on his facebook account:

In his post, he revealed the location of the air defense assets and publicly demanded that the government be maximally transparent about where such units are positioned because “people are worried.”

Naturally he is silent on condemning Russia for the drones themselves or the explosions in people’s neighborhoods… apparently, that isn’t worrying to Mr. Dodon.

MD-Alert

The Moldovan government is working to implement an emergency broadcast system called MD-Alert - currently scheduled to be active sometime in 2027. This system would be similar to Romania’s RO-Alert system which uses the cell phone networks to broadcast warnings that quite literally cause your cell phone to blare an alert when drones are in the air nearby2. Radio Europa reports that the National Crisis Management Center is now working with the E-Governance Agency to create a temporary warning module via the EVO app. This should be ready by later this fall.

Other Security & Transnistria Updates

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories related to security and Transnistria:

• Moldova proposes convergence infrastructure. The Ministry of Reintegration announced that it has proposed 2 infrastructure investments for the Transnistria region. These would be a new center for family doctors and social assistance in Bender and a sewage treatment plant in the same city. Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri stated that these would be early investments from the newly created convergence fund and that they have been presented to the Transnistrian “authorities,” who have not yet responded to them.

• Transnistria’s economic crisis continues to deepen. A new study by think tank IDIS Viitorul estimates that 25,000 Transnistrians now work in constitutionally controlled Moldova, primarily in the HoReCa sector. It estimates that their combined annual salaries are approximately $240 million, exceeding the region’s total annual exports of $224 million. The study estimates a 20% contraction in the region’s GDP in 2025 and that the current GDP per capital of the region is less than half that of the rest of Moldova. It highlights a “structural crisis” in the region’s economy and budget and states that:

“The real public policy choice [for Moldova] is not between maintaining the current situation and immediate reintegration, but between a planned adjustment and one imposed by the crisis,”

• New American sanctions against Shor’s A7 network. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the A7 companies as well as subsidiaries as part of “Operation Economic Outcast” targeting “Iran and other adversaries.” To date there has been little to no public indication that Shor’s network is laundering Iranian money, and while much of the announcement focuses on Iran it is clear that the “other adversaries” noted by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is primarily referencing Russia. This is a major action that should stand as a warning to entities in China and other countries that facilitate A7’s work.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• Moldova has a new American Ambassador. President Sandu accepted the credentials from Ambassador Joseph Mark Burkhalter this week alongside 4 other new Ambassadors. These included Turkey, Canada and Saudi Arabia who both have new Ambassadors at Large based in Bucharest, and Algeria, whose Ambassador at Large is based in Kyiv. This marks the first time that Moldova has had an official American Ambassador since Ambassador Logsdon left in June 2024.

• The Romanian political crisis deepens as parliament rejects Siegfried Mureșan’s government. President Nicușor Dan continues to reject calls for an early election and stated that he will announce a new candidate for Prime Minister on October 5 following consultation with the parties. He warned all parties against forming a coalition with the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). The news comes in the same week as an explosive Wall Street Journal story reported that American Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle threatened Greek politicians saying that the US government was involved in the collapse of Romania’s previous government under Ilie Bolojan and that the same thing could happen in Greece.

• Prime Minister Tofan addressed the UN General Assembly. In his speech (which is worth watching in full) he spoke of Moldova’s journey as a small country emerging from the domination of its neighbors to determine its own future. His speech highlighted agency in difficult times saying “Small countries choose neither their geographical location nor their size. But being small does not mean being powerless.” The Prime Minister went on to speak of Moldova’s decision to join the European Union as the country’s national project, saying that:

“For us, joining the European Union does not mean replacing one sphere of influence with another. It means exactly the opposite. It means that our citizens exercise their right to choose. To choose democracy. To choose prosperity. To choose peace.”

He concluded with an address to Moldovan citizens in Romanian saying that while “a hard winter awaits us” people must “stick together” and help those in the most need. He concluded:

“Moldova may never be a great power. But we have everything it takes to be a great country“

Energy & Water Crisis Updates

Here is a roundup of the top stories in Moldova’s dual crises this autumn:

• Outflow from the Novodnistrovsk Reservoir has been reduced to match inflows. Ukraine has announced that the reservoir no longer has reserves and that they are substantially reducing outflows. Already some Ukrainian towns along the river are rationing water according to scheduled on/off basis. Currently the much smaller Dubasari Reservoir has sufficient storage to ensure adequate flows for the Chisinau pump station, but there are questions about whether the pumping station will be able to continue accessing water at the river’s level for much longer. The government has provided the pumping station with more supplementary pumps that reach into deeper sections of the river as a stopgap measure. Moldovan members of the Dniester Commission have criticized Ukraine for taking action unilaterally and abruptly, leading to a rapid drying up of some parts of the river that killed large numbers of fish. The Moldovan government has sought to deflect blame from Ukraine by noting that you cannot negotiate with an empty bucket, but the opposition is seeking to blame water shortages on Ukraine and on Moldova’s government for not being “firm” enough with the Ukrainians. Near Soroca, the river’s level is already catastophically low as you can see in this video from Observatorul de Nord:

• Gas and heating prices spike ahead of winter. The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) approved new prices for centralized thermal heating, raising prices 62% for customers in Chisinau and a 53% in Balti. At the same time, the ANRE set a new natural gas tariff of 26.14 lei / cubic meter starting on October 1. This is a 29% increase on the current price of 20.3 lei / cube, which was itself a jump of 41% on September 1 of the prior price of 14.42 lei / cube. That is a cumulative 81% increase in prices over 2 months. The agency cited skyrocketing natural gas prices for both changes.

• Opposition parties staged a protest outside of ANRE headquarters. Representatives of the MAN party, Socialist and Communist parties, Our Party, PSDE and PPDA parties gathered a crowd with slogans about high prices and “down with PAS” posters. Organizers claimed 500 participants in the protests. PAS representatives responded to ZdG requests for comment by noting that they cannot control global energy prices but that the government is preparing targeted compensation for the hardest hit consumers.

• Moldova to seek long term gas supply contracts. In a major pivot, Prime Minster Tofan announced that the government would seek out long term supply contracts to blunt market instability. He noted that government projections anticipated a market price of $360 per 1000 cubic meters and the actual prices are higher than $1000. He stated that “Wherever the gas is, that’s where we’ll go to find it for Moldova. We’ll go to Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, no matter how difficult it may be” clarifying that “We won’t go to the Russians or Putin, though. All other options need to be considered.” This comes in the context of a reported meeting between Tofan and (former3) Russian oligarch and gas billionaire Igor Makarov to discuss long term contracts. Makarov is a Moldovan citizen, but is sanctioned by Canada. This meeting reportedly followed an introduction by former American official Kurt Volker.

Political Updates - Major Change in LPA Reform

Prime Minister Tofan announced a major shift in direction for the Local Public Administration (LPA) reform, stating that Moldova’s current 32 districts will be replaced by 3 regions - north, center and south. Chisinau, Balti and Gagauzia will retain their status and Taraclia will be reorganized into a level 2 municipality as planned. Under the new plan, public services will remain at the town and village level while the consolidated regions will focus on larger strategic infrastructure projects. The goal of the new plan is to reduce bureaucracy and cut overlapping functions while building smaller more specialized regional teams. The Congress of Local Authorities of Moldova (CALM) called the announcement a “pleasant surprise” but noted that complicated questions of detail will follow.

Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Vasile Tofan wrote an op-ed for Moldova Matters criticizing the planned LPA reform and calling for bolder steps to reduce the number of regions. You can read that article here:

46 MPs Sign a Petition to Impeach Maia Sandu

All opposition MPs signed this bill seeking to suspend President Sandu. The announcement was led by PDCM leader Ion Chicu who was flanked by members of the Socialists, Communists, Our Party, MAN and PPDA. Interestingly, no other party sent their leaders or even senior leadership to the announcement. Speaker Grosu commented on this fact saying:

“They united to overthrow President Maia Sandu. It’s strange that the leaders of these parties didn’t come out either. They must be ashamed of their own initiative. Maybe it’s an order from above and they don’t want to be associated with this order either.“

He went on to note that the doomed initiative was being made in lieu of similar unity in condemning Russian drone attacks or productive proposals around the energy or water crisis.

If you only visit Moldova once, October is the month to do it. This is the country’s biggest month on the cultural calendar, anchored by two major celebrations back to back: Ziua Națională a Vinului (National Wine Day) on October 3-4, and Hramul Orașului Chișinău (Chișinău’s City Day) on October 14. With both celebrations and the wine harvest still wrapping up in the villages, October is Moldova showing off exactly what it’s proud of.

National Wine Day is the big one, and this year is special - it’s the 25th edition. What started as a modest celebration of Moldova’s winemaking has grown into one of the country’s signature national events, drawing well over 100,000 visitors to Great National Assembly Square for two days of tastings, folk performances, and concerts. Moldova has been making wine for thousands of years, and this is the one weekend a year when that heritage is front and center, not just for wineries but for the whole country. If you’ve been putting off a wine country trip, plan it around this weekend.

Two weeks later, Chișinău marks its own patron saint’s day. Hramul Orașului Chișinău falls on the Orthodox feast of Acoperământul Maicii Domnului (the Protection of the Mother of God), and the city treats it as an unofficial birthday - a full day of concerts, craft fairs and family activities centered on the same square that hosted the wine festival two weeks earlier.

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National Wine Day - October 3-4

Great National Assembly Square, Chișinău

Now in its 25th year, National Wine Day brings together more than 110 wineries, including 43 small producers, for what is easily Moldova’s biggest tourism weekend. The centerpiece is the “Tasting Passport” system introduced in 2017, which lets visitors sample wines from across the country in an organized, responsible way - more than 50,000 glasses were poured at the 2024 edition alone.

Saturday, October 3 opens at noon with Wine School masterclasses covering everything from Moldova’s native grape varieties to its sparkling wines, plus a “Peasant’s Courtyard” of traditional crafts and guided tours of the square. The evening brings performances from Lidia Isac & Band, Satoshi and DJ Fox.

Worth building your afternoon around: at 1:00 PM on Saturday, organizers will attempt a Guinness World Record for the world’s largest human grapevine, part of the 25th-anniversary programming. Details on how to join the attempt should be posted closer to the date - worth checking the official site if you want to be part of it rather than just watch.

Sunday, October 4 opens with the “Golden Goblet” awards at 11:30 AM, honoring the country’s best wines, followed by more Wine School sessions and a lineup that includes the National Philharmonic’s Folk Orchestra, a music and dance ensemble from Cahul, and evening sets from Cuibul, Zdob și Zdub, and DJ Fox.

Wine Day isn’t just a Chișinău event - wineries throughout the country hold their own tastings and open houses the same weekend, so if you’d rather skip the crowds in the capital, it’s a good weekend to head out to wine country directly. Program and details here.

Wine Day Around the Country

Ziua Vinului la Vinuri de Comrat - October 3-4

Down in Gagauzia, the historic Vinuri de Comrat winery (founded in 1897) runs its own full-day “Wine Road” experience: five wines tasted across five different locations on the property, from vineyard terraces to 19th-century cellars, plus a visit to a reconstructed Gagauz village and museum. It’s a packaged day trip from Chișinău with round-trip transport included, and a good way to combine Wine Day with a look at Gagauzia’s culture. Tickets and details here.

Ziua Vinului la Cricova - October 3-4

Moldova’s famous underground wine city runs its own National Wine Day celebration alongside the main event in the capital, opening up its cellars - which stretch for kilometers underground - for tastings and tours. More information here.

National Wine Day at Château Vartely - October 3, Orhei

Château Vartely’s own celebration runs from noon with a welcome glass of sparkling wine, tastings of two wines made from indigenous grape varieties, unlimited fresh must, hourly guided cellar tours, a grape-stomping workshop, and an AR light show projected onto the barrels in the cellar. The day winds down with a DJ set and a bonfire, and there’s a traditional Moldovan menu available à la carte if you want to make a full evening of it - the winery’s own hotel is an option too if you’d rather not drive back. Tickets 200-450 lei. Tickets and details here.

Festivalul Vinului - October 3-4, Château Cojușna

About 15 minutes outside Chișinău, Château Cojușna runs a two-day festival with round-trip transport from the city center included in the ticket price, along with a guided cellar tour, six wines to taste, pottery and barrel-making masterclasses, and live music both evenings. Tickets 350-700 lei. Tickets and details here.

Doina Vin - October 3-4, Răzeni

A quieter, smaller-scale option: an 1875 cellar in Răzeni where the winemaker himself leads small-group tours, pours straight from the barrel, and serves a home-cooked Moldovan meal afterward. Visits are by appointment and run about two hours. Tickets 600-1,000 lei per adult. Tickets and details here.

Show Must Go On - October 5, Castel Mimi

Castel Mimi’s own Wine Day celebration runs the following Monday, from 2:00 to 8:30 PM, with unlimited young wine, a folklore show by the Dorurele ensemble, cellar tours, concerts from Felicia Dunaf and Maria Iliuț, a flashmob hora and a DJ set with marshmallow roasting to close out the evening. Organizers ask guests to dress in grape-inspired colors - purple, indigo, dark blue - and wear comfortable shoes. Tickets run 400 lei for adults, with a round-trip train option from Chișinău for 550 lei. Tickets and details here.

Beyond these, expect most of the country’s well-known wineries - Mileștii Mici and the smaller producers around Orheiul Vechi and Ștefan Vodă - to be busy with visitors all month, even outside the festival weekend itself. If you’ve never done an underground cellar tour, October is as good a month as any.

Chișinău City Day (Hramul Orașului) - October 14

Chișinău’s patron saint day falls on the feast of Acoperământul Maicii Domnului and is treated as the city’s unofficial birthday. Expect a full day (usually 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM) centered on Great National Assembly Square and the pedestrian stretch of Ștefan cel Mare Boulevard, with a craftspeople’s fair, thematic exhibitions, children’s workshops, folk performances, and an evening concert featuring Moldovan artists alongside the municipal Camerata Chișinău orchestra. Past editions have also included a flower-laying ceremony at the Ștefan cel Mare monument and headline concerts from acts like Zdob și Zdub - worth checking the municipality’s own announcements closer to the date for the full lineup, as the city sometimes extends the celebration to include October 13 as well. Admission is free. More information here.

Opera, Ballet, and Concerts

The Maria Bieșu International Opera and Ballet Festival, which opened in September, continues into October with a full schedule at the National Opera and Ballet Theatre:

Carmen - October 1

Bizet’s Carmen, one of the festival’s marquee productions. Tickets here.

Nunta lui Figaro (The Marriage of Figaro) - October 4

Mozart’s comic opera, performed in Italian. Tickets here.

Concert de Gală (Gala Concert) - October 11

A gala concert closing out the festival’s main season, featuring guest artists alongside the theatre’s own soloists and orchestra. Tickets here.

Tickets for all performances are also available at the theatre’s iTicket page.

Theater and Comedy

Ferma Animalelor (Animal Farm) - October 4

18:30, Odeon Cultural Center

A stage adaptation of Orwell’s satire on power and manipulation. In Romanian, recommended for ages 16+. Tickets 170-250 lei. Tickets here.

Stand-up Solo - Alexandru Ghețan - October 3

19:30, Tooman Lounge Bar

A solo stand-up set; advance table reservations recommended. Tickets 200 lei. Tickets here.

UNCOVERED - October 6 & 7

18:00, National Theater Mihai Eminescu

The editorial team of CU SENS and the “Mihai Eminescu” National Theater present an originally scripted documentary play about the work of investigative journalists in Moldova. The production is inspired by the work of multiple generations of journalists whose investigations and undercover work have played such a critical role in defending Moldova’s young democracy. Panel discussions follow the shows. Details on facebook, tickets available here.

Film

Badanta - October 1

The feature-film debut of the Comedy Zebra Show, a homegrown Moldovan comedy about family, love, and misadventure - being billed locally as proof that Moldova can do comedy on the big screen. Details here.

Abis - October 3 and 10, 18:00, Cinema Odeon

A Moldovan drama-thriller about past guilt and hidden truths. In Romanian, 90 minutes, recommended for ages 12+. Tickets 120 lei. Tickets here.

Exhibitions

“Satira comentează istoria”

Through October 9, National Museum of History of Moldova

Fifty caricatures by secondary school students tackling power, freedom, and misinformation through satire - a small but worthwhile stop if you’re already at the museum. More information here.

Sports

Chișinău Boxing Night 3 - October 3, Chișinău Arena

A boxing gala headlined by Romic Airapetean vs. Alexandru Ioniță main event, with six additional undercard bouts. Tickets here.

As always, if you know of an event we’ve missed, let us know in the comments. We’ll continue updating our monthly guides to help readers discover the best of Moldova throughout the year.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

Russian violations of Moldovan airspace have massively intensified in both quantity and potential danger to the population. Overflights - where a drone briefly enters and then exits Moldova on its way to a target in Ukraine are becoming a daily occurrence. At the same time, drones that crash and explode in Moldova, or linger for long periods in the country’s airspace, are becoming much more frequent. Here is a roundup of the main violations in the past week:

• September 18 - Explosion in Colonița outside Chisinau. Multiple residents called the police after hearing the explosion at 4:20 am1. While various home security cameras captured the sound and flash (video compilation from the police here), military radars did not track or identify this drone. At 1:00 pm police search teams found debris from the turbojet-powered missile-drone scattered across a 100 m radius.

• September 19 - “Several” drones violated Moldovan airspace from multiple directions. One may have crashed and exploded approximately 1.5 km across the border in Ukraine.

• September 20 - Residents from 2 villages in different parts of the country called police to report drone overflights. Military radars did not record any overflights and they are unconfirmed.

• September 21 - Radars detected drone incursions at 00:17, causing closure of the country’s northern airspace for 24 minutes. The drones returned to Ukraine. In the afternoon another drone overflew Moldovan airspace in the south near Planaca.

• September 24 - Four drones entered Moldova in 2 hours with 2 crashing and exploding. One went down in the village of Cernița, Florești district. It hit a tree and then exploded in a cornfield. The other is believed to have crashed and exploded in Transnistria, but is unconfirmed by their “authorities.”

What’s Happening and What is Being Done About it?

State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Ghenadie Cojocaru gave an interview to answer the public’s questions and concerns about the drones. Asked how the military did not track the drone that crashed in Colonița, very near to Chisinau, he explained that various conditions, including altitude make tracking drones difficult. He noted that the current radar situation is much better than at the start of the war2, but that there are still major gaps. Right now the system is capable of giving decision makers the general situation and allowing for enough warning to protect civilian aircraft (closing airspace, etc).

Asked whether Moldova has the capability to shoot these drones down, he said “partly,” explaining that the army has Man Portable Air Defense (MANPADS), machine guns and Electronic Warfare Systems (EWS). At the same time, numbers are limited and they are organized to protect critical infrastructure systems. Asked what is going on, Cojocaru explained that in the cases where there are long-distance incursions the government suspects that the Russians are probing Moldova’s capabilities.

The STRATCOM center put out a statement explaining that these incursions coincide with waves of disinformation being spread through Kremlin propaganda channels. They seek to foster fear and include messages linking the abandonment of European integration with safety from Russian attack.

Between February 24, 2022 and September 22, 2026, there have been 77 recorded violations of Moldovan airspace. 40 of those occurred in 2026 with 16 cases of crashes resulting in explosions or fires in August and September alone.

Ilan Shor is now Everyone’s “Monster”

This week the FT released an article titled “Kremlin-backed forgery scheme moved $6.9bn through global banks.” It was shortly followed by a NYTimes piece titled “The ‘Monster’ Behind Russia’s Global Effort to Evade Western Sanctions.” This monstrous forgery scheme refers to Ilan Shor’s A7 companies and their growing centrality to Moscow’s sanctions evasion and war financing architecture.

Both investigations are worth reading in full as they shine a light on the growing A7 empire and how it relies much more heavily on shell companies and document forgeries than on crypto. Financial Analyst Zachary Tvarozna, whose articles Moldova Matters has cross-posted on multiple occasions, is cited in the FT piece. He recently dove deeper into his thesis (seemingly proven) that the A7 story is far more about money laundering through traditional banking systems than it is about crypto. Here’s a link:

Evidence of Absence

I May Have Been Early, But I’m Not Wrong

Read more

12 days ago · 2 likes · Zachary Tvarozna

I really suggest subscribing to his Substack.

Here are a few of the top line findings from the FT and NYTimes articles:

• FT: A7 operates via a vast network of shell companies and correspondent bank relationships. They use OpenAI products for mass forgeries of invoices and stamps in order to mask the actual goods being paid for.

• FT: Reports that A7 claims to now manage 1/5th of all Russian foreign transactions, including masked military purchases as well as civilian business.

• FT: Tracked $6.9 billion in money laundering, promissory notes (veksels) worth $20 billion in face value and unspecified “billions” in USDT crypto.

• NYTimes: Tracked more than 4000 transactions in the first half of 2025 totaling more than $500 million with over $130 million in military / industrial purchases.

• NYTimes: Gazprom is routing some energy payments through A7 companies

• NYTimes: Kyrgyzstan was the major hub for sanctions evasion via A7 with Kyrgyz bank profits soaring from $42 million in 2021 to $354 million in 2024. Chinese and European shipments to Kyrgyzstan grew from $8 billion to $23 billion in the same timeframe. Following crackdowns on sanctions evasion in Kyrgyzstan, A7 shifted operations to Bahrain, UAE, Nigeria, Mongolia and others.

• NYTimes: Reported that “hundreds of millions of dollars” from these schemes were funneled through a “nonprofit” (likely Evrazia) to interfere in Moldvoan elections.

The NYTimes notes that A7 has adopted the nevalyashka toy as a mascot. This is a type of traditional Russian doll with a weight at its base that allows it to self-right when knocked over. It symbolizes A7’s resilience to sanctions.

Energy Crisis (Again)

In what is becoming a grim annual tradition, Moldova has slipped into energy crisis and parliament declared a State of Emergency on September 22 lasting 60 days. Prime Minister Tofan stated that the government is reversing course on plans to bring austerity to the energy compensation programs and is now planning to expand on last year’s subsidies to meet the new challenge.

Addressing parliament to ask for a State of Emergency, the Prime Minister stated:

“The problem is that we are entering the cold season with several major risks overlapping at the same time. We have, basically, a perfect storm”

In his speech (which is well worth reading in full simply as a piece of oratory), he identified 4 interconnected risks that the country is facing:

1. Natural Gas - Moldova has contracted 90% of the winter supply but these contracts rely on European TTF market prices which are now skyrocketing due to the “crisis in Hormuz,” damage to Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and attacks on the Ras Laffan LGN facilities in Qatar. Moldova has gas, but the market prices are already 50% higher than consumers’ bills and they are climbing.

2. Diesel - Refineries and production in the Middle East and Russia are damaged or offline. The government has been managing this crisis since August but needs more tools to assure supply.

3. Water - The drought affecting the Dniester and Danube has spilled over from an agricultural problem to a problem of drinking water and energy production. The hydroelectric plant at Costeşti on the Prut is showing 55% reduced output right now. These threats have reduced production in Moldova’s adjacent hydroelectric stations and threatened shutdowns at Romanian and Hungarian nuclear reactors.

4. Ukraine’s Coming Winter - Right now Moldova is still importing electricity from Ukraine. Tofan stated: “According to our assessment, if Ukraine, before the war, had about 70 GW of installed electrical capacity, today the capacity has reached 11-12 GW.” Ukraine supplied 100 MW in August to keep Moldova’s lights on at peak hours. During the winter, Moldova will need 400-450 MW at peak, and Romania can only supply 360 MW. If Russian attacks this winter further degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Moldova will face critical shortfalls.

Prime Minister Tofan concluded stating:

“Here’s the problem. These multiple risks don’t exist separately:
Gas influences district heating and electricity production.
Water influences hydropower.
Electricity keeps the water pumps running.
The situation in Ukraine influences how much electricity we can import.
And diesel influences transportation, agriculture, logistics, and ultimately prices throughout the economy.”

He called on parliament to vote the government emergency powers to manage this “perfect storm” and parliament voted to create the State of Emergency with 54 in support, 20 against and 22 abstentions.

In parallel, Prime Minister Tofan has accelerated the reorganization of state agencies in order to reduce budget expenditures and allocate more resources to household energy subsidies. Each ministry is reviewing its subsidiary agencies with 161 state agencies, with 52,000 total employees, under review. They have set a target of reducing staff by 10-30% by merging institutions and cutting redundancies.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• This week multiple news outlets, including the Washington Post, France24 and Forbidden Stories, reported on the architecture of the American 3rd country deportation network. They investigated cases where individuals were deported to countries to which they had no connection. They found that Moldova accepted 31 deportees, all of whom were “citizens of the former Soviet region” without criminal records who already had visa-free access to Moldova. In the reporting, only 2 countries responded to requests for comment and one was Moldova. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that of those, 27 have already left Moldova while 4 remain - 2 citizens of Georgia and 2 of Russia. One of these has applied for asylum. Moldova has no official agreement with the United States and was not paid in either money or other resources in this effort. Moldova Matters analyzed rumors of an agreement with the United States back in July 2025 when these transfers apparently began:

• Moldova at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). British PM Andy Burnham spoke of the UK’s support for “Moldova in protecting its elections from Russian interference” when he announced plans to create a new “National Information Defence Centre” (similar to Moldova’s STRATCOM). He noted that Russian information attacks are an accelerating problem and cited a $1.7 billion annual budget allocated by the Kremlin to these efforts. Romanian President Nicușor Dan called Moldova the “second country most affected by this war” and promised additional support on Moldova’s path to the EU. Prime Minister Tofan will address UNGA September 26 from 5-6 pm. He has been holding meetings on the sidelines encouraging investment into Moldova and speaking with journalists including a video interview with CNN.

Security / Transnistria

Here’s a roundup of the top security / Transnistria stories of the week:

• Russia opened 16 polling stations in Transnistria during its Duma “elections.” This compared to 3 total polling stations in the United States, 2 in Germany, 7 in Belarus and 7 in Kazakhstan. ZdG reporters who observed the polling places in Tiraspol undercover from a distance reported a large police and military presence along with “several men in civilian clothes, with an athletic build and dark glasses, near the stations.” Each polling station had metal detectors at the entrances and loudspeakers playing Russian patriotic songs. Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the opening of these 16 unsanctioned polling places.

Politics & Elections

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• The Barometer of Public Opinion (BOP) previewed its latest annual poll with sliding approval for Moldova’s direction of travel. 38.2% of respondents stated that the country was on the right track while 56.6% said it was on the wrong track. These numbers were driven in part by growing economic and cost of living anxieties. A majority of Moldovans always consider the country to be on the wrong track, but these numbers show a slide from around 43% right track / 47% wrong track a year ago.

• Parliament has passed the new anti-SLAPP law in the final reading. The law aligns Moldova with EU standards and provides protection for journalists, media organizations, civic activists and others from Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). Under this law, if a court rules a suit was filed abusively the plaintiff could risk significant fines and other penalties. A late amendment by PAS MP Artemie Cătănoi slightly watered down the law by retaining criminal liability for slander (set to be repealed) and delaying the implementation of the law to 12 months from its publication in the official Gazette (it had been planned for January 1, 2027).

The headlines themselves tell a story. In the first, Moldova is caught in the middle of a great power struggle, in the second, in a battle for Europe’s future. In neither, is there any implication that Moldova has any agency, nor that the country might be interested in choosing its own future. A lack of agency is very much a theme of this article.

This article made me furious when I read it and multiple friends wrote to me with similar thoughts. I’ve decide to share my own opinion here in the Perspective section of the newsletter because I think this piece highlights a specific type of sloppy journalism that can do real reputational damage to a small country like Moldova.

The article opens with the line “One gray morning last fall I visited Andrei Morari and Ecaterina Samonii at their home in Chisinau, Moldova’s unassuming capital.” Right away we get the core idea both visually and in text - everything is “gray.”

Mills opens with a discussion over tea with Andrei and Ecaterina about the 2025 Parliamentary Elections that had just taken place 2 days before. They express frustration with the choice between PAS and the Patriotic Bloc and the geopolitical choice between Moscow and Brussels. Ecaterina tells her “There should be a middle for Moldova, just to be Moldova.” In addition to the grayness, this indecision and rejection of the East-West dynamic is a running theme of the article. About their home, Mills writes:

“Their home was scattered with keepsakes, including a small statue of Lenin that Andrei had brought back from Moscow, where he’d lived for a time as a history student.”

I’ll come back to statues of Lenin later, but if you read this article knowing nothing else about Moldova you would assume that they are *everywhere.*

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Andrei Morari and Ecaterina Samonii

Mills opens and closes her essay with this couple and their frustrations about Moldova’s East-West dilemma. They are pictured above alongside the article title. That photo does quite a lot to set the tone of the article - rural, old fashioned clothes, Soviet vibes, etc. When Andrei leaves for work and Mills continues to chat with Ecaterina over tea you get the impression that Andrei is off to work in a tractor factory or something. The “gray” is easily transferred to their lives in the minds of a reader.

That does quite a disservice to the subjects. Ecaterina is a fashion designer who had debuted a new collection 2 months before this interview. Andrei studied TV and film directing and is a passionate photographer. Given this information, we can see that photo above as someone choosing a Soviet Chic style, not someone going off to work in a tractor factory. Very much modern hipsters and not people frozen in time.

I’m able to find out so much about Andrei and Ecaterina because they were 2 of the 4 protagonists of a DW Documentary released in September 2025 called “Moldova’s young people at a crossroads - Between Russia and the EU.” In it Andrei is shown to be pretty cynical (if well informed) about politics. He is from Transnistria but cannot go home because he refused military service, he worries about the cost of living and is considering emigrating to Europe.

This documentary, which explores the same themes as this photo essay, highlights the problematic choices that Mills is making in 2 ways. Firstly, Andrei has very specific reasons to be disillusioned. He has to literally sneak through fields to see his family in Transnistria and discusses not knowing his identity - certainly not Moldova, not really Transnistrian, mostly he considers himself Russian. His concerns are real, but not representative.

Secondly, that documentary focuses on 3 sets of protagonists with different approaches to the challenges in their lives. One is an activist - relentlessly trying to make Moldova live up to her values and expectations. Another is a simple guy with a passion for music - he is a DJ and is trying to introduce his village to a new sound while looking for options to continue living in his home country.

Mills chose to focus on the couple that was deeply disillusioned and planning to emigrate. She also chose not to give us pretty important context about everything from how they dress to what specific (and understandable) experiences formed their worldview.

Wait, Where is Russia?

One of the most startling aspects of this article is what is missing: any discussion of Russia’s hybrid attacks on Moldova or the role the Kremlin plays in this story. The article treats both Russia and Europe as destinations and Moldova as standing (confused) at a fork in the road. She writes about how the “ambiguous” referendum on EU integration suggests a “complex picture,” implying that the country is evenly split. She does this without noting the fact that Russia bribed more than 100,000 voters and spent over $100 million dollars interfering in the 2024 referendum.

Mills interviews a man named Dmitri Ianul in Gagauzia who she identifies as a “teacher and former journalist.” He tells her how the explosions at the Ukrainian port of Reni near his village wake him and his wife up at night. Dmitri is pro-EU but explains that his neighbors are very pro-Russian and they refuse to believe that drones crashing outside of their town are Russian, suggesting that “they were decoys launched by pro-European politicians to justify a national pivot away from Russia.” He tells her that his neighbors plan to leave for Russia if Moldova joins the EU because:

“They worried the bloc would use Moldova as a dumping ground for Europe’s waste and transform the country with L.G.B.T.Q. propaganda and that people would no longer have the right to farm their own land.”

But Mills never asks the question - why? Why might people believe such things? Why might they reject their own experience of drones crashing nearby for narratives about false flags?

Russian influence, information warfare, hybrid attacks - the article never touches on these topics.

Spectators vs Actors

In this telling, Dmitri Ianul is telling a sad and confusing story. His neighbors are unable to see what is right in front of them and this “teacher and former journalist” can only relate how mixed up the world is. We are again given a picture of disillusionment.

But Frankie Mills missed something else that is really important - when his neighbors talk about pro-EU politicians, they are talking about Dmitri Ianul. He is not simply a “teacher and former journalist,” he is an elected politician - a detail this article leaves out entirely.

He is the President of the Cișmichioi Local Council and a prominent pro-EU figure in Gagauzia who actively works to attract EU funding and support to his region and town. Dmitri Ianul is not a spectator, he is an actor. Someone who is fighting to make change in a part of the country subject to the highest bombardment of Russian propaganda. Someone who is trying to rebuild local infrastructure and convince his neighbors about a brighter future that is possible.

Rather than discuss this, or explore why he is such a supporter of the EU in an area with so many pro-Russian voters (and how he keeps getting elected), we move on to a reflection on how everywhere Mills traveled in Moldova, “it was apparent that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine didn’t necessarily make joining the European Union more appealing.”

It is genuinely hard to tell whether Mills was trying to actively downplay pro-European sentiment, or if the whole article is just so pessimistic that she naturally highlights the downsides.

A Country With a “Soviet past”

The article describes Moldova as “Wedged between Romania and Ukraine, with a population of around 2.4 million people and a Soviet past.1” In her telling, Mills leans into that Soviet past hard. She talks about Andrei having a Lenin statue in his house, and then features photos of a giant bust of Lenin and another one of Stalin. Both busts are photographed at the Soviet Open Air Museum and both have dilapidated abandoned buildings in their background. Like all the other photos, the sky is overcast and everything is gray.

Readers without much context will think that Moldova is swimming in statues of Soviet dictators. That could not be further from the truth. Most Lenin statues were long gone when I got here back in 2012. They moved to statue parks or museums or just to the trash. Gagauzia and Transnistria are exceptions, which is why tourists go there for pictures.

I remember in 2013 when a friend of mine in the Peace Corps told me how the Lenin statue in Donduseni was decapitated during the night. The mayor didn’t know what to do with that, and while he hadn’t wanted to remove the statue he certainly didn’t want to pay to have it fixed either. Whether by policy, or vigilante action, Lenin was gone from most of the country long before the war began in 20142.

This is just the most visible of a more subtle decision that you can see across these photos - there is absolutely nothing modern about Moldova. Not buildings, not cars, not people. Frankie Mills chooses to give us a photo of 2 young people who want the country to join the EU. Here is who she selected:

With all respect to Stefan and Dumitru and their sartorial choices, this is not a representative look in Moldova post 1999. Finding 2 kids who chose to dress like a 90’s gopnik was a choice Mills made. If you went down the road in Chisinau looking for a pro-EU voter you would have to talk to hundreds, maybe thousands of people before finding this outfit.

Working Backwards

The article is part of a series for the Times call “The New World Disorder” which purports to be a “series exploring the disintegration of the postwar international system and how countries are adjusting as America steps aside.”

Now, readers can feel free to disagree with me, but I didn’t see anything like that in this article. How countries are adjusting implies agency and decision making. This article spent much more time talking to elderly teachers sadly putting pins in maps to indicate where their students emigrated to.

On her website, Frankie Mills states that she tells “stories about displacement” and that she is “interested in exile; especially how people create a sense of belonging and meaning when in limbo.” That tracks well with this story. She focuses on Ecaterina and Andrei because they speak a lot about displacement. Recounting her conversation with Ecaterina, Mills writes:

“We talked about the complications of navigating everyday life in a country with two widely spoken languages, Romanian and Russian, and the isolation felt by those who speak just one.”

It’s worth noting here that “those who speak just one” refers almost exclusively to Russian speakers who chose not to learn Romanian. Meanwhile, all Romanian speakers also know Russian3 - a minority language that is not the national language.

This is a very human portrayal of Ecaterina and her sense of dislocation. That is a personal story - but it is not Moldova’s story.

I think that is my main frustration with this essay. Nothing in this story is outright false - the NYTimes fact checkers did their jobs - but it is absolutely not sharing useful information with readers about Moldova in 2026. It shares a narrow set of stories, often without important context, and paints an exceptionally bleak picture against a backdrop of gray skies and statues of Soviet dictators.

It’s like a photo essay of a small town in Appalachia focused on poverty and the opioid crisis - except that 99% of the readers have literally no other images in their mind of America. In such a case, you aren’t painting a picture of that town, you are telling the world about a country, and you are doing a disservice to the readers if you don’t know that.

Geopolitically, this article fundamentally mistakes the choice that it sets out to explore. We are given the impression of Moldovans standing at a fork in the road leading to 2 different destinations - Moscow and Brussels. But Moscow is not a destination - Moscow is actively trying to come here4. Russia is spending hundreds of millions of dollars trying to capture Moldovan politics while spending billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives trying to conquer Ukraine. Should they succeed at that, only a fool believes they would stop at the Dniester river.

Finally, the overwhelming “gray.” The picture being painted here is bleak and I have to believe that is intentional. Again and again this essay introduces characters and places that are gray and one dimensional. It lets the reader fill in the blanks and see the “post-Soviet” hellhole that their stereotypes will easily plug into this content. But Ecaterina is a fashion designer with some really cool work to show off. This country is full of color and energy. People here talk about the future and every year things improve - better roads, better restaurants, better parks and places to spend time with family and friends. Sometimes the government makes things better, as often, improvements come in spite of their efforts. Moldova is complicated but fundamentally focused on the future.

To conclude, here are some pictures I took in September 2025. I’m providing them to prove that in Moldova the sun does shine from time to time. I live in a village and I did not find people despairing about the future, nor were there statues of Lenin or Stalin anywhere to be seen. People made wine and went fishing. In Chisinau people went to trendy cafes and walked along modern streets and through beautiful parks.

Most importantly, the sun shone brightly.

I’m not saying that there aren’t gray days and people who are pessimistic. I am saying that this article did a terrible job of painting a picture of a whole nation.

Last week, we wrote about how an overflight by a Russian missile-drone caused the diversion of 7 planes in Moldova. Of those, 3 were held on the ground at Chisinau’s Eugen Doga International Airport, 3 were diverted to holding patterns in the air and one diverted to Iași for an unscheduled landing.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s plane was among those which were delayed in this incident. At the time, he was flying from Chisinau to Oslo to attend the funeral of Norway’s King Harald V. Zelenskyy has been using Chisinau for flight transit since early June when a diplomatic spat between Ukraine and Poland caused substantial tensions between the countries1.

On September 9, Euronews reported that Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store stated that:

"His [Zelenskyy’s] flight was almost hit by a drone when it was taking off from Moldova. That is the reality he lives in,"

Some outlets like Euronews reported this statement as fact, while others such as CNN more cooly noted that a “Russian drone incursion delayed Zelensky’s departure from Moldova.” Official statements from the Moldovan Presidency and Government confirmed this characterization, explaining that the drone overflight and eventual crash more than 160 km from Chisinau caused flight delays which impacted President Zelenskyy’s itinerary .

Not (Necessarily) Targeted, but Not a Coincidence

Immediately after the event, Moldova’s Ambassador to the United States characterized the incident as “not an accident,” telling CNN:

“We do not believe in jet propelled drones just flying into Moldova’s territory for surveillance purposes while [the] Ukrainian president’s airplane is on the ground at the airport,”

In an interview with CBS News, released on September 15, Zelenskyy himself seemed to confirm this characterization, saying:

"In Moldova, my presidential jet was there, and that's why they attacked Moldova,"

In the interview, President Zelenskyy clarified that by “attacked” he was referring to an airspace incursion, and that he was not sure he himself was targeted. In a back and forth with the interviewer he implied that the aim was intimidation2. Zelenskyy also stated that when he returned to Moldova a few days later another drone entered Moldovan airspace at the same time - an incursion that CBS stated had not previously been reported3.

A Pattern of Escalation

As we’ve written before, this comes in the context of a huge spike in drone incursions and explosive crashes in Moldova - a situation that is not unique to Moldova. Russia recently targeted a train near the Poland-Ukraine border at the same time as various dignitaries, including former CIA director David Petraeus and former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, passed through. NATO air patrols have been shooting down drones entering alliance airspace with increasing regularity.

In Moldova, it is clear that some of these attacks are targeted at ports of entry. Russia has sought to justify recent strikes on the Tudora-Starokazache crossing saying that they were targeting weapons transfers to Ukraine. Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called these accusations “false,” saying that “No weapons are transported to Ukraine through the territory of the Republic of Moldova” and noting that only “People pass through these points - families, children, mothers and the elderly, who travel between the two countries.” Recall that this attack killed 2 Ukrainian civilians and wounded one Moldovan.

Drone incursions and attacks on border infrastructure are becoming more brazen, whether or not there were attempts to target President Zelenskyy directly.

Other Security News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security and Transnistria stories of the week:

• Russian Ambassador Designate4 Oleg Ozerov disputed the recent report on Cobasna. He suggested that the report was of “highly questionable quality” and that even (unnamed) “Western experts” disputed its findings. Ozerov suggested that the efforts made by SIS and Moldovan Army Intelligence to disprove decades old narratives about the stockpile are designed “to pave the way for a military solution to the Transnistria problem.” In case you missed my 2 part investigation on this topic you can find it here:

• Anthropic’s September 2026 “Detecting and countering misuse of AI” report mentioned Moldova 16 times. The report detailed how Claude was used by various Russian propagandists to facilitate multi-language disinformation and create “false verification loops” whereby disinformation appeared in multiple places and languages. This allowed various spreaders of this disinformation to cite multiple sources for the same lies. These reports were only a small subset of the global Russian disinformation and cyberwarfare campaign outlined across the report.

• “Protestors” have gathered at the “border” checkpoints in Tighina (Bender) to protest against taxes levied on Transnistrian businesses. According to Transnistrian state TV, they included 300 “representatives of Transnistrian public organizations and labor collectives.” The same group with the same signs first appeared on September 10 to protest outside of the Joint Control Commission during the visit of the new OSCE Ambassador Christopher W. Smith. They then moved to the “border” points on September 15 and 16. Promo-LEX lawyer Vadim Vieru told Newsmaker that these protests are not real and are organized by the local “authorities,” noting that if anyone protests anything in Tiraspol they are arrested for extremism.

Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• Prime Minister Tofan announces major “managerial rotation.” The director of the National Health Insurance Company (CNAM) was moved to the role of director of Public Property Agency (APP), the director of the Republican Clinical Hospital “Timofei Moșneaga” became the director of CNAM, the director of the National Social Insurance Company (CNAS) will become the director of the State Tax Service (SFS), the outgoing director of the SFS will remain as deputy. Interestingly, the former ANSA director (and Minister of Agriculture for 3 days) Radu Musteață will take over the Agricultural Intervention and Payments Agency (AIPA). Tofan stated that “manager rotation is a practice used in developed countries” when describing the highly unusual moves5.

• Tofan announces “Moldova Project” National Infrastructure Development Office. This new entity will be tasked with overseeing implementation of major strategic projects. It will be headed by Mircea Eşanu, who is leaving the Public Services Agency (ASP) after a 5 year tenure where he led successful modernization and digitization efforts there. He will lead a team of 26 in the new office within the State Chancellery. The Prime Minister explained that responsibility for large projects is spread across too many structures with too few specialists - leading to slow implementation. He stated:

“Moldova needs major projects, and they need to be implemented quickly, not years later. For over a decade, we’ve been talking about modern regional hospitals in Bălți and Cahul, irrigation projects in the south, an airport in the north, and transport infrastructure. The modern prison project in Chisinau began back in 2013, and it still hasn’t been completed. And these are not the only examples,” (…)

“We want to build a small but very strong team: engineers, project managers, procurement and tender specialists, contract management, finance and legal experts. We’re looking to the experience of countries like Lithuania, Ireland and Montenegro,”

• Parliament appointed 2 new committee chairs. MP Marcel Spatari became the Chairman of the Committee on Economy, Budget and Finance while Adrian Băluțel took over his role as Chair of the Commission for European Integration.

• Reports of “intense and coordinated activity” across social media targeting the Gagauzia elections. Analysis from Stopfals.md outlined a ramping up of pro-Kremlin propaganda painting a picture of “Gagauzia on the brink of conflict.” Narratives focus on how Chisinau is trying to “take control” of the autonomy as well as stoking traditional fears of union with Romania6. With the election campaign only getting started, we should expect serious hybrid attacks and interference over the next months.

• Prime Minister Tofan unveiled a major deregulation and debureaucratization package aimed at cutting red tape for businesses. The plan touches roughly 100 pieces of legislation and targets duplicate permits, repetitive inspections and outdated procedural requirements. At the same time, the government insists that health, safety, environmental and consumer protections will remain robust. On the enforcement side, the government wants to move toward risk-based, more predictable inspections after entrepreneurs flagged unannounced tax audits and disproportionate penalties as top complaints in a public consultation that drew over 200 submissions. The package is now in final review at the Justice Ministry and the National Anti-Corruption Center before heading to parliament.

Economics & Infrastructure

Here is a roundup of the top economic and infrastructure news of the week:

• Fuel prices continue to rise as crisis in the Middle East deepens. Gasoline hit a price of 33.67 lei / L (42% higher than February) while diesel hit an all time high of 35.53 lei / L (74% higher than February). The National Energy Regulation Agency (ANRE) cited Houthi advances and strikes on Saudi infrastructure as the drivers of price increases, calling it “an atypical situation, generated entirely by external factors.” Alternative Bloc MP Ion Chicu agreed, saying that the country needs to prepare for 40 lei fuel since the “situation in the Middle East won’t end anytime soon.” He stated:

“There’s a shortage of diesel fuel on international markets. I hope the government has a plan to ensure the country has diesel fuel. As for the price, that’s beyond our control,7”

• The government approved a bill on restructuring Moldovan Railways (CFM). The proposed bill would break the company into Moldovan Railway “Passengers and Freight” and CFM Infra. The first company would do exactly as the name implies, while CFM Infra will manage the rails and infrastructure. Neither company is being privatized. The restructuring is being done according to EU norms with the goal is inviting competition into the system, where new entrants would pay for the right to use infrastructure without being blocked by a national monopoly. The restructuring will be completed by the end of the year.

• The National Bank has raised the base rate by 1.5% to 9%. They cited inflationary pressures and “geopolitical uncertainties,” and estimate a 6.96% inflation rate for August 2026. Executive Director of the think-tank Expert-Grup, Adrian Lupușor, projected a “period of stagflation” that may stabilize in the second half of 2027.

• Prime Minister Tofan has stated that airport expansion “must begin in October at the latest.” In an announcement on facebook, the Prime Minister stated that “The good news is that we have over 6 million passengers, the number has doubled in two years. The bad news is that, effectively, we can no longer cope.” He stated that temporary measures including extra seating and mobile food and coffee points will be arranged in the short term. At the same time, he stressed the need to move forward with the planned terminal expansion as son as possible. The massive number of Hasidic pilgrims heading to Uman makes September a particularly challenging month for the airport’s infrastructure, but passenger traffic has grown steadily over the last few years driven largely by Ukrainian transit.

• The Novodnistrovsk reservoir is still in trouble. The water inflow at the Ukrainian reservoir averaged 22.7 cubic meters per second in the first half of September, but with steady and daily declines. Meanwhile, the outflow has been maintained at 60 cubic meters per second. On September 14 the Dnister Commission met and Ukrainian representatives recommended reducing outflows to match inflows. Moldova did not agree and the meeting broke up inconclusively with a plan to reconvene in the coming days. Minister of the Environment Gheorghe Hajder stated that neither Moldova nor Ukraine is at fault here noting that “This is the effect of climate change.” He also noted that “We cannot negotiate something that is not there.” Major reductions in outflow risk the water supply to Chisinau and many other towns, as well as agricultural irrigation across the eastern half of the country.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of Moldova’s top international affairs stories of the week:

• Romanian President Nicusor Dan nominates MEP Siegfried Mureșan for Prime Minister. Mureșan is supported by the Save Romania Union (USR), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). That is not a parliamentary majority so he will need to try and build bridges with other parties to break Romania’s political stalemate. Siegfried Mureșan is an MEP and Vice Chairman of the EPP as well as the EPP group in the EU Parliament. He is one of the strongest voices in Europe supporting Moldova’s EU accession and for sustained support for Moldova.

• The US Embassy held an event to commemorate the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the 25th anniversary. President Maia Sandu, Prime Minister Tofan and Speaker Grosu attended the event. Speaking at the event, President Sandu stated:

“We reaffirm a simple belief that unites our nations: terror and totalitarianism can take lives, but they cannot defeat the freely expressed will of the people. (…) Terrorism, extremism and authoritarianism take different forms. But they all share the belief that fear and force can defeat human freedom. September 11 showed us something else. It showed us extraordinary courage in the face of terror. It showed us the power of solidarity. And it reminded us that free societies are strongest when they are united,”

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Moldovan Border Hit with Drone Attack

Last night Russian drones attacked and struck the Tudora-Starokazache border crossing point with Ukraine. An alert at 11:35 pm triggered the evacuation of the border crossing and Moldovan border police reported hearing explosions around 5 minutes later.

Of 3 drones apparently targeting the checkpoint, one struck it while 2 more crashed nearby. The Ukrainian authorities report 2 Ukrainian civilians were killed and 2 more people injured, one of whom was a Moldovan bus driver. He was returning with an empty bus after transporting Hasidic pilgrims to the Ukrainian city of Uman ahead of Rosh Hashanah. His injuries were light and he returned home that evening.

Prime Minister Tofan noted at a government meeting that the 2 civilians killed at the border needed to be identified via forensic analysis because the bodies were unidentifiable. Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the incidents while also conveying “sincere condolences to the families of the deceased and a speedy recovery to the injured.”

This is now the 3rd recent incident where a drone strike was apparently directly targeting Moldovan - Ukrainian border crossing infrastructure.

7 Planes Diverted in Drone Incident

On the same day, September 8, the Moldovan Army detected a drone entering the country’s airspace at 4:20 pm. The turbojet-powered “missile drone” initially headed towards Chisinau before skirting the city to the north and then crossing into Romania after flying over a town near Ungheni. The drone then returned to Moldova from the direction of Iași and headed north before crashing and exploding in a field near the town of Mihăilenii Vechi, Rîșcani.

Observers compared it to a Shahed-type drone and police confirmed it used a turbojet engine, likely making this a newer Geran-4 or similar. During the incident, Moldovan airspace was temporarily restricted and 7 planes were diverted. 3 were held on the ground at Chisinau’s Eugen Doga International Airport, 3 were diverted to holding patterns in the air, and one diverted to Iași for an unscheduled landing, apparently by the decision of the captain.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) analyzed this incident in the context of Russia testing Moldova’s air defense capability and NATO’s eastern defense posture. They mapped out the drone flight with the timeline clearly showing how much more quickly the situation unfolds with jet-powered drones.

These incidents are part of a clearly escalating series of airspace incursions that show signs of being deliberate. Since the last weekly roundup, which itself led with a section called “Lots of Drones This Week,” there was a drone incursion and separate crash in Romania near the border on August 24, 5 drone incursions to mark Moldovan independence day on August 27 and a drone incursion on August 30.

Taken together, there were 17 airspace incursions in August alone, more than in the entirety of 2025.

Other Security News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security stories of the past weeks:

• Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration has begun what he promises will be regular direct addresses to Transnistrian residents. In a video message, Deputy PM Valeriu Chiveri spoke in Russian to the region’s residents calling reintegration “a process that can no longer be stopped.” He stated that the government feels it is essential to regularly inform them about steps being taken and to dispel false narratives being spread by their “leaders.”

• Russia will illegally open 16 polling stations in Transnistria for the upcoming Duma elections. They will also open 1 polling station in Chisinau at the Russian embassy. No polling stations in Transnistria were authorized by the Moldovan government, leading to a formal diplomatic protest.

• The Moldovan authorities arrested a 49 year old Azerbaijani man under charges of spying for Russia. They allege that the man was gathering photos and information about military targets in Moldova, as well as American facilities in the country, and forwarding them to his handlers in the FSB. They also allege that he was preparing for acts of sabotage against installations in Moldova and Ukraine.

• Russia’s FSB announced the arrest of a Moldovan citizen who attempted to assassinate a Russian general. They showed video of 21 year old Nicolae Cociu, allegedly confessing to being recruited by the Ukrainian security services to conduct the assassination in exchange for $70,000. Separate reports indicate that the target was Major General Nikolai Varpakhovich who was shot 6 times in a village outside of Engels but survived. He was responsible for organizing and ordering the air attack on a children’s hospital in Kyiv in July 2024 that killed 2 and injured 32. Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that they have heard no official communication from Russia on the incident.

International Affairs & EU Integration

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs and European Integration stories of the week:

• European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated that Moldova and Ukraine have met the conditions to open all negotiating clusters. She noted that once again progress is being blocked by Hungary, but expressed hope that the remaining clusters could be opened by the end of the year.

• American diplomat Christopher Smith is the new head of the OSCE mission to Moldova. He is a career diplomat who previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, and before that as the Deputy Chief of Mission at US Embassy Kyiv from 2022-2023. On arrival, Ambassador Smith met with President Sandu and Prime Minister Tofan to discuss the security situation and Transnistria.

• Moldova abstained in the recent UN vote on right-sizing the world’s maps1. The proposal would replace the Mercator projection with the Equal Earth projection, which more accurately shows the size of land masses in relation to each other. The vote was supported by 164 countries and opposed only by the United States2. Moldova was one of 6 countries that abstained, joining Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine in protest against the reference map showing Crimea as a separate entity. Georgia also abstained without giving a reason and Serbia abstained in protest of the map showing Kosovo.

Tax Reform Moves to Parliament

On September 8 the government voted to approve a proposed tax reform bill and will send it to parliament for consideration. This bill incorporates amendments to the original bill that was presented on August 6. The new proposal marks a substantially more conservative bill than the one that made waves over the summer3, but will still substantially reshape the country’s system of taxation. It estimates 5.1 billion lei4 in new revenue, with 820 million coming from income tax, 1.6 billion from VAT and 2.7 billion from excise duties. Most provisions will come into effect on January 1, 2027 with the exception of VAT duties on parcels which will come into effect on October 1.

While the summer’s reform attempted to move most VAT categories to a standard 20%, this bill takes a far more moderate approach. Restaurants and HORECA will go from 8% to 12% and most socially necessary food products will remain at 8%. Energy will not change until April of 2027 and the current tax rates will remain for the first 100 kW of electricity and 150 cubic meters of natural gas used by a household. After that, rates will go up to 20%. Plans around dividends and reinvested profits will remain, with new provisions designed to encourage investment in the business sector.

The government backtracked on a plan to increase the VAT on feminine hygiene products from 8% to 20%, with Prime Minister Tofan saying:

“It was a wrong decision. We are correcting it, as Minister Belous announced. Hygiene products will remain at the reduced VAT rate. Thank you to everyone who drew attention to this issue. Governance also means promptly recognizing when a decision is not good and fixing things.”

The majority of the increases though are from “sin taxes,” with new excise taxes on non-alcoholic sugary drinks, energy drinks and fireworks. Excise taxes on tobacco will increase by 20% in 2027 and then 15% in both 2028 and 2029.

We’ll continue to watch this bill as it moves to parliament and is debated there.

Other Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the other top political stories of the last 2 weeks:

• Gagauzia votes on November 15. Moldova’s Central Election Commission (CEC) has determined that elections for both the People’s Assembly and Bashkan will be held on that date. Once the People’s Assembly declared the Bashkan’s seat as vacant on August 17 that triggered a legal ticking clock that required elections to be set. The People’s Assembly then failed multiple times to set a date, which triggered legislation forcing the CEC to intervene and set the date. Thus, after almost a year of impasse the autonomy has an election scheduled.

• Alexandr Stoianoglo announced that he will run for Bashkan as an independent. The former Socialist-backed presidential candidate stated that he will suspend his activity as an MP during the campaign and plans to present a full program of governance at a later date. Stoianoglo got 97.4% of the votes in the autonomy during the second round of the 2024 presidential elections. This election will be the first where the Bashkan is required to speak Romanian, which is not an issue for Stoianoglo but may limit the field otherwise.

• Moldova marked Romanian language day on August 31. This year marked 37 years since the Supreme Soviet of the MSSR established Romanian as the state language and returned the Latin script. It was marked by the Great National Dictation as well as speeches on the importance of language and history. President Sandu stated:

“Our parents and grandparents continued to speak it even in the most difficult times, despite prohibitions and humiliations. Thanks to them, the Romanian language has survived on this piece of land.
Today we can speak it freely, without fear. Even more so, we have a duty to take care of it. And, above all, to transmit to our children the love for the Romanian language, just as we received it from those before us. Let us leave them this precious legacy: a living language, spoken beautifully, in which to tell their stories, sing their doinas and express their longing.
Happy birthday, Romanian language!”

• Prime Minister Tofan announced a government reshuffle. Eugeniu Osmochescu was moved from the office of Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Development and Digitization5 to the role of Minister of Agriculture. In his place, Claudiu Năsui became the new Minister of Economy. Minister Năsui is Romanian and had been serving as a Romanian MP with the Party USR. He was formerly Romania’s Minister of Economy from 2020-2021. He had never been to Moldova before being invited to be a minister, and was made a citizen by President Sandu on August 25. Like Vasile Tofan, Năsui is a well-known admirer of Javier Milei and is committed to liberal reforms aimed at shrinking the size of the state.

• Mayor Ceban is working remotely and plans to see the city from a new perspective. He explained that while he recovers from surgery, he is attending meetings online, but that he will soon be getting out and about in a wheelchair and evaluating the city from the perspective of mobility issues. He has continued to dodge questions about how he broke both of his feet.

• Parliament has extended by 30 days the Commission of Inquiry looking into the management of state-owned companies. Commission Chair Dinu Plîngău called the situation with these companies “serious” and explained that more time is needed to understand the full situation and come up with proposals. He noted that it isn’t even clear how many companies the state owns, with records for 1359 registered since independence, but mixed records now. The State Register of Legal Entities lists 515, but of those 323 have no IDNO6. Meanwhile, the Public Property Register lists 163 companies while the State Fiscal Register lists 609. Plîngău has stated that they are focusing on the risk that board seats on these companies have turned into compensation tools rather than real management bodies.

• Parliament passed the Restart in Education reform in the second reading. The reform moves primary and secondary schools under the direct control of the Ministry of Education via the newly established Territorial Education Agencies. The plan is to establish national norms and standards and to centrally control funding so that rural schools don’t get left behind. The changes will come into effect on January 1, 2027.

• Prime Minister Tofan swam the Bosphorus with his son. He had previously said that while he was skipping August vacation to work, he needed to keep his promise to his son and swim alongside him. Tofan explained that his 14 year old son swam faster than him and that he is returning to Chisinau "with his batteries charged and his heart full."

Moldova Celebrates 35 Years

On August 27 Moldova celebrated 35 years of independence. The country observed the holiday with the largest independence celebration in the nation’s history under the tagline “Independence Unites Us.”

President Sandu addressed a message to citizens where she recognized the efforts of those who created an independent country and called on citizens to do their duty to help the nation develop. She stated:

"Independence is not about being the same, independence does not require us to be identical, but to be free together. Our direction is common - towards the European Union. Because there identity is respected, not controlled,"

The President also highlighted the importance of protecting democracy, saying “Our nation never wants to live in a prison country again.”

The day was marked by a series of events including a solemn gathering at the hall in the presidency where the declaration of independence was signed. This was attended by living signatories, members of parliament and the government, and international guests.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled to Chisinau for the celebration and held a joint press conference with President Sandu, who gave a speech saying:

“The fact that today, on Independence Day, you are both here, in Chisinau, has a special significance for us.

35 years ago, this week in August, the map of our region was changing. Romania was only 20 months after the revolution. On August 24, Ukraine proclaimed its independence. Three days later, Moldovans, young and old, gathered in the Great National Assembly Square and demanded the independence of the Republic of Moldova, and the Parliament voted for it on the same day.

We were three poor countries, on the edge of Europe, with ruined economies and an uncertain future. And today, three European states, we sit at the same table. Respected in Europe and in the world. (…)

Independence means having light and warmth in your home, no matter what is decided in Moscow. Selling your products where you and your work are respected. Choosing your own friends and path. Being treated as a partner, having a say. And deciding, by voting, who runs the country.

Independence means being able to choose. Friends, allies, the path.

You are given only one thing from the beginning: your neighbors. And the Republic of Moldova was lucky.”

Independence Day Military Parade

Over 2000 military personnel marched in central Chisinau alongside veterans and around 100 military vehicles. On social media President Sandu wrote that “A peaceful Moldova needs a Moldova capable of defending its peace” and stated that the army has modernized, broken from Soviet standards and that the country “can be proud of those who make sure we are safe.” In addition to Moldovan troops, honor guards from Ukraine, Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, France, the Czech Republic and the United States joined the parade with the President writing that “their presence reminded us that we are stronger when we are not alone.”

In the evening, Presidents Sandu, Dan and Zelenskyy addressed the crowd at the Great National Assembly Square and spoke of Moldova and Ukraine’s future in Europe. President Zelenskyy addressed the crowd in Romanian, Ukrainian and English. He stated:

“Moldova has been through a lot in these 35 years and you have shown that Moldova is a strong nation, and without a doubt: a wonderful country. You are a wonderful people, a European nation. And I am sure that, united, we will all be part of Europe, a free and peaceful Europe – which matters most to our people, and we value human life in the same way. We want to live with dignity, in our own countries. We want to remain European countries.”

You can watch the full speech here:

Reflecting on 35 Years of Independence

35 years ago Moldova was one of many nations to declare independence and break away from the Soviet Union. Now, as Vladimir Putin seeks to rebuild the Russian Empire as a new “Prison of Nations,” the stakes of independence are starkly clear.

On August 27 five Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace in an action that can only be understood as a threat against that very independence. The country’s independence from Russia stood in clear contrast to what Moldova’s citizens have chosen to use their independence for - a choice for Europe, for democracy, for their native language and alphabet, for Peace.

On August 24 Ukraine celebrated its 35th anniversary of independence. On that day, Moldova’s parliament was lit up with the Ukrainian flag and President Sandu traveled to Kyiv to mark the occasion. There, she was decorated by President Zelenskyy with the Order of Princess Olga (1st degree), one of the nation’s highest state awards. She accepted this “on behalf of the people of the Republic of Moldova. In the first days of the war, families in our country opened their doors and hearts to women and children fleeing the bombs. This is their merit.”

In turn, President Sandu awarded President Zelenskyy with the Order of the Republic, Moldova’s highest state decoration. She did so to mark “his enormous contribution to protecting peace and freedom on the European continent,” noting that Ukraine fights so that Moldova can sleep peacefully.

Today Moldova and Ukraine are closer than at any time in history. The nations’ security and European futures are deeply interconnected, as are their pasts. As Russia seeks to erase both the common history and the countries’ future aspirations, it is a good time to sit and reflect on just how precious independence is.

Today we’re going to go through a quick roundup of the other top stories of the week. Then, Moldova Matters is going to take week off as I go on vacation for a spell. We’ll be back in September.

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NYTimes Investigation Highlights Moldova

On August 14, the New York Times published an investigation into Russian hybrid attacks against Moldova and the attempts to subvert the 2024 and 2025 elections. Longtime readers of Moldova Matters (or of the Moldovan press) will find very little new here, but the article is a good read and has a few sections that genuinely landed as a surprise for readers who have not followed Moldova. In one such example, the article cites multiple Western intelligence officials claiming that Putin briefed Russia’s top leadership that their goal in 2026 is “the collapse of NATO and the E.U. from within.” The article went on:

“Moldova is central to this effort. In the hierarchy of Kremlin priorities, the Western intelligence officials say, conquering Ukraine is first, and taking control in Moldova is second.”

The article noted that Putin has not given up on capturing Odesa and creating a land bridge to Moldova.

While it is unclear whether or not Moldova is central to Russia’s plans to collapse NATO, it has been abundantly clear from Chisinau that Moldova is central to Russia’s plan to do something. The Odesa line shows once again the mismatch between Russian capability and intention - but this article is a good reminder to the world that those intentions remain.

Lots of Drones This Week

As Ukraine suffers intense bombardment, including with new “missile drones,” Moldova has seen a major increase in crashes and overflights. On August 16, a drone flew through Moldova into Romania before being shot down by a Spanish F-18 around 24 miles north of Galati.

On August 17, a drone crashed and exploded outside the village of Talmaza in Ștefan Vodă. It happened in a corn field and left a crater with a 2 m diameter and a depth of 50 cm and threw wreckage in a spread of 45 m x 20 m. Based on the small turbojet engine found at the scene this was identified as one of the new missile drones, possibly a Geran-4.

August 20, saw one drone overflight, with the drone leaving Moldovan airspace and returning to Ukraine. It also saw one strike at a truck stop in Ukraine 150 m from the Giurgiulesti-Reni border crossing with Moldova. This second strike caused a brushfire which spread into Moldova but was quickly contained by fire fighters. In the morning, a mobile border patrol team found a crater and drone fragments in a field 1 km inside Moldova in the vicinity of the same border crossing point.

Then, August 21, a drone struck the Ukrainian side of the Myrne-Tabaki border crossing checkpoint, which is also in Southwestern Moldova. It damaged border crossing facilities 300 m from the border with Moldova.

Another missile drone crossed in and out of the airspace this morning.

Russia’s increased use of missile drones and ballistic missiles, combined with Ukraine’s depleting stock of Patriot interceptors, has made August a difficult month in Ukraine. The spillover into Moldova, whether accidental or not, also marks an escalation of the conflict along the southern border.

Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top political stories of the week:

• The Bashkan seat is vacant. That was the decision of the Gagauzia People’s Assembly on August 17 following the Court of Appeals ruling against former Bashkan Evghenia Gutsul. When residents of Gagauzia go to the polls on November 15 they may be voting for both delegate to the the People’s Assembly as well as the Bashkan - making this the biggest electoral test of the government’s' efforts to combat the Shor network in 2026.

• Mayor Ion Ceban had an accident while on vacation (somewhere). Chisinau’s mayor posted on his facebook page August 15 writing that he was returning to Moldova following an “unpleasant incident” while on a short vacation with his family. Once back home, he will immediately undergo surgery on his legs. Rumors of a drunken fall as well as pictures allegedly showing him in the airport in London (or on some fancy island) swirled around the internet. Ceban rejected the rumors but did not mention how he was injured or where he was traveling. He later posted a picture stating that a 7 hour surgery went well and thanking the doctors. Mayor Ceban has consistently been secretive around his travels, with a notorious case of lying about being in Moscow on February 24, 2022. In addition to the rumors of his injury, much of the coverage of this incident has focused on how he and his family have afforded such vacations on the mayor’s official salary.

• Teachers protest as the government punts on salary increases for public sector workers. Teachers and other public sector workers had been promised a wage increase from September 1, but the government now says that this was tied to the passage of a tax reform bill that stalled over the summer. Prime Minister Tofan and Minister of Education Dan Perciun both went to speak to the protestors and promised solutions. Later, they announced a one-time 4,000 lei payment for most teachers who earn less than 20,000 lei a month in October. This payment is meant to be a bridge to full salary increases that are now scheduled for January 1, 2027. The Prime Minister announced that the new wage law should see an increase of 15-25% for most public sector workers while gradually narrowing the wage gap from lowest to highest paid in institutions from 1:15 to 1:10.5.

• The Novodnistrovsk reservoir on the Dniester water continues to drain. On August 16 the inflow rate had fallen to 23 cubic meters / second while the outflow rate is being held at 75. This means that the reservoir is in serious decline and the Ministry of the Environment has continued to call for all households to implement water-saving measures.

• The Vulcănești – Chișinău power line’s commissioning has been postponed again. Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu stated that a fault was found in a transformer, and it needed to be shipped back to the manufacturer in Spain for repairs1. While it appears to be a standard manufacturing fault, this does mark the first specific deadline in the Tofan government program that has been missed. The program promised that this power line, well over a year behind schedule, would be commissioned by the end of August 2026.

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That is the title of a new report on the Cobasna ammunition depot in Transnistria, produced by Moldovan Army Intelligence and the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS). This morning, the directors of these agencies presented the major findings of this report in a press conference.

Moldova Matters received an advance copy of this report several weeks before its public release, under an understanding that we would not publish before the government's own announcement. That time allowed for the interviews, technical verification and cross-referencing that inform this piece.

This article is Part 2 in a series with the first being a history of Cobasna and of the myths and narratives that shape our perception of it today. If you haven’t already, I suggest starting with that article first:

The report itself is only 17 pages long plus graphics and annexes. I will update this article with a link to the public version when it is posted officially.

** Update: The full report in English is available at this link.

Today, we’re going to look at the key claims and findings of this new study and compare them to expert analysis to see if they hold up.

This new report is the first substantial publicly available analysis of the condition and safety of the Cobasna depot since 2005. If credible, it could completely change the public discourse around this critical security issue. Let’s dive in.

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The Report - What is it and What Does it Aim to Do?

This report is a military and intelligence analysis of the Cobasna depot. It is not an independent analysis and should best be seen as the Moldovan government’s official view on the matter. As the title suggests, the report is explicitly aimed at debunking myths that have emerged about Cobasna in the absence of verifiable information about the depot and its contents since 2006. Most importantly - the report seeks to challenge the 2005 National Academy of Sciences report and its claim that a detonation at Cobasna would result in an explosion with the power of a nuclear weapon - usually framed as having the same power as the “Hiroshima explosion in 1945.”

Claim 1: New Munitions Tonnage Estimate

The report claims that, following the removal of approximately 21,000 metric tons of ammunition between 2001 and 2004, “The remaining stockpile is currently estimated at 14,000 metric tons, consisting mainly of obsolete munitions whose authorized storage life has expired.”

This is a substantial drop from the 21,000 metric tons estimated to remain at Cobasna in 2006 according to the last OSCE report1. This report does not specify how they came to this new estimate, except to say:

“The estimate of the remaining stockpile is based on an analysis of military activities conducted on the left bank of the Dniester over the years, as well as information derived through HUMINT2, OSINT3, GEOINT4, and SIGINT5.”

A source involved in the assessment told Moldova Matters that the estimated drawdown related to ammunition used for training in the last 20 years. They stated:

“The 20,000-tonne figure is outdated. Our data, collected over years, tracks what the Operational Group of Russian Forces and the so-called Transnistrian army have used for their own equipment and training.”

I asked Ambassador William H. Hill, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 1999 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2006, what he thought of this estimate. He suggested that the estimate was credible, but at a lower bound of numbers he has heard informally discussed.

In particular, he noted that the Russians and Transnistrians have withdrawn ammunition for the depot for training and military exercises over the last 20 years. Ambassador Hill stated that the “Moldovan and Transnistrian administrations are thoroughly penetrated by each other” and that the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) cited is likely to come through cousins, family connections and efforts by the Moldovan security services to monitor movements of these munitions over many years. He concluded that the Moldovan Army should have “a pretty good idea of how much ammo they’ve taken out of Kolbasna [Cobasna] in order to conduct or to use in these exercises,” concluding that the figure is “probably a pretty good guess.”

A different former OSCE staffer who spoke to me on background agreed that the estimate could be credible, but suggested that smuggling and black-market sales could also not be ruled out as a cause for the drawdown.

At the same time, this report does not allege any illicit removal of ammunition. Ambassador Hill found this extremely interesting and a major departure from the position of the Moldovan security services in the early 2000s. In many cases at the time, allegations of terrorist connections or arms dealing were used as a political cudgel against the Tiraspol “authorities” by the Voronin government. Ambassador Hill stated that the tenor of this report was very different and called it “a professional report” that “takes the data and draws the conclusions that it can.”

So while the drawdown to 14,000 metric tons is an unconfirmed estimate, multiple sources found it credible, but also noted that this is still a lot of munitions.

Claim 2: Mass Does Not Equal NEQ

The report explains that the 2005 National Academy of Sciences report and other narratives claim that Cobasna has the explosive equivalent of a nuclear bomb. This report claims that this view conflates total mass with Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ). The OSCE estimate of 21,000 tons of munitions, or this report’s 14,000 tons estimate, both include explosive materials and shells, casings, bomb components, crates, packaging and more.

This report notes that only 14-17% of an artillery shell’s mass is actually explosive material, with the rest being the metal shell and case. Similarly, it states that the explosive proportion of an aerial bomb “rarely exceeds 30-40%.”

The proportion of a munition that represents the actual mass of explosive material is called Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ). Of the 14,000 tons the report estimates to be at Cobasna, they estimate approximately 2,800 tons of that is NEQ - meaning that four fifths of the stockpile is inert material.

NEQ Does Not Equal TNT Equivalent Either

This is not outlined in the report, but came up in conversations I had talking to experts on background. NEQ does not cleanly compute to the “TNT equivalent” used to describe nuclear weapons yield. NEQ is a mass calculation, while TNT equivalent is a unit of energy. Some reasonably modern high explosives stored at Cobasna may have a higher explosive energy rating than 1 kg TNT equivalent. At the same time, many items - especially small-arms munitions for pistols and rifles - will have propellant charges far less powerful than TNT (and not designed to explode).

That’s not a 10 Kiloton Warhead

Taken together, the mass to NEQ to TNT consideration means that reports that casually toss around the Hiroshima figure massively simplify a complex situation. The 2005 National Academy of Sciences report estimated that of the OSCE-reported 21,000 tons at Cobasna there was a TNT equivalent of 10,000 tons (10 kilotons)6. The new report claims a much lower NEQ, and importantly notes that it isn’t stored all in one place.

Claim 3: No Instant Chain Reaction

The report states that while past estimates have modeled a “perfect explosion” to present catastrophic scenarios…

“A proper assessment begins not with the question ‘How many tonnes of munitions are stored at Cobasna?’ but rather ‘What quantity of explosives could be involved in a specific event, and how would that event propagate?’”

Having re-examined the total amount of munitions on site as well as the NEQ of the stockpile, the report then moves on to look at how they are stored. It states:

“The explosive fraction itself is dispersed across dozens of separate storage facilities of three types - above-ground, semi-buried, and underground (Annex No. 1, 10 pages). This dispersal, together with the protection provided by compartmentalized infrastructure and the terrain, means that any incident would involve successive explosions and localized fires rather than a single large-scale blast.”

In essence, different munitions carry different levels of threat and are therefore stored accordingly7. Here are pictures of the 3 types of storage facilities:

The report provides illustrations of each as well as an indicative illustration of how each one would explode if the munitions inside were to detonate.

Just as important as the types of facilities is how they are arranged. The report states:

“The depot covers a total area of approximately 132 hectares and has a perimeter of about five kilometers. The technical storage area covers approximately 1.03 km² and contains 42 ammunition storage facilities of three different types. These facilities are located approximately 80–200 meters apart and are separated by natural and man-made barriers.”

You can see the type and distribution of these storage facilities here:

At the core, the report is making 2 separate arguments here, one explicitly and one implicitly.

1. Explicit: “Nuclear” explosions are simply not how ammunition depots blow up. If this facility was subject to fire, bombing, lightning or some other catastrophe, it would operate as intended and either keep damage contained to some sections, or be destroyed by a creeping calamity as fires spread slowly building to building over hours or days.

2. Implicit: By and large, this facility is not only designed to work as described, but maintained as such also.

On the first claim, experts I spoke to were unambiguous in agreement, with one former OSCE staff member speaking on background about the instantaneous explosion scenario saying simply “that’s not how ammo depots blow up.”

As we will see in the next section, this isn’t a matter of professional opinion - the last few years have given us numerous examples of exploding ammunition depots to consider and the report studies them as well.

On the second, implicit claim, I asked Ambassador Hill about how the base was maintained when the OSCE still had access. He stated that at that time, an American military officer with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) lived on the base in the bachelor officers’ quarters and that the OSCE team observed it up close. Ambassador Hill described the depot as “well-run,” noting that while the Russian military “did things in slightly different ways” from the American military, this base was “state of the art” on its own terms. It had precautions against lightning, fire and other hazards. Even if the materiel was “stacked primitively” it was “stored separately and segregated carefully.”

He added that it was “done carefully so that they wouldn’t blow themselves up.”

In March 2023, TV8 ran an investigation on the safety of Cobasna in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine. In it, they quote Cobasna Mayor Leonid Ivanovich Kuratov stating that the villagers living around 1 km away from the depot are not afraid because it is their place of work and they have good salaries.

This human angle was also important to a former OSCE staffer who served later than Ambassador Hill and spoke to me on background. I asked if there was any reason to believe that the conditions Ambassador Hill described from the early 2000s should have substantially deteriorated. The staffer told me that “the lives of the people there depend on them doing their jobs,” and that unless they have a material shortage, for example, not getting the right wire for a fire protection system, then “I have no reasons to think things would have gone bad.”

So the report’s claim that the materials are stored in a competent, if Soviet, manner that is inconsistent with a single mass detonation holds up. The report then moves on to a discussion of the worst-case scenarios modeled by the Moldovan security services.

Claim 4: Worst-Case Scenarios

In modeling a real-world worst-case scenario, the report chooses to present a highly simplified case with a lot of caveats. You can see the worst-case scenario model on this graphic:

In their model, no chain reaction takes place and explosive shockwaves occur one by one. Fatalities would be limited to some people on the base with serious damage occurring in the village of Cobasna 1 km away. Even then, no shockwave would level the village.

The model used is the UN SaferGuard Blast Damage Estimation methodology, which has a helpful online calculator here. Importantly, this is a “free-field” explosion model focused on direct blast effects. This means that it does not factor in the bunkers and embankments which would serve to slow the detonation, nor does it take into account topography. The report notes that changing elevations and intermittent tree lines would further slow or divert the blast wave(s).

Instead of a blast wave, the report suggests that:

“the primary hazard would remain the dispersal of ammunition components, metal fragments, and infrastructure debris over distances of up to two kilometers, as well as air pollution, which could have minor adverse effects on the population and the environment.”

As one former OSCE staffer told me on background, life would be “really bad” for people living 1 km away, but it would not be Hiroshima.

Bringing it All Together

I asked Ambassador Hill about the report as a whole and how he felt it stood up against his knowledge of the facility. He replied:

“I think it’s probably accurate. I recognized a lot of stuff - they used a tremendous amount from OSCE records and photos... For the purpose of their report, they’re right. It’s dangerous - but not in the sense of the metaphor I used on Transnistrian TV, that it’s like two atomic bombs going off. It’s dangerous, but within limits... They’re quite right to point out that the total weight is not the same thing as the explosive power.”

The report itself concludes on a powerful argument that dispenses with descriptions of bunkers and models and simply notes that since the early 2000s a substantial number of munitions depots in Europe and Russia have exploded. These included depots that were much larger than Cobasna, including:

• Balakliia (Ukraine 2017) - Approx. 138,000 metric tons. One civilian death.

• Ichnya (Ukraine 2018) - Approx. 88,000 metric tons. No deaths reported.

• Toropets (Russia 2024) - Approx. 30,000 metric tons. No deaths reported.

Across these and other comparable incidents, casualties have been in the single digits despite the scale of material involved - a small fraction of what a true mass detonation of even a portion of this tonnage would imply. In each case, the slower, rolling nature of the explosions gave civilians time to evacuate.

Conclusion - Too Big to Verify

At some level, 20,000 metric tons of munitions and 10 kilotons of TNT are numbers the brain simply thinks of as “really big.” When you add in “Hiroshima” and “as large as an atom bomb” then really big = really scary. For many years, I took this story as truth. I had read it repeated in many news stories and heard about the “largest ammunition depot in Eastern Europe” (false). I also heard the story that it would be an explosion equivalent to an atom bomb (also false) many times.

After spending multiple weeks looking into this story, evaluating the SIS / Military Intelligence Report and speaking to numerous experts on and off the record, I’m convinced that the broad strokes of this report are accurate. That Cobasna has no reason to behave differently or worse than Toropets and that the people of Ribnita can sleep well at night knowing that no black circles on a map will be coming for them in the form of a single bright flash.

At the same time, I find myself coming to another deeply uncomfortable conclusion - that this myth should not have persisted for 20 years.

The report from the National Academy of Sciences by Gheorghe Duca is the “scientific” source that has done the most to propagate fears about Cobasna. While Academician Duca told Moldova Matters that he stands by that report’s conclusions and that it was “scientifically independent,” there are clear elements that should have raised eyebrows long ago.

Most nuclear weapons, including the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima, are designed for an air burst. That bomb detonated 580 meters above the city on August 6, 1945. If detonated on the ground, the same explosive yield produces far less of a result as buildings and terrain absorb the blast wave.

Even without a sophisticated modeling of terrain and bunker distribution, we can look at what a 10 kiloton nuclear explosion at the depot would look like with online modeling software (click for a modeled scenario from NUKEMAP). Such an explosion would destroy the ammunition depot, and it would break windows and cause light damage in some parts of the town of Cobasna 1 km away, but it would not level even that town. That’s a far cry from reducing every town in a 50 km radius to ruins.

Similarly, claims of a 75 m deep blast crater should also have raised red flags. The first hydrogen bomb, 10.4 megaton “Ivy Mike,” tested in 1952, only left a 50 m deep crater8.

For more than 20 years, the ammunition depot at Cobasna has produced frightening myths that were used to suit various political ends. Today, the Russian Federation continues to claim that its control of this “exceptionally dangerous” depot is the reason that its army must continue to illegally occupy Moldovan territory. This new report, “Cobasna: Separating Myth from Reality,” is, in my reporting, a highly credible effort to right-size the threat. Cobasna is a serious security problem for Moldova - but one that can be managed.

It is not a “ticking time bomb,” and it never risked being “Hiroshima.” After more than 20 years, it’s time to put that myth to bed.

Today Moldova Matters is publishing a 2-part investigative series looking into Cobasna in order to better understand what is really there, what threats it poses and what it means geopolitically.

This series comes in the context of a new report titled “Cobasna: Separating Myth from Reality” that has just been released by Moldova’s Military Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS). In this article, we’ll first look at the history of Cobasna from 1949 through 2006. In the second article (in your inbox now), we’ll dive into the new report and assess its credibility and put the new findings into context.

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Ready to Supply the Southern Front of World War 3

The origin of the Cobasna military depot dates back to 1949 and the earliest days of the Cold War. Originally designated Artillery Depot No. 1411, the Cobasna facility grew over time to be part of the infrastructure of the Soviet Union’s WW3 plans for South Eastern Europe. The reason for this was that while Romania was a Warsaw Pact member, it never hosted Soviet troops or military bases directly. Romania’s Communist leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu, also charted a somewhat independent course, refusing for example to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. This meant that Moldova, and modern-day Transnistria in particular, hosted large stores of munitions and heavy weaponry that was ready to be utilized in the event of a war with NATO.

As the Soviet Union approached its collapse, ammunition that was withdrawn from other Warsaw Pact countries such as East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, was transported to Cobasna and stored there. By the time the Soviet Union itself collapsed, there was a vast quantity of munitions in Cobasna, as well as a massive supply of heavy weaponry also in Transnistria.

While this depot was now officially on the territory of the newly independent Republic of Moldova, the 1992 Transnistrian conflict created a significant dilemma. Russia’s 14th Army was still stationed in the region and maintained control of the depot as well as most heavy weaponry. They ultimately intervened in the war on the side of the separatists and froze the conflict. The 14th Army did not turn itself or its weapons over to the Transnistrian “authorities” or to Moldovan control and eventually became the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) which is still there.

In the mid 90s, General Yevnevich, commander of the 14th Army began to destroy old armor and unstable ammunition. This took place at the same time as a gradual reduction in forces, and a withdrawal of some equipment back to Russia. At the same time, negotiations of a full Russian withdrawal failed as Transnistria sought to keep them there as their protectors. When the OSCE began negotiations on the withdrawal or destruction of this ammunition, Cobasna contained 42,000 metric tons. This was in addition to the heavy weaponry elsewhere in the region.

Dr. William H. Hill served as the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova from 1999 to 2001 and from 2003 to 2006 where he participated in the two major efforts at brokering a resolution to the conflict. Ambassador Hill was also deeply involved with OSCE efforts at the time to remove or destroy the munitions. I spoke to him for this article, and he explained that when the OSCE first got an inventory for Cobasna it included millions of rounds for pistols, AK-74 assault rifles, tanks and much more. The OSCE’s later final report indicated 135 million rounds for AK-74 assault rifles alone.

That was in addition to the heavy weapons in the region, which included more than 500 tanks, APCs, towed and tracked artillery, anti-aircraft guns and missile systems and much more.

1999 - 2003: OSCE Negotiations and Partial Withdrawal

As the 1990s came to an end, Russia and the West entered into a period of significant collaboration on Cobasna. The OSCE led an effort to remove this equipment back to Russia or destroy it on site. Initially, this involved the large-scale removal of heavy weaponry.

At the same time, some equipment was destroyed on site. This included more than 100 T64 tanks and large numbers of APCs, multiple rocket launch systems and artillery.

This ultimately resulted in the full removal of all heavy weaponry from the region. But that left the 42,000 metric tons of munitions at Cobasna. This spanned small-arms munitions, hand grenades, artillery shells, mines, tank shells, aerial bombs and more.

Initially the OSCE and the Russian Army developed a plan for the large-scale destruction or disassembly of the munitions on site. Ultimately though, this was not required as almost all the munitions were found to be in good enough condition to transport.

This process saw the removal of around 21,000 tons of ammunition back to Russia from 2001 through March 2004. The vast majority of that ammunition, over 16,000 tons, was transported in 2003 alone. At that point the OSCE estimated that it would take no more than 6 months for the full withdrawal of the remaining 21,000 tons of ammunition and with it, the full Russian military contingent.

The final phase of the process stalled and eventually talks completely broke down. This was due to a separate process that was happening in parallel that sought to find a political solution to the frozen conflict with Transnistria. At the time, there was an official OSCE negotiating format, and a secret Russian-led effort that produced an unequal federalization plan that is now called the Kozak Memorandum.

If you’re interested in the political track, I suggest the podcast I recorded in 2024 with Ambassador Hill or his excellent book: Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict.

Russia’s failure to impose a political solution that would see Transnistria (and therefore the Kremlin) dominate Moldovan politics led to a substantial deterioration of relations between the countries. The final OSCE inspection to Cobasna took place on 13 November 2006.

Speaking to me in July 2024 for the aforementioned podcast episode on Transnistria, Ambassador Hill emphasized the significance of the total removal of heavy weapons from the region saying:

“There was no second front on Odessa in 2022 because of what happened back in from ‘99 to 2003. And while the process was working, the Russians were forcing the Transnistrians and working hard to get all of their stuff out. The process stopped when the Kozak memorandum fell apart and the geopolitical alignment started to deteriorate in 2004.”

In essence, Cobasna remains filled with ammunition, but there are neither the tanks nor the artillery pieces in the region to use it. So without an offensive capability, how dangerous is Cobasna?

In the Absence of Facts, Myths Grow

According to Ambassador Hill, the OSCE mission and partners had very good insights into the Cobasna facility in that period from 2000 through early 2004. But before and after that time things are much murkier. Even during this period of cooperation things were sometimes less clear regarding other potential ammunition storage areas in Transnistria.

In 2023, Moldovan journalist Ilie Gulca wrote a story in Balkan Insight called Cobasna: Russia’s ‘MacGuffin’ Between Ukraine and NATO. He opens it by comparing the depot to a Hollywood narrative device called a MacGuffin that drives the plot along without ever being fully understood by the audience - the classic example being the suitcase in Pulp Fiction.

For years now, Cobasna has been the MacGuffin in many stories that have driven political narratives or been shaped by their times. Our next article will examine the new report from the Moldovan government titled “Cobasna: Separating Myth from Reality.” But before we get there, we need to look at these dominant myths - some still current, some mostly forgotten.

The Blast Circle 1999 - 2000

After the OSCE began seriously engaging with the problem of Cobasna, but before the agreements and beginning of equipment and ammunition withdrawals, there was a long period of negotiations. During this process the Transnistrian “authorities” repeatedly tried to block the withdrawal of both weapons and ammunition. On one hand, they saw the Russian forces as their protectors, on another, they hoped to profit from the process in some way, according to a former OSCE official who agreed to speak on background.

In this period, then-OSCE Ambassador William Hill was invited on Transnistrian Sheriff TV for a live call-in program. During the show, a woman called in and asked “why are you so against us having this ammunition?” To which he replied “I’m glad you asked” and he held up a poster board showing a map with a purported blast radius drawn on it.

This circle shows a roughly 15 km radius around the Cobasna ammunition depot. This includes multiple small villages in Transnistria and Ukraine as well as a considerable part of the Transnistrian city of Ribnita, seen on the left side of the image. According to Transnistria’s 2004 census, the city had a population of more than 53,000.

Ambassador Hill spoke of how the depot could go off and “devastate Ribnita.” Recounting the event he told me that “the Transnistrians were livid, and so I was the last Westerner on Transnistrian TV live.”

When I asked Ambassador Hill about the basis for this circle - whether it reflected what the OSCE thought was a credible worst-case scenario, he told me that he told his people to draw a radius around the depot to reflect an explosion equivalent to an atomic blast, with the main purpose being “working against the Transnistrians” and getting publicity.

“Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear”

That was a December 6, 2003, headline in the Washington Post setting up an article about Cobasna and weapons in Transnistria more generally. This article, and another in the Washington Times in January 20041 paint the region as an open-air weapons bazaar for terrorists and al Qaeda. The article quotes multiple sources from Moldova, and the US, on and off the record, describing factories running all night producing missiles and Soviet weapons being removed from storage and smuggled to the Caucasus, Central Africa and elsewhere. It quotes William C. Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, saying:

“It’s one-stop shopping for weapons and all kinds of other illicit goods. Very possibly, that includes the materials for weapons of mass destruction.”

This story has serious issues, many of which should have been apparent at the time. It cites unnamed “Western and Moldovan officials” saying that 50,000 metric tons of munitions remained at the end of 2003. By this time, the OSCE had facilitated the removal of all of the heavy weaponry and 20,000 of the 42,000 tons of munitions.

Ambassador Hill told me that he and his successors in the OSCE spent lots of time trying to chase down these rumors, which turned out to be a “mix of fact, speculation, and hype, mostly the latter two.” In particular, they focused on allegations of nuclear materials, but found no evidence of any radiation linked to weaponry,2 nor any large-scale sale or smuggling of weapons from the storage depots3.

The Washington Post article was written by Joby Warrick, who later went on to win 2 Pulitzer prizes, so it is hard to write this off as shoddy reporting. The “dirty bomb” reports seem improbable in retrospect - they involved retrofitting anti-hail rockets with radioactive materials (not a bomb). But at the time, post 9/11 and in the early days of the Iraq War WMD discussions, it was pretty par for the course in the United States. At the same time, Ambassador Hill stressed to me that all factions in Moldova were actively spreading narratives trying to discredit the others.

While these “dirty bomb” stories have faded away, the narrative of a “Hiroshima at Cobasna” has not. This idea, which has become commonly accepted knowledge in lots of Moldova, comes from…

The 2005 National Academy of Sciences Report

By far the most pervasive narrative about Cobasna is that it is a serious danger of exploding and consuming the towns and cities around it. Colloquially, people in Moldova will often say "when, not if” it explodes, windows will break in Chisinau. People talk about how old and degrading munitions could simply go off, and how the amount of munitions there would make this one of the largest non-nuclear explosions ever - equivalent to Hiroshima.

This narrative is based on a 2005 National Academy of Sciences of Moldova report that was written by a team led by Academician Gheorghe Duca. The report itself remains classified, but its key findings have been reported widely. As recently as 2023, it was discussed in detail at a Moldova State University conference.

Here’s a summary of how multiple outlets have described the report’s findings over the years:

• Blast Crater: 1.5 km wide and 75 m deep (equivalent to a 27-story building)

• Death Zone: The blast wave would kill all living things in a 4.5 km radius

• Property Destruction: Towns in a 50 km radius could be “reduced to ruins”

• Chisinau: The blast would be felt in the capital 85 km away

The 2005 report explicitly compares an explosion at the depot to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in terms of total explosive power. It cites a total explosive equivalent at Cobasna as 10 kilotons of TNT.

Multiple sources, including Ambassador Hill, described this as part of a broader pattern in Moldovan politics: using alarming narratives about Cobasna to attract Western attention, support, and funding. Several suggested the 2005 report fit this pattern, commissioned under President Vladimir Voronin at a moment when his government had strong incentives to raise the alarm4.

I reached out to Academician Gheorghe Duca to ask about his report. He stands by it as a “scientifically independent” product and stated that:

“The presidential office did not ask for a specific result, nor did it impose any conditions on our findings. Our sole objective was to assess, as objectively as possible, the potential consequences of a catastrophic event at the depot.”

A key element of the report’s findings is that it modeled a simultaneous detonation of all the explosive material in Cobasna. I asked Academician Duca about this, and he defended it as a “theoretical worst‑case scenario” which was based on their concerns of a fast-moving chain-reaction. In the next article, we will examine these claims, as well as the 10 kiloton estimate, in more detail.

The “Hiroshima” narrative has endured up through the present and has been cited again and again, by Balkan Insight (2023), Arnika (2022), Deutsche Welle (2015), Newsweek (2023) to name a few. Wikipedia cites it as fact (citing Deutsche Welle) and Grokipedia and other AI regurgitate it (likely citing Wikipedia). Of those cited articles, only the one by Newsweek treats the “Hiroshima” claim skeptically, while all the others accept it as a fact of the situation.

In our next article, we’re going to look at a new report by Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and Army Intelligence that examines these narratives, and the 2005 report explicitly.

You can read Part 2 online here:

On the night of August 8, a drone crashed in a field near the town of Crocmaz in the Ștefan Vodă district. According to police the drone crashed into a tree around 2.5 m off the ground, exploded and started a brush fire. No one was injured or killed, but nearby houses sustained damage.

Crocmaz is a town located on the Dniester river immediately across from Ukraine. It is located near the border crossings of Palanca and Tudora and is very close to the Et Cetera Winery.

Prime Minister Tofan addressed the incident, saying:

“It’s good that it hit a tree and not a house. At the same time, we have damage almost 800 meters away - at some households, windows shattered from the impact. (…) We feel this war. We all know who the aggressor is in this case.”

“Missile-Drone”

Initial statements from the police, and remarks condemning the incident from President Sandu, indicate that this is the first crash in Moldova of a new generation of Russian drones.

For the past several years, Russia’s main attack drone was the Geran-2, an improved copy of the Iranian Shahed-136. Russia has been testing a new version, the Geran-3, which replaces the Geran-2’s pusher propeller with a jet engine. A second “missile-drone” entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 10 before departing towards Odesa one minute later. Local media reported this as a Geran-3, but reports on the Geran program indicate that the Geran-3 was a proof of concept model and is already out of production - replaced with the Geran-4, which uses a better Chinese turbojet engine. In either case, the Geran-3/4 has blurred the line between a drone and a cruise missile, offering substantially higher speeds, higher operating altitude and the ability to maneuver to evade threats.

New estimates indicate that jet-powered drones now comprise up to 2/3 of Russian drone attacks while Ukrainian intercept rates are falling.

The Geran-4 is itself giving way to the Geran-5, which is closing the drone-cruise missile loop with a design very similar to the original V1 flying bomb. Russia is effectively iterating its way from cheap loitering drones to cheap mass-produced, fully capable cruise missiles. This incident is Moldova’s first interaction with this new phase of the war.

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Other Security & Transnistria News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security stories of the week:

• Is a Polish former deputy minister of justice hiding in Transnistria? Polish radio RMF24 reported that former politician Marcin Romanowski, who is wanted on more than a dozen corruption charges, sent a petition to the Warsaw court with a return address in Tiraspol. Romanowski is facing up to 25 years in prison on charges of corruption, abuse of power and being part of an organized criminal group related to an alleged $40 million fraud when he was part of the Law and Justice government. In 2024, he fled Poland to evade arrest and was granted political asylum by Viktor Orban in Hungary. Following the fall of Orban, he vanished. Poland’s government has reached out to Moldova with a request to confirm his presence, and Poland’s ruling coalition called Transnistria “a new destination for politicians who have run into trouble with the law to flee.1” Moldovan police have confirmed that there is no evidence of Romanowski crossing the Moldovan border, and are taking steps to ascertain if he is in Transnistria.

• More Transnistrians are coming to Moldova for work. The first half of 2026 saw a 67% increase, to a total of more than 20,000, in the number of Transnistrian residents employed on the right bank. While the actual population of the region is unknown, this is likely to represent a considerable share of the total workforce2.

• Transnistria to pay VAT from September 1. A new draft resolution would levy VAT and excise taxes on 12 categories of goods from Transnistria by September 1. These include luxury goods such as alcohol, caviar, tobacco, fireworks, jewelry, etc. Taxes on five more categories, including critical raw-material inputs, are proposed to go into effect on January 1. Taxes on energy may be included from April to harmonize with the proposed changes in the rest of Moldova.

Water & Electricity Crisis Updates

On August 13, falling water levels in the Danube caused Romania to fully shut down its only nuclear power plant at Cernavoda. While Romania is quickly firing up emergency coal plants and asking users to conserve power, the country will still be a major net importer of electricity for the near term.

Right now experts estimate that Moldova will not run short of power, and neither country is actively discussing rolling blackouts or emergency measures. At the same time, the regional electricity market is coming under considerable strain, and Moldovan experts expect price increases.

Energocom announced that the company has finished purchasing natural gas for the winter and has contracts covering 76% of Moldova’s projected consumption from October 1, 2026 through September 30, 2027. This equates to 100% of winter consumption. These contracts were signed after 24 rounds of public tenders starting in July, and are not fixed-price but are based on formulas calculated on public indexes. Suppliers are still making purchases to ensure that Moldova will have 15% of yearly supplies in physical storage by November 1.

On the water front, the level of the Novodnistrovsk reservoir continues to fall rapidly. On August 11, the Dniester Commission decided to reduce outward flow from 85 to 75 cubic meters / second through the end of August. The goal is to stretch out the Dniester’s water reserves as long as possible since no substantial rain is forecast in the Carpathians in the next 2 months. Moldova’s authorities continue to ask people to conserve water as much as possible.

Other Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the other politics and news updates of the week:

• Teachers threaten protests as promised salary increases are delayed. Their union has stated that unless their salaries are increased on September 1 as promised by the former Minister of Finance, they will take action. The government has explained that these increases are directly tied to the tax reform, which has been delayed3. The Ministry of Education has promised clarifications in the coming weeks.

• RFE/RL Investigation - more trouble on state company boards. According to an investigation by Europa Libera, substantial numbers of state employees serve on the boards of more than 3 state-owned companies. Legally, the limit is 3 board seats. At the Public Property Agency (APP), a total of 60 officials hold a combined 219 board seats - averaging 3.65. At the Ministry of Economy, 68 employees hold an average of 2 seats each. In 42 of the 81 companies controlled by the APP, officials sat on both the board and the state oversight bodies. Numerous state employees are paid more for their board positions than for their official salaries. The Ministry of Economy responded by launching internal investigations and forcing resignations of anyone on more than 3 boards. Quick analysis in a footnote4.

• The Ministry of Economy presented a new investment law that defines strategic investment sectors including R&D, IT industry, semiconductor / chip manufacturing, electronics manufacturing, energy production and more. Investors putting a minimum of €10 million into one of these sectors will benefit from fast-track permitting and a 1 stop shop bureaucracy concierge service operated by the Investment Agency. Investments of over €20 million will benefit from free leases of state land for up to 49 years, and investments over €40 million will be able to enter into direct agreements with the government. Strategic investment sectors explicitly exclude armaments and dual-use technologies, which are subject to more complex regulations.

• 100 foreign workers relocated to dormitories after TV8 investigation. The investigation had found workers from Bangladesh and Nepal were housed in repurposed train sleeper cars in cramped and unsanitary conditions. The General Inspectorate for Migration has reported that inspections of the company resulted in new housing.

• Taraclia will become a municipality (like Chisinau and Balti). The Taraclia district will be dissolved and the town of Taraclia will become a municipality, directly absorbing some towns while converting others into official suburbs. Secretary General of the Government Alexei Buzu explained: “Because in Taraclia we have our citizens of Bulgarian ethnicity, we want to offer them this status, so that they have these powers including on aspects related to cultural programs.” The Taraclia district has approximately 26,000 residents with 10,000 in the town, of whom a majority are ethnic Bulgarians. Asked whether Bulgaria pushed Moldova to do this, Secretary Buzu simply noted that the Bulgarian government was part of the discussion.

• There will be a military parade on Independence Day. It will include more than 2,000 soldiers and security personnel from Moldova and partner countries, and will take place in the city center. This will include 150 Moldovan veterans and soldiers from Romania, Ukraine, Italy, France, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and the United States. In addition to the soldiers, around 100 military vehicles will take part in the parade. Asked my Moldova is putting its military in the center of this celebration, President Sandu replied that it will highlight recent defense investments, and underscore that “peace is paramount, and the security of our citizens is our top priority.”

That line opened the final paragraph of an article titled “Green China of Tibetan Plateau: Aba region as modern model of coexistence between people, tradition, nature” that was published on August 1 as a special report on Moldpres.

The article is written by Moldpres journalist Lilia Grubîi about her recent trip to “Aba,” the Mandarin name for the Tibetan region of Ngawa1, presenting how China’s development of the region is an example for the world.

The article is one of 10 in a series published by Moldpres since late May. Each is described as a MOLDPRES REPORT and none discloses who funded or organized the trip. In answer to questions from Moldova Matters, Moldpres stated that Lilia Grubîi’s travel, lodging and other costs for this trip were paid by the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association, an organization closely linked to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. They also confirmed that Moldpres has no policy requiring editorial transparency about press junkets organized and financed by foreign governments.

We will look into Lilia Grubîi’s reporting on Tibet, how it contrasts with independent reporting on the region and what the implications of the Moldpres policy are below. But first…

What is Moldpres?

The State Information Agency “Moldpres” is a Public Institution under the control of Moldova’s State Chancellery. What that means in practice is a bit hard to describe, as it combines aspects of a newsroom, a wire service, and a state publisher. According to their website, their main activity is to “provide accurate, equidistant, transparent information and to ensure pluralism of opinion.”

The institution has 3 primary activity areas:

1. Wire Service - publishing updates and press releases from the government and state agencies. This is done in Romanian, Russian and English and their website claims that they work to ensure the “dissemination of information (news, interviews, reports, photo reports) from the first source to foreign press agencies.”

2. Publisher of the Official Gazette of the Republic of Moldova - this publication is the state’s official gazette where laws, presidential decrees, government decisions, major court rulings, etc. are published. Laws only take effect once they are published in the Official Gazette.

3. Newsroom - the institution has reporters and journalists who publish original stories, photos and interviews. These are not separated on the site but mixed into the wire service and general news feed.

Moldpres is therefore a somewhat ambiguous entity. Part state agency subject to political control, part mass media organization.

In parliament’s pending mass media reform Draft Law 123/2026, aimed at aligning with EU regulation, Moldpres is given a unique position. Article 5(2) of the bill states that:

(2) The State and the central and local public administration authorities may not have the quality of founder, owner or entity exercising control over a media service provider, with the exception of:
a) public providers of audiovisual media services regulated by the Code of Audiovisual Media Services no. 174/2018;
b) providers of media services intended for children and the promotion of national culture, founded by the Ministry of Culture;
c) the Public Institution State Information Agency “Moldpres” founded by the
State Chancellery.

The Public Broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) referenced in Article 5(2)(a) is subject to substantial regulation in the Audiovisual Code that ensures editorial independence and transparent editorial standards. Moldpres, which is explicitly named in 5(2)(c), is not. Nowhere does Moldpres publicly disclose its editorial policies, its funding-transparency practices, or details about outside funding it receives.

When responding to questions, Moldpres representatives clearly struggled with the ambiguities of their organization. We’ll get to that below, but first let’s look at these articles and why they matter.

Tibet and “Ecological Civilization”

In her article, Lilia Grubîi presents a picture of the Ngawa (Aba) region of Tibet as an idyllic mix of traditional culture, modern development and ecological conservation. She writes:

“On this journey, the special MOLDPRES correspondent discovered that Aba is trying to find a delicate balance: economic development without destroying nature, tourism without degrading the landscape, modernization without losing traditions.”

The article describes large investments to restore wetlands, protect waterbirds, revive the local yak milk industry and encourage new tourism models - including collectivized community tourist companies.

At a high level, this is best understood as Communist Party of China (CCP) party messaging presented as travel journalism. The framing closely mirrors a key concept in “Xi Jinping Thought” called “Ecological Civilization.” As such, it is a key element of CCP ideology, formally taken up by the Party's Central Committee in 2018.

In response to questions from Moldova Matters, Moldpres stated that Lilia Grubîi’s reporting was part of a “professional internship program” and that:

“Participation in the internship did not involve editorial obligations. According to information provided by the journalist, no external entity requested the publication of any materials, and none intervened in their selection, drafting, or approval. The subjects published reflected the author’s own journalistic choices and covered fields such as technology, agriculture, ecology, and culture.”

This answer, as well as the content of the article itself, fails profoundly to grapple with exactly what is going on in Ngawa.

Ngawa (Aba) – a warning for the whole world

In her article, Lilia Grubîi praises the authorities promotion of tourism in the region, noting that:

“Tourism is allowed, but strictly controlled. Visitors travel along specially designed ecological routes, so that nature remains the priority.”

This is stunning in its failure to acknowledge that the “strict control” for which Ngawa is famous, is for the oppression of human rights. China has deployed one of the most extensive population monitoring systems in the world across Tibet, a system that Human Rights Watch has called “grid management.” This system breaks towns and villages in Tibet into segmented units which are monitored by party officials. Each individual living there is tracked - their opinions, communications and religious practices are all monitored. Checkpoints called “convenience police posts” involve regular mandatory phone searches for banned content.

Incredibly, Human Rights Watch has reported the wide scale DNA harvesting of residents against their will - including the mass collection from children while in kindergarten and villages where all boys over the age of 5 had their DNA forcibly collected.

Within Tibet, Ngawa is seen as a hotspot of resistance and an epicenter of oppression. Since 2009 more than 150 people have self-immolated in protest against Chinese imperial policies in Tibet. Of those, 40 have been in Ngawa.

According to a report by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC), journalists face serious challenges trying to independently report on the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The US Department of State cites this 2025 FCCC report in their own report on freedoms in TAR to Congress writing:

“Ninety-three percent of correspondents who attempted to travel to the TAR and other Tibetan areas of the PRC faced difficulty in reporting. While the government occasionally organizes press tours of the TAR, they do not provide opportunities to report independently.” …

“When U.S. journalists gained access to Tibetan areas, the Chinese government further suppressed their ability to report about Tibet by intimidating and preventing Chinese nationals from interacting with them. Group tours enabled the government to claim increased numbers and greater access to the region while maintaining strict control over the information conveyed.”

Emphasis mine.

So while the MoldPres correspondent may not have been under any official editorial obligations, the Chinese government assures that these trips are controlled in a way that shapes their outputs - especially for non-critical journalists.

As we can see in this story, they succeeded.

Is Moldpres Obliged to Report Funded Trips Transparently?

When I reached out to Moldpres to ask about this piece on Tibet, I wanted to understand a few things. Who paid for the trip? Did the sponsor exercise any editorial control? and Does Moldpres have a policy for disclosing sponsored reporting trips?

The initial response from the director of Moldpres highlighted the ambiguity of the organization itself. He stated that my questions, framed as a “request,” were sent to the relevant departments for review and that:

“We assure you that we will provide you with a response as soon as possible, in strict compliance with the deadlines and provisions of the legislation in force regarding access to information.”

This is a standard response from a state agency to a freedom of information request - but a very unusual response from a newsroom. The “legislation in force” typically allows for multiple weeks to meet information request deadlines. I pressed, noting that if Moldpres is unable to answer basic questions about its reporting and editorial policies I’ll simply note that in my piece. This caused a switch to “journalism mode” with Moldpres beginning to send answers.

On the 3 main questions:

Who paid for the trip?

Moldpres responded that “MOLDPRES journalist Lilia Grubîi participated, during the period May 11 – August 11, 2026, in an international professional internship program, with the agreement of the press agency’s administration” with the costs being covered by the “organizers from China.” After I pressed for a specific organization that paid, they responded that it was the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association (CPDA).

Officially, the CPDA is an NGO, but in reality it is a part of China’s public diplomacy apparatus with close ties to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Did the sponsor exercise any editorial control?

Moldpres stressed that “Participation in the program did not involve any editorial or contractual obligation to provide content” and that the “published subjects represented the author’s own decision and focused on technological, agricultural, ecological, and cultural themes.”

That answers a narrow, contractual question, but somewhat misses the bigger picture. Across numerous articles, it is very clear that all of the perspective and quotes are drawn from a carefully choreographed process. This is explained at times in quotes like this one:

“As part of a documentary program for the international press, the MOLDPRES special envoy visited several Chinese companies active in sectors considered essential for the green economy”

Each article reads as if a story was laid out clearly for the journalist to report on. No articles indicate independent followup or contradictory perspectives to those presented by the “organizers” who are never named. No example is more clear than the uncritical reporting on Tibet.

Does Moldpres have a policy for disclosing sponsored reporting trips?

Moldpres repeatedly described this program as a professional development internship - not a press junket or funded reporting trip. They wrote:

“MOLDPRES does not currently have a policy requiring journalists to specify, in each individual article, the funding of study visits or professional mobility programs.”

Noting that this policy applies equally to “programs are funded by American, European, Chinese, or other international partners.” Moldpres also stated that:

“As far as we know, no similar policies exist at other private media entities either.”

I reached out to Alina Radu, CEO of Ziarul de Gardă (ZdG) to ask about their policies in this area. She stated that in all cases ZdG discloses their sponsorship and that this applies equally to any paid travel. However, she stressed that the first question is always about whether to accept a paid trip in the first place. According to Radu, ZdG never accepts trips designed to promote someone - whether a company or a government program. She stressed that they apply journalistic ethics to these decisions and differentiate between informational trips to Brussels sponsored by the EU and trips to visit a factory sponsored by the company that owns it.

Putting aside whether or not this was an internship or a press junket, it is unambiguously true that all of the articles produced in this series are promotional in nature (see footnote for links to the articles2). They promote Chinese companies, Chinese policies and China itself.

So whether or not there was an obligation to report the trip’s sponsor as a matter of Moldpres policy or journalistic ethics, there was an editorial choice made here. This choice resulted in a series of stories that uncritically presented a curated view of various aspects of Chinese policy to readers. Most notably, an article that omits, and in that omission whitewashes, human rights abuses in Tibet.

Why does it Matter?

Ngawa’s story is not really about wetlands, yak milk or eco-tourism. It is about what happens when a system built for oppression is allowed to write its own account of itself - and what happens when that account is published, unlabeled, by a state news agency of an EU candidate country, without a single word of independent scrutiny.

Moldova’s pending media law will soon draw a sharper line around who can own a newsroom and who must disclose their funding. Moldpres, carved out of that law by name, will remain outside of the accountability mechanisms that apply even to state broadcasters. Until that changes, Aba’s “lesson for the whole world” will keep circulating in Moldova’s press exactly as Beijing packaged it - with Ngawa and the warning quietly left out.

First though, an appeal - this all takes A LOT of time. If Moldova Matters provides you value, or if you just want to support the work - please become a paid subscriber. And if you are reading this for work - don’t forget, we have organizational subscription options as well.

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Heat and Drought Create Dual Crises

This week Moldova is facing a heat wave, but overall has seen a mild summer with one of the best years for agriculture in some time. But sustained heat waves and drought in the region have caused a dual water and electricity crisis that is quite literally flowing down stream to Moldova.

Crisis 1: Reduced Dniester Flow Threatens Chisinau’s Water Supply

A lack of rainfall in the upper Dniester (Romanian Nistru1) has reduced inflows to the Novodnistrovsk reservoir and caused it to fall to a critical level. On July 31 the Dniester Commission held an extraordinary meeting and agreed to reduce outflows from the reservoir from 100 m³/s to 85 m³/s. The current inflow rate is 30 m³/s, meaning that even with the reduction the reservoir is draining rapidly. The commission agreed to maintain this level for 2 weeks but will then need to reevaluate.

According to the Ministry of Environment, a critical problem is the Chisinau water intake station in Vadul lui Voda. This is a fixed intake and cannot adjust to critically low water levels.

The situation has led Environment Minister Gheorghe Hajder to warn that Moldova is consuming its strategic reserve and called on people to save water saying “Every liter saved counts.”

Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban initially rejected worries, claiming that the water level at the pump station is fine so long as the government does its job of making sure the outflow from the Novodnistrovsk reservoir remains adequate2. Minister Hajder shot back, criticizing Chisinau City Hall’s failure to modernize the pump station. Prime Minister Tofan intervened and answered Mayor Ceban’s simultaneous request for emergency pumps, stating:

“Providing citizens with water should not be a subject of debate and I will not accept its politicization. I have ordered the release of motor pumps from the stocks of the Material Reserves Agency (MAI) to support the works carried out by the Chisinau City Hall.”

The government has continued to supply pumps as the Chisinau authorities install emergency water feeds to the pump station. Simultaneously, Mayor Ceban announced the preparation of 213 water storage and distribution points around the city and noted that city authorities have 253 Eurocubes, 20 tank trucks and 45 specialized water units3 prepared to distribute water in case of disruptions. Additionally, technical water for irrigation and green spaces is being pumped from the capital’s lakes and from the Chisinau mine4.

Crisis 2: Reduced Danube Flow Sparks Electricity Crisis

At the same time, the Danube River is also seeing historically low water levels due to drought. This has created a major electricity crisis as Hungary almost fully shut down Paks, its sole nuclear power plant, and Romania shut down Unit 1 of its Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Both plants require river water to cool the reactors. Paks supplies over half of Hungary’s electricity, while Romania is facing a substantial electricity deficit.

This has created an unprecedented situation where Romania is relying on Moldovan energy company Energocom to supply imported electricity from Ukraine. At the same time Romania is taking radical steps to try to balance its grid. Acting Prime Minister Bolojan has called for voluntary reductions from households and industry, and announced that Dacia and Ford are closing their auto manufacturing plants in Romania through August 19 in order to save electricity.

At the same time, the Romanian military is attempting to divert the Danube in order to raise the water level at the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant by a few critical centimeters. The army detonated Pârjoaia rock to partially redirect the flow, while the navy is working to sink barges and partially block one branch of the river in order to redirect water towards the plant.

The goal is to offset the continued fall of the water level and keep reactor 2 running.

Moldovan Government Response

Moldova is facing a critical electrical shortage each evening from around 18:00 - 22:00 during peak hours - especially after the sun sets and solar production goes offline. Romania has no electricity to supply, so Energocom is scrambling to purchase power from emergency supply at exorbitant prices. The National Crisis Management Commission (CNMC), chaired by Prime Minister Tofan, met on August 3 and put in place emergency measures. They have limited power exports during peak hours and called on households and companies to conserve power. Government buildings are reducing all non-critical power consumption and turning off fountains and decorative lighting. Companies are requested to do the same. Individuals are urged to avoid elevators between 06:00 - 09:00 and 18:00 - 23:00 in order to conserve power and avoid the risk of becoming stuck in an outage.

Similarly, the government has called on people to conserve water and asked farmers to irrigate overnight and according to specialized schedules.

Speaking of the dual crises, President Sandu called on people to conserve power and water and stated that while the government was working on mitigating the crises, “there are no magic solutions.”

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Tax Reform 2.0

On August 6, Prime Minister Tofan announced a second attempt at a major tax reform with a speech laying out principal elements of the reform as well as the government’s rationale for the changes being proposed. In that speech he started by completely rejecting the core philosophy of the previous tax reform laid out under his predecessor saying:

“I want to start with a simple idea: the way a country organizes its taxes influences the way its economy works. If we want more people to work legally, we need to tax labor in a way that encourages legal work. If we want companies to invest more, we need to leave them more capital for investment. If we want to discourage vices — tobacco, vaping, especially among young people, excessive alcohol consumption, gambling, if we want the environment not to be polluted by fireworks — this must also be reflected in tax policy.”

He went on to outline a set of measures that he claims will produce a tax code that is “simpler, fairer and more difficult to circumvent.” The core approach is to reduce taxes on labor and investments, raise taxes on vices and reduce exceptions. Summing it up, he stated that “our approach is not ‘raise taxes.’ Our approach is: put the accents right.”

A deep dive into the proposals will have to wait for a future article, but here are a few of the more important announcements:

• Payroll taxes: a 35% increase in the personal exemption. Increased from 29,700 lei annually to 40,000 (the previous reform proposal removed it entirely).

• 0% taxes on reinvested profits for companies up to 200 million lei revenue (current ceiling was 100 million).

• Raised tax on dividends from 6% to 8%

• VAT Changes: “Basic” food items5 and medicines remain at 8%, other foods, HoReCa and tourism up to 12%, electricity and gas to go up to 20% in April 2027 for energy consumed above a tax-free / low tax allotment per household.

• Sin Taxes: New 6% excise tax on gambling, 50% increase in excise taxes on vaping, new excise taxes on sugary drinks and energy drinks (rates not announced), new 25% excise tax on fireworks, progressively increasing excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.

• Temu / Parcels from outside Moldova: 20% VAT and 12 lei fix tax per package

• 50% increased taxes on bank profits: one year only for 2027

We will come back to this topic in much more detail later. But for now, there are a few important things to note. Firstly, this reform is slower, and the Prime Minister emphasized predictability as a key goal. Secondly, it is less rushed - there are 2 weeks for public consultations (rather than 5 days) for a reform that is less sweeping. Thirdly, Prime Minister Tofan has thrown his political weight behind it, and, through this speech and subsequent interviews is actively making the case for the reform.

It is explained as setting a direction and tone, with officials indicating a larger reform to the tax code is coming, presumably next year

LPA Reform Updates

Under the proposed Local Public Administration (LPA) Reform, towns and villages had until July 31 to commit to voluntary amalgamation. By that date, 761 of 890 mayoralties had begun the process, with around 430 finalizing plans and many others stuck or delayed in the process. Given this, the State Chancellery announced an extension of the deadline to August 31.

Recall, the goal of LPA reform is to incentivize small villages to voluntarily combine into larger entities. In exchange for this decision, the government is offering substantial infrastructure funding for towns that choose to combine voluntarily.

Frank Bracco, recently Country Director for the Tony Blair Institute in Moldova, published an interactive map showing the progress of this reform. I highly recommend it for anyone trying to get into the weeds on this process.

You can find it at this link.

At least 60 mayoralties have refused any participation in the process. Under the rules of the process, they risk “normative amalgamation,” aka being merged with their neighbors with neither a say in the process nor financial incentives.

President Sandu recently warned of this saying:

“I regret that several dozen city halls refused to participate in voluntary consolidation; residents of these communities will not be able to benefit from the financial resources provided by the government. The state will not leave anyone behind; all citizens deserve a decent standard of living. However, citizens should know that city halls that did not voluntarily decide to merge their administrations will be consolidated without financial incentives or the opportunity to choose which city halls to merge with,”

International Affairs

On July 30, Prime Minister Tofan made his first international trip, traveling to Bucharest and meeting with Acting Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and President Nicușor Dan. He spoke about Moldova’s important relationship with Romania both for EU integration and for growing the economy, making the pitch for Romanian companies to consider investing in Moldova.

While the government might have hoped this would be the international affairs story of the week… it really wasn’t. Instead, on August 3, the number one story in Moldova was about a delegation from the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which landed at the Chisinau airport on a mission to talk about agricultural cooperation.

According to the Kabul Tribune, this is a senior delegation from the Taliban’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, led by Deputy Minister Sadr Azam Osmani, which “traveled to Moldova at the official invitation of the Moldovan government to discuss expanding practical and technical cooperation between the two countries.”

This led to an explosion of criticism of the government and a race to figure out what was going on. It turns out that while they did not come at the “official invitation” of Moldova’s government (which does not recognize the Taliban), they did get officially invited via a process that has been reported to be both haphazard and embarrassing.

The process started when a Moldovan agricultural producer who currently exports to Uzbekistan began investigating expansion into the Afghan market. Under their rules, the Taliban require an official visit/inspection when starting up a new trade relationship. The businessman approached the Ministry of Agriculture where State Secretary Vasile Șarban decided to help, later explaining that “I believe it is right for the Moldovan authorities to take care of Moldovan economic agents.” He then sent an official request to the Ministry of Foriegn Affairs to facilitate this access and issue visas, which they did.

Apparently, at no point was the “Taliban Delegation” topic thought important enough to bring to the attention of either Minister. Also, because none of the men is individually under sanctions, neither Ministry was required to notify the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS).

Prime Minister Tofan called the situation “embarrassing and unacceptable” and explained that while all procedures were followed normally and according to the law, “An obviously sensitive case was treated as a routine administrative file. The result was a wrong decision.” He called on all officials to be more responsible, saying “We do not manage papers, we manage a country and we must be more careful when making decisions.”

The “delegation” stayed through their planned trip on August 7, presumably meeting with the businessman but without any official meetings or recognition from the Moldovan government.

Security & Transnistria

Here’s a roundup of the top security stories of the week:

• South Ossetian “representative” Vitalii Iankovski was photographed in Tiraspol. The “diplomatic representative” from a non-state to a non-state was previously barred from entering Moldova and declared undesirable for 5 years. Zona de Securitate reported that he attended events there and was conspicuously photographed on July 29. Moldovan officials have stated that they do not know how Iankovski managed to enter Transnistria. Vitalii Iankovski has both Russian and Ukrainian citizenship.

• Fragments of a Geran-2 drone were found in the village of Văleni. The crash of another Russian drone in a rural part of the Cahul district triggered the normal round of diplomatic protests.

Other Politics & News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) raised the base rate half a point to 7.5%. They cited the upward trajectory of inflation “caused by factors associated with consumer demand against the background of persistent supply shocks.” NBM estimated the annual inflation rate to have hit 6.51% in June, just above the targeted 5±1.5%. They now estimate that inflation will continue to rise through the end of 2026 and not return to the target range until Q3 2027.

• Parliament has approved a new draft electoral code in the first reading. The code would eliminate single member constituency elections in Gagauzia and return the region to a proportional representation system. The coming elections, scheduled for November 15, would still be on the old system with the new one coming into place at the next local elections in the autonomous region. Additionally, new processes are put in place to regulate and coordinate postal voting in elections.

• Ana Revenco resigned as director of the Center for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation (STRATCOM). She had run the center since she was appointed to start it in October 2023 and did not announce a reason for her departure. In a statement, Revenco stressed the distance they had come from a startup in the midst of crisis to what is now a “functional institution with a professional team and clear operating mechanisms." President Sandu accepted Revenco’s resignation and appointed Liliana Vițu as the new STRATCOM director. Vițu had just announced her resignation as the Director of the Audiovisual Council, which replaced her with her Vice Director Aneta Gonța.

“European Economy, Efficient State”

That’s the title of the new program, which opens with a vision statement about economic development saying that Moldova must be “the most business friendly country in Europe.” Before getting into how the new Prime Minister plans to accomplish this, it is worth noting that this document is long. Really long.

At 147 pages “European Economy, Efficient State” is just a few pages short of double the combined length of the 3 former PAS government programs. Here are links to my deep-dives into those past programs for reference:

• “Moldova of Good Times” (41 pages), Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita

• “Moldova: Prosperous, Safe, European” (21 pages), Prime Minister Dorin Recean

• “EU, PEACE, DEVELOPMENT,” (15 pages), Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu

In addition to being longer, this program is structurally completely different than its predecessors. In fact it reads like a document from an entirely different genre.

Prime Minister Gavrilita’s program was fundamentally a political document, it hewed closely to the PAS electoral program and reorganized those promises in terms of ministerial competencies. Recean’s program represented a hard pivot to refocus the government on national security in the context of the war and to remove lots of outdated COVID related activities. Munteanu’s program was notable for how short it was - there was no problem statement, analysis of the current situation or political rhetoric. It contained 16 thematic areas like “European integration” and “Affordable health” and then a short bulleted list for each area. These bullets were sometimes hard targets like “modernized 3000 km of roads” and often aspirations or ideas to be explored.

Prime Minister Tofan’s government program is an entirely different beast. It reads more like a results-based management framework. The document is filled with baseline metrics from 2024 or 2025 and then specific targets of where the government hopes to get by 2029. The implication is that Prime Minister Tofan has set targets for the ministries and he plans to hold them accountable.

Simultaneously, this is a clear invitation to the public to hold his government to its promises.

Structure

After setting out a vision, the program begins with a lengthy problem statement called “The Reality We Start From.” Anemic economic growth, labor shortages, shrinking tax base, a pension system under pressure, poverty, bloated bureaucracy, poor services, unequal access to infrastructure, climate change threatening agriculture, etc. Each of these problems is tied to opportunities that can be realized by major reforms, but the main threat is identified as “inertia.” The implication is that these problems have been known for a long time and never addressed, but that time is running out and they must all be tackled head on now.

Following this problem statement, the program sets out 5 priorities for the government as follows:

1. Relaunching economic growth

2. Accelerating accession to the European Union

3. An efficient, digital and accountable state

4. Security, justice and peace firmly defended

5. Increasing the quality of life and social cohesion through decent jobs and human capital

Each of these priorities is followed by 5-8 bullet points outlining actions to be taken in these areas. All together, this gets us 18 pages into the program and sets out a clear direction of travel. What comes next from pages 19 - 147 are sector specific policies in great detail. I’ve pulled out a few of them that are particularly interesting or highlight a new approach below, but first, let’s look at some…

Big Picture Takeaways

Here are a few high level takeaways from this program:

• It is very candid about dysfunction and failure. Each section begins with a blunt analysis of what is not working and then outlines steps to fix things. It does not shy away from calling out serious dysfunction and seems totally unbothered by the fact that PAS has been in power for 4 years. It’s a prognosis and plan of action - not a political whitewash.

• EU integration is not a chapter - it is the skeleton holding it all together. Every single section from Economics to Infrastructure to Culture is organized in terms of EU integration. The program does not treat EU integration as another task list, but as a process that will have impacts across every level of government and life.

• The focus is on quantifiable actions. Targets with specific dates for completion are all over this document. Deficits to fall by 2% of GDP by 2029, shrinking of rural to Chisinau schools math performance gap by 1/3, etc. The document is numbers heavy and spends a lot of time explaining where we are and where we are going.

• Initiatives are bundled for easier communications. In a number of cases very complex reforms and activities are bundled into big-name programs like “Model Schools,” “Tourism 2029,” a new “Country as a Service” digitization program, etc. The document is highly technical but also built around communicating the work that they plan to do.

• The approach changed, the content didn’t. Most of the promises and targets set out in the Munteanu program are unchanged. What is different is the level of detail, the figures and deadlines and the structuring of all of these reforms in EU integration terms.

• The “Once Only” Principle as a cross cutting theme. The program commits to move the government to a place where the state will only ever ask information from a citizen one time. While this sounds simple, it is the strongest commitment in this document to reducing bureaucracy and saving time. In essence, it envisions a common data storage system between all state agencies and levels of government. I’ll explain how this works in practice in a footnote digression1.

• Moldova - Small but Fast. That through-line is all over the document. The analysis is that Moldova is small, far behind its neighbors and lacking in any meaningful natural resources. Given that, the competitive advantage the country can build is speed. Simple regulations, highly digitized, easy to do business. This is how the Tofan government wants to make the country more competitive, grow the economy and deliver a European quality of life.

Taken together, this program does not outline a major new set of policies, it reorganizes the PAS electoral program and policies into a new framework. This framework is quantifiable, time bound and structured to invite accountability2 and bound by a real through-line.

If EU integration is the goal then a small, highly accountable and very fast state is how Moldova gets there.

Sectoral Policies

Read more

August is one of the best months to experience Moldova. The country celebrates two of its most important national holidays - Independence Day on 27 August and Limba Noastră (Our Language Day) on 31 August. During the final week of the month, Chișinău comes alive with free concerts, outdoor performances, artisan markets, food vendors, and cultural celebrations that attract visitors from across the country.

Independence Day marks Moldova’s declaration of independence in 1991 and is the country’s largest annual public celebration. While the official program is typically released only a few weeks beforehand, visitors can expect festivities centered around the Great National Assembly Square and Ștefan cel Mare Boulevard, including live music, family activities, exhibitions, and an evening concert featuring some of Moldova’s best-known artists. Museums, parks, and public spaces across the capital also host special events throughout the day.

Just four days later, Moldova celebrates Limba Noastră (Our Language Day), a holiday dedicated to the Romanian language, literature, and national culture. The atmosphere is noticeably different - more reflective than festive - with poetry readings, book fairs, folk performances, and cultural programs held throughout Chișinău and other cities. For anyone interested in Moldova’s history and cultural identity, it is one of the most rewarding days of the year to visit.

Beyond these national celebrations, August is packed with the year’s biggest music festivals, anime conventions, sporting events, food festivals, and outdoor entertainment. Long, warm evenings and a full calendar of events make it one of the easiest months to explore Moldova.

Featured Events

July 31 – August 2 | Anime Days at Shopping MallDova

One of Moldova’s largest celebrations of anime, manga, cosplay, gaming, and Japanese pop culture returns to Shopping MallDova. The three-day event features cosplay competitions, gaming tournaments, K-pop performances, workshops, artist booths, merchandise vendors, and activities for all ages. Admission is free, making it an excellent event for both dedicated fans and curious first-time visitors.

Location: Shopping MallDova, Chișinău
Admission: Free
For more information: Shopping Malldova

August 7–9 | Festivalul Lupilor (Festival of the Wolves)

Held against the spectacular backdrop of Orheiul Vechi, Festivalul Lupilor has become one of Moldova’s premier summer festivals. Visitors can enjoy live music from popular Moldovans such as Satoshi and Alternosfera, historical reenactments, camping, artisan markets, food vendors, workshops, and outdoor activities. Even for those who don’t attend the concerts, the location alone makes the trip worthwhile.

Location: Orheiul Vechi
Tickets can be purchased here: Official Site

August 8–9 | KULTURA: Moldova Auto Weekend

Arena Chișinău hosts one of the country’s largest automotive festivals featuring modified cars, classic vehicles, drifting demonstrations, exhibitions, motorsport displays, food trucks, music, and family-friendly activities.

Location: Arena Chișinău
For more information and tickets: Official Site

August 8–9 | La Plăcinte Festival

A celebration of traditional Moldovan food, music, and crafts held in the Botanical Garden. Visitors can sample regional dishes, enjoy live folk performances, browse handmade products, and experience one of Moldova’s best-loved culinary traditions. Live music will be performed by a long list of famous Moldovan singers such as Satoshi, Nelly Ciobanu, Pasha Parfeni, and more.

For more information, music lineup, and tickets: Iticket

August 15 | MIRAGE Festival

One of Moldova’s largest electronic music festivals returns with international DJs, immersive stage production, lighting effects, and an energetic late-night atmosphere. The event has become increasingly popular with visitors from across the region.

Location: Arena Chișinău
Tickets can be purchased here: Livetickets Site

August 22–23 | Summer Fest 2026

Summer Fest is Moldova’s largest contemporary music festival and one of the highlights of the country’s entertainment calendar. Thousands of visitors are expected for two days of live performances featuring international artists alongside some of Moldova’s biggest musical acts. Food courts, entertainment zones, and activities continue throughout the day.

Location: Botanical Garden, Chișinău
Tickets can be purchased here: https://summerfest.md

August 27 | Independence Day 🇲🇩

Moldova celebrates its Independence Day with concerts, military ceremonies, family activities, exhibitions, artisan markets, and evening entertainment throughout central Chișinău. Great National Assembly Square becomes the centre of celebrations, while many museums and cultural institutions organize special programs.

The official schedule is normally released during August.

For the official program (when released): Gov.md Website

August 31 | Limba Noastră (Our Language Day)

This national holiday celebrates the Romanian language and Moldova’s literary heritage through poetry readings, concerts, exhibitions, book fairs, and cultural performances. While quieter than Independence Day, it offers visitors an excellent opportunity to experience Moldovan culture and traditions.

The official program is usually announced during the second half of August but expect speeches and poetry recitals and events near the statues of famous authors such as the Mihai Eminescu statue in Stefan cel Mare Park.

Sports This Month

Whether you’re looking to compete or simply enjoy a local sporting atmosphere, August offers plenty of opportunities to get active or cheer on Moldova’s athletes.

August 6–9 | Balkan U22 Beach Volleyball Championship

Some of southeastern Europe’s best young beach volleyball players come to Chișinău for the Balkan U22 Championship. Matches are held throughout the day in a relaxed outdoor setting, making this an enjoyable event even for casual spectators.

Location: La Izvor Park, Chișinău
Admission: Free for spectators
For some information on this event: Fest.md

August 15 | Europe Triathlon Junior Cup

Young elite athletes from across Europe compete in swimming, cycling, and running during this international event. Held alongside Moldova’s national championships, it is one of the country’s highest-profile international sporting competitions.

Location: La Izvor Park, Chișinău
Official event information: Triathalon.org

August 29 | Dragonul de Aur Marathon

Finish the month by joining runners from across Moldova in the Dragonul de Aur Marathon with a course that will take you around the historic sites of Orhei Vechi. With marathon, half-marathon, and shorter race options, the event welcomes both serious competitors and recreational runners.

Location: Orhei Vechi
Registration and information: Run Moldova Site

Other Things Happening This Month

In addition to the headline events above, August is packed with smaller concerts, exhibitions, sporting competitions, and family activities taking place throughout Moldova.

Open-Air Cinema Nights

Throughout August

Several parks across Chișinău host free evening film screenings during the summer. Bring a blanket or lawn chair and enjoy classic films and recent releases under the stars.

More information: Fest.MD

August 15 | COMPOT Fest III

COMPOT Fest returns for its third edition with a full day of family-friendly entertainment, live music, interactive games, food, and activities for both children and adults. Organized to celebrate six years of the COMPOT brand, the festival promises a relaxed summer atmosphere with performances by guest artists, children’s entertainment, giveaways, and a wide variety of local food and drinks. Whether you’re traveling with family or simply looking for a unique summer event outside Chișinău, COMPOT Fest offers an enjoyable day in northern Moldova.

Location: Fazenda Event Venue, Sîngerei–Bălți Highway
Time: 2:00 PM
For more information: Official Site (Russian)
Tickets can be purchased here: ITicket Website (Romanian)

Museum Exhibitions

Throughout August

National Museum of History hosts a temporary exhibit “The Smell of Warm Bread” featuring tools used in the cultivation and production of grains in the Dacian civilization.

More information: Official Museum Page

As always, if you know of an event we’ve missed, let us know in the comments. We’ll continue updating our monthly guides to help readers discover the best of Moldova throughout the year.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

Moldova Matters has previously reported on USMI’s organization of the planned CODEL and their official request for a meeting with then Prime Minister Munteanu that referenced 4 members of Congress - Representatives Andy Harris (R-MD), Earl “Buddy” Carter (R-GA), Michael Cloud (R-TX) and Sheri Biggs (R-SC). In response to that original reporting, Representative Carter’s office responded that he “is not currently scheduled to attend.” Representatives for the other members of Congress did not respond to requests for comment and neither did USMI.

No CODEL arrived in Moldova on the scheduled dates and Moldova Matters can report that at least in some cases, USMI never reached out to notify those it planned to meet with of a cancellation or to try and reschedule.

What Happened?

With no comment forthcoming from either the named participants or USMI we don’t know for sure. It is possible that Moldova Matters’ reporting on USMI director Sam Alaverdov’s past financial sponsorship of a Moldovan politician linked to Ilan Shor, or the fact that USMI’s website features a partner list of Moldovan government entities, companies, NGOs and the Moldova UNHCR office that is substantially false, caused members of Congress to reconsider their participation.

Furthermore, because the members never traveled to Chisinau, House Ethics rules - which would have required financing and schedule details to become public 15 days after the CODEL’s return - will likely never be triggered, meaning the public may never learn how USMI planned to fund the trip.

Going forward, Moldova Matters will continue reporting on USMI’s activities, including its relationships with US-based institutions beyond this single delegation.

Following his swearing in on July 22, Prime Minister Vasile Tofan held his first cabinet meeting where he told the ministers to “tighten their belts.” He took particular aim at official travel, noting that “travel budgets are quite large” and stating that some of it is touristic in nature. He stated:

“I learned today that the Prime Minister approves all visits outside the country. (…) I want to tell you that I will be much more demanding in approving these visits,”

In the meeting he addressed public concerns about “unspeakable” public sector salaries. He stated that a new wage law is needed (and coming) that will codify salary rates as well as practices around bonuses. But that in the meantime, all ministers were instructed to “bring order” to the agencies and organizations in their portfolios.

Speaking about the tax reform, Tofan stated that “The first attempt to bring the tax reform to fruition was not successful, to put it delicately. In fact, it was a failure.” But he emphasized the need for a major reform of the tax system and directed the Ministry of Finance to publish a draft by August 6th. He told the assembled ministers that he would be involved in the process and personally responsible for this reform.

This drew a stark contrast with his predecessor who put out his first statement on the tax reform more than 2 weeks after he stepped down. In it he praised the professionalism of the reform, noted that it was approved by the IMF, compared critics to “amateur league” football players and generally punched back at critics1.

Prime Minister Tofan has also announcement members of his team, with former Minister of Finance Andrian Gavrilită returning to government as his chief economic advisor. Carolina Bogatiuc will be his chief of staff and journalist Dumitru Ciorici will be his press secretary.

Radu Musteața’s Turbulent 3 Days in Office

An early challenge for the Tofan government came when Journal TV published a picture of the brand new Minister of Agriculture, Radu Musteața, allegedly showing him at a Democratic Party (PDM) meeting. The story reported that the photo in question showed Musteața receiving his PDM membership card from PDM MP Nae Simion Pleșca. Allegedly, this occurred sometime in 2017.

This story mattered because it alleged that Musteața had joined Vladimir Plahotniuc’s PDM at the height of the oligarch’s state capture.

Minister Musteața adamantly denied this writing on facebook that “I have never led any territorial organization of a political party and I have not been a member of the Democratic Party.” He went on to repeat categorical denials in multiple statements and on TV interviews.

Prime Minister Tofan indicated that he believed Musteață and that lacking clear evidence contradicting his statements, “Radu Musteață has my full support.” This evidence soon began piling up with PDM’s successor party, PSDE stating that their records show that was a PDM member and had a party leadership position in Ciocana.

After 3 days as Minister of Agriculture, Radu Musteață resigned from his position claiming that he did so to protect the team and maintain trust, asking that the action “not be tarnished and eroded by false and manipulative information.” Effectively, he resigned while still denying the accusations.

Asked to comment, Speaker Igor Grosu stated that he believed Musteață when he said he was not a PDM party member and expressed regret that he resigned. The same day PSDE produced a copy of his signed application for membership and Musteață finally admitted that he lied. He continued to downplay his interactions with PDM as “insignificant” but admitted that he regretted that he “did not have the courage to tell the whole truth.”

This marks one of the shortest tenures of any minister in Moldovan history2 and a bumpy start for the new government. No announcement of a new candidate for Minister of Agriculture has been made to date.

Politics & News

Here’s a roundup of the other top politics stories of the week:

• Anti-corruption police (CNA) detain 3 in relation to MoldATSA scandal. At the same time the CNA conducted 25 searches in relation to alleged criminal decision making at the company - including violate public procurement, fake hiring competitions, unjustified salaries and bonuses and more. CNA noted that MoldATSA spent 9 million lei on staff trainings in the first 5 months of 2025 alone including 106,000 lei spent on sending a staffer to the UK for a beginner English course. Arrests targeted decision makers including the company’s Chief Accountant. Two of the 3 arrested are confined for 30 days detention while one is on house arrest.

• The government approved the “Restart in Education” reform aimed at centralizing school administration. Under the proposed law, all schools above the level of kindergarten will be subordinated directly to the Ministry of Education via newly established Territorial Education Agencies. Currently, schools are administered locally by district and municipal councils. Minister of Education Dan Perciun explained the reform as necessary for uniform standards and conditions throughout the country.

• The Model Schools network is expanding. Parliament approved an investment of €50 million euros to remodel 20 more schools in the regions. Of the investment, €40 million will come from the European Investment Bank (EIB) as a loan. This investment will bring the total number of schools in the program up to 90 and when renovations are complete will see 1 in 4 children in Moldova enrolled in a Model School.

• The government approved an anti-SLAPP law. The proposed law would create new protections against SLAPP lawsuits,3 allowing judges to rapidly throw out obviously unfounded claims, sanction those committing abuses by filing these suits and create protections for defendants of SLAPP suits to more easily recoup their legal costs. This law is designed to protect journalists and civil society activists and brings Moldovan legislation into line with EU directives.

• The government approved a legal framework for cryptocurrencies. It delegates supervision of the digital currencies and assets markets to the National Bank (NBM) and National Financial Market Commission. The framework envisions separate regulations for fiat-backed stablecoins, coins backed by other assets and “other” crypto currencies. Currently Moldova has no regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies effectively making them illegal in the country.

• 30 day State of Alert declared in the area of energy security. The government noted that commercial diesel stocks fell from 17.6 days supply at the end of June to 6.9 days on July 27. Fuel imports continue to be affected by the War in Iran as well as supply chain disruptions elsewhere - including Kazakhstan severely reducing outputs following Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil terminals. Uncertainty has caused prices to resume climbing after a few weeks of relative plateau, with diesel prices now 50.6% higher than pre-war (in Iran) levels and gasoline 29% higher. Under the state of alert fuel imports are expedited through special corridors and certain exports are prohibited.

• 30 day State of Alert declared in the area of water security. The alert comes in the context of reduced water levels in the Novodnestrovsk reservoir which is at a record low level for this time of year and is rapidly draining. If Ukraine restricts outflow from the reservoir it could substantially reduce the flow of the Nistru river, impacting Moldova’s water supply and threaten the provision of water to towns and even to Chisinau. The state of alert will increase monitoring of river flows and direct downs to switch to alternative water sources where available.

• On July 20 TV8 released their long signaled investigation into the real estate dealings of Alexandr Trubca. By the time of release, Tubca had already resigned from parliament but continues to deny wrongdoing. The investigation outlines how Tubca entered parliament 5 years ago with modest earnings and property and is today on the verge of becoming a euro millionaire. His increase in wealth comes entirely from an expanding property portfolio, mostly in the Chisinau suburb of Trușeni but also in Romania. In Trușeni, his companies have invested in 2 projects, one to build a 400 unit apartment building and another to develop 34 single family homes. TV8 reported that his partners include the recently resigned director of the Public Property Agency as well as PAS donors. Trubca struggled to explain the source of his funds, noting that for some projects he borrowed the investment money4 and others were funded from proceeds from the first project - though TV8 noted that this timeline does not match up and his company showed no revenues at the time of the second investment. Alexandr Trubca continues to deny wrongdoing.

The Rabbi and the Rocket Launchers?

Back in November 2025, customs officers at the Leușeni-Albița border crossing between Moldova and Romania discovered a large cache of weapons hidden inside a truck. This story prompted a wave of disinformation with Russian proxies alleging the smuggling of American Stinger missiles / drugs / all manner of other conspiracies (in fact, all the weapons were Russian / Soviet).

The truck driver is in Romanian custody and continues to assert that he did not know what was in the truck. Moldova arrested 5 additional alleged conspirators and one plead guilty this week, getting a 5 year sentence with 3 suspended. His name is Eugeniu Pralea and he was the courier who brought the weapons into Moldova from Ukraine. Documents related to his sentencing have shed light on the details of the case with some startling revelations. They include:

• Weapons: The shipment included 8 RPG-30 anti-tank grenade launchers, a launch tube for a 9K333 Verba anti-aircraft missile system, 18 9M133 Kornet laser-guided anti-tank missile systems and an entire Geran 2 drone (disassembled and with a defective motor).

• Smuggling from Ukraine to Moldova: The weapons were smuggled out of Ukraine from 2023 - 2025. Eugeniu Pralea was hired for this and claims to have accepted the job on the condition that the smuggled goods were neither weapons nor drugs. He claims to have been told it was electronic parts and / or goods related to humanitarian aid projects. He claims that no “arrangements” were made with Moldovan customs officers at Palanca because the shipments were broken into small amounts and never discovered.

• Destination - Israel: After being accumulated over 2 years and stored in a warehouse in Moldova, the weapons were wrapped in a special material meant to fool border scanners. The truck carrying them was destined for the port of Constanta in Romania and then on to Israel.

• Organizer - Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman: Eugeniu Pralea alleges that Rabbi Zaltzman organized the shipments from Ukraine to Moldova and onward to Israel.

Searches turned up multiple phone calls and text messages between the defendants and the Rabbi including pictures of the weapons and discussion about them. Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman has professed innocence and is currently in Israel. Prosecutors have not commented on whether or not he is being investigated.

Rabbi Pinhas Zaltzman titles himself the “Chief Rabbi of the Republic of Moldova” and is a prominent figure in Moldova’s Orthodox Jewish Community based at the historic “Hay” synagogue. However, there is no official “Chief Rabbi of the Republic of Moldova” and the title is self-styled. The “Jewish Community of the Republic of Moldova5” released statements noting that the title of “Chief Rabbi” is self appointed and that he has “never been appointed, elected or confirmed in any religious leadership position within the Jewish Community of the Republic of Moldova by its statutory bodies.”

Other Security and Defense News

Here’s a roundup of the other security, defense and hybrid war news”

• Romania shoots down 3 Russian drones in 48 hours. For the first time since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, the Romanian air force has downed 3 Russian drones that entered its airspace - one in Buzău and 2 in the Danube Delta region. Romania expelled one Russian diplomat in protest against the incursions. President Sandu condemned the violation of Romanian airspace and stated that

  “Romania’s security is the security of the Republic of Moldova. We stand with Romania.”

• Moldova has delayed the imposition of VAT and excise taxes on Transnistria until September 1. The taxes, which were supposed to come into force on August 1, are being delayed due to the change in government. Transnistria’s “Foreign Minister” Vitaly Ignatiev recently refused to travel to Chisinau for a meeting in the 1+1 format on the tax changes stating that the issue is “not on the negotiating agenda.” Ignatiev has continuously refused to travel to Moldova for fear of arrest under a law on separatism - a fear which the Moldovan authorities call unfounded.

• Three Shor parties to be dissolved by court decision. The "Renaissance,” “Chance” and “Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova” parties were found to be successors to the unconstitutional Shor Party and have been dissolved. The Moldova Mare (Greater Moldova) party was suspended for 12 months. These rules mark wins for the Ministry of Justice, which petitioned for their dissolution based on referrals from the Central Election Commission (CEC).

• “Evrazia” declared an extremist organization. The decision comes from Moldova’s Court of Appeals and attaches criminal liability to Moldovan citizens - at home or abroad - which fund Evrazia or participate in their programs. The request for this designation came from Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) in July 2025.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• Indian President Droupadi Murmu visited Chisinau. This marked the first visit from the head of state of the Republic of India since Moldovan independence. In meetings with President Sandu they discussed economic cooperation, deeper cooperation in higher education6 and investments. She also participated in the first Moldova-India Business Forum which was organized by Invest Moldova.

• The United States drops all tariffs against Moldova (for now). On July 24th the Trump Administration imposed a sweeping new tariff regime on imports from more than 80 countries including the European Union. This new regime replaced the global 10 percent duty that had expired at midnight which itself replaced the “Liberation Day” tariffs that were struck down by the Supreme Court. This newest iteration utilizes the Trade Act of 1974 and is designed to combat countries that engage in “forced labor.” This join a patchwork of other tariffs, including some levied under a revived Smoot–Hawley authority7 as part of the ever changing trade policy of the United States. Moldova was not included in the recent announcements which targeted major trading partners and largely skipped smaller countries (for the time being). This means that the US tariff on Moldovan goods has gone from 31% (announced, not implemented), to 25% to 10% to 15% to 0% in the last year and a half.

Today we’re going to look at the new cabinet - who’s in, and who’s out - as well as the vote of confident and parliamentary debate. In a future, subscriber only article, we will look at Prime Minister Tofan’s program in depth. Running over 147 pages it is both ambitious, unusual and deserves a deep dive in itself.

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Meet the Ministers

While Tofan has come in with a major shift in tone and priorities, he is largely keeping the same team of ministers assembled by former Prime Minister Munteanu. No changes have been made to the key security and foreign affairs portfolios - and the changes that have been made largely prioritize experience and continuity rather than radical shifts.

Minister of Finance

Victoria Belous will return to the position of Minister of Finance. She previously held the office from July 2024 - November 2025 when she departed after having been elected to parliament. Andrian Gavriliță was appointed to the Ministry. Belous will now leave parliament and replace Gavriliță.

Prior to becoming Minister the first time, Victoria Belous worked for 17 years in the State Tax Service, working her way up through the ranks. Previously as Minister, her profile had been something of a studious technocrat and supporter of the status quo. In parliament, her profile shifted dramatically as she became a vocal proponent for reform and one of the most articulate members of the PAS faction on economic and fiscal issues. Last month, when MP Radu Marian stepped down as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Economy, Budget and Finance she took his place.

Andrian Gavriliță wrote a long facebook post after the change was announced writing “Unfortunately, being a minister is more than just theory, figures, understandings with the IMF, and rational decisions. It’s a deeply political role.” Referencing the tax reform that he championed, he blamed personal mistakes as well as very bad timing - referring to the MoldATSA scandal among others - for the media storm surrounding his last month in office.

Minister of Agriculture

Ludmila Catlabuga, who has led the Ministry of Agriculture since November 2024, will be replaced with Director of the National Food Safety Agency (ANSA) Radu Musteața. After graduating from the State University of Moldova with a bachelors in Chemical Technology and Biotechnology and a masters in Environmental Protection, Radu Musteața joined ANSA in 2013 and has held various positions before becoming the director in 2021.

Ludmila Catlabuga departed expressing hope “that the relationship and communication between the ministry and people in agriculture be no worse than the one we managed to build.”

Minister of Health

Alexandru Gasnaș will replace Emil Ceban as Minister of Health. Gasnaș had previously served as advisor to President Sandu in the field of health and as a State Secretary in the Ministry of Health. He is a neurologist, who has been both an associate professor at the Nicolae Testemițanu State University of Medicine and Pharmacy, and headed the department of Neurology, Internal Diseases and Epileptology at the Institute of Emergency Medicine.

Emil Ceban will return to the position of Rector of the Nicolae Testemițanu State University of Medicine and Pharmacy.

Minister of Culture

Dan Suruceanu will replace Cristian Jardan as Minister of Culture. Suruceanu has been the deputy administrator of the Chisinau Arena since 2023 and prior to that worked for at least some of his career at the National Museum of Arts1.

Presenting the Cabinet and Program in Parliament

On Tuesday July 21 Vasile Tofan led his proposed cabinet of ministers to parliament to present their governing program and ask for a vote of confidence from the legislature.

In parliament, Vasile Tofan started by stating the challenges ahead and noting that “There is no point in denying that we are going through a crisis.” He noted that the country faces simultaneous economic and political tensions but that there is a “single window of opportunity” in the coming years. He stated:

“I want us to find the balance between the necessary changes and the stability of the foundation together. Let’s make capital repairs, but let’s not shake the walls. We are not the first country to go through such challenges. Other small countries – Ireland, Estonia, New Zealand – have had such complicated moments and emerged victorious from them. I know that any comparison is not perfect, but such examples encourage us.”

Tofan went on to structure his address to the deputies around the 5 priorities outlined in his program of government.

Priority 1. Relaunching economic growth

He spoke of anemic GDP growth, ballooning imports and shrinking exports and “enormous” challenges including…

“… a small internal market, a declining population, a labor shortage, insufficient capital, an agriculture vulnerable to drought, and an economy that exports too much raw material and too little added value.”

Tofan stated that the government’s starting priority is to “bring back confidence” because “Pessimism is the most dangerous disease of an economy.”

Priority 2. Accelerating accession to the European Union

“The objective of the mandate is to be ready to complete the negotiations and prepare for the signing of the Accession Treaty by the end of 2028”

Tofan once again centered the goal of being prepared to join the EU in 2028. He stressed the need to open all negotiating clusters this year and to move rapidly through reforms. At the same time he emphasized that simply changing rules and laws does not improve people’s lives - and committed his team towards careful implementation so that people feel these changes.

Priority 3. An efficient, digital and accountable state

“Too often, the state asks the citizen to be more organized than it is.”

In his remarks, Mr. Tofan noted cases where state institutions make citizens run from office to office to resubmit paperwork that the state already has in its possession2. He spoke of overlapping responsibilities between agencies and programs and policies not based on results.

“The state must be smaller where it duplicates functions and stronger where it is indispensable – security, justice, infrastructure, education, health, and protection of the vulnerable.”

Priority 4. Security, justice and peace

“I lived in Kyiv. I know the sound of the missile alarm. I know how a Shahed flies and how a Kalibr hits. I know what it’s like to collect the shards of broken windows in the morning from the explosion of an Iskander 50 meters from your house.”

Tofan spoke of the “real and interconnected” risks that Moldova faces. Attacks against energy systems, cyberattacks, disinformation, organized crime and the war next door. He stated that “Constitutional neutrality does not oblige the Republic of Moldova to be weak” and tied investments in defense and law enforcement with a modernizing of citizen services3.

Priority 5. Increasing the quality of life and social cohesion

“Citizens do not live by macroeconomic indicators. They live by the salary they receive at the end of the month, by the bill they have to pay, by the waiting time at the doctor's office, by the quality of their child's school, and by the certainty that their parents will have support in their old age.”

Tofan spoke of the need to translate his plans for economic growth into good jobs and better public services. He laid out concrete targets for increasing employment rates by making the labor code more flexible while also maintaining protections for employees’ rights.

Debate and Vote

After delivering his speech, the parliamentary session moved to a Q&A format. From 12:20 pm until 8:27 pm Vasile Tofan answered questions about his team, his program and himself. Throughout he proved to have deft political instincts, addressing complex questions head-on while not falling into traps or going down topical cul-de-sacs. Compared to recent prime ministers, he seemed much more comfortable and confident speaking extemporaneously and he was consistently able to pivot questions back to his focus area - the economy.

Following the debate, parliament voted with 53 MPs for, 21 against and 21 abstaining. Two PAS MPs did not vote in support: Alexandr Trubca who recently resigned and whose seat has yet to be filled, and Vasile Grădinaru who previously submitted a request for absence for personal reasons. All MPs from Alternative, Democracy at Home and Our Party abstained along with 1 MP from the Socialists. The remaining Socialist and Communist MPs voted no.

Vasile Tofan is Sworn in as Prime Minister

On July 22 President Maia Sandu swore in Vasile Tofan as Prime Minister alongside his cabinet of minister. She emphasized EU integration as the clear agenda of the government and called on the new Prime Minister to keep the promises he made in parliament the day before.

Moldova has a new Prime Minister and government, we’ll return to follow their first steps in this week’s roundup.

On their website, USMI lists 10 companies, organizations and government entities in Moldova under the page “Our Partnerships.” On that page they claim that “USMI's work is made possible through a growing network of Moldovan and international partners” and suggest concrete cooperation writing:

“Together with our partners, we build the programs, connections, and civic infrastructure that a stronger Moldova requires”

Of those 10 partners, the National Olympic & Sports Committee (CNOS), UNHCR - the UN Refugee Agency in Moldova, the Handball Federation of Moldova, NGO Speranta 87 and the National Commission of the Republic of Moldova for UNESCO all denied knowledge of USMI and any official partnership with the organization.

A representative of Moldova’s National Olympic & Sports Committee (CNOS) responded writing:

“The National Olympic and Sports Committee of the Republic of Moldova has no formal partnership or any other form of association with the US Moldova Initiative. Furthermore, we are not familiar with this organization and have never provided our consent for the use of our logo or for the inclusion of our Committee among the partners listed on its website.

The use of the National Olympic and Sports Committee of the Republic of Moldova’s logo on this website was unauthorized and constitutes an improper and unauthorized use of our visual identity.”

Emphasis theirs.

Other listed partners - WKF Moldova, construction company Basconslux SRL, the Union of Sugar Producers of Moldova and Vinăria Bostavan (Purcari Winery Group) did not respond to requests for comment as of this article’s publication.

USMI also lists the Linella Supermarket chain and Commercial Director Maria Movileanu by name in their partnership writeup. Reached for comment, Maria Movileanu responded that she served as the parent company Moldretail’s Commercial Director until June 30, 2026, but that “I have no idea about this project” and that she is “not aware of this initiative.” She did not reply on behalf of the company.

These responses indicate a pattern. USMI’s website partner list appears to be substantially, if not completely, false. In at least 5 instances, partners were listed without consent or verification and in the case of UNHCR, their representative stated that their attempts to contact USMI to remedy this have not been successful.

USMI and Executive Director Sam Alaverdov did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.

The offices of Representatives Andy Harris, Michael Cloud, and Sheri Biggs - who USMI has listed as participants in the July 24–29 CODEL - did not respond to questions about USMI’s claimed partnerships or whether this new information affects their understanding of the trip. The offices previously did not respond to requests to confirm their attendance.

You can read Moldova Matters’ previous reporting on this CODEL here:

USMI Has an Unusual Schedule in Moldova

Congressional Delegations traveling to Moldova will typically schedule meetings with private sector representatives - especially American investors - to discuss economic cooperation between the two countries. These meetings would typically be organized by the American Chamber of Commerce in Moldova (AMCHAM).

Since this CODEL is privately organized, USMI exercises considerable control over who the members of Congress will meet while in Chisinau. Moldova Matters has confirmed that USMI did not reach out to AMCHAM for a meeting, nor did they contact the European Business Association (EBA), the Foreign Investors Association (FIA) or the Moldova Small Enterprise Alliance (AIM)1. Instead, they are meeting with private sector representatives via the “Traktor Business Community.”

Unlike the previously mentioned organizations, Traktor is not a business association2. It does not represent investors or local companies in dialogues with the government and it does not participate in the development of policy or reforms. Traktor is more like a club that organizes events and parties for their members3. Nor are there any indications that Traktor has American members or seeks to incorporate foreign investors. Multiple people familiar with Traktor’s work told Moldova Matters that it is a predominantly Russian-language group4 focused on networking and events organization.

Cristina Trucani, the Executive Director of Traktor, confirmed their participation in the delegation’s visit but stated that they are “awaiting further details about the meeting from the American side.”

What This All Means

On March 13, 2026 USMI launched their website stating that their organization “connects Americans and Moldovans through exchange, civic engagement, and the belief that real relationships change the world.” There is no evidence that USMI has done any activities in support of this aspiration so far. On their website, they list partners who they claim play key roles in their work. Of the 10 partners listed, 5 had never heard of USMI and flatly stated that their organization did not have any partnership with them. No “partner” confirmed a relationship with USMI at the time of publication.

The one activity that USMI has engaged in is the organization of a privately funded US Congressional delegation to Moldova, scheduled to arrive this week. With no prior activities, USMI has publicly presented only 2 mechanisms of verifying their credibility - their partners and their team. With half of their listed partners denying any connection, that leaves their team - namely, Executive Director Sam Alaverdov.

Prior Moldova Matters reporting has shown how Mr. Alaverdov privately funded political lobbying efforts for a Moldovan politician linked to sanctioned oligarch Ilan Shor. He was also listed on House Ethics Committee filings as the representative of a different NGO that financed a 2021 CODEL to Ukraine. That NGO reported neither income nor expenses in the year in question and it remains unclear who paid for the three members of Congress, family and staff to make that trip. You can read that reporting here:

Finally, USMI is not simply organizing plane tickets and hotels. They are substantially, if not totally, responsible for the organization of the meetings and events that these members of Congress will attend. The fact that they will be meeting the Traktor Business Community, but not the American Chamber of Commerce, highlights this discretion.

This Friday, July 24, USMI is expected to bring three members of the US Congress to Chisinau. If the trip proceeds as planned, an organization that appeared 4 months ago, has falsely listed partnerships in Moldova and is run by a man whose previous NGO reported serious financial discrepancies, including on a past CODEL, will organize travel, lodging and events for three elected representatives and will substantially frame their view of Moldova.

Moldova Matters will continue following the story and report on the CODEL itself if it arrives as planned.

Prime Minister Designate Vasile Tofan will present the composition of his government and their program to parliament for a vote of confidence on Tuesday July 21.

Since his appointment on Saturday, Tofan has been holding consultations with business associations, opposition political parties, civic groups and the interim government. He met with all 16 acting ministers to discuss the critical priorities for the next 12 months. No acting minister confirmed to the press that their job is safe and none has resigned so far.

In remarks so far, Tofan has signaled continuity - stressing that he would not disrupt ongoing reform processes such as the local public administration reform that he previously opposed publicly. In various remarks he stressed the importance of EU integration and building a growing and competitive economy as his top priorities.

Vasile Tofan turned 44 years old the day after his appointment by President Sandu. He and his wife welcomed their 4th child, becoming the parents of 4 boys, less than one month ago. Tofan has joked that his wife is not thrilled with his acceptance of this mandate but supportive.

EU Opens Cluster 6 with Moldova and Ukraine

On Tuesday July 14 the European Union opened negotiations on Cluster 6: External Relations with Moldova and Ukraine. For Moldova, this was made official at the 3rd Moldova - EU Intergovernmental Conference in Brussels with Moldova being represented by Interim PM Eugeniu Osmochescu. Cluster 6 contains 2 negotiating chapters titled “External relations” and “Foreign, security and defense policy.”

July 14 came to be called “Super Tuesday” as the EU held 4 intergovernmental conferences. While Moldova and Ukraine both opened a cluster, Albania provisionally closed 3 chapters and Montenegro provisionally closed 2. Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos named it “Super Tuesday” as she noted that no comparable step in EU enlargement had taken place since 2002. These moves come in the context of Hungary no longer blocking some aspects of enlargement after Viktor Orban’s defeat this Spring.

International Affairs & Security

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs & security stories of the week:

• President Sandu represented Moldova at the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) meeting in Paris on July 13. This is the first time that Moldova has participated in the CoW and marks a further commitment in support of the defense of Ukraine. In remarks, President Sandu stressed that Moldova is not the only neutral nation that participates and that Moldova joins “a group of countries, largely European, who have united their efforts to support Ukraine to reach a ceasefire and, subsequently, a just peace, which will prevent further aggression.”

• German Ambassador to Moldova Hubert Knirsch created a scandal when he suggested that Romanian and “Moldovan” might be different languages. In an interview on Jurnal TV, the Ambassador was asked about the topic of Moldova uniting with Romania with the interviewer noting that “we were once one country, we speak the same language, we have a common culture, traditions and religion.” The Ambassador noted that any decision on union belongs to the citizens of Moldova and Romania, but questioned the idea that the countries share a common language and religion. His formulation was interpreted by many in the public as saying that some people call the language “Moldovan” and some call it “Romanian” - turned into an explosive controversy. He clarified in a later video that he was speaking of the linguistic diversity of the country. The Ambassador received massive criticism online with some even suggesting that the Ambassador is a Russian agent. Ambassador Knirsch has apologized for not being “clear and precise” and promised to go on a listening tour to better understand the “concerns” raised1.

• President Maia Sandu attended the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Kyiv. There she advocated for more air defense support for Ukraine, more pressure on Russia and increased sanctions. She held bilateral meetings with President Zelenskyy, the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković and the Prime Minister of Slovenia Janez Janša. Moldova officially signed the Kyiv Declaration reiterating support for Ukraine in the war against Russia.

• Russia’s FSB claims to have foiled a drone attack in the Moscow region involving 2 Moldovans. In their press release, the FSB alleges a complex plot involving 35 drones transported from Slovakia hidden in crates of Spanish ceramic tiles. The alleged plot is complicated, and improbably involves Ukrainian Rapper “Kyivstoner.” The FSB alleges that 2 Moldovans, Victor Pîrlog (born in 1986) and Aurel Calos (born in 1995) participated in the plot and escaped. They claim that all 35 drones were launched but were intercepted by special technology before hitting their targets2. None of this has been confirmed and Moldova’s Ministry of Foriegn Affairs has requested clarification.

• On Monday July 13 a Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drone crashed in the village of Copanca in Căușeni. The Army confirmed that the drone entered Moldovan airspace during a large Russian attack on Odesa. On impact, the drone’s gas tank exploded, causing alarm the crash site was less than 50m from a residential house. When police and army sappers arrived they found that the 40 kg warhead had not detonated. PAS MP Artemie Cătănoi went to the scene and told the press that the elderly couple living nearby were evacuated with their pets. Army sappers successfully moved the drone to a safe place and detonated it. This all resulted in official protests and the summoning of Russian Ambassador Designate Oleg Ozerov to the Ministry of Foriegn Affairs for his 3rd note of reprimand in 4 months.

• On the same day, the Council of the European Union announced €120 million euros in new assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Moldova. These funds are for the purchase of air defense equipment, with a focus on medium range air defense. This brings total EPF support for Moldova to €317 million since the start of the full scale invasion, with past financing going to clean up Nistru river pollution,3 support Army sappers with disposing of new (and old WW2) shells and more.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top stories in politics (and scandal) of the week:

• PAS MP Alexandr Trubca announced that he is resigning from parliament on July 10. After previously trying to preempt a coming investigation by TV8 with a serious of facebook statements explaining his investments, the MP resigned while claiming that “Everything I said publicly remains valid.” PAS leader Igor Grosu specified that he resigned after conversation with the party faction but did not answer whether Trubca did it of his own accord. TV8 has stated that they will air their investigation on July 19, but previewed it by noting that when elected in 2021, Alexandr Trubca had a salary from a local NGO, drove a modest car and owed a substantial mortgage on his apartment. They state that he is now a “multimillionaire in real estate, with investments in Moldova and abroad” and TV8 promises “more irregularities related to the businesses of Trubca and his partners, including other PAS deputies and state dignitaries.”

• Energy prices are going up… again. As gasoline and diesel begin to rise again on news of renewed war between the United States and Iran, Energocom has requested that regulators at ANRE approve a jump in the price of natural gas from 14.42 lei / cubic meter to 20.93 lei (incl VAT) - a 45% increase. Acting Energy Minister Dorin Jungietu supported the change, noting that it is caused by the ongoing war against Iran and the spike in prices across Europe’s energy market. Energy expert Eugen Muravschi from WatchDog called the planned change “realistic” stating that previous projections for gas purchases from August - December were €404 / 1000 cubic meters. The price is currently at €623 / 1000 cubes. He explained that “In Europe, prices have exploded” and that as countries stockpile gas they may continue to rise.