Wherever you are in the world - happy Easter from Moldova Matters and enjoy the time off!

- David

Orthodox Easter Holidays

This month, Moldova celebrates Orthodox Easter, or Paște, on April 12th. This holiday is one of the most important days of the year for Moldovan families and many people journey back to the villages and towns where their older family members still live. The religious services for Easter begin Saturday evening with services leading up to the lighting of candles at midnight using a flame that is brought to Moldova from Jerusalem. Services continue through the night until priests begin blessing food brought by individuals that will later be served to their family. The celebrations are full of traditions including:

• Washing your face in basin of water that has coins at the bottom is said to bring wealth and good luck.

• Hard-boiled eggs are dyed brownish red by boiling them with the skins of red or yellow onions. Family members take turns tapping an egg against another family members eggs in a competition to be the last one to have an uncracked egg.

• Salt, blessed by the priest, is often poured in the local well for good luck.

• People dress in new clothes and spend the days ahead preparing their garden, whitewashing tree trunks and making their house beautiful for spring.

The Sunday of Easter and the Monday after are holidays and most business will be closed.

The following Sunday, the 19th, is a uniquely Moldovan Holiday called Paște Blajinilor. This holiday serves as a memorial day where Moldovans go to the cemetery and visit the graves of their ancestors. The cemeteries are filled with people including many of the diaspora who have returned home for the holidays. At the grave sites are tables and benches where families share food and wine with those visiting the cemetery. Many will give a “pomana” which is a gift to remember the dead and might consist of bread, eggs, dish towels, cups and plates, or a small amount of money.

This holiday also continues on Monday the 20th and both days are official holidays. You can read a guest essay about this unique holiday from Elena Vrabie here, originally published in Moldova Matters in May 2024:

Spring is full of holidays and days off so plan accordingly:

Official holidays:

• Paște (Orthodox Easter) - Sun/Mon April 12-13

• Paște Blajinilor (Memorial Easter / Easter of the Dead) - Sun/Mon April 19-20

• Labor Day - Friday May 1 (Note: Thursday, April 30 is considered a short work day)

• Europe Day / Victory Day - Saturday May 9

• Children’s Day - Monday June 1

While the week between the two Easter holidays is very quiet, there is still a lot of activity in Moldova. Here are a few notable events.

Opera, Ballet, and Concerts

The Maria Biesu Theater has a full schedule this month with two notable events at the end of the month:

• Sparticus - This Russian ballet from 1956, based on the novel Sparticus, will be performed for one night only, April 26. Tickets are available here.

• The Marriage of Figoro - Mozart’s renowned Opera will be be performed in Italian. Tickets are available here.

Other large musical events are happening throughout the month:

• Rock Symphony - The Moldovan Youth Orchestra will perform interpretations of some of the most popular rock and alternative bands ever. Join them at the Chisinau Arena on April 4th and get your tickets here.

• Bands and Brews - On April 1st, LaBREWatory is hosting another edition of their Bands and Brews event. The event features live music and a selection of their craft beers. Tickets can be purchased at the door. For details and information on bands, visit their event page here.

• Symphony Concert - The Symphony and National Philharmonic will be perform a selection of three composers at the Palatul Republicii on April 17th. Details on the performance and tickets can be found here.

• Three Double Piano Concert - The Organ Hall presents a performance of double piano pieces by Bach and Tchekovski. This event is for one night only on April 26 and tickets can be details can be found here.

Theater and Comedy

• Asa, Buna Seara - Six comedians present the history and historical hereos of Moldova at the Chisinau Arena on April 5th. Details can be found here.

• Opera de trei parale – Bertolt Brecht’s Opera de trei parale (The Threepenny Opera) appears at Satiricus on April 24th at 18:30 as a musical-theatre work that blends crime, romance, and social satire. Details available here.

Sports

• Chisinau Half Marathon - On April 26th, Chisinau will hold the spring half marathon. This weekend is full of events including a kids marathon on the 25th. For details on the many events and registration links, visit Sporters Website here.

  • In addition, join fellow runners on April 18th at Valea Morilor Park at 9:00 am to practice for the marathon. Details here.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

On March 28 Moldova’s Minister of Energy announced that the high voltage line struck during Russia’s attack on the March 23 was fully repaired. This followed a difficult few days with the country coming very close to instituting rolling blackouts on March 27 due to challenges purchasing enough import capacity.

Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu, speaking to ZdG stated, that this “was a deliberate attack” and provided more information on the target saying:

“We have seen several photos, but they cannot be made public, because they are sensitive information and would expose more than they should, but one of the critical pillars of this line was deliberately attacked with several drones. They knew very well where to hit, where they wanted to hit.”

He put the attack in the context of the recent “accident or attack at the hydroelectric power plant in Ukraine, which polluted our Dniester River” strongly implying that Russia was targeting infrastructure in Ukraine what would necessarily have a knock-on effect in Moldova. He described the high voltage line pillar targeted as “critical” and also hard to repair. This is partly because it is in a remote location in the Danube delta region that is inaccessible for heavy equipment if the ground is wet from rain.

While the acute phase of the emergency has passed, this vulnerability remains. The Minister has pledged to complete the works on the Vulcănești – Chișinău power line by May, but noted that it will not protect from this specific targeting as a small part of the line will still pass through Ukraine1.

Kremlin disinformation campaigns targeted the country’s vulnerability, with Russian state media reporting on the problem - but not the cause - and social media campaigns blaming it on “incompetence of the government.” Socialist MP Bogdan Țîrdea and fugitive former Shor Party MP Marina Tauber called the State of Emergency a fiction designed to create fear and take away personal liberties.

A main narrative is also that Moldova should restart purchases of electricity from the MGRES power plant in Transnistria - currently impractical if not impossible2. Socialist MPs Igor Dodon and Zinaida Greceanîi traveled to Moscow on a “short-term working visit” to discuss energy supply and blame the PAS government for not purchasing energy from Russia / MGRES.

The government announced that it plans to ask parliament to lift the State of Emergency next week after the repaired line is fully tested and certified. The Ministry of Foriegn Affairs also announced that they plan to seek compensation from Russia for the damage3.

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Iran Energy Crisis

While the high voltage line strike was an acute crisis, the much bigger crisis facing Moldova is the energy crisis caused by the United States’ and Israel’s war against Iran. Prices continue to rise with diesel now 56.3% more expensive than when the war began and gasoline 25.7% more expensive. As of March 30th fuel stocks provide for 17 days of supply for gasoline, 7 days for diesel and 16 days for LPG. While imports are continuing as normal there are substantial worries across Europe of shortages if the war continues much longer.

On March 26 the government met in extraordinary session and has begun implementing response measures including:

• The National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) will update its formula for calculating standard diesel price limits. Previously the formula relied on a 14 day average of purchase prices, now it will use a 7 day average. This will allow prices to rise more quickly and prevent gas stations from closing en-masse when the purchase price exceeds the allowed retail price.

• If gas stations run out of standard diesel, they are required to sell premium diesel at the standard price.

• Lukoil is allowed to purchase supplies on the local market to supply their stations. This rule does not allow them to restart imports or violate other aspects of American sanctions, but is designed to expand the number of operating gas stations during the crisis.

• Regulated fare prices for bus and mini-bus routes will be updated weekly according to price rises.

• Fuel importers are required to present their April plans to the government and are prohibited from importing less fuel in April than they did in March.

Reactions and Analysis

Moldova’s Union of Transporters and Road Workers (UTA) called the initial 16% increase in bus and mini-bus fares “a superficial measure that does not solve the root of the problem.” They blamed the government for imposing a regulated market but not taking responsibility via subsidies for a crisis. The association is calling for 0% VAT rate on fuel for transport operators, deferred tax payments for new vehicle imports, direct subsidies via travel vouchers for vulnerable passengers (pensioners, students, etc) and more. They also noted that the “disastrous state of district and inter-district roads” following Moldova’s harshest winter in a decade is another hidden tax on them as they struggle to maintain and repair their vehicles.

UTA and farmers are among the first groups to face stress from this crisis but certainly not the last. Experts interviewed by ZdG painted a bleak economic picture and few solutions for the government. Eugen Muravschi from Watchdog explained that the biggest issue is diesel which is used for agriculture and transit. He noted that Moldova’s excise taxes on fuel are already low - more than 2x lower than the European norm - which leaves very little room to cut. These taxes also fund road repair and after last winter the road network is a mess. A VAT cut for all fuel sales would be too damaging for the budget, but he suggested that targeted measures for farmers and transport operators might help.

Adrian Lupusor director of the think-tank Expert-Grup presented an analysis showing a real economic crisis may be coming. He wrote:

“If the oil crisis persists or intensifies, prices at $120–$140 per barrel could reduce Moldova’s GDP by 10 percentage points due to rising import prices, production costs, and consumer prices. This could lead to an economic recession of approximately -5% in 2026 and a continued shock into 2027,”

He noted that Moldova is more vulnerable than its neighbors because fuel imports account for a high percentage of all imports at 15.9%. His analysis indicates that the inflation caused by fuel prices should mostly be absorbed by the coming economic recession4.

Analysis: The Bigger Picture

Naturally, Kremlin disinformation networks are spreading narratives blaming the government, or sometimes Romania, for the shortages. They are likely trying to plant useful stories now in the hopes that some take root when the crisis spreads from the pump to the wider economy in the coming weeks and months.

The success of that campaign seems doubtful. More than any economic crisis in living memory this crisis can clearly be attributed to one man - Donald Trump. Americans worried about $4 / gallon gas may not realize that Europe is now facing $7 - $8 / gallon rates5 - numbers that are expected to rise sharply if this war continues.

That’s the best case scenario. Politico reports multiple European leaders describing sleepless nights as they try and deal with an oil supply shock larger than that of 1973, 1979 and the war in Ukraine combined. Leaders are now contemplating options for “demand destruction” including drive-free Sundays, gas rationing and similar approaches.

While polls show that Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of this war, I don’t get the impression that they widely understand how enraged Europeans are. In a recent podcast from Pod Save America, Jon Lovett described Trump’s negotiations with Iran as 2 people playing chicken after the cars have already crashed head on - just shouting at each other over blown airbags. In that analogy, Europe (and even more so East Asia) are like collateral roadkill that neither party noticed except when Trump somehow blames them for the crash. The war has seriously threatened NATO’s cohesion, been a massive boon to the Russian war effort and threatens huge and lasting harm to the continent’s economies.

With no end in sight, this war is upending the global security and economic order - and small countries like Moldova have very few ways to insulate themselves from the damage.

If you’re interested in a more comprehensive analysis of the European vs American perspectives on this war, I recommend the most recent episode of The Rest is Politics Podcast.

International Affairs & Security

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs and security news of the week:

• President Sandu made the first official visit of a Moldovan head of state to Slovakia. There she signed agreements on promoting joint investments and on deepening security cooperation. The President thanked Slovakia for assisting both in the Nistru river cleanup and in supporting the provision of electricity during the recent crisis. She highlighted both crises as examples of how “Ukraine’s resilience matters far beyond Ukraine itself. It is essential for Moldova’s security and for European security as a whole.”

• Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu attended the 4th anniversary of the Bucha massacre in Ukraine. In the 22 days that the Kyiv suburb was occupied, ending on March 31, 2022, Russia committed more than 9000 war crimes and murdered more than 1700 civilians. Writing about the event Speaker Grosu stated:

“It’s been four years since the massacre in the city of Bucea, one of the towns in the suburbs of Kiev, which experienced unimaginable atrocities from the Russian army. I was there four years ago. I saw it. And you can’t forget it. Today, together with other European leaders, we commemorated the victims of that massacre,”

• Transnistria further delays salary payments. In June 2025 the regional “authorities” began splitting salary payments into 2 installments6 allowing for the second half of the payment to come at the end of the following month. This has now been pushed back further until the 9th of the next month. This delaying tactic is essentially a zero interest loan from workers to their employer and, while it can buy time, it does not materially change the conditions causing the crisis.

• On March 31 another drone entered Moldovan airspace. The Shahed drone was tracked on Ukrainian radar as it flew over Transnistria for around 7 minutes before returning to Ukraine.

• Ukraine has announced new security measures on their border with Transnistria. The Ukrainian army has announced that the border is now “heavily mined” and that they are in the process of installing barbed wire and autonomous video warning systems. They have also announced the deployment of additional mechanized troops to strengthen the defenses.

Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• Parliament has accepted the resignation of PAS MP Nicolae Botgros. The famous composer previously announced his resignation because he felt forced to choose between politics and music due to laws around side-jobs. Opposition MP Renato Usatii proposed an amendment of these laws to allow musicians, actors and athletes to continue with their careers while in parliament. Currently, only academic jobs are allowed for sitting MPs. Speaker Igor Grosu supported the idea and suggested that parliament study loosening the rules, noting that Moldova has far stricter compatibility rules than other countries in the region including Romania.

• The EU delegation announced that the Chisinau-Ungheni rail line would be the first electrified railway in the country. It will be rebuilt on European rail guage and allow for travel of up to 140 km / h. The Ministry of Infrastructure has previously announced that the first phase of this project will connect downtown Chisinau to the Eugen Doga International Airport.

• Irina Vlah had a wonderful birthday. The opposition politician declared 423,000 lei in cash birthday gifts for her recent 51st birthday. These came from dozens of people - family, former employees, party members and even a former interim president of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). This birthday haul exceeded 2 times her annual salary. Moldovan birthday traditions are really very strict - you buy all of your friends and family dinner and drinks and they give you gifts - which are very rarely cash. When you become a (certain type of) politician, suddenly, lots of cash gifts. What a wonderful tradition.

Crime & Corruption

Here are the top justice sector stories of the week:

• Justice reform is progressing, but judges are under heavy pressure. That was the takeaway this week from the General Assembly of Judges convened by the Superior Council of Magistracy. Guest speakers included President Sandu and European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, Michael McGrath who spoke on justice reform. A report on 2025 activity showed that judges are now averaging 103.7 cases per month, a 24.3% increase from 2024. The removal of judges who fail vetting has continued to increase pressure on those who remain.

• Veaceslav Platon’s trial hasn’t had a hearing in a year. The last hearing in the case of “fraud and money laundering in particularly large proportions” was heard in March 2025 as judges have repeatedly accepted requests for delays due to Platon’s lawyer being on sick leave. Platon is scheduled to have his UK extradition hearing from May 11 - 13, after his lawyers there successfully delayed it from its originally scheduled November 2025 dates. Platon has been out on bail in the UK since July 2025.

Ending on a High Note

Moldovan musician Sergei Stepanov, known as “Epic Sax Guy,” appeared on Britain’s Got Talent, getting “yes” votes from all 4 judges. Simon Cowell liked the performance, but seemed genuinely baffled as to who this strange dancing saxophone player was. Not so with Rapper judge Olajide Olayinka Williams (KSI), who is apparently a mega-fan and basically went crazy while the performance was happening.

Epic Sax Guy became a household name across Europe after competing in Eurovision in 2017 for Moldova with the band SunStroke Project. Their performance of “Hey Mamma” got 3rd place, which was frankly a crime as they were far better than the top 2.

If you want to put a smile on your face, here’s the Britain’s Got Talent appearance:

…and here’s Hey Mamma from 2017

…and here’s Moldova’s delightfully insane and genuinely fun 2026 Eurovision entry

Ok, that’s much better than economic crisis and war. I hope it cheered you up as much as it did me.

Most of the following newsletters are on Substack but not all.

Days Until the Hungarian Elections

Journalists Veronika Munk and Zoltán Szalay write this excellent newsletter counting down to Hungary’s April 12 parliamentary elections. Europe is holding its collective breath as Viktor Orban’s Fidesz faces opposition challenger Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party. This vote has the potential to shape issues related to Moldova and Ukraine’s EU accession as well as the geopolitical direction of the bloc as a whole. Munk and Szalay take you through the twists and turns of the extremely dirty campaign, highlighting Russian hybrid attacks and the increasing number of threats against journalists in Hungary.

Following the elections the newsletter will continue following government formation and covering the country’s major news developments.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Power Vertical (Newsletter / Podcast)

Brian Whitmore’s Power Vertical Podcast is one of the original great podcasts looking at Russia and its role in the former Soviet space. I was thrilled to join Brian as a guest in an episode right before Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections to discuss Russia’s hybrid attacks and election interference. Now the Power Vertical is on Substack as well, where you can get episodes and follow updates from the Power Vertical team.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Ukraine’s Arms Monitor

Written by Olena Kryzhanivska, a Ukrainian defense analyst based in Canada, Ukraine’s Arms Monitor is a go-to resource for tracking military developments in the war in Ukraine. It combines detailed reporting on weapons and technology with sharp analysis of how the conflict is driving rapid innovation - particularly in areas like drone warfare. As Ukraine and Russia adapt in real time, this newsletter offers one of the clearest windows into how modern warfare is evolving.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Goulash (VSquare)

Goulash is a newsletter from VSquare, an investigative journalism network focused on Central and Eastern Europe. It combines investigative reporting with sharp regional analysis - with a particular strength on Hungary and its wider influence.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Eastern Flank

Journalist Michał Kranz publishes this weekly newsletter focused on the top stories in Eastern Europe - which he defines as “all the countries east of Germany, Austria, and Italy, north of Greece and Turkey, and west of Russia, as well as Georgia and Armenia in the South Caucasus.” His newsletter is great for keeping up with the region, but I tune in for his analysis of how Eastern Europe impacts, and is impacted by, wider geopolitical events around the world.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Baltic Flank

While we’re on the topic of flanks - I recently discovered the Baltic Flank and have no idea how I missed it before. Written by investigative journalist Holger Roonemaa, the newsletter focuses on European security issues as well as Russia’s hybrid war against the West. While it casts a wide net, the main lens for the reporting and analysis is a focus on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

PolandWatch

Written by veteran journalist Stuart Dowell, PolandWatch is both a deep dive into Poland’s internal politics, and an analysis of its place in the wider region. The country’s complex political dynamics have foreshadowed many broader trends in European politics - including populism, democratic backsliding, migration challenges and more. It has also shown how a country can come back from the brink. PolandWatch is great for following these wider trends as they play out in the Polish and regional context.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Brief Eastern Europe

Brief Eastern Europe is a regional newsletter covering politics and society across Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on connecting developments across countries. It’s part of the New Eastern Europe family which also has an excellent podcast called “Talk Eastern Europe.” Their newsletter is a great way to track the main stories around the region and also get solid opinion and analysis of key events.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Balkan Brew

Journalists Rodolfo Toè and Tommaso Siviero write this excellent weekly newsletter looking around the Balkans and picking out some of the most interesting and impactful stories in the region. If you’re like me, the Western Balkans especially can feel hard to get a handle on politically. Balkan Brew helps me catch the most important stories and (often) notice how many countries are facing challenges similar to those we are seeing in Moldova.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

how we cee it

That’s CEE = Central and Eastern Europe. Journalist Tomas Hrivnak covers a range of stories in business, tech, and security facing the region. I’ve recently enjoyed a number of stories looking at defense sector investments and how regional security is being impacted by the war in Iran.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Did I Miss Something?

If you’ve got some newsletters that help you make sense of the region that didn’t make my list - share them in the comments!

On March 27, 1918, Bessarabia, a former Tsarist province dating back to 1812, when the Principality of Moldavia was divided in two, united with the Kingdom of Romania. Bessarabia, unlike modern Moldova, had clear cut natural borders, stretching from the Prut River in the West and the Dniester River in the East, Habsburg Bukovina in the north and the Danube mouth, and Black Sea in the south.

The decision was made by Sfatul Țării, the local parliament, a quasi-representative body like many others in the national peripheries of the former Tsarist Empire. In the later parts of WWI, similar indirectly representative bodies were created at a time where war prevented direct elections. Such parliaments decided the fates of other provinces and fragments of empire - creating national states (e.g. Poland and Estonia), or recreating lost independent states out of pieces of the Russian Empire (e.g. Lithuania).

This is to say Sfatul Țării was broadly representative and held democratic legitimacy according to the standards of the time. Moreover, it had legitimacy to decide the future of the province. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and other Russian political parties as well as the province’s main ethnic groups were represented. They all recognized the Sfatul Țării as the supreme and legitimate institution of the province.

Since then, the legitimacy of Sfatul Țării’s vote on March 27, 1918 has often been questioned or contested with the argument that the Romanian Army controlled the province since mid January 1918. At that time, the Sfatul Țării had requested Romanian support in a situation of deteriorating security and rampant violence. Much of this was driven by the disintegration of the Russian Army on the Romanian front and the transformation of these units into Bolshevik raiding parties in the chaotic context of the Russian civil war.

With this background, on the historical day of March 27, 19181, 3 members of the Sfatul Țării voted against the Union with Romania and 36 abstained. Only 86 voted for, while 12 were declared absentees.

The divided vote speaks to the fact there was some room for freedom of the ballot. In one example, Ștefan Balamez, a Ukrainian who was one of the three voting against the Union, worked in the interwar period in various capacities in the Chișinău City Hall. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1940 in the aftermath of the Red Army’s occupation of Bessarabia and sent to Siberia where he died in 1942. This demonstrates not only was there freedom of the vote, but that it did not clearly map onto what we might now call pro-Romanian or pro-Russian lines.

The vote was contested mainly by the Bolsheviks, but also by the former Tsarist political class. These forces, though irreconcilable enemies on the battlefield across all of the collapsing Russian Empire, allied in a common front during the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920).

The Ukrainian political elites of all ideological stripes also vehemently contested the Union of Bessarabia with Romania as the province was perceived as part of ethnic Ukrainian lands2. This is in spite of all credible statistics (including Tsarist ones), showing that Ukrainians only made up around one quarter of the total population. Meanwhile, the Romanian-speaking populations3 made up around 50-60% of the province’s residents4.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania came as a surprise to the residents of the other regions on the right bank of the Prut river that make up modern-day Romania. Bessarabia did not have a privileged place in the Romanian discourse before 1914. Transylvania was the most coveted Romanian speaking territory due to many factors, one of them being the level of national consciousness among Romanians in the region. There were also major political differences. The Bessarabian peasants were more preoccupied with the land reform than with any nation-building agenda, and Romania as a Kingdom was perceived as a harbinger of landlords’ interests. Furthermore, the King, even though he converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy, was suspected of not being of their own faith.

The drive to unite Bessarabia with Western Moldavia (from which it was detached by the Russian Empire in 1812) and thus the Kingdom of Romania was driven by both internal and external factors. Even though Sfatul Țării was legitimate, it did not have resources and organizational capabilities to impose its authority outside the capital - and it sometimes struggled to control the capital itself. This was largely due to Bolshevik raiders and political fanatics sent from Odessa to spread propaganda and sow anarchy. This type of violent and chaotic situation was engulfing much of the collapsing Russian Empire as the Bolsheviks sought power at any cost.

Paradoxically, in this late stage of WWI, the sworn enemies in the Entente Powers and Central Powers managed to agree on this union. France, Great Britain and Germany all, for various reasons, recognized (or tolerated) the decision of Sfatul Țării of March 27, 1918. The United States neither endorsed nor opposed but chose to closely observe the process.

Within Bessarabia a sense of national identity had been growing - but with serious contradictions. Soldiers and elites serving on various fronts during the war had come to understand that they were linguistically the same as their brethren West of Prut River. At the same time, Bessarabia remained deeply Russified and even during the Sfatul Țării’s meeting of March 27th 1918 most of the discussions took place in Russian. This was because it remained the language of their education and most knew Romanian only at the vernacular level.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania made the century long process of Russification of the Moldavians of Bessarabia reversible. In the interwar period, they enjoyed full national rights and schools in Romanian with Latin alphabet. Rights were granted to minorities as well, including to education in other languages. In the economic sphere, in the south, sometimes the minorities (Bulgarians) enjoyed privileges in detriment to the local Romanian speaking population, such as fishing rights in the Prut valley.

The interwar gave a fresh life to Romanian language and culture and made speaking Romanian more and more prestigious and respectful. In Bessarabia, it was no longer simply a tolerated language that was limited in the public space. The language was lively and loved by the Moldavians / Bessarabians across ethnic groups, including by the Gagauz. The latter were – in contrast to the Soviet period – one of the most integrated ethnic groups in the Romanian cultural and linguistic milieu. They were also one of the most loyal ethnic groups to the Romanian state as they were not attracted by Bolshevik ideology and propaganda before, during or after the Tatarbunar insurrection of 1924 - the peak of Soviet hybrid war against interwar Romania.

Being part of Romania between 1918-1940 spared tens of thousands of lives that otherwise would have become victims of Soviet state terror - as happened in other parts of the USSR. This included the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), created on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924. This region served a similar role to modern day Transnistria, allowing the new Russia to maintain a claim on Bessarabia until they could come back in force.

In the MASSR alone, about 40,000 persons of all ages and ethnic backgrounds died during the Holodomor of 1932-1933, and about 5,000 were executed by death squads during the Great Terror of 1937-8. Tens of thousands more were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Life in interwar Romania was not paradise on earth either, it was the era of extremes all over Europe, but Romania did not practice state terror on the scale seen in the Soviet Union.

Note: Romania bears responsibility for its role in the Holocaust during World War II. Under the Antonescu regime, hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Transnistria, often in coordination with Nazi Germany. Among the victims were many Jews who were educated in, and closely connected to, Romanian language and culture.

A number of survivors later played a role in preserving elements of Romanian literary and cultural life in Soviet Moldavia after 1944. Their contributions formed part of a broader, complex process through which Romanian cultural identity persisted despite sustained pressures of Russification in the Soviet period.

Looking at 1918 Through a Modern Lens

The events of 1918 remain highly relevant in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. For some, the parallels appear striking: a moment of regional instability, uncertainty about borders, and the question of how small states can secure their future. In this view, unification with Romania is sometimes presented as a potential safeguard against renewed Russian aggression.

At the same time, the differences between 1918 and today are profound. The Union of Bessarabia with Romania was decided in the context of collapsing empires, limited state capacity, and a very different international system. Any comparable decision today would have to follow true democratic procedures, reflect the will of the population, and take place within a complex European and international legal framework.

In this context, occasional political statements in favor of unification - such as the expressions of personal support by President Sandu for a hypothetical referendum - should not be understood as signaling an imminent or likely political project. Public discourse on Union often operates at the level of identity and historical memory rather than concrete policy. In practice, there is limited political momentum for unification in either Chișinău or Bucharest.

Moreover, the regional security environment, while unstable, does not necessarily make Union more feasible. On the contrary, a deterioration of the security situation - such as a further Russian advance in southern Ukraine - would introduce significant risks and uncertainties. In such a scenario, Romania and its allies would likely prioritize stability and deterrence over undertaking a complex and potentially destabilizing political integration.

A more immediate and tangible challenge remains the unresolved status of the Left Bank, or Transnistria. As in the early 1990s, this issue is both a domestic and a regional security problem, now with broader European implications. Any sustainable solution would require the withdrawal of Russian forces and the demilitarization of the region, followed by a cautious and gradual reintegration process that does not undermine Moldova’s internal political balance or its European trajectory.

In this sense, while the legacy of 1918 continues to shape political imagination and identity, its direct replication under current conditions appears unlikely. The questions facing Moldova today are less about territorial reconfiguration and more about security, governance, and integration within the European framework - challenges that differ fundamentally from those of 1918.

“Please pay special attention to air raid signals today. There are intelligence reports that Russian forces may be preparing a massive attack. Appropriate instructions for our air defense forces have already been issued. Please take care of yourselves and Ukraine ,”

There was a massive attack with Russian drones overnight as well as a major daytime attack on March 24th. In total Russia launched more than 1000 drones against Ukraine including Shaheds and Gerbers1. Ukrainian air defense shot down 541 drones but 15 got through and scored hits.

At 7:15 pm on March 23rd residents in Chisinau noticed the lights briefly go out and then flicker back on. In the morning the Ministry of Energy announced that the key high-voltage line between Isaccea (Romania) - Vulcănești (Moldova) had been hit and damaged. They wrote:

“On the evening of March 23, at around 7:15 p.m., due to Russian attacks on the territory of Ukraine, our energy infrastructure, the property of the Republic of Moldova, was affected. What happened? Several “Shahed” drones targeted our energy infrastructure. And as we see in this picture, this is the effect.“

Understanding the Infrastructure Situation

On January 31st, 2025 most of Moldova lost power due to “serious problems in the Ukrainian power grid” that caused a massive voltage drop on the Isaccea-Vulcăneşti-MGRES high voltage line - which triggered automatic disconnections. At the time I wrote a detailed overview of the key infrastructure and I recommend re-reading that article for context. In short, Moldova gets up to 60% of its power from Romania via a line that runs from Isaccea in Romania through Ukraine to Vulcăneşti in Moldova and then back and forth across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border before it meets the MGRES power plant in Transnistria. From there the power line runs to Chisinau.

The damage on March 23rd was to a particularly critical section of that power line between Isaccea and Vulcăneşti which also runs through Ukraine. You can see the whole system on the map on the left as well as an illustration of the part targeted on the map on the right below.

Moldova has been working to create its own direct connection to Romanian power via the Vulcăneşti - Chisinau high voltage line that was supposed to be completed in December but is running behind schedule. That line would allow Moldova to bypass Transnistria BUT critically not fully avoid transiting Ukrainian territory. It would still require the small segment Isaccea-Vulcăneşti which was targeted.

At the time of writing we do not know if this was intentionally targeted by Russia or if it was accidentally hit by a drone targeting the Ukrainian port of Remi (either off-course or shot down). We do know that this was the first Russian attack directly on Moldovan owned critical infrastructure in this war.

State of Emergency

On March 24th Prime Minister Munteanu convened the National Crisis Management Center and requested that parliament be called into extraordinary session to declare a state of emergency. He stated:

“Crash drones were identified in the immediate vicinity of the affected infrastructure, which imposes access restrictions for technical teams and the need to carry out demining works to fully allow the necessary intervention and in safe conditions,”

Parliament was convened on March 24th and held a debate on declaring a State of Emergency in the Energy sector for the next 60 days. Prime Minister Munteanu explained the gravity of the situation saying:

“The 4 interconnection lines with Romania have been activated, but the situation remains complicated. Starting tomorrow, the estimated deficit will reach 350-400 MW during peak hours. Chain disconnections, as you can deduce, remain very possible. We cannot rule out new attacks, we cannot wait,”

The these interconnections mean that the country is maintaining electricity through emergency “island connections” via smaller 110 kV lines. I explained island connections in the January article I referenced above.

The Minister of Energy estimated that repairs could take 5-7 days. The reason is that explosive materials remain on the site and army sappers have to make it safe before technicians can affect the repairs. There is also the risk of continued attacks on the line.

The State of Emergency was passed with 72 votes in favor, 18 abstentions and 0 against. Igor Dodon explained that the Socialists refused to vote for the bill because their suggestion that Moldova start buying power from the MGRES plant again were not taken into account (I’ll explain why this makes no sense in a footnote2).

Following the declaration of the State of Emergency, the government issued a series of orders and recommendations as follows:

• Called on all users to minimize electrical consumption during peak hours (6 am - 9 am and 5 pm - 11 pm). They warn against the use of elevators in this time in case of outages.

• Mandated that Thermoelectric plants in Balti and Chisinau have been instructed to produce at full capacity.

• Called on public and commercial buildings to reduce light by 30% and refrain from using decorative and advertising lights.

• Called on industrial activities to schedule operations outside of peak hours.

• Mandated export and re-export restrictions on petroleum products until a stockpile of 5,000 tons of gasoline and 25,000 tons of diesel are stored.

• Accelerated import processes for fuels.

• Restricted gas station purchases in containers to 20L jerrycans.

• Instructed grid operators to prioritize hospitals and critical infrastructure in case of shortages and resort to rolling blackouts as a last resort.

Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban called on city residents to conserve power and he condemned the “the war and Russia’s attacks on Ukraine.” He announced plans to move schools to online education and suspend trolleybus routes if there are major shortages.

On March 25th the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) met to approve a decrease in electricity prices, but postponed the move for the duration of the State of Emergency.

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The Other Energy Crisis

This new State of Emergency replaces last week’s State of Alert which was called to respond to America and Israel’s war against Iran. Fuel prices continue to increase in response to the global supply shock with prices for gasoline now 23.74% higher than before the war and for diesel 49.3% higher.

This has caused the Employers’ Association of Auto Transport Operators (APOTA) to announce that “an enormous number of regular district and inter-district trips [bus and mini-bus routes] will be suspended, and their number could reach 80% of the total number.” The prices of bus tickets are regulated and the association claims that the National Road Transport Agency (ANTA) is not raising prices fast enough to keep routes profitable.

On March 23rd President Sandu convened the National Security Council (NSC) and after meeting warned that prices will continue to rise. She stated:

“All of the energy shocks, despite the measures we have taken—and because we do not have oil, because we do not have natural gas—are clearly affecting us through rising prices, both at the household level and across economic sectors. We will continue to monitor the situation, and our hope is that this crisis will end sooner rather than later, but we must also prepare for the worst-case scenarios

We have a pricing formula, or a price formation mechanism, that assumes a slower transition to market prices—over a period of 14 days—and this helps us, to some extent, avoid extreme volatility. However, this does not mean that prices will not eventually reach global market levels,”

Right now prices in Moldova remain lower than those in Romania and much of the region because of this 14 day transition period. Across Europe many countries have different levels of market responsiveness to rapid price changes which has led to drivers crossing borders to fill up in other states and countries like Hungary to create differentiated prices for citizens vs foreigners.

President Sandu went on to speak about support mechanisms for farmers, but noted that the only long term options is increased adoption of renewables. Indeed, without Moldova’s hard pivot to wind and solar it is likely the country would already face substantial rolling blackouts.

President Sandu concluded saying:

“So, I repeat, we are monitoring the situation, and it is a worrying one. I will say this plainly: it is a very worrying situation if things do not stabilize, if prices do not stabilize in the coming weeks,”

Nistru Oil Spill Updates

On March 19th Prime Minister Munteanu announced that water supplies were being reconnected for Balti, Soroca, Singerei and Floresti. He stated:

“I know that these days have been difficult. Thank you for your patience. I also thank the teams in the field who worked non-stop so that people have water. The interventions at the Cosăuți station and in the localities have yielded results. The supply is being resumed in stages, with strict control at each stage. The installed filters remain in operation, and the teams remain in the field for continuous monitoring and rapid intervention, if necessary”

This outcome was achieved via a massive cleanup effort by many parts of the Moldovan state including the National Army. It was supported by Romania and donations from EU partners including Poland and Belgium. Many filters and dams were installed along the river which allowed for the water feeding these towns and regions to return to safe levels.

On March 25th Minister of Environment Gheorghe Hajder posted a video from Ukraine where he was checking on the origin of the spill. He explained that the origin of the leak (still unnamed) had been stopped and no more oil was entering the river. He explained that small slicks may still be seen working their way down the river but with the containment mechanisms in place and the source of the problem stopped the crisis was ending.

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Politics & General News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• Parliament voted for the final denunciation of Moldova’s participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The bill passed in the first reading 58-28. Moldova joined the CIS after it was created in Minsk in January 1993 along with many former Soviet Republics. Moldova has slowly been disentangling itself from various multilateral aspects of the CIS since 2022.

• Ion Ceban claims that the Nistru oil spill was not real. The mayor claimed that without official test results he did not believe what the government was saying and alleged that it was all a 2 pronged conspiracy. First, to distract from rising gasoline and diesel prices, second, to “introduce a foreign operator to provide water and sewerage services in the north of the country.”

• Invest Moldova has begun a major promotion campaign on the BBC. The campaign, titled “Moldova – a Trustful3 Partner for Export,” plans to air 250 TV broadcast commercials on BBC news from February through April. They are targeting 5 million views. You can see one of the videos on youtube here.

• PAS MP Nicolae Botgros has resigned from parliament. The famous conductor and artistic director of the National Folk Music Orchestra “Lăutarii” had run in 11th place on the PAS list. He has publicly struggled with a transition to politics and has been accused of incompatibly splitting his time by continuing some performances. This month RISE posted an investigation into a real estate deal that Lăutarii was involved in which began as a public project for a music school and ended as an apartment building. Nicolae Botgros denied wrongdoing, and it isn’t clear if the investigation prompted his resignation. Asked to comment on his resignation he simply said “where is art, where is politics, they are far apart.” At the beginning of this Spring 2026 parliamentary session he had previously promised to remain in parliament “until they take him with his feet to the other side.” He joins an unusually high number of MPs who ran on the PAS list only to leave parliament very early in their term.

Plahotniuc Will be Sentenced on April 22nd

This date was set by the court after hearing closing arguments from the prosecution and defense. The case involves his role in the theft of $1 billion dollars from 3 Moldovan banks. In their closing arguments the prosecution requested a 25 year jail sentence - the maximum allowed. The defense called for an acquittal and accused both the prosecutors and the judges4 of not acting neutrally in the trial. Plahotniuc himself took the stand on the final day to speak in favor of his innocence. The court will proclaim guilt or innocence and announce the sentence on April 22nd.

Cyberattacks were a key enabling element of this strategy. In a new report published in collaboration with Watchdog I look at the role of cyberwarfare in the September 2025 parliamentary elections, and how Moldova’s cyberdefenders and their partners secured the vote.

The whole report is shared below with Moldova Matters readers, but you can also access it on the Watchdog site at this link.

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections took place against the backdrop of sustained Russian hybrid pressure on the country’s democratic institutions. In the months leading up to the vote, Moldovan authorities and independent investigators documented a wide range of activities linked to Kremlin-aligned networks. These included disinformation campaigns, illicit political financing, efforts to mobilize paid street protests and attempts to manipulate public perceptions of the electoral process.

Cyber operations formed an important component of this broader effort. In the year leading up to the election cyber operations primarily worked to support FIMI campaigns and circumvent website blocking. In the weeks before the election and throughout election day itself, Moldovan institutions faced a series of direct cyber attacks ranging from the compromise of home internet routers to large-scale distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting government infrastructure. These attacks were directed at systems supporting the Central Election Commission (CEC) and other critical digital services used during the voting process.

Cyberattacks aimed to disrupt election-day systems, slow the reporting of results, and create visible technical failures that might undermine public confidence in the integrity of the vote.

This report argues that cyber operations targeting Moldova’s 2025 elections should be understood not as isolated attacks but as part of an integrated hybrid campaign. Their purpose was to enable and amplify other political operations designed to contest the legitimacy of the election outcome. Technical disruption could create uncertainty, information operations could frame that uncertainty as evidence of fraud and organized protests could then transform these narratives into political pressure against the government.

The report is broken into four parts:

• Section 1 outlines Moldova’s evolving cybersecurity architecture and the institutional reforms implemented since 2017.

• Section 2 examines how cyber capabilities were used to support foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations targeting Moldovan audiences.

• Section 3 analyzes the cyberattacks directed at election infrastructure on election day itself.

• Section 4 examines how these cyber operations interacted with other elements of a broader hybrid strategy intended to undermine confidence in the electoral process.

While the attacks ultimately failed to disrupt the election in a meaningful way, they illustrate how cyber operations can function as enabling tools within larger political campaigns aimed at delegitimizing democratic institutions. Moldova’s experience therefore offers important lessons for understanding the role of cyber activity within contemporary hybrid interference operations.

Section 1: Moldova’s Cyber Landscape

Successive Moldovan governments have been working since 2017 to modernize the country’s cybersecurity infrastructure and defenses. This began with the country’s first comprehensive cybersecurity law which created a national strategy and outlined the restructuring of critical institutions.

In subsequent years a number of institutions were reformed or created in order to coordinate and implement the country’s cyber defenses. The key ones were:

• Serviciul Tehnologia Informației și Securitate Cibernetică (Information Technology and Cyber Security Service, STISC). STISC was created in 2018 from the existing Centrul de Telecomunicații Speciale (Special Telecommunications Center, CTS). CTS was itself created in the 1990s to take over KGB-era secure communications infrastructure. Its mission remained focused on securing government communications and the maintenance of these legacy systems. When CTS was reformed into STISC the focus shifted from simply securing information to protecting the government’s entire cyber infrastructure. It is the agency primarily responsible for protecting government IT systems.

• Agenția pentru Securitate Cibernetică (National Cyber Security Authority, ASC). ASC was created in 2023 to oversee cybersecurity strategy, regulation and coordination. The ASC is responsible for aligning with EU cybersecurity frameworks and overseeing compliance by private sector actors who manage critical infrastructure - such as telecom companies.

• National Institute of Innovations in Cybersecurity “Cybercor.” Launched in 2024 with the support of the Future Technologies Project supported by USAID, the UK government and Sweden, Cybercor is an education and research center located in the Technical University of Moldova (UTM). Its mission is to train civil servants and to create a robust hiring pool of cybersecurity professionals.

During these years the Moldovan parliament passed a series of major laws related to cybersecurity. These aligned Moldova with EU directives and created inter-agency / inter-ministerial emergency response working groups. Critical infrastructure was identified and regulations were created to assure that cyber risk management and incident reporting mechanisms were in place in the companies operating that infrastructure.

According to Anatolie Golovco, Cybersecurity Advisor to the Prime Minister (February 2023 - present), a critical piece of this was the creation of well-paid civil service positions in these agencies1.

Since 2018, and in accelerating fashion since February 2022, these agencies have worked on 4 topline goals:

1. Consolidating and hardening government digital platforms and infrastructure. These were largely centralized under STISC.

2. Shifting focus from information security to infrastructure security.

3. Implementing the EU’s Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive and coordinating with private sector critical infrastructure operators to ensure compliance.

4. Assuring a training pipeline of skilled cybersecurity professionals and attractive jobs to accommodate them.

It was these changes, as well as the ongoing support from Moldova’s security and development partners, that put the country in a position to identify and respond to Russian hybrid attacks that involved cyber operations. Moldova entered the 2025 election with a far more centralized and capable cyber-defense posture than in earlier years.

Section 2: Cyber as an Enabler for Information Operations

One of the key functions of Kremlin cyber operations was the furtherance of their Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns targeting both Moldova and other parts of the world. In Moldova, these FIMI operations were designed to shape the political environment ahead of elections and to provide tools for rapid dissemination of FIMI on election day and immediately after. Cyber operations acted as an enabler for these campaigns in the following key ways:

1. Evading Website Blocks - As the Moldovan (or European) authorities block websites or TV channels, Kremlin actors create workarounds. That included both replicating infrastructure and attacking user’s Domain Name Service (DNS) systems.

2. Hack & Leak Operations - Kremlin hackers breached the personal devices of Moldovan politicians and activists and leaked information selectively (and possibly after altering it). Hack-and-leak operations are visible, but we must assume that similar operations are happening invisibly at the level of espionage. Passing sensitive information to Russian proxies or using it to frame campaign and messaging strategy.

2.1 Evading Website Blocks

In response to propaganda being produced by the Kremlin in support of the war in Ukraine, the Moldovan government has taken steps to block certain TV stations and websites affiliated with the Kremlin and Ilan Shor. This has created a cat-and-mouse game as Kremlin cyber actors race to find ways around these blockages.

The most common way to block a website uses DNS, where the government orders Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to modify their DNS records to prevent users in that network from finding the IP address of the website they are looking for.

One example of this process was reported on in June 2025 when the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab (DFRLab) published a report detailing the new online2 TV channel Moldova24 (MD24). The TV channel had a variety of web addresses including moldova24.online, moldova24.org, moldova-24.live, etc. These, in turn, all directed users to the same website but could be switched out as the Moldovan government worked to block the DNS records. At the same time, DFRLab showed that the IP address behind these websites was also hosting dozens of other websites used to promote Ilan Shor and to spread Russian disinformation - including multi-lingual black propaganda services in French, Spanish, Croatian, Italian and more.

By July 2025 these tactics became more sophisticated. At that time anonymous advertising campaigns began promoting a new streaming platform called HaiTV. This application and website advertised the ability to access blocked Russian TV channels - which meant movie and TV options, as well as MD24, Russian propaganda channels and Shor channels. While the government quickly announced the blocking of this new site, it remained accessible in Moldova even weeks later due to sophisticated efforts to circumvent these blocks.

Ziarul de Garda reported that HaiTV domain was purchased and registered by the Moscow based, UK registered, Aeza International LTD. This company was responsible for creating and running a network called “Doppelganger” which Qurium had previously reported as using complex network infrastructure to both evade blockages and to substitute fake website clones for real sites. This involved cloning the Washington Post, FoxNews, Le Parisien and many many others.

In this cat-and-mouse game, Kremlin actors regularly used Western registered companies and Western infrastructure in order to bypass national level blocking. Via sophisticated manipulations of DNS records and the use of many intermediary domains their cyberoperations acted as enablers to the broader FIMI operations.

2.2 Hack & Leak

In addition to protecting FIMI resources by keeping them online, Russian hackers regularly sought to breach the computer systems or online accounts of Moldovan politicians, journalists and civil society actors. In the case of the 2022 “Moldova Leaks” Telegram hacks, this was designed to reveal unflattering messages and to create fear that the hackers had much more information than they shared.

The Moldova Leaks operation released the Telegram address books and chat logs for prominent government and civil society leaders one by one. The implication was that they were building to a major reveal (the blacked out figure) but that never happened and the site was deleted. In addition to the leaking embarrassing (and possibly manipulated) message exchanges, this slow build created paranoia around who would be targeted next and what more would be released.

In other examples, a cyberattack originating from the network of Aeza International LTD hacked official emails of TV8 and Moldelectrica. They then sent official emails to individuals and institutions containing disinformation messages.

It’s worth noting that Hack & Leak operations were also conducted by anti-Kremlin organizations (currently unidentified) and resulted in the dissemination of phone recordings of Moldovan politicians talking to their FSB handlers and troves of insider data into the Shor network.

Section 3: Cyberattacks on Election Infrastructure

The second major focus of Kremlin cyberattacks on Moldova’s elections was targeted at election day itself and involved an attempt to take down Moldova’s digital election infrastructure. While Moldovan elections are conducted entirely with paper ballots and hand counts, the country relies on important digital systems run by the Central Elections Commission (CEC) to conduct the elections and distribute the results.

3.1 Why Paper Elections Still Depend on Digital Systems

When a voter enters a polling station (in Moldova or in a diaspora polling place) they show their national ID card to a poll worker who verifies in the CEC system that this person is at the right polling station and eligible to vote. The voter then votes and places a paper ballot in a box, while the computer system notifies the central CEC servers that the person voted. This prevents the same person from trying to go to another polling place and vote again. Additionally, it updates a ticker on the CEC website showing turnout in real time.

This CEC website is detailed about voter turnout - showing vote by regions, demographics, etc. It also updates constantly and people are used to watching returns in real time on election day.

When the polls close, the paper ballots are counted by hand in the presence of election observers. Once the count is certified the totals are sent provisionally to the CEC server which publishes them on the website precinct by precinct. This also creates a “real time viewing” perception by voters who are accustomed to a rapid vote count after the polls close.

3.2 What the Attackers Were Trying to Disrupt

The attacker’s goal was to disrupt the CEC system in order to shake public confidence in the outcome of the vote. The aim was to slow down or fully disrupt the digital systems in order to force an all-paper process. This would slow but not stop voting or the vote count.

Without computer ID verification, voters would need to be checked against printed voter lists. This slows the process and removes the real time data transmitted to the CEC that people watch online on election day. This would similarly affect the vote count and reporting process which may drag out over several days.

To be clear, the attackers did not try to change vote totals or to otherwise directly impact the election results. The goal instead was to undermine faith in the elections and imply that someone else was manipulating the results. By slowing or disrupting these real time systems they could discredit the government - showing that they are not in control of critical infrastructure - and they could plant FIMI narratives about how the disruptions were because PAS was rigging the election itself. We’ll look at this broader hybrid attack landscape in Section 4.

3.3 How DDoS fit that objective

A Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) is a cyberattack designed to overwhelm a website or network service with a flood of illegitimate requests. The attacker instructs a huge number of computers or devices to all request the service at the same time (e.g. load a webpage). This causes the server coming under attack to either slow under the flood of requests or simply crash. Thereby the attack denies service to legitimate users who will be unable to access it.

The CEC’s election infrastructure is managed by STISC which houses centralized government servers and network infrastructure. On election day, DDoS attacks were directed at STISC infrastructure with the goals of taking down the CEC website and disrupting the VPN secure connections between the central CEC servers and the polling stations.

STISC did not act alone in defending critical networks and was supported by various outside actors including some companies. One example was CloudFlare which helped STISC defend election infrastructure against DDoS attacks. In a post election article they wrote:

“[O]n September 28, 2025, the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) experienced a series of concentrated, high-volume (DDoS) attacks strategically timed throughout the day. The attack began in the morning at 09:06:00 UTC and lasted for over twelve hours and ended as the official result reporting was underway at 21:34:00 UTC. In total, we mitigated over 898 million malicious requests directed at the CEC over the twelve-hour period.”

Defending against DDoS attacks generally involves identifying illegitimate incoming traffic and blocking it / filtering it out. This is easiest to do when the traffic has a common origin and is therefore less “distributed” - for example, Russian systems known to be used for cyber attacks. This gets much harder when the attack is coming from closer to home.

3.4 Weaponizing Home Routers and IoT

In order to make it as difficult as possible to defend against these DDoS attacks, Russian actors sought to compromise as many devices as possible inside Moldova. If the cyberattack was coming from Moldovan citizens’ homes, it would be very hard for STISC and partners to identify who is legitimately trying to access the CEC website and who is a malicious attacker. It could also mean that defending the CEC website would mean cutting off legitimate users.

On September 24, 2025 National Chief of Police Viorel Cernăuțeanu announced that “thousands” of home internet routers had become compromised. With just 4 days to go before the elections Cernăuțeanu warned the public that this network was to be used in a DDoS attack against the CEC and government systems, and stated that the authorities were working on it.

This entailed a minimum of tens of thousands of home routers with the total number remaining undisclosed. The compromise affected MoldTelecom systems using combo fiber optic modems and home Wi-Fi routers. It remains unknown how the routers were infected, but the purpose was clear. They served two functions:

1. Creation of a Local Botnet - The compromised routers then opened up the compromise of all the devices on that local home network. This particularly focused on Internet of Things (IoT) devices with weak security. According to Anatolie Golovco, in one example, they detected a wave of DDoS attacks from a Chinese brand of air conditioner that has a Wi-Fi connection.

2. DNS Spoofing / Traffic Re-Routing - The same router compromise also re-directed traffic to Russian network infrastructure. This meant that Moldovans wanting to load example.com would first travel into this malicious Russian network without ever knowing it. That would bypass Moldova’s website blocks on apps such as HaiTV, but it would also allow Russia to use DNS spoofing to replace the real example.com with a Russian clone. That would allow them to, for example, display their own CEC website to any users with hacked home router equipment.

It remains unclear how the attackers gained access to so many routers, but Anatolie Golovco believes it was most likely leveraging default passwords and other soft spots in security. He also noted that there was an additional element here of “social engineering.” No one wanted their home networks to be hacked, but lots of people wanted access to blocked Russian channels playing movies they like. Golovco noted that in every group of friends, or village, there’s someone who helps you reinstall Windows and fix your Wi-Fi. He suspects that some of these people were unwittingly compromising home equipment by modifying settings or installing software meant to get around blocks on popular movie / TV channels.

3.5 How Defenders Kept the Network Online

This attack ultimately failed. While many details have not been made public, we know a few details.

• Last minute updates. The government worked with MoldTelecom to push out a massive update to affected routers. Because these were combo modem-routers from MoldTelecom they are technically customer-premises equipment, legally owned by the company. This meant that Chief of Police Cernăuțeanu didn’t have to plead with citizens to update their routers, the company could do it en masse.

• Cloudflare and partners. STISC had many partners both in the private sector and in the form of foreign partners. Other than Cloudflare, most prefer to remain anonymous. Collectively these efforts responded in real time to incoming DDoS attacks and coordinated to manage and block attack vectors.

With a flurry of activity in the weeks before the election, as well as on election day itself, STISC and partners were able to keep the CEC infrastructure operational on election day.

Section 4: Hybrid Attacks - Undermining the Election Results

The likely political objective was not to change votes directly, but to create a disputed outcome. To do that, the attackers needed four things: technical disruption, apparent evidence of fraud, visible disorder and protest capacity.

The cyberattack would provide technical disruption and a discrediting of the Moldovan government’s ability to conduct elections. Let’s walk through the other elements of this integrated hybrid operation:

4.1 “Evidence” of Electoral Fraud

Kremlin networks organized multiple operations to sow doubt and provide alleged evidence of fraud by PAS and the pro-EU parties. One example of that was dubbed “Operation diaspora” and was designed to discredit votes from those in the diaspora.

Investigative journalists from ZdG infiltrated this coordinated operation to recruit unofficial “election observers” to watch polling places in the diaspora. This centrally controlled operation promised “salaries” of €300 - €500 euros per day and “bonuses” of up to €30,000 euros for video evidence showing vote rigging. In many cases, “observers” were given the option of the candidate whose campaign would allegedly register them with the CEC. These candidates were not selected from the pro-Russian opposition and they denied participation. Some of these “observers” who were confronted appeared confused and sheepish, including one confronted by the Moldovan Ambassador to Greece who admitted that things were proceeding in an orderly fashion. All observers were tasked with counting (via an app) each person who went into the voting booth.

In addition to this, online videos were released as part of information operations allegedly showing vote rigging. This included videos purporting to show election workers burning stacks of ballots stamped for the pro-Russian “Patriotic Bloc,” all implying that PAS was working to rig the elections.

4.2 Visible Disorder

On election day there were multiple threats against polling stations. Bomb threats were called against polling places in Brussels, Rome, Genoa (Italy), Bucharest, Asheville (USA) and Alicante (Spain). In Iași a man threw a tear gas grenade into a polling station. There were also many bomb threats against polling stations inside the security zone. Embassies and polling places had to be evacuated and checked by the police delaying some votes.

4.3 Street Mobilization and Escalation

Long before the elections the Shor network had made preparations for violent street protests. On September 22, 2025 the Moldovan authorities conducted more than 250 searches and made more than 70 arrests around the country targeting people planning for violent unrest. The investigation targeted people brought by the Shor network to Serbia under the guise of religious pilgrimages. There they were trained with firearms, armed drones and learned tactics to instigate street riots. The operation was overseen by Russian intelligence and searches turned up weapons, ammunition, explosives and other equipment. Police released a compilation video showing some of the arrests and evidence from the raids. Here are some screenshots from the video:

4.4 Protest and Stop the Steal

All of these elements were designed to be used to contest a close election and to discredit the democratic legitimacy of any pro-EU parties who came to power. In the months leading up to elections there was a constant drumbeat of statements from pro-Russian figures alleging that the elections would be rigged. Many of them cited supposed rigging of the Romanian elections and built on a stolen-election narrative that George Simion had been building there.

There is evidence that mass street protests against the elections were planned and police reported that on September 29th messages went out promising €150 euros for people to come to a protest and €50 more to “bring a friend.” The protest in question was organized by Igor Dodon, who denied the paid protest allegations. The event was being organized “without party flags” and was billed as the opposition defending victory that he said was assured.

Ultimately the protest was small, peaceful and lasted around half an hour. After a few speeches everyone just went home.

Each of the steps in this integrated hybrid campaign ultimately failed. The end result was lots of noise and many confusing headlines but no mass unrest. The failure of the cyberattacks against the CEC were one important factor in defusing the planned FIMI campaign. In the end, the small protests that occurred claimed that the elections were illegitimate but had few arguments to explain why and a very small organic turnout to hear them.

Conclusion

The cyber operations targeting Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections were not designed to directly alter vote totals or manipulate ballots. Instead, they were part of a broader hybrid strategy intended to undermine confidence in the electoral process and create the conditions for a contested political outcome.

Because Moldova conducts elections using paper ballots and hand counts, the attackers focused on the digital systems that support the voting process rather than the ballots themselves. Disrupting the Central Election Commission’s infrastructure could have slowed voter verification, delayed the reporting of turnout and results, and created visible uncertainty on election day. In such an environment, information operations could frame technical disruptions as evidence of fraud or manipulation by the government.

These cyber operations were therefore closely linked to other elements of the broader campaign. Disinformation networks sought to produce alleged evidence of fraud. Organized actors attempted to generate disorder around polling stations and in diaspora voting locations. Meanwhile, political networks connected to the Kremlin-aligned opposition prepared to mobilize protests contesting the election outcome. Each of these elements reinforced the others. Technical disruption could provide the initial trigger, information operations could shape public interpretation, and street protests could transform uncertainty into political pressure.

In practice, this integrated strategy largely failed. Moldovan institutions were able to keep critical election infrastructure operational despite sustained DDoS attacks and other cyber operations. At the same time, attempts to generate credible evidence of electoral fraud proved weak, and efforts to mobilize large-scale protests produced only limited participation. Without visible technical disruption or persuasive evidence of wrongdoing, narratives claiming that the election was illegitimate struggled to gain traction. Critically, the election was also not very close.

The events surrounding Moldova’s 2025 elections illustrate an important characteristic of contemporary hybrid interference campaigns. Cyber operations rarely operate in isolation. Their strategic value often lies in enabling or amplifying other political and information operations designed to challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. In Moldova’s case, the resilience of election infrastructure prevented cyberattacks from creating the uncertainty needed for these wider operations to succeed.

As elections across Europe continue to face similar hybrid threats, Moldova’s experience highlights the importance of strengthening both technical defenses and institutional coordination. Cybersecurity reforms implemented since 2017 - along with cooperation between government agencies and outside partners - played a key role in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. While vulnerabilities remain, the 2025 elections demonstrate that coordinated preparation can significantly limit the impact of cyber-enabled hybrid attacks.

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This document was leaked, presumably directly to Soloviev, and is one of the most significant document leaks of this kind in years. It’s safe to assume that this leak was not an officially sanctioned trial-balloon by the Moldovan government2, so it remains an open question as to who leaked it and why.

Today we’ll take a look at this non-paper and see what it can tell us about the government’s plans for reintegration.

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The Baltic Formula

In 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte sat down to redraw the map of France. He replaced a chaotic patchwork of feudal provinces with a clean grid of departments and prefectures, designed so that any citizen could reach the administrative centre within a day’s ride on horseback. Two hundred and twenty-six years later, long after the horses retired and the Emperor met his Waterloo, the French state still breathes through that same Napoleonic design.

The lesson for Chișinău is as clear as it is uncomfortable: administrative reforms are not policy tweaks. They are state architecture. Get them right, and they last for centuries. Get them wrong, and you live with the consequences just as long.

The current PAS government deserves real credit for touching this third rail of Moldovan politics. For decades, successive governments have stared at Moldova’s map, a bloated, Soviet-era patchwork of 898 tiny primării (city / town halls) and 32 redundant rayons (counties), and blinked. To propose consolidation in a country where “local identity” is often a polite euphemism for “local patronage” takes genuine political courage.

But courage is wasted if it is spent on half-measures. The reform currently under discussion, reducing the number of primării to around 300 and rayons to roughly 10, is a step forward, but a hesitant one. It risks falling into what might be called the Latvian trap: paying the political price of reform without actually solving the problem.

The Cost of Hesitation

Latvia has already run this experiment. In 2009, it reduced its 548 municipalities to 119. At the time, this was seen as bold. In reality, it was a compromise designed to soften local resistance. Within a decade, it became clear that many municipalities were still too small to function effectively. In 2021, Latvia had to go through the entire process again, reducing the number to 43. The lesson is simple: reform done halfway is reform done twice.

Moldova cannot afford that luxury. It is already sleepwalking into a demographic wall. Many rayons have lost over 40% of their population since independence. In places like Nisporeni, the state has quietly become the employer of last resort. Around 35% of the workforce are bugetari (state employees), outnumbering those in agriculture by a factor of three and industry by a factor of four.

This is not a development model. It is an expensive, fragmented waiting room for emigration.

The Baltic Formula

Moldova often speaks of the Baltic states as a North Star. But when it comes to the plumbing of the state, it prefers its own broken pipes. The Baltic formula is disarmingly simple: scale creates capacity.

Lithuania operates with just 60 municipalities for 2.8 million people. Latvia now has 43 for 1.9 million. Estonia runs with 79 for 1.3 million. In each case, the Soviet-style district layer, the equivalent of Moldova’s rayons, has been eliminated.

Georgia followed the same logic in 2006, under Saakashvili, consolidating rapidly, in his characteristic bold, top-down fashion, and abolishing the intermediate tier altogether. Ireland, with nearly 6 million people, functions with just 31 local authorities and no elected regional layer. Denmark retains regions, but with limited roles. Real power sits at the municipal level.

In Moldova, by contrast, a typical village primărie is a ghost ship and 60% of them don’t meet even the extremely low legal requirement of 1,500 residents. With a staff of five or six, a mayor, a secretary, a couple of accountants, there is no one left to design a wastewater system, apply for EU funding, or coordinate even a basic regional transport route.

Compare that to a Lithuanian municipality of 40,000 to 50,000 people, with over 100 to 150 professional staff, including departments dedicated to urban planning, infrastructure, investment attraction, and utilities.

The results are not cosmetic; they are foundational. In Lithuania, over 90% of households are connected to public water systems. In rural Moldova, that number is closer to 35%, with many families still relying on nitrate-heavy wells. The disparity in basic sanitation is equally stark: while Estonia has moved toward a high-tech, centralized waste management system that mirrors its digital prowess, Moldova remains scarred by nearly 5,000 unauthorized, open-air dumps that poison the local water table.

You just cannot build a 21st-century economy on 19th-century infrastructure managed by a 20th-century bureaucracy.

Leadership Over Logistics

One of the recurring objections to reform is that it is politically difficult, especially when it involves merging villages. That is true. But it is also beside the point.

The current “voluntary amalgamation” approach is, in essence, a polite request for people to vote themselves out of existence. It rarely works. Villages have weak coordination, strong local identities, and often long-standing tensions, administrative, political, sometimes even ethnic. Disputes over which village becomes the center are almost guaranteed. You cannot blame people for resisting this.

The solution is not to force villages into artificial unions. It is to change the unit of reform. Instead of merging villages with villages, Moldova should consolidate around existing rayon centers (county seats), natural economic, logistical, and cultural hubs. This creates scale while respecting how people actually live, move, and identify.

At the same time, local representation in villages can and should be preserved. The model already exists. Ukraine uses the starosta system. France has the maire délégué. Poland - soltys. Moldova can introduce a similar role, pretors, to handle local issues, while shifting real administrative capacity to the municipal level. This is not about erasing the village. It is about giving it a functioning administration behind it.

The Missing Ingredient: Fiscal Power

Structure alone is not enough. Without money, decentralization is an illusion. Moldova’s current system leaves local governments dependent and underpowered. To change that, fiscal decentralization must be part of the reform.

Allow municipalities to retain 50% of corporate income tax and 2 percentage points of VAT generated locally. This would immediately change incentives. Municipalities would compete, not for transfers from the central budget, but for businesses, residents, and investment. They would have a reason to issue permits faster, build better infrastructure, and attract employers. In short, they would behave like economic actors, not administrative outposts.

The Bottom Line

Today, Moldova is spending a disproportionate share of its limited resources simply to maintain its fragmented administrative structure. Even in larger communes, some 60% of local tax revenue goes not into development, but into paying the salaries of those who collect the taxes. It is a model of recursive futility.

If Moldova is serious about EU accession, this has to change. The country will need local administrations capable of absorbing large volumes of EU funding, managing complex projects, and acting as credible partners for investors. That requires scale.

PAS has done the difficult part by opening the discussion. Now comes the harder part: following through. If Moldova is willing to pay the political cost of reform, it should at least ensure the reform is worth it. So the question is not whether to reform, but how decisively. Doing it halfway risks repeating the Latvian experience - paying once now, and again later.

Administrative systems, once built, tend to endure. Moldova has the opportunity to design one that works for decades to come. It would be a pity to waste it.

March 7th strikes on the Dniester Hydroelectric Station in Ukraine have resulted in an environmental crisis in Moldova. The strikes began the process of a spillage of technical oil into the Nistru river which has since flowed downstream and threatened the water supplies for much of Moldova’s Northeast.

By March 11th the city of Balti was forced to cut off drinking water as oil reached the pumping station and water tests showed high levels of contamination. By March 13th Moldovan, Ukrainian and Romanian teams were working to contain the oil using oil containment booms and other containment technologies. Minister of Environment, Gheorghe Hajder traveled to Soroca to monitor the situation and Prime Minister Munteanu dispatched the army to assist with cleanup and containment. He also requested the activation of the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism “for the rapid mobilization of teams of specialists and the equipment necessary to manage the situation on the ground.” The Prime Minister later traveled to Soroca himself to monitor the situation.

There he stated:

“Together with the Minister of the Environment, Gheorghe Hajder, we are in Soroca to monitor the situation on the ground. (…) Additional filters are being installed, and straw bales are being used in the water – an effective method for retaining petroleum substances. In parallel, the mobile laboratory is taking samples from the field every six hours to constantly monitor the water quality.”

Following this visit the government approved a 15 day “State of Alert” regarding the oil spill. This frees up some resources to prevent the situation from escalating, while falling short of being a full State of Emergency declaration.

Over the last few days large parts of the North of Moldova have been cut off from their water supplies. Supplies were suspended in Naslavcea, in the districts of Soroca, Florești, Sîngerei and in the Balti municipality. Chisinau’s water authorities have been installing protective dams around the Vadul lui Vodă pumping station.

Villages and towns are relying on their wells and in many cases are rushing to clean older wells and put them back into use. The most acute problems are in the city of Balti which has moved to remote schooling and called for help supplying emergency water. Balti Mayor Alexandru Petkov announced that the city of Iași in Romania was sending a humanitarian convoy of water trucks. Additionally the Moldovan Army has sent trucks and is distributing water to people in affected areas. As of March 17th more than 95 tons of drinking and technical water had been transported to Balti for distribution.

Minister Hajder has stated that the Ukrainian authorities have not explained what caused the oil leak. He stated:

“As soon as we learned of Russia’s attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, we requested official information; we even had a telephone conversation. I was told that several engines were damaged. We don’t know exactly what happened because these hydroelectric power plants are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy and are protected by martial law,”

He said that they promised more information soon. It remains unclear how long the cleanup will last or whether it will force water disruptions in Chisinau, which relies on the Nistru river for 98% of its water supply.

Moldova’s Ministry of Foriegn Affairs summoned Russia’s Ambassador-Designate1 Oleg Ozerov to issue a formal condemnation of the attack against the hydroelectric plant. At the meeting, the Ambassador-Designate was “gifted” with a bottle of oily water from the Nistru.

As of March 17th Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban has stated that no water outages are expected in Chisinau at this time. He claimed that his team is testing the water hourly and leveled criticism at the government for mishandling the situation in Balti. He demanded transparent testing results and suggested that technical water should continue to be supplied to the city.

Minister of the Environment, Gheorghe Hajder responded with a video where he called the mayor’s statements “extremely irresponsible.” He noted that city hall is able to test the water for pH, not for oil - and therefore the tests Ceban is touting are useless. He also noted that the supply of technical water is a bad idea saying:

“⁠The mayor orders us to provide technical water to Bălți. A dangerous and, again, irresponsible request. How does the mayor guarantee that no child or elderly person or any resident will accidentally drink the water that the mayor proposes to turn on in the taps. Moreover, if we now provide water to the supply network, knowing that it has petroleum substances in it, we will poison the network.”

The Minister went on to note that oily water pumped into the system could take months to clean out.

Iran War Crisis

Moldova continues to feel the aftershocks of the ongoing war in the Persian Gulf as fuel prices continue to rise. Compared to prices before the American-Israeli attack on Iran, prices for gasoline have increased 16.4% at the pump and for diesel 36.1%. The National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) sets maximum prices daily based on a formula that tracks the Platts average (S&P Global) and then factors in merchant margins and taxes. These rates are climbing at an accelerating rate as market uncertainty grows.

Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu has sought to calm consumers, explaining that imports of fuel are continuing as normal and that the country maintains stocks of 22 days of LPG, 12 days of gasoline and 11 of diesel2. The Minister has called on people to purchase only what they need and avoid hoarding fuel. He noted that while the legislation in force does not permit rationing, he is calling on people to be responsible and noting that gas stations filling illegal containers will be fined.

This Ministry has also been promoting their e-Carburanti (e-Fuels) website which shows the prices of fuel and availability at all gas stations in Moldova in real time. They are promoting the site in an attempt to prevent additional runs on gas stations.

The rising fuel costs are already forcing the government to make difficult decisions. Prime Minister Munteanu has called on all departments in the government to economize. He stated:

“In a tense international economic context and with increasing pressures on energy and fuel prices, the state must set the first example of financial discipline and responsibility towards public money.

Non-critical purchases will be reduced by at least 10%, and expenses for official transportation and the number of transport units will be reduced by at least 20%.

Public resources must be concentrated where they are truly needed: in infrastructure, in the functioning of essential state services and in maintaining economic stability,”

The Ministry of Agriculture has announced tax support policies for farmers seeking to buy diesel ahead of the planting season, and Chisinau Mayor Ceban announced that city hall lost millions of lei over the last 2 weeks due to rising prices.

Moldova Gets Nightly Drone Overflights

Since March 14th there have been numerous reports of Shahed or “Shahed like” drones crossing into Moldovan airspace. One crossed into Moldova on the night of the 14th and then subsequently left the airspace. Another on the 16-17th which crash landed in a field near Tudora and another on 17-18th which exited the airspace and was shot down over Ukraine.

Addressing the second drone, President Sandu stated:

“The Russian drone discovered today in the village of Tudora, Moldova, was assessed as carrying explosives. This is a gross violation of our airspace and a threat to our citizens. Russia systematically violates our sovereignty and puts the lives of our people at risk,”

This drone was a Shahed and was subsequently destroyed by Moldovan sappers in a controlled explosion.

Foriegn Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top foreign affairs stories of the week:

• President Sandu visited Vilnius Lithuania on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the restoration of Lithuanian independence. On her trip she met with the country’s President Gitanas Nausėda as well as other senior leaders. They discussed Moldova’s EU aspirations, common security threats and bilateral relations. Speaking of Lithuania’s support for Moldova President Sandu stated that "In Brussels, within the European Council and in every room where our accession is discussed, Lithuania is a reliable friend.” President Sandu also addressed the Lithuanian Parliament where she noted that the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact sealed the fates of both countries saying "We simply found ourselves in an empire that we had never chosen." She spoke of Lithuania’s leadership as the first country to declare independence from Soviet Occupation and how Moldova was the first country to recognize that - even as Moldova remained officially part of the Soviet Union itself.

• The Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected Ion Ceban’s appeal against his ban on entering Romanian (and thereby the Schengen area). Mayor Ceban promised to appeal further in the courts. Vasile Tarlev and Natalia Morari have also appealed their bans and the cases are in the lower courts.

• The European Commission dispersed €189 million euros under the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova. The decision recognizes Moldova’s implementation of 24 reform milestones and according to the Commission “This highlights the significant progress the country has made in advancing on its path to EU accession.” According to Prime Minister Munteanu:

“The money will be directed towards important projects for citizens: in the energy sector, to advance the construction of the regional hospital in Balti, to expand access to drinking water in several localities, to develop childcare services and support for young people entering the labor market. Moldova invests in people, and these projects will bring better conditions throughout the country,”

Politics - June 21st Elections in Gagauzia(?)

The People’s Assembly of Gagauzia held 2 extraordinary meetings on March 17th in order to deal with the region’s political crisis. Recall, the mandates of the representatives to the assembly expired last year and elections were scheduled for March 22nd. This has not happened because of a dispute between Comrat and Chisinau over the name of the autonomous region’s electoral body. Gagauzia calls it the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) while Chisinau says that constitutionally there is only one Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and that therefore the Gagauz body is the Central Electoral Council (CEC). Due to the expired mandates of the people’s assembly, and a recent law prohibiting legislation during the lame duck, they are unable to change the name (even if they were willing).

On March 17th the People’s Assembly tried to solve the impasse when they passed a resolution appointing 9 members titled “On Approving the Composition of the CEC.” They finally passed this resolution, and set the election date for June 21st, after many arguments - including a debate around whether this date was too close to the June 22nd anniversary of Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union.

The clever “everyone can see the acronym that they want” fudge may not be enough. Last week the Ministry of Justice appealed to the Constitutional Court (CC) asking for a review of the constitutionality of the region running its own elections at all. Therefore the first extraordinary meeting ended and everyone moved across the street to a larger venue for a second meeting. This one included guests like Igor Dodon and Irina Vlah and lots of discussion about how bad Chisinau is and some debate about whether they should even be negotiating with parliament at all. In the end, this meeting voted on a resolution calling on the Ministry of Justice with withdraw their appeal to the CC, and a second resolution appealing to Putin and Erdogan for mediation.

It remains completely unclear when the Gagauz elections will actually take place.

Crime & Corruption

Here’s a roundup of the top justice sector stories of the week:

• Dmitri Vartic is officially a suspect in his wife, Liudmila Vartic’s suicide. This was confirmed by Minister of Internal Affairs Daniella Misail-Nichitin. The authorities have questioned more than 30 people as they investigate the very public allegations of abuse, but no more details have been released. Dmitri Vartic has rejected accusations of abuse and has begun making police complaints against people he claims are defaming him.

• Anti Corruption Prosecutors have accused former Moldovan Ambassador to Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland (one post), Liliana Guțan, of embezzlement. They accuse her of falsifying accounting records and using public money for personal expenses to the tune of 275,927 lei. Guțan denies the accusation and claims that they are a political conspiracy to remove her from her post (she was removed in April 2025).

• Updates on alleged serial killer Stepan Găină. After a psychological evaluation the court found Găină to be sane and fit to stand trial. The investigation is ongoing but police report that they have finished the DNA examination of human remains. Publicly, the authorities have suggested that there are up to 6 victims killed by Găină and fed to his pigs.

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In this final piece we examine how the Kremlin is attempting to synchronize their faith-based messaging about Moldova with a larger ecosystem of Russian “anti-globalist” “traditional values” “anti-Sorosist” messaging. In particular we’ll look at how the contradictions and obvious falsehoods in much of this campaign create opportunities for those seeking to combat Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 4: Cross-Border Ideological Synchronization

The narratives and FIMI campaigns discussed in this series of articles represent both tactical efforts at political manipulation and strategic efforts to align with Kremlin-allies across the west. Putin’s Russia did not begin a conversation about “traditional values” vs “globalists” / “Sorosists.” This is language that they have adopted and adapted from existing western discourse. Figures like Brian Brown, who spoke at the Make Europe Great Again (MEGA) conference in Chișinău in July 2025, embody the long history of these connections. Brown is the President of the World Congress of Families, an organization that was co-founded by American and Russian intellectuals in 1997 to promote the “traditional family.” His involvement in influence campaigns around the Moldovan election, and much deeper involvement in support of George Simion in Romania’s elections, show the increasing ties between the religious right in the US, Romania, Moldova and Russia.

In spite of all of these connections, the strategy of aligning all of these groups with Russia’s geopolitical aims suffers from 2 major inconsistencies:

1. A deep aversion to Socialism / Communism amongst the religious right.

2. The complete lack of truth in the claims of “religious oppression” and the Orthodox-centric character of the allegations.

The Problem for the Socialists and People’s Republics

The narratives and campaigns discussed here are part of a broader re-alignment of politics across the region. Moldova’s Soviet-legacy Communist and Socialist parties have never been left wing and always took a center-right position in Moldova’s vague left-right spectrum. With the larger regional / global conversation about ideological politics and the era of power blocs over, this was a useful fudge. They could be both conservative and nostalgic for the (mostly) elderly voters who supported them.

In 2025 this ambiguity became a liability and Socialist leader Igor Dodon openly floated the idea of renaming the party the “Party of Sovereigntists of Moldova.” This potential move was calculated to align his party with Romania’s George Simion and the growing MEGA / sovereigntist movement in Europe. As recently as 2018 Dodon was calling Simion a “fascist,” but in May 2025 he had endorsed Simion’s presidential run and was musing about renaming his own party. Ultimately Dodon did not make the change, either due to party opposition, worries about giving up the Soviet nostalgia that they rely on, or simply due to a lack of time before the elections.

This exposed them internationally and opened up opportunities for PAS and pro-EU groups to message in ways designed to divide right wing talking points about Moldova. Moldova’s Ambassador to the United States, Vlad Kulminski, gave an interview to Fox News following the election where he stated:

“Essentially Russia tried to keep the Republic of Moldova within its orbit, and, in order to do that, it interfered massively in the recent parliamentary elections in the country. And Russia was backing a coalition of Communists, Socialists and Antifa against a center right government party.”

The false inclusion of “Antifa” in this mix only underlines how much electoral messaging is being framed in MAGA terms globally. This analysis about the Communists and Socialists made little sense in Moldova, but drove a wedge into arguments being made in these FIMI campaigns.

Another example of this comes from Conrad Franz’s trip to Transnistria. There he quickly absorbed his host’s propaganda about how there is perfect religious freedom in Transnistria and their portrayal of the region as an Orthodox paradise. At the same time, he noticed a major contradiction - statues of Lenin and Marx everywhere. In subsequent podcasts he explained how he sought to square that circle by putting the question directly to Transnistrian “President” Vadim Krasnoselsky. On the Counterflow Podcast Episode 383 Conrad Franz explained:

“But if you talk to the president, Vadim Krasnoselsky, he would say, and it’s like one of my favorite quotes of any politician and recently he said, “People accuse us of being a sliver of the Soviet Union. I say no. I say we’re actually a sliver of the Russian Empire.” And he’s like a huge imperial historian. And you look at all the new statues that have been built as opposed to the ones that were built under the Soviet times, and they’re all imperial. The biggest statue in Tiraspol is of Suvorov. One of the biggest statues they have is of Catherine the Great, who obviously is the one that initially brought all of this part of the world under Russia. The church is very prominent in town.”

Emphasis mine.

These contradictions create problems for their messaging campaigns and opportunities for those seeking to counter their message even in their own target demographics. But they are adapting and it is very possible that the Party of Socialists does rebrand, or is replaced as the primary Russian proxy by a “sovereigntists” party before the next elections.

The Real State of Religious Tolerance in Moldova

On its face the message that Christians are being persecuted in Moldova by the government and at the behest of the EU holds no water. The specific claim that the Orthodox Church, which claims 95% of the population as adherents is under assault by a secular, globalist, “satanic” government does not add up. If such a crime were happening it is clear that more people than Bishop Markell would be speaking about it. At the same time it is worth taking a look at the people who would be feeling religious persecution, if such a thing existed, namely, those who follow minority religious groups.

To get this perspective I spoke to multiple people in the Evangelical Christian community who agreed to be quoted as “missionaries serving in Moldova.” Evangelicals, representing Baptists, Pentecostals and other protestant denominations make up between 2% and 3% of the population. This community knows quite a bit about state oppression as many of the church elders got their start as bible smugglers or running covert churches during the Soviet period. Many of these churches began as household gatherings forced to hide from the authorities.

Modernly, the Evangelical community has many political differences but largely shares the concerns of the Orthodox church related to the EU. They worry about LGBTQ+ freedoms, abortion and they see the moral perspectives of Western Europe as alien to their way of life. Some segments of the community also adhere to conspiracy theories around COVID and vaccines that are highly prevalent in the Orthodox community. Where these agreements part sharply however is on Ukraine1.

The New Iron Curtain for Believers

One missionary I spoke with had knowledge of the religious situation across what he called the “New Iron Curtain” and explained it as follows: there are 3 levels of religious oppression in our region radiating out from Russia.

1. The Russian Federation - The 2016 “Yarovaya” law and its subsequent implementation has effectively banned religious freedoms. Churches have been closed, pastors have been arrested and currently sit in jail. Religious organizations outside of the Russian Orthodox Church are denied registration, and unregistered religious activity is equated with terrorism.

2. Belarus - Officially they mirror Russian law, but enforcement is less strict. Oppression is bureaucratic and legal and Evangelical churches are denied licenses. Pastors are sitting in jail but the oppression is not absolute and the church exists in the shadows.

3. Transnistria - The region’s “laws” also mimic Russia’s but the oppression is less than Belarus. The missionary I spoke with was not aware of church leaders currently being imprisoned, but noted that there is no official freedom to operate there. No evangelism is allowed and bureaucratic rules prevent gatherings and any official registration.

Asked to characterize the situation in Moldova he stated:

“Ukraine has the most religious freedom in Europe, after Ukraine is Moldova”

Asked to explain that assertion he cited examples of political correctness and what he viewed as limits on speech in various countries in Western Europe. He stated that Moldova and Ukraine are not like that, saying that the countries aren’t “anti-woke” because they never became “woke” in the first place. Asked about assertions by the bloggers and podcasters from this report about how Moldova is more oppressive of religious freedom than the Soviet Union he became apoplectic and did not feel that this statement even deserved response.

One of the missionaries I spoke to explained that the only persecution he had ever witnessed in Moldova was carried out by local priests of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. He explained that in the past these priests might hire local drunken brawlers to assault missionaries with the goal of drawing the police in and getting the missionaries removed from the town. But even that was more than 10 years ago.

For him, his church community was extremely cognizant of how their rights stand now. He said that during open prayer at his church…

“At least once every 2 weeks someone at our church will pray and give thanks for their freedom. They do not mean political freedom, they mean religious freedom.”

Narratives a Mile Wide and an Inch Deep

The contradictions in the messaging around religion in Moldovan politics present serious challenges for Russian FIMI as they continue to push a strategy of aligning and integrating messaging with European far-right and American far-right groups.

Their attempts to target messages at a figure like JD Vance rely on carefully phrased arguments in articles like the one in LifeSiteNews that mostly elide the tougher questions of religious freedom in a country and fully avoid the words “Socialist” and “Communist.” Messaging directed at ROCOR is much more explicit, but is aimed at a small (if highly mobilized) group within the US.

Speaking to Evangelical groups none felt that their churches had been targeted specifically with messaging around the elections. Most of those I spoke to felt that the majority of their community under 50 supported Moldova’s EU integration - though many had reservations. None knew of widespread support for the Russian war in Ukraine or for Moldova returning to the Russian world. None knew of a single instance of their community showing anything but open arms to Ukrainian refugees.

This mirrored actions early in the war by other religious minorities - including Catholics, Muslims and the Jewish Community, which all played outsized roles in refugee relief efforts relative to their community size.

It is plausible that this is the reason that figures like Brian Brown and Bausman’s Bloggers did not appear to engage with minority religious groups as part of their campaigns.

Series Conclusion

In the 2024 and 2025 elections Russia has run active FIMI campaigns targeting religious messaging inside and outside Moldova. They used sophisticated and evolving campaigns that were not simply tactical but were aligned with broader political narratives in Moldova, Europe and the US that Russia sees as sympathetic to their cause.

In Moldova, Shor-network actors adapted 2024 efforts at simple bribery of priests to create a complex network of paid “activists” and online infrastructure organized around the “Salt and Light” newspaper. This network mixed traditional religious content with covert religious messaging and overt calls to action - largely with AI developed pictures. They gathered millions of views and built infrastructure that mostly remains intact and ready for reactivation in future campaigns.

Outside Moldova these narratives were retooled to appeal to MAGA and MEGA figures with the apparent primary hope of triggering statements or social media posts by JD Vance or other senior American figures. Failing that, they spread anti-PAS, anti-Maia Sandu and anti-EU messaging through both main-stream right-wing media outlets and into niche but highly engaged groups like ROCOR. Much of the content produced in this campaign took place in the months after the elections with the most recent content about the trip coming in December 2025.

Strategically, religious messaging is one component of a larger Russian strategy of ideological alignment across right wing groups in the US and Europe. Activists and organizations such as the World Congress of Families have worked towards this goal for years and are now playing a role working to bring these politicians and communities together. Political culture war issues, LGBTQ+ rights and other “traditional family” topics provide fertile common ground for discussion or cooperation. At the same time, much Kremlin FIMI around Moldova seeks to extend this common ground to objectively untrue claims about religious persecution and lack of free speech. The experience of actual religious minorities, as well as the continued use of Soviet nostalgia, provide fertile soil for counter narratives and debunking of claims.

Looking forward, these networks - inside and outside Moldova - are likely to play an ever more key role in Kremlin FIMI. In a hybrid war of disinformation and propaganda that is increasingly targeted by population segments but unconstrained by borders it will be important not only to be aware of these campaigns, but to counter-program and to actively exploit the weaknesses of their narratives.

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This concludes a four-part Moldova Matters series based on a new report produced with WatchDog. Readers interested in the full analysis can read the complete report here.

Like the rest of Europe, Moldovans have spent the last week watching the unfolding war against Iran and trying to figure out the basics. Why? why now? and what does this mean for us? While the first 2 questions seem as opaque now as they were the first day, the question about the impact on Moldova and the rest of Europe is becoming more clear.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has led to skyrocketing oil prices. With Gulf states unable to load oil and LPG onto tankers they have filled up their storage and begun gradually shutting down production. The longer the war lasts the harder it will be to restart this production. With analysis saying that this is already the largest oil shock in history (with the potential to dwarf 1973 and 1979) it is clear that the crisis could have a long tail.

Russia has emerged as an early winner in this war as the rising price of oil replenishes their exhausted war chest and the Trump Administration begins “temporarily” dropping sanctions against Russian energy. Meanwhile, peace negotiations in Ukraine have frozen as the real estate investors tasked with finding peace have refocused their efforts on the Middle East.

Incredibly, the United States and Gulf nations expended more Patriot Missile interceptors in 3 days than have been used by Ukraine since 2022. The US has long argued that it needed to limit the provision or sale of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine so that the country could maintain stocks for a potential conflict with China. Now, with US stocks rapidly depleting and Arab Gulf states running dangerously low on interceptors, they have turned to Ukrainian experts to help them with a more cost effective drone and missile defense.

None of this is good for Ukraine that it itself dangerously low on interceptor missiles. Meanwhile, the Pentagon has said that it is “not concerned” about reports that Russia is aiding Iran in targeting American ships and bases.

Moldova Braces for an Oil Shock

Right now Moldova does not face shortages of gasoline or diesel fuel, but worries have set off panic-buying that is causing lines and emptying gas stations. The EU requires all member states to maintain emergency oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of imports of 61 days of consumption. Moldova has no such oil reserves and the Ministry of Energy has estimated that commercial reserves could cover 21 - 30 days of supply.

The government declared a 60 day State of Alert1 in the energy sector but warned the public against panic-buying and noting that the conditions to not warrant a full State of Emergency at this time.

The Ministry of Energy has proposed a draft law this week to create 90 day reserves with the government responsible for 50% of the total and private companies responsible for the other 50%. The proposal states that 60% of the reserves would need to be kept in-country. The new law targets diesel, gasoline and aviation fuel and would gradually fill a reserve until July 1, 2030.

Moldova has seen some small fuel prices increases as regulators easy the price up while monitoring the direction of events.

Transnistria faces a more acute crisis as the attack on Iran immediately disrupted their natural gas supply2. On March 4th the region’s MGRES power plan switched operations to coal in order to conserve natural gas. The regional “authorities” have instituted a gas saving regime by cutting off heat to non-essential buildings.

The ongoing crisis and manifest uncertainty across Europe is only likely to further drive Moldova’s renewable transition. This week the authorities reported that Moldova covered 24.5% of its electricity consumption in 2025 with renewable power. The country ended the year with 980 MW of installed capacity, up from 77 MW in 2020. Of that 980 MW, 400 MW was installed in 2025 alone.

Other International Affairs News

Here’s a roundup of the other top international affairs stories of the week:

• Moldova and Ukraine resolve a trade dispute after exchanging heated words. The issue started recently when Moldova’s health department (ANSA) detected the antibiotic metronidazole in chicken feed that had been imported from Ukraine. This caused a suspension of all poultry import from Ukraine subject to lot by lot testing for banned substances. Ukrainian authorities claimed that the situation was blown out of proportion and publicly suggested that they might retaliate by banning Moldovan wine. After much back and forth Moldova’s Minister of Economy Eugene Osmochescu announced that nothing will be banned and the countries are working together on new testing processes.

• Far-right parties gather in Washington DC for the “Alliance of Sovereign Nations.” The event, which took place from March 4-6 was attended by Moldovan MP Vasile Costiuc, leader of the Democracy at Home (PPDA) party. The event was organized by MAGA Congresswoman Anna Paulina Luna with the support of Turning Point USA. It featured Speaker of the House Mike Johnson as the keynote speaker. Other speakers included George Simion and members of Georgian Dream and AfD. At the event Costiuc posted selfies with various attendees and wrote about the event’s opposition to globalism and support of “national sovereignty.”

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Politics - a Week of Scandals

Outside of the international uncertainty, attention in Moldova this past week has focused on 2 “scandals,” the first involving a change in the laws for justice reform, the second involving the tragic suicide of the wife of a local PAS leader. Let’s jump in.

The Fight Over Herman von Hebel

The first scandal centered on the PAS party’s nomination of Herman von Hebel to the Prosecutor’s Evaluation Commission. This is the body responsible for vetting prosecutors and is the next major step in the planned justice reform process. Von Hebel was previously the international chair of the Pre-Vetting Commission and in that role drew lots of attacks from opposition parties.

On March 5th parliament voted to appoint von Hebel to the commission where he got 53 votes of the required 61. PAS MPs then abruptly voted to change the law on vetting to reduce the required threshold to a simple majority (51 votes) for members of the commissions proposed by international development partners. This law was passed with 55 votes. Following this, 53 PAS MPs voted to appoint Herman von Hebel and Bernard Lavigne to the Prosecutors Evaluation Commission. All opposition factions opposed this move and vowed to appeal to the Constitutional Court.

The move, which included slipping the amendment in an unrelated bill and passing it directly in the second reading, drew widespread condemnation. Many prominent civil society organizations, including the Legal Resources Center (LRJM), the Promo-LEX Association, the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE), Amnesty International Moldova, the Soros Foundation Moldova, Transparency International – Moldova and the Contact Center, all signed a letter of concern. It stated (in part):

“The legislative change was promoted in an accelerated manner, without real public consultations and by introducing an amendment to a draft law with a different objective. At the same time, the urgency argument invoked for adopting the change is not legally proven, and the existing legal framework already contains mechanisms designed to prevent potential blockages in the work of the evaluation committees”

Vadim Vieru, Promo-Lex program director, said of the situation:

“This is not reform, it is the reflex of a majority that prefers to change the rules of the game rather than play by them”

**Ilie Chirtoacă of Tte Legal Resources Center of Moldova said:

“It is an absolutely regrettable decision, because it is not justified, it was not consulted and I think it will serve as a rather bad signal for the European Commission,”

Valeriu Pașa, President of Watchdog stated:

“Changing the law on the vetting commission with such speed, promulgated by the President without lifting her foot off the accelerator, is a very bad example.”

Responding to the criticism, President Sandu stated:

“In this Parliament, there are not 61 deputies who support justice reform. There are not. If you disagree, you can give me names. Beyond the parliamentary majority, who would be the other deputies who support justice reform? We can analyze their statements and the actions of the opposition – they do not support justice reform. So, by definition, it is not possible to have 61 votes in this Parliament. In the previous Parliament, they existed because the parliamentary majority ensured 61 votes and then it was not a problem. (…) We are not talking about changing the Constitution here, we are only talking about appointing members to the Vetting Commission.”

For his part, Herman von Hebel stated that he’s looking forward to getting to work.

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The Death (Femicide?) of Ludmila Vartic

The second scandal of the week involved the tragic suicide of Ludmila Vartic, who allegedly jumped from the 11th story of a Chisinau apartment building on March 3rd. The case became public on March 8th, International Women’s Day, when the NGO National Coalition “Life Without Violence” posted the following on facebook:

“Last night, the Coalition was notified via a post that another woman died as a result of violence.

Her name was Ludmila.

Ludmila’s death was no accident. It was the result of continuous abuse, humility and control.

Her husband abused her, degraded her, limited her access to her own children and ultimately left her homeless, without support and without safety. This man pushed her to death.”

The post went on to describe the death as “femicide,” define the term for readers and call on people in trouble to reach out to their network members to assistance.

This post immediately went viral, driven by the overlap with Women’s Day and the fact that Ludmilla’s husband was Dumitru Vartic, vice president of the Hincesti District Council and member of PAS.

President of the Council, Nicoletta Moroșanu, immediately called for his resignation saying that she acted not based on an assumption of guilt but that given the seriousness of the situation “maintaining an important public position in such circumstances is not appropriate.”

This was followed by a call by Doina Gherman, Vice President of Parliament, and the local PAS party in Hincesti moving to expel him from the party. Dumitru Vartic initially made a facebook post which was a mournful dedication to “Ludmila – the one who was Mother, Wife, Daughter and Friend.” He later deleted the post as the story went viral.

Dumitru Vartic resigned on March 9th.

What we (don’t) know…

At the time of writing the only concrete “evidence” that Dumitru Vartic abusively drove his wife to suicide came from that one facebook post from the National Coalition “Life Without Violence,” which itself said that they were “notified via a post.” The NGO later followed up noting all the various government agencies, politicians and police departments that have jumped into the case since they first posted - saying that they will monitor everyone’s work so that “justice will be done.”

Meanwhile, lots of social media posts swirled with rumors of rapidly arranged burials, skipped autopsies and similar claims of coverups. As near as we can tell none of those are true.

Here’s what we know, the police have now opened 2 criminal cases - one investigating her death in Chisinau and another in Hincesti looking into her husband. National Police Chief Viorel Cernăuțeanu stated that the police were unaware of any reports of domestic violence prior to her death and that contrary to rumors, police on the original scene acted according to protocol. He also said:

“It’s important to understand: if the victim remains silent, that doesn’t mean society should remain silent. Many are currently discussing what happened in this family. It’s a shame we’re only talking about this now, and not at an earlier stage, when social services, psychological support, and safety measures could have prevented the tragedy,”

The police have said that there was a suicide note but that it is being withheld to protect the couple’s minor children.

Social services announced that they were monitoring the situation with Ludmilla’s 2 children, but noted that the family was not previously on their radar.

The head of the Hincesti council, Nicoleta Morosanu, also noted that there were no previous complaints, either from Ludmilla or her relatives, that they were aware of.

For his part, Dumitru Vartic has not responded to requests for comment from many news outlets but told Nicoleta Morosanu that his wife was suffering from “professional burnout.” Ludmilla Vartic was a local Kindergarten teacher. He denies accusations of abuse and “femicide.”

This scandal has rocked Moldovan social media and politics. As far as I can tell, at the core there is a tragic death, and an accusation by a well respected coalition of NGOs without accompanying evidence or clear sourcing. National attention is squarely focused on investigating what happened and hopefully we’ll have more concrete updates next week.

Hybrid War Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top hybrid war stories of the week:

• A new Watchdog report shows a new coordinated social media campaign in support of Mayor Ceban. The campaign involves 10 facebook pages, 5 founded in 2023, 4 from 2024 and 1 from 2016, that engaged in a coordinated rebranding in order to launch Moldova targeted content. The pages were previously focused on specific cities in Romania such as Stiribraila.info (news from Braila) which changed its name to ObservatorulChisinaului (The Chisinau Observer). All the pages now promote Chisinau City Hall projects with a heavy emphasis on the mayor himself. One page dating from 2016 was previously reported to have been launched by groups affiliated with George Simion. All the pages are running paid promotions and appear to be violating META policy by not disclosing either that the content is political or who is paying.

• Moldova’s fugitives from justice in Transnistria have been located. The former president of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, Dmitri Constantinov, is staying at a friend’s apartment in the region, while other fugitives are in “more secure, more protected places” including a Russian military compound “under the protection of the Russian Federation.” This was reported by Moldova’s Chief of the National Police Viorel Cernăuțeanu. He noted that while the Moldovan authorities had located the fugitive members of the Shor network, they remained beyond the reach of the law.

• Former deputy Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) director is on trial in Romania for treason. Alexandru Bălan was arrested in September 2025 by the Romanian authorities and accused of passing state secretes to the Belorussian KGB. In the ongoing trial the authorities detailed multiple in-person meetings with KGB handlers as well as the use of email draft exchanges4 for secure communications. Bălan was appointed deputy director of SIS under Plahotniuc and served in that role until 2018.

USAID

Finally today, I want to applaud the recent episode of Last Week Tonight with John Oliver that focused on USAID. In a 30 minute takedown, Oliver focuses on the malicious stupidity behind the effort to feed USAID into the “wood chipper” and the merry band of conspiracy addled fools who have now caused hundreds of thousands of deaths - most of them children.

Back in February of last year I focused in on one of the main culprits of this event - Peter Marocco. Oliver talks about this truly odd character, but there is so much more. If you want to understand the “religious” motivation, petty vengeance, kidnapping plots, January 6th events and more that brought this man to a place of power over USAID - read my piece from last year.

USAID was imperfect - and the first people to tell you that would have been the people who worked there. But the agency did a huge amount of good around the world and provided Moldova critical support at some of the country’s lowest moments since independence. More importantly, in my experience, the people who worked there were in it for the right reasons and really really cared about their work helping others.

I can’t put into words how angry I remain at how the Trump administration maligned these people - calling them criminals or worse. Luckily, John Oliver found some good words so I’ll share those with you here.

In Part 3 we look at how the Salt and Light and other agents of Kremlin disinformation simultaneously worked to spread faith-based narratives attacking Moldova in English for Western audiences.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 3: Externally Facing Religious Themed FIMI

In January 2026 I authored a report for Watchdog titled “Externally Facing Influence Campaigns” that looked at case studies of Russian FIMI campaigns targeting western audiences. In it, Case 3: Bausman’s Bloggers, involved a previously unreported campaign organized by the Russian Orthodox Church to spread FIMI about Moldova in publications across the English speaking world.

Exposure of this campaign began on September 18th, when context.ro reported on the visit of American, Canadian and British “bloggers” who were being featured in Salt and Light publications. This delegation was organized by the Moscow Patriarch Department for the Church’s Society and Mass Media Relations so that participants could “get firsthand experience of our [Russian Orthodox] Church life—in Moscow, Moldova, and the Donbas.”

Here is a list of the participants listed by Salt and Light in their posts:

• Charles Bausman - An American with a long history of working as a Russian propagandist. He publishes content called “Fascist” and “antisemitic” by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Bausman entered the US Capitol on January 6th and fled to Russia soon after according to the New York Times. He was the organizer of this delegation alongside the Russian Orthodox Church.

• Conrad Franz - An American who hosts the “World War Now” podcast and Substack newsletter (24,000+ subscribers). Its tagline is “Covering the Third World War and political and religious realignment from the perspective of Christian prophecy and rising multipolarity.” Franz is a convert to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR).

• Buck Johnson - American from Texas, host of the Counterflow podcast. Also a convert to ROCOR, Johnson’s podcast combines Orthodox Christianity, masculinity and Libertarianism.

• James Delingpole - A British far-right commentator and podcaster, former editor of Breitbart UK, known for conspiracy-driven culture-war content, climate change denial, and repeated alignment with pro-Kremlin narratives and Russian state-adjacent media themes.

• John-Henry Westen - Canadian co-founder and editor-in-chief of LifeSiteNews. The site takes an ultra-traditionalist Roman Catholic approach to the news. The site is known for publishing mis- and dis-information and was permanently removed from YouTube in 2021 for promoting MAGA “stop the steal” content. Westen is close to the MAGA movement and was pictured visiting Mar-a-Lago in March 2025.

• Thomas Herman Ertl Jr. - Unknown. I have been unable to find any writer operating under this name.

I reached out to all of those listed above for comment (except for Thomas Herman Ertl Jr) but none answered. Buck Johnson did not actually travel to Moldova because he dropped out last minute for unspecified personal reasons. He did interview other members of the group when they returned for his podcast “Counterflow.”

Claims and Narratives

Following the trip these men produced a series of podcasts, articles and interviews about what they saw in Moldova. You can find a list of the articles in the last report, today we’re going to look at the common themes and narratives and how they tie to wider messaging from the Kremlin. Different publications emphasized different narratives, but most included some version of the following:

• Moldovan elections were rigged. Maia Sandu came to power via fraudulent mail-in ballots. PAS engages in voter suppression - e.g. Moldovans living in Russia had only 2 polling stations to go to.

• PAS and the EU promote an LGBTQ+ agenda. The EU is forcing Moldova to legalize same-sex marriage. Government benefits are being unfairly given to “LGBT teenagers” for political reasons - excluding more qualified straight children. Illegal methods are being used to force pro-LGBT policies on the population. The EU is forcing Moldova to legalize adoption by same-sex couples. The Ministry of Culture and Minister of Education have plans for “incremental integration” of LGBTQ ideology into curriculums. Etc.

• There is no religious freedom in Moldova. EU claims about religious freedom are lies. Moldova and the EU are purging the true church (often called the “canonical” church). Ordinary Moldovans are 95% orthodox but this foreign “globalist” ideology is being forced on them. PAS will ban the church within months if they win the elections, etc.

• Moldova is a police state that oppresses Christians. Priests told the bloggers about how their phones were bugged and they are followed by the “secret police.” Priests sitting in churches would make a shushing motion and point to the supposed locations of hidden listening devices. They claimed that police cut the electrical cables to churches in the middle of the night if they refuse to defect to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. The secret police threaten to beat priests. In one interview Conrad Franz states:

“you start to realize this is like a gangster state. Many priests told us that what they are experiencing right now is worse than some of the worst Soviet times—which is shocking to hear”

• There is no free speech in Moldova. Russian media is banned even when the “vast majority” of the population speaks Russian. Opposition media is banned and people are under physical and electronic surveillance. State security agencies blackmail opposition and priests and they are subject to arbitrary fines, travel restrictions and threats of physical violence constantly.

• The EU is interfering in Moldovan elections through the church. Romanian funding for priests in the Metropolis of Bessarabia (referred to as “EU funding”) limits their abilities to speak out on LGBTQ+ issues or abortion. Conrad Franz claims that priests are paid “60, $70,000 yearly salaries, which like that makes you like one of the richest people in Moldova” to defect. They state that Moldova is too small and poor to stand up to the massive financial interference coming from… the EU.

• Russia vs the EU globalists - a war of civilizations. The war, elections and all politics in Moldova and Ukraine is explained as ecclesiastical and civilizational with no concern for differing political systems, ideology, ethnic or linguistic differences, etc.

• Moldova is Ukraine 2.0. The church schism in Moldova is just like Ukraine but worse in terms of government attacks on Christians.

• Russia is awesome. Transnistria is awesome. Moldova is hell. Tiraspol is much nicer than Chișinău, there is no church oppression there and all experience freedom of speech and religion. Many participants traveled on to the Donbas and to Moscow leading to articles like James Delingpole’s “Believe it or not, Russia is great,” published in the Spectator. Speaking in a podcast Conrad Franz explained:

“If they [Moldovans] could only get good info they would see that staying in the Russian sphere of influence does not doom them to worse quality of life”

Franz was referring to how much nicer Tiraspol (allegedly) was than Chișinău and the need for all Moldovans to spend time in Transnistria in order to better understand the benefits of the Russian world.

Long-form - Not Social Media

Within Moldova, Russian FIMI focuses heavily on short-attention span scrolling platforms. TikTok, Facebook, Telegram - all rely on a compelling picture, short video and / or short text. The goal is to target a mass market audience that is already on these platforms with narratives and arguments tailored to make them stop scrolling and dive a bit deeper. The foreign facing FIMI from the Baussman’s Bloggers trip is structurally different. The output of this trip came in the form of articles in LifeSiteNews, the Spectator and other sites that dive much more deeply into these issues. The content and positioning differs based on the target audience but the assumption is that the readers are open to long-form arguments diving into issues of attacks on religious freedom or free speech, rigged elections or COVID / vaccine conspiracy theories. Moldova is slotted into this space as an example of the worst of the worst offender.

This is even more clear in the podcasts that came out of this trip. Many of these podcasts are very long - up to 3 hours in length. Moldova may not come up until 1-2 hours into the discussions or interviews. This content is targeting people who are already very much part of the community in question and inserting the idea that Christians in Moldova are under attack and that the Moldovan government is an arch example of their brand of political enemy.

Audience Analysis

While we don’t have listener or readership numbers or demographics from these publications, an analysis of the publications themselves and the arguments deployed in different places indicates that there are 3 main target audience groupings for this FIMI:

1. MAGA Leaders - specifically JD Vance

2. MAGA base voters and fellow travelers outside the US - specifically people focused on culture wars and former libertarians

3. Converts to the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR) and people in their media ecosystem

Articles such as Charles Bausman’s “EU’s Shocking Push for LGBT in Europe’s Most Conservative Christian Country – Moldova” in LifeSiteNews frame Moldova in a political context designed to appeal to religious MAGA voters in the US. Narratives focus on globalism and promotion of LGBTQ+ “ideology.” Bausman writes of “widespread electoral fraud using mail-in ballots” in a clear callback to the Stop the Steal movement that led him into the US Capitol on January 6th and led to LifeSiteNews being banned platforms like YouTube.

While narratives like this exist in all of the produced content, it’s worth zooming in on appeals to MAGA leadership and to ROCOR.

“Get this to the desk of J.D. Vance”

A major figure in the delegation’s trip to Moldova was Archbishop Markell of Bălți. He met with the delegation while they were in Moldova and across their many podcast discussions he appears to be one of the key sources for many of the “facts” that they are sharing. On September 22nd, 2025 Markell shared a video on X where he makes a direct appeal to Vice President JD Vance saying:

“The whole world knows that you advocate for traditional values, the traditional family and traditional Christian upbringing (...) In that sense, we are absolutely identical to you. We advocate for the same values which is precisely why the Orthodox Church in Moldova is persecuted.”

The video then pans away from his direct appeal to show Charles Bausman, Conrad Franz, James Delingpole and others sitting in his office reviewing papers of some kind. They don’t seem to have been told that they are part of some appeal video and have likely been included simply as props - showing known American “journalists” and bloggers with Markell.

In subsequent podcasts the members of this delegation frequently refer to the need to educate JD Vance on what is happening in Moldova. In episode 95 of his World War Now podcast, Franz says:

“He’s [Archbishop Markell] been doing his best to raise awareness, and he himself even told me he really thinks that if word about this can get to J.D. Vance, specifically, who we know J.D. in the past Vice President has spoken out against the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is a good sign that if we can potentially raise some awareness, get this to the desk of J.D. Vance, maybe even get this on J.D. Vance’s timeline. We know he follows a lot of people on X that we are familiar with. So if we could get eyes on this, make sure we spread this around, it would really do a service to suffering Orthodox Christian brothers that are never going to get their day in court, both physically in their country illegally or in the media that of course is going to side with their oppressors.”

In April of 2024 Vice Presidential Candidate JD Vance gave a speech calling out the “assault on traditional Christian communities” in Ukraine. He stated:

“That will be … our shame for refusing to use the hundreds of billions of dollars that we send to Ukraine as leverage to ensure and guarantee real religious freedom,”

His remarks in the context of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Schism drew the attention of church authorities and clearly made him a main target of efforts by Conrad Franz and others. In the same podcast Conrad Franz called on his listeners to contact their “local and federal representatives” to put pressure on Moldova, Romania and the EU.

Understanding ROCOR

Of all the participants of this delegation, the one who produced the most content before and after the trip was Conrad Franz. Following the full delegation’s trip to Moldova, he is the only one to speak or write about visiting Transnistria. He then traveled to visit churches in Russian-occupied Ukraine near the frontlines in Donbas, and then on to Moscow.

Franz and Buck Johnson are both recent converts to ROCOR. They are part of a huge wave of conversions to ROCOR taking place in the United States in the years since 2020 - particularly in Texas. Converts are overwhelmingly male and were initially drawn by ROCOR’s staunch anti-vax views. The phenomenon has been reported on by NPR, the BBC and the New York Times which wrote:

“Many of the young Americans new to the pews have been introduced to Orthodoxy by hard-edge influencers on YouTube and other social media platforms. Critics call the enthusiastic young converts “Orthobros.”

The “orthobros” are a growing part of the wider “manosphere” that drive their message with slick looking YouTube videos of priests pumping iron and discussing how converts can “increase their manliness to absurd levels?”

Orthodoxy in the United States has typically been limited to immigrant communities who build churches around those communities - for example, Greeks, Ukrainians and Russians. These new converts are massively swelling the number of Orthodox believers in the United States and bringing a very different flavor to the church. Even before this current wave, Orthodoxy drew a disproportionate number of White Nationalists including high profile figures such as Matthew Heimbach, the organizer of the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville Virginia. Heimbach converted to Antiochian Orthodoxy in 2014 but was excommunicated only a week later after he beat an anti-fascist counterprotestor with a large wooden Orthodox cross. He has since found a Romanian Orthodox group that accepted him.

It is worth noting that while ROCOR is not inherently antisemitic, more fundamentalist Orthodox converts in the US have a high level of overlap with antisemitic and Neo Nazi groups. That includes Charles Bausman (called a publisher of “Fascist” and “antisemitic” material by the Southern Poverty Law Center) and much of the content created following the blogger delegation in Moldova. Antisemitism, millenarian prophecy, talk of Satan (often as Maia Sandu) and similar themes run through many of the podcasts produced following this trip.

It is also worth noting that many of the ideas prevalent in this wing of ROCOR - including the slogan “Orthodoxy or Death” - are banned in Russia as extremist. Conrad Franz and many in this movement are monarchists who hope to see the return of a Russian Tsar after Vladimir Putin. It is ironic to note that some of their content, if produced in Russia and in Russian, would likely result in a close encounter with actual political, religious and speech persecution.

This article is Part 3 of a four-part Moldova Matters series. In the final installment, we examine how narratives developed in Moldova were repackaged for audiences in the United States and Western Europe — and what this reveals about a broader ideological alignment between Kremlin messaging and segments of the Western far right.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

This article is the second in a four-part series drawn from a new report published in collaboration with WatchDog on the role of religion in Kremlin-aligned influence operations targeting Moldova. While Part 1 examined the historical roots of Moldova’s Orthodox church divide, here we turn to the election campaign itself.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 2: The Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Elections

In addition to in-line links to investigations in the local press, this section draws heavily from the October 1, 2025 DFL report titled Targeting the faithful: Pro-Russia campaign engages Moldova’s Christian voters1 which is worth reading in full.

In May 2025 Journal TV exposed a Kremlin operation called “Matushka” which sought to use clergy members of the Moldovan Orthodox Church to influence the September parliamentary elections. This was really an extension and adaptation of existing operations targeting the EU referendum and presidential elections in 2024. In all cases, the goal was the same - to defeat President Maia Sandu and the PAS party and to turn the country away from the path of EU integration.

In 2024 the operation worked as follows:

• Priests and lay church associates traveled to Russia ostensibly to participate in religious pilgrimages. Once there, they were trained by Russian agents and members of the Shor-network in how to influence their parishioners‘ political views.

• Journal TV reported that around 900 priests and 200 lay associates received Russian MIR bank cards in this process. Ilan Shor’s organization Evrazia paid them $300 - $1000 / month via these cards as compensation for their political work.

• Shor-network handlers and Russian political operatives arranged followup calls with the priests to instruct them as to which politicians to support. Initially they were told to promote Shor’s candidate Victoria Furtună, then support was switched to Alexandr Stoianoglo in the second round.

The results of this scheme appear to have been mixed. Many priests happily pocketed the money, enjoyed their pilgrimage and then never spoke about politics from the pulpit. In essence, Moscow spent a lot of money but did not have tools to verify the results.

They changed tactics in 2025. Journal TV reported that 19 archpriests (Protopop) were invited to a pilgrimage in the Holy Land between March 30th and April 3rd 2025. There the Kremlin’s political organizers announced a new strategy. Instead of focusing on ordinary priests they created a grassroots network organized around trusted nodes at the archpriest level. This network was mostly laymen and laywomen and operated on a pay-for-results model. “Activists” would organize social projects and events and would distribute a new newspaper called “Salt and Light” (Sare și Lumină).

This network spread information online via various religious affiliated facebook pages and Telegram groups (including the official Salt and Light page) and offline with their newspaper and events.

Whether distributed as a newspaper, via social media or from the pulpit, the messages from this network were consistent. They consisted of a blend of inoffensive religious content and cloaked election messaging with a series of recurring themes. These included:

• “Moldova with Faith” versus “Moldova with Europe” - One campaign presented side by side pictures of orthodox weddings vs gay weddings, happy families vs promiscuous hippies and similar themes. In each case true orthodoxy was pitted against European integration which was presented as “moral decay.”

• Church Schism & Anti-Romania Messaging - The Metropolis of Bessarabia was consistently painted as a threat to believers’ religious rights. It was framed as a tool of Romanian nationalism, EU integration and western degradation (sometimes even presented as a slippery slope to protestantism or catholicism).

• Church “under siege” - They said that the Moldovan authorities are waging war on the Church. In this narrative Maia Sandu and PAS are trying to destroy true orthodoxy, take church property and lead believers into a godless and degraded EU. They suggest that the authorities are promoting the Metropolis of Bessarabia and attacking the Moldovan Orthodox Church to create a “Ukrainian scenario” whereby the state would play an active hand in fully driving out the Russian Orthodox Church and its subsidiaries.

• Direct Political Messaging - Readers were told that PAS was preparing anti-church laws for when they were re-elected and messages and videos openly promoted pro-Kremlin candidates. In one video, Archbishop Markell defended Bashkan Evgenia Gutsul and framed her imprisonment as a political attack on innocent religious people. This video was heavily promoted in their network. Other posts promoted Shor-network candidate Victoria Furtuna before her party was removed from the elections. On September 26 on the final day of the electoral campaign readers were told to “follow the star” with a picture of a ballot voted for the Patriotic Bloc.

Many of the posts involved pictures or graphics that were clearly developed with AI. The Salt and Light network extended onto TikTok, YouTube, OK, VK, Facebook and Telegram. Its content was further promoted by other pages, including regional church pages for various dioceses around Moldova.

In addition to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), these pages also included calls to action - usually asking readers to click a link and interact with a Telegram bot in exchange for “prizes.” These tactics were used to gather personal information on readers and watchers.

Posts gathered millions of views and tens of thousands of followers across the online social networks. It’s unclear how many Salt and Light newspapers were distributed, but photos and stories posted online show mass distribution in Chișinău apartment buildings as well as across villages. In one instance alone, Police seized 200,000 newspapers from a clandestine print house. Of those nearly 100,000 were religious papers, mostly Salt and Light in Romanian and Russian.

As of February 2026 this network is still operational. While many websites have since been blocked, and follower counts on social media have fallen, the pages are still actively posting content. Now most posts are religious and non-political in nature, but the network is active and capable of reactivating in future elections.

Church “Seizure” Provocations

In parallel with the FIMI propaganda operations, pro-Russian groups have staged a series of occupations and attacks related to churches and priests that have switched to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. This can involve a mob physically expelling a Metropolis of Bessarabia priest and his family from a church and occupying it. Violent issues like these generally stem from a dispute over property rights, with the mob claiming that the church building belongs to the Moldovan Orthodox Church and therefore cannot defect. As many churches are the property of the local governments or the Ministry of Culture, this is a more complex legal issue. The Moldovan government has sought not to take sides in these religious disputes, but the police are often pulled in to maintain order and ultimately side with whichever side the courts rule has the right to use the property.

This leads to scenes of violent confrontations with the police in the middle. Nuance about court orders and multi-year EU-level lawsuits are cast aside in favor of narratives spinning these confrontations as police organized church seizures. These incidents fuel local propaganda and are the nexus of a separate FIMI campaign focused on western audiences.

Taken together, these online and offline campaigns shaped an information space designed as a wedge between voters’ national and economic aspirations with the EU and their faith and traditions. These networks remain active and are capable of shifting back to political messaging in the future.

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This article is Part 2 of a four-part Moldova Matters series. In Part 3, we follow the evolution of these efforts and how the “Salt and Light” ecosystem was used to create English language disinformation targeting Moldova for believers in the West.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

This article is the first in a four-part series based on that report. Here we begin with the historical context that makes these influence operations possible: the existence of two parallel Orthodox church structures in Moldova. The Moldovan Orthodox Church, subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinate to the Romanian Patriarchate.

Understanding how this ecclesiastical split emerged - and how it compares to the better-known church schism in Ukraine - is essential to understanding how religious narratives later became intertwined with election messaging and foreign influence campaigns.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

Part 1: Understanding the Church Schism

In terms of self-identification, Moldova is among the most religious countries in Europe with 2.27 million people, 94.3% of the population1 self-identifying as Orthodox in the 2024 census. While the census does not break down affiliation within the Orthodox faith, Moldova has 2 different churches that represent different cultural and historical affiliations for believers. They are:

1. Metropolis of Chișinău and All Moldova - Often called the Moldovan Orthodox Church, this branch is an autonomous self-governing church within the Russian Orthodox Church that is subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Moldovan Orthodox Church governs day to day operations locally but is canonically subordinate to Moscow and the head of the church, currently Metropolitan Vladimir, is officially confirmed by the Moscow Patriarch.

2. Metropolis of Bessarabia - This church is directly subordinate to the Romanian Orthodox Church under the Romanian Patriarchate. The church is headed by a Metropolitan, currently Metropolitan Petru, who is appointed and confirmed by the Romanian Holy Synod. Unlike the Moldovan Orthodox Church, the Metropolis of Bessarabia is not autonomous and is an integral part of the Romanian Patriarchate.

There are no firm estimates of membership in the 2 churches, sources generally cite 80% of believers belonging to the Moldovan Orthodox Church and 20% to the Metropolis of Bessarabia2.

A Brief History of the 2 Churches

Prior to the Annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire in 1812, the local Orthodox Church was integrated into the Principality of Moldavia which was under Ottoman suzerainty. The church was under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople but was locally integrated with Romanian as the primary language of daily life and Romanian operating alongside Old Church Slavonic

for church functions.

Following the Russian Annexation in 1812 the Diocese of Chișinău was created under the Russian Orthodox Church and administration shifted to St. Petersburg which began a process of Russification. The Romanian language was sometimes tolerated, sometimes sidelined, but the church was consistently used as a tool of imperial control and integration.

In 1918 the Moldavian Democratic Republic was created and then quickly voted to form a union with Romania. Following this, in 1925, the Metropolis of Bessarabia was formally established to govern the church in the region under the control of Bucharest. Throughout the period of Romanian control (1918 - 1940) church life was re-Romanianized.

Following the Soviet Annexation of Bessarabia (1940) and then during Soviet control after WW2 the Orthodox Church entered the turbulent world of Soviet state-church politics. After initial waves of suppression, Stalin introduced limited toleration during the Second World War and following the war the church was allowed to function within strict state control, including KGB infiltration of the clergy.

The modern church schism dates from Moldovan independence in 1991 when the Metropolis of Bessarabia once again became active and began contesting legitimacy with the Moldovan Orthodox Church. Both churches claimed historical legitimacy by leaning on different historical interpretations and political traditions. The Moldovan Orthodox Church attempted to ban the Metropolis of Bessarabia with state support from successive governments in the 1990s, but lost in the European Court of Human Rights in the case Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova which forced legal recognition of the Romanian church in Moldova in 2001. Since then both churches have legally operated in the same territory.

Linguistically, the Metropolis of Bessarabia operates exclusively in Romanian. The Moldovan Orthodox Church also primarily operates in Romanian (which it calls “Moldovan”) but also operates Russian speaking parishes in parts of the country with majority Russian populations.

Growing Schism (2023 - Present)

While geopolitics began to fuel the schism with the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014, the full scale invasion in 2022 acted as a major shock to the status quo. In Moscow, Patriarch Kirill has framed the war as a civilizational struggle and has openly supported Russia’s war of aggression and conquest in Ukraine. This left the semi-autonomous Moldovan Orthodox Church institutionally tied to a war of aggression and believers and church leadership struggled to manage these geopolitical challenges.

Beginning in 2022 and accelerating in the following years, parishes began transferring from the Moldovan Orthodox Church to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. The growing schism burst into public attention in October 2023 when Metropolitan Vladimir, leader of the Moldovan Orthodox Church, wrote a letter to Patriarch Kirill which leaked to the press. In this remarkably frank letter, he laid out the challenges facing the Moldovan Orthodox Church and specifically cited the political pressure caused by the war. Metropolitan Vladimir noted an increasing exodus towards the Metropolis of Bessarabia and how the actions of the church in Moscow are forcing people to decide between their “Latin roots” and the clear ambitions to reincorporate the country into the “Russian World.” In the letter he pleads for additional funding and resources to offset growing costs associated with energy prices and competition with the Metropolis of Bessarabia who, he claims, pay priests €800 - €900 euros / month in addition to healthcare and a pension.

While the hierarchy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church remains opaque, there are publicly 2 competing factions with different approaches to politics and geopolitics. Metropolitan Vladimir has publicly tried to chart a pragmatic course while remaining closely tied to Moscow3. More aggressive is the Bishop Markell of Bălți and Făleşti, who pushes aggressive Russian talking points and appears frequently in Kremlin organized Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns (as we will see below).

Factors Driving the Schism

Here are some key factors driving parish-level decisions on defections to the Metropolis of Bessarabia:

• History & Proximity - Parishes in communities with stronger Romanian identity ties - particularly along the Prut river - were among the first to switch.

• Geopolitics - Russia’s war in Ukraine and the bellicose rhetoric from the Patriarch has caused both priests and parishioners to switch allegiance due to a crisis of conscience.

• Politics - The Moldovan Orthodox Church has repeatedly been drawn into schemes by the Kremlin and Shor-network to become involved in Moldovan elections. Political speeches from the pulpit have anecdotally driven away parishioners who are uncomfortable mixing politics and spirituality.

• Money - The Metropolis of Bessarabia is a direct funder of their parishes in Moldova. According to expert Andrei Curararu, salaries for priests are closer to €300 euros / month, rather than the propaganda claim of ~€900 (or much higher as we’ll see below). But this number disguises a different relationship with the church organization. In the Metropolis of Bessarabia resources flow downward from the center through the bishoprics and to the parishes. In the Moldovan Orthodox Church funds flow upward with a portion of the “fees” gathered for church services being directed towards the upper echelons. Thus, regardless of monthly salaries, it may be more lucrative for a priest and local parish to be part of the Metropolis of Bessarabia as they are more able to keep their “earnings.”

• Opportunity - The hierarchy of the Moldovan Orthodox Church is opaque and many priests feel that they do not have opportunities for advancement. Some switch to the Metropolis of Bessarabia because they feel that their own careers will advance more quickly.

Of these factors, Andrei Curararu says that top-down motivations of priests are more common in the decision to switch allegiance than bottom-up movements of parishioners. Motivations are complex, but neither church is “reformed” in the western parlance and parishioners exercise limited democratic functions within church decision making.

Opposition to switching churches is often rooted in tradition and the calendar. While a majority of Moldovans self-identify as Orthodox there are no solid numbers as to how many go to church regularly. Many, likely a large majority, are culturally orthodox and primarily interact with the church through family milestones (births, deaths, marriages) or through holidays such as Christmas and Easter. The Moldovan Orthodox Church uses the Julian Calendar while the Metropolis of Bessarabia uses the Georgian Calendar. As such, a change between the churches requires people to re-order their holiday calendar and change traditions that they have often celebrated all their lives.

Role of the Church in the Community

For western readers, it is important to note that the Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Metropolis of Bessarabia have a lot in common both structurally and theologically. On the question of EU accession, the Metropolis of Bessarabia is considerably more pro-EU than the Moldovan Orthodox Church which largely aligns with the Kremlin’s anti-EU position. But that is not because they differ on key issues - e.g. LGBTQ+ rights, “traditional values,” etc. The Romanian Orthodox Church has many of the same anxieties but has seen the process of EU integration firsthand and knows that it is not directly threatening to their church. They may pursue many of the same culture wars but they do so within the EU’s infrastructure.

Both churches draw on the same elite and same seminaries and schools. Both churches see their role in their communities as the keepers of tradition and ritual and as enforcers of community rules. Neither church shows aspects of the reformed traditions of Western Europe, including democratization of parish governance or a role in the community’s social welfare. It is worth stressing that during the great crises of these past years - COVID lockdowns and the 2022 Ukraine Refugee Crisis - neither church played an organized role in providing supplies, donations or aid to those in need. The schism is about hierarchy, language and history - but not about theology, or the role of the church in community life.

Comparison with Ukraine

Many Kremlin FIMI narratives compare the church schism in Moldova with the parallel upheaval in the orthodox church in Ukraine. They are not similar and it is important to quickly explain why. Here is a short comparison:

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This article is Part 1 of a four-part Moldova Matters series based on a new report published in collaboration with WatchDog. In Part 2, we examine how religious messaging was mobilized in Moldova during the 2024-2025 elections and how networks of clergy, activists, and online channels helped translate theological language into political influence.

You can read the whole report online from WatchDog.

The Legends of Mărțișor

Beginning March 1st, Moldovans begin celebrating spring with the ancient traditions of Mărțișor (pronounced muhr-tsi-shor). This tradition dates back possibly as far as 8000 years ago where evidence exists of small red and white tokens being used by ancient peoples in the area. Modern Moldovans purchase small red and white thread pendants to exchange and wear to bring good luck for the year. At the end of the month, these pendants are hung on fruit trees to bring a bountiful harvest. Across the city beginning in late February, these pendants and other red and white decorations can be purchased from street vendors. Be sure to get yours before they are sold out!

But why wear red and white? There are many legends and stories explaining this tradition but most fall under two categories. In all the stories the red typically symbolizes blood and life while the white symbolizes the winter’s snow and purity.

One variation of the legend is as follows. The sun, disguised as a beautiful girl, came down to earth where she was kidnapped by an evil dragon. Without the sun, the land was covered with snow and ice. A brave hero fought the dragon and drops of his blood began melting the ice. Once the sun was free of the dragon, spring returned to the earth.

The second story involves variations on the legend of the old crone, Baba Dochia (pronounced baba dok-i-uh). Baba Dochia’s precious son Dragobete married against her wishes, a young, beautiful maiden. Baba Dochia was jealous of the girl and liked to torment her. One winter, Baba Dochia sent the girl to a stream with wool from a black sheep and told her to wash it until it was clean. The girl attempted to wash this wool without success until a being appeared from the sky and gave her a red flower and told her to touch this flower to wool. The wool magically turned red. Upon seeing the red flower and wool, Baba Dochia assumed spring had arrived and set out in her 9 coats to collect wild flowers. As she warmed up she would take off a coat and shake off the dust from the winter. This gives us the added legend of the late spring snows being connected to Baba Dochia taking off her extra coats, causing these late snows. After removing all her coats, a cold spell returned and Baba Dochia froze to death as her punishment for being so cruel to the girl.

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March Holidays and Important Dates

• Sunday March 8th - International Women’s Day - be sure to get your restaurant reservations in advance if you want to celebrate in the city.

• Sunday March 29th 03:00 AM - Daylight savings time begins in Moldova. Clocks will spring forward at 3:00 am.

Mărțișor Celebrations

For the 60th anniversary of the Martisor Music Festival, the Ministry of Culture has organized 12 days of events. A complete list of events can be found in this document published by the Ministry. Some highlights include:

• March 6th and 7th - The National Ballet “JOC” presents “The Legend of Martisor”, a extravaganza of traditional dance.

• March 9th - Irina Rimes - Popular singer Irina Rimes will perform a concert at the National Palace “Nicolae Sulac”. Information and tickets available here.

In addition to the music festival, other spring and Martisor celebrations can be seen around town.

• The National Museum of Ethnography and Natural History presents a temporary exhibit show many different designs of Martisor pendants. More information is here.

Concerts and Culture

• March 14th - Adrian Ursu - The popular Moldovan singer and television host, Adrian Ursu, will perform a concert dedicated to “Mothers, Wives, and Daughters.” The show will include support from the Moldovan Chamber Orchestra as well as a complement of background dancers. Tickets are available here.

• March 15th - Spring Harmonies at the National Ballet and Opera “Maria Biesu.” This concert features a range of music billed as “From Vienna to Broadway.” Tickets and details available here.

• March 27th - “We are Romanians” - A large spectacle at the Chisinau Arena will be held featuring a long list of Romanian language performs including The National Ballet “JOC” and many singers that are locally popular. The full list of participants and tickets are here.

• March 28th - The national ballet will present the ballet - “Don Quijote”. This 150 year old ballet features vibrant costumes and lively dancing. Tickets available here.

• Through March 10th - The National Museum of History presents a photo exhibition, “The Road of War” to mark the 4th anniversary of the war in Ukraine. This exhibition shows the impact of the war through photos taken by two photo journalists. Details here.

Around Town

• Shopping Malldova - Spring Events - Throughout the month of March, the popular shopping mall “Shopping Malldova” will have events including a free Women’s Day concert on March 8th and a fashion show by local traditional clothing designer, Alina Bradu, on March 28th.

• March 5th and 19th - Drinking Liberally at the Litra Taproom - Join Drinking Liberally on first and third Thursdays from 6:30-8:30 pm. This free discussion group gives everyone a chance to talk about the events of the day and politics. Sign up for the email list here.

• March 15th - IMOM’s Trivia - The IMOM’s celebrates it’s birthday in Chisinau with a trivia game a Look’s Resto Bar. This group’s mission is to connect women from around the world. More information can be found here or on their Facebook page.

Sports

• March 14th - The Milestii Mici Wine Run - Join fellow running and wine enthusiasts for a 10k run through the cellars of Milestii Mici. Details here.

• March 27th - Moldova’s National Football team prepares for the World Cup with a match against Lithuiana’s team at the Sheriff Sports Complex in Tiraspol. Tickets and details on this and other matches can be found here. The Moldovan team will also play an away match in Cyprus on March 30th. Look for it on television or at your favorite pub.

Fun for Everyone

• The Chisinau Zoo is open daily from 9:00 am to 6:00 pm. The zoo recently shared a video of the new baby animals at the recently completed “Country Yard”. View the video here and get more information on the zoo on their website.

• The Republican Puppet Theater continues to offer a variety of shows for children of all ages. For a full list of performance dates and times, visit their official website here.

• Chisinau Circus - Beginning March 7th, every Saturday and Sunday at 12:00 pm and 4pm, the Chisinau Circus will perform their show “Waterfall of Emotions”. To see images of the show and more details, visit the Circus’s official website here.

Editorial Note: Moldova Matters is not receiving payment to share any of these events and does to endorse or make any guarantees about the event or its organizer. This new section is just that - new!! Feel free to leave some feedback in the comments and share any upcoming events that we might have missed!!

34 Years Since the Transnistrian War

On March 2nd Moldova marks the Day of Memory and Gratitude commemorating those who died in the Transnistrian war. It’s not definitively known how many people died in the 4 months of war from March to July 1992, but estimates suggest 300 combatants and 400 civilians from the right bank1, and around 800 total from the left bank.

On the occasion President Sandu, Prime Minister Munteanu and Speaker of Parliament Grosu laid flowers at the statue of Stefan Cel Mare and then participated in the March of Remembrance through central Chisinau to the war memorial. There, they laid flowers at the statue “Mourning Mother” and President Sandu spoke to honor the sacrifice of the fallen and all veterans saying “The commemoration of the heroes of the war on the Dniester reminds us that freedom is not a given. It must be protected.”

She spoke of Moldova’s struggle for freedom and for the right of people to speak their own language and have their own traditions. Then, the President connected the events of 34 years ago with the present saying:

“We need to call things by their proper names.

In war, the aggressor is the one who attacks.

In 1992, the aggressor was Russia.

Today, in Ukraine, the aggressor is Russia.

To say that “both sides are guilty” is to falsify the truth. Moral neutrality in the face of aggression is not only cowardice, but also a lie. And solidarity between peoples who have experienced aggression is a duty.

The Republic of Moldova did not covet foreign territories. It did not start wars. It only defended its ancestral land.

And even today, the aggression against our country has not disappeared. Only the methods have changed.

If in 1992 aggression came with tanks, today it comes through propaganda, manipulation and disinformation. We are living a true cognitive war — a war that targets memory and identity. A war that tries to relativize responsibility, to confuse the aggressor with the victim.

Therefore, the defense of memory must be part of national defense.

Because the Day of Remembrance and Gratitude is not just about the past. It is also about the future. It is about the values ​​that define us. It is about our attachment to freedom, democracy and peace. It is about our natural place in the family of European states that value human dignity and the common good.

Knowledge of history and the sacrifices of ancestors is a condition for a strong state. Without memory, there is no identity. Without identity, there is no resilience. Without resilience, there is no security.”

Moldova Increases Pressure on Transnistria

On February 25th President Sandu signed a decree withdrawing the citizenship of 9 persons in Transnistria. This was done under Article 22(1)(c) of the Moldovan Constitution and the only official reason given was a referral from the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS). President Sandu’s National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru explained the move saying:

"The withdrawal of citizenship of the Republic of Moldova is a form of sanction for exercising functions within unconstitutional structures on the left bank of the Nistru River, for continuous actions to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as well as for serious violations of the rights of citizens of the Republic of Moldova. These acts were committed in the interests of a foreign state that violates the neutrality of our country and is waging a war of aggression against the neighboring state of Ukraine."

All 9 persons named hold, or have held, senior leadership roles in Transnistria and at least 2 fought for the separatists during the war. Some were deputies in the “Supreme Soviet,” others were responsible for falsifying their elections as members of their “Central Election Commission” and others were members of the region’s security services and have been accused of human rights abuses.

Article 22(1)(c) allows for the withdrawal of citizenship in cases where a person commits acts deemed "exceptionally grave" that cause harm to the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national security. It has been used in recent years to strip citizenship of Moldovans who voluntarily fight in the Russian army in Ukraine. Previously, it was illegal in Moldova to strip citizenship from someone if the act would result in them becoming stateless. A carveout to this condition was introduced in December 2025 amendments to the citizenship law that allows citizenship to still be withdrawn for certain very serious acts.

It is unclear if the 9 persons in question also have Russian citizenship, or if they are left only with the universally unrecognized “Transnistrian citizenship.”

Moldova is Creating a Convergence Fund

The next day, PAS MPs proposed a bill to gradually remove tax exemptions for Transnistrian companies. The bill would initially target “socially non-essential” products such as alcohol, but would gradually expand. Chairman of the Economy, Budget and Finance Committee, Radu Marian, explained that the region now largely imports products via companies registered in Moldova. He estimated that equalizing the taxes for these companies would bring the state 3.3 billion lei (~€164 million euro) in additional revenue.

Starting on August 1st, 2026 this money would be directed into a “Convergence Fund” that will be used to fund the increased expansion of public services to Moldovan residents in the Transnistria region. Due to the region’s economic crisis, 2025 saw a 40% increase in social spending by the government in support of Transnistrian residents.

This week that economic crisis deepened as the Transnistrian “authorities” announced that from March 1st through December 31st the salaries of state employees will be paid in 2 installments2. They claim that this is a temporary measure.

1+1 Talks Resume

On February 26th Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Valeriu Chiveri met with Transnistrian “Foreign Minister” Vitali Ignatiev for the first 1+1 meeting in 10 months. The meeting was held under the OSCE mission framework.

Zona de Securitate journalist Irina Tabaranu explained that Chisinau’s message was blunt, if diplomatic. Deputy PM Chiveri explained the creation of the Convergence Fund as a mechanism for gathering internal and external financing to support reintegration. He also spoke of plans to expand social services including pilot programs to expand emergency 1123 coverage.

Additionally, Deputy PM Chiveri delivered Chisinau’s standard demands about allowing Romanian education, access for journalists and civic activists, free movement of people and farmers, etc.

New Details in Foiled Assassination Plot

Last week we got the first details in a story about how Moldovan and Ukrainian security services foiled an assassination plot against public figures in Ukraine. We now know that the 2 countries detained 12 people in connection with this plot which was orchestrated by Russian intelligence. Searches in the case were conducted in Chisinau, Kyiv and Odesa.

The organizer of the scheme along with 2 accomplices was detained in Moldova. Police report that he is a 34 year old Moldovan citizen who was recruited by the Russian security services while serving in a Russian prison. The Ukrainian authorities stated:

“After returning to Moldova, he supported pro-Russian groups whose activities were aimed at destabilizing the country and organizing mass protests in 2022-2023,

It has been established that the group planned to kill at least five Ukrainian government officials. These murders were intended to cause significant public outcry. The aggressor state intended to use this to destabilize the situation in Ukraine,”

This network recruited contract killers to travel to Ukraine and map out the habits and movements of a set of target individuals that included high ranking military personnel, leaders of state enterprises, Russian dissidents and at least one journalist who was reported to be Dmitry Gordon. The killers were to be paid up to $100,000 per kill depending on their seniority. Ukraine’s SBU released photos showing that at least one person detained there had an ID card from PGTRK (First Transnistrian) television channel, indicating that the individual was a Transnistrian “journalist.”

Nicolae Șepeli

This is the name of one of the men detained in Moldova and based on available information likely the organizer of the plot. Șepeli was sentenced to 11 years in prison back in November 2017 in Russia for attempted drug trafficking on a large scale. He was subsequently transferred to Moldova to finish serving out his sentence in a process that started in 2018 under the government of Prime Minister Pavel Filip.

In April 2022 President Sandu released him from prison on a probationary pardon. The fact that he subsequently went on to play an active role in the Shor network (fined for electoral corruption in December 2025) and then this scheme has drawn a huge amount of scrutiny towards the pardon process. As we wrote last week President Sandu revoked his pardon the day before he was detained.

Investigative journalists including those at ZdG have done extremely detailed reporting on this pardon process and mapped out the entire multi-year cycle. The entire story is too long to include in this newsletter but interested readers should visit the above link if they want all the details. In short, the sentence transfer process from Russia was standard and following it former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo added Nicolae Șepeli’s to a list of people to consider for a pardon. The prosecutor’s office continued this after Stoianoglo was removed from office. The rationale was that a group of people from Moldova including Șepeli had been fraudulently brought to Russia on the promise of work as couriers and did not realize that they would be forced into trafficking illegal drugs (they were told it was be supplements).

The pardon recommendation was made with the support of human rights and anti-trafficking NGOs and was contingent on the Russian court also not knowing the circumstance at the time of original conviction. Of those recommended for a pardon Nicolae Șepeli was the only one accepted because he had no prior criminal record, served the majority of his sentence4 with a good behavior record and had a family willing to support him during his probation and reintegration.

As of the time of writing, no wrongdoing has been found or alleged at any stage of this process which involved officials appointed by all Moldova’s major political parties at one stage or another.

We’ll update in future editions if there is more information about the pardon process or about the operation to dismantle the contract killer network.

Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top political stories of the week:

• New IMAS poll shows dissatisfaction with the Munteanu government. Respondents were asked to rank the new government’s performance on a 1-10 scale with 10 being the best. 39% gave a grade of 1-4, 25% a grade of 5-6, 18% a grade of 7-8 and only 7% a grade of 9-10. 61% of respondents said that the Munteanu government has brought no changes, 17% said changes for the better, 14% change for the worse and 8% don’t know / no response.

• Vasile Tarlev’s Future of Moldova Party loses state funding starting in February. Prior investigations by the Central Election Commission (CEC) showed major financial violations in the 2024 presidential campaign and the party owes 587,500 lei to the state budget. The party does not have this money and has requested that their state funding be diverted to pay this debt which is now happening.

• Chisinau city hall has allocated 70 million lei for park & ride commuter lots. The new parking lots will be located in Ciocani, Buicani and Riscani and will allow commuters to drop their cars and proceed into the city on public transit. Explaining the move, the city noted that Chisinau is designed for 90,000 vehicles and currently has more than 400,000 vehicles registered in the city alone (not counting commuters).

Crime, Corruption & Justice Reform

Here are the week’s top stories in crime and justice:

• Plahotniuc’s court hearings on the “bank fraud5” case wrapped up the judicial investigation phase on February 26th. The court will reconvene on March 20th for closing arguments and then proceed to a verdict. In the last phase of the evidentiary trial the court heard testimony from a secret (anonymous) witness from inside Plahotniuc’s alleged criminal organization. This witness explained how the oligarch hired a Romanian consultant named Bogdan-Andrei Gheorghiu to build a web of shell companies collectively called UNIASIA HOLDINGS and how between 2013 and 2015 approximately $35 million dollar was transferred into this network. In 2016 Bogdan-Andrei Gheorghiu was arrested by the Romanian authorities but Plahotniuc got him out and arranged a fake Moldovan citizenship for him under the name Andrei Munteanu. The witness described the movements of 10s of millions of euros through the UNIASIA network and how Bogdan-Andrei Gheorghiu betrayed Plahotniuc and took control of these companies himself when the oligarch fled Moldova in 2019. The witness additionally explained complex schemes by which Plahotniuc acquired and maintained a €32 million euro yacht, a €40 million euro hotel in Spain a plane and more.

• Hassan Toper released and then re-arrested. Toper is alleged to be an accomplice to pre-meditated murder in the Summer 2024 “scoot by shooting” in Chisinau and was extradited from the UK to Moldova to stand trial. The court released him on house arrest over prosecutors objections creating a political scandal with MP Renato Usatii declaring “Long live reforms in the judicial system!” After 6 days of prosecutors appeals he was re-arrested.

• Major searches in a case involving the embezzlement of EU funds. Anti-corruption police (CNA) conducted searches in Causeni, Singerei, Soroca, Soldanesti, Edinet, Taraclia, Straseni, Glodeni and Chisinau targeting local public authorities, the “National Office for Regional and Local Development” and a company in Chisinau. 5 people were detained. The case involves contractor(s) offering kickbacks in exchange for winning road and sewage system construction tenders. The contractors would later bribe inspectors and engineers to get their shoddy work accepted. In one phone intercept, conspirators discussed cutting the material deliveries in half and laying 6-8 cm of asphalt instead of the required 10. Works were financed through the “European Village” program supported by the National Office for Regional and Local Development with “national and foreign” infrastructure funds.

• CNA searches in a second case of “embezzlement of foreign assets” targeted the Moldsilva Agency. The forestry agency was implementing a project called the “National Forest Expansion and Rehabilitation Program.” The CNA alleges fictional employee contracts totaling more than 4 million lei and the use of public funds for private purchase by Moldsilva employees. Environment Minister Gheorghe Hadjder announced the subsequent firings of the section heads of Moldsilva in Chisinau, Ghidighici, Vadul lui Voda, and Criuleni as well as many lower level employees. He said that firings will be followed by prosecutions. Explaining the origin of the case the Minister stated:

“Following inspections at the Ghidighici and Criuleni forestry units, where over 1,000 trees were illegally felled, we ordered internal audits at all forestry enterprises. As a result, inspectors recorded numerous violations. And it’s not just illegal logging; there are also unaccounted surpluses, unjustified expenses, and work that’s just on paper. We will not tolerate corruption, which is why dismissals and sanctions have followed,”

Economics and Infrastructure

Here’s a roundup of the top economics stories of the week:

• The US Supreme Court decision brings Moldova’s tariff rate down to 10%6. This is a major reduction from the “Liberation Day” rate of 25%. The Moldovan government is monitoring how the US implements these changes and notes that the new legal justification for the tariffs is (theoretically) temporary and expires in 150 days. In 2025 Moldova’s trade with the US grew 8.6% to $244.9 million dollars with the vast majority of Moldova’s exports the the US being wine (62%).

• PAS MPs have introduced a bill in parliament to mandate the labeling of the country of origin for products in the supermarket. The current law mandates that this information be public, but it is often hidden in the fine print. The new law would require the country to be listed on the price tag, which could include a flag, so that shoppers can easily opt for local products. Chairman of the Economy, Budget and Finance Committee, Radu Marian believes that this initiative can increase sales of local products by 5-15% and said that “It is an initiative through which we want to transform a simple act - daily shopping - into an engine supporting the national economy.”

Like many others who watched the buildup to war closely, I had bags packed and my car stocked in early February 2022. Predictions of the Russians taking Kyiv in 72 hours and the evacuations of Embassies in the Ukrainian capital drove most news cycles in that month. On February 15th, 2022 Moldova Matters switched to a “quick hit” format of short release articles addressing the deepening crisis1. Things felt imminent but we didn’t know when it would begin.

On February the 24th I remained glued to media reports of progress across the suddenly massive front line. That day I wrote two articles (one, two), and reading them back now they remind me of how uncertain and confusing that time was.

In Moldova, it was clear to anyone paying attention that Russia would not stop at the Moldovan border. In later years I spoke to a Moldovan Army Officer who served at the time who said that they expected to be engaged within 7 days. Even as counterattacks slowed the Russian army’s advance on Kyiv and Kharkiv, in the South enemy forces broke through rapidly capturing Kherson. By February 26th they were outside Mykolaiv - the last real obstacle in the advance on Odesa. But there they stalled.

Ukraine won the Battle of Mykolaiv, and the Battle of Kyiv, and in subsequent years has retaken Kherson and countless other towns and cities.

When I sip my coffee in Moldova and reflect that “we’re still here,” it is due to the courage and sacrifice of so many in Ukraine. In those early days it was far from obvious that Ukraine would turn Russia back in such critical battles. It was inconceivable, at least for me, that this war would still be raging in 2026.

Back in July 2024 I sat down for a discussion that turned into a 2 episode podcast with my friend and business partner Vlad Șuleanschi. We discussed what it was like to experience those early days and how people mobilized all across Moldova to support the sudden and overwhelming influx of Ukrainian refugees. Refugees who are still here in many cases and are now members of our communities. If you’re interested, here are the 2 episodes:

Marking Four Long Years of War

Today President Maia Sandu released a short video marking the 4th anniversary of the full scale invasion. She spoke in English - the video is available here:

Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu also released a statement saying:

“On February 24, 2022, I didn’t watch the war on TV. I was in Kiev. I woke up with the first explosions, the sirens didn’t even go off in the first few days, an airfield near my house was being bombed. In a few moments, the reality of millions of Ukrainians changed. They were forced to leave their homes in search of a safe shelter, and the war separated entire families, leaving behind pain and uncertainty,

Today marks four years since the Russian Federation has been waging a barbaric war against Ukraine. Four years in which the Kremlin has relentlessly bombed Ukrainian cities, hit energy infrastructure, and turned winters into a weapon against the people.

Russia has brought the war to the home of every Ukrainian and is killing innocent people to break the spirit of Ukraine. But the spirit of this people is invincible. All this time, I have seen the determination of the people not to abandon their freedom. I have seen the unity of a people that does not break, but becomes stronger and more united. I have also seen European solidarity – human solidarity – thousands of Ukrainian refugees met at the border by our citizens who fraternally opened their homes to them and offered them food and shelter.

(…)

Glory to Ukraine,”

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy marked the occasion with a series of videos and statements. In one, lasting 18 minutes and subtitled in English, he reflects on those early days of the war and shows for the first time the series of bunkers that the government operated out of when coordinating the defense of Kyiv and the rest of the nation.

Today, President Zelenskyy hosted European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa and the leaders of 9 European countries who traveled to Kyiv to show Western support for Ukraine.

This show of support was reflected by posts, videos and statements by European Embassies and diplomats in Chisinau, including the Embassies of Sweden, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Austria2, the United Kingdom, and others.

The US Embassy in Chisinau has posted no statements at the time of writing, instead featuring a profile of South Carolina as part of the 250th anniversary celebration schedule. They were also notably absent from any comment on last year’s 3rd anniversary.

Of all the posts, perhaps the most direct was the one from Romania’s Ambassador to Chisinau Cristian-Leon Turcanu. He served as Ambassador in Kyiv at the outbreak of war and wrote a lengthy post condemning the war, supporting Ukraine and reflecting on the change it wrought. All with this iconic art of the Moskva as backdrop.

“This is for the ones who stood their ground”

Russia’s defeat at the Battle of Mykolaiv stalled their offensive in the South and they have never come as close to Odesa - and therefore Moldova - as they did back in March-April 2022. Since that time Moldova has fended off mass hybrid attacks but not had to worry about Russian tanks crossing the borders.

Not while Ukraine hold’s its ground.

In those very early days it seemed as if Odesa would be a front line city in a matter of days. Many people, almost all women and children, crossed into Moldova seeking help during those days - and they got it. But back in Odesa people in the city prepared.

Reflecting on those days I’ll always think of this video - in which ordinary people fill sandbags from the public beaches for the defense of the city. The video shows the work as a band sets the rhythm and encourages the crowd playing “It’s My Life.”

Слава Україні! Героям слава!

The Munich Security Conference

Compared to last year’s Munich Security Conference, the 2026 event was far less shocking to participants. Partly, that’s because US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech was far less abrasive1 than the one delivered last year by JD Vance. Partly, it’s because the shock of the recent Greenland Crisis has been internalized and it’s getting harder for the US to shock European leaders.

President Maia Sandu was one of the more than 50 heads of state and government attending the event. There she spoke on a panel about hybrid threats sharing Moldova’s experience and warning that hybrid attacks affect all countries now - big and small. On the sidelines of the event she gave an interview to Romanian Substack news platform Explicativ where she called out “cognitive warfare” as the most dangerous threat to democracies and highlighted the role and power of social media companies saying:

“The Republic of Moldova is too small a country to be able to impose rules on platforms. And platforms must have a degree of responsibility, because they decide which algorithms they use. These algorithms bring information to our screen thousands of times to form an opinion. But that is not freedom of expression,”

At the conference President Sandu had numerous bilateral meetings, including one with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Speaking about their discussion she said that she expressed gratitude to the United States for past an ongoing support - particularly in the field of energy projects. They also discussed American cybersecurity and defense support to the country.

Following the conference, Marco Rubio journeyed onward to directly involve the United States in Hungary’s elections where he spoke of a “golden era of relations between our countries” and told Viktor Orban that “President Trump is deeply committed to your success.”

Meanwhile, a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) of 4 Democratic Senators, Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Chris Coons (D-DE) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) stopped in Chisinau on a tour of the region.

While in Chisinau the Senators met with President Sandu and Prime Minister Munteanu.

In questions and statements the Senators explained to the Moldovan press that the country is not unique in not having a US Ambassador with Senator Coons saying:

“I see our relations as close and strong. You should not misunderstand the lack of an ambassador here. We lack ambassadors in many countries”

They spoke of the Trump Administration’s support for energy projects in Moldova as evidence that a strong strategic relationship exists. Senator Blumenthal strongly condemned Putin’s war of aggression and praised Ukraine and Moldova’s “commitment to democracy.”

RISE Investigation Identify’s Shor’s Aircraft Fleet

RISE Moldova released 2 investigations this week into the financial dealings of Ilan Shor and his close proxies. The first investigation showed that starting in Spring 2024 Ilan Shor began acquiring a fleet of aircraft, starting with a AgustaWestland AW139 helicopter. This was followed by a Gulfstream G650ER, a Gulfstream G450 and another Gulfstream G650ER.

To evade sanctions, members of Shor’s network loaned money to the Turkish private jet rental company Zafer Air. These loans were not repayable in cash, but were to be redeemed for the aircraft at some future date. Zafer Air operates 12 aircraft of which 4 are Shor’s. RISE tracked the planes as largely flying to Ankara, Moscow, Istanbul, Tel Aviv, Bishkek and Abu Dhabi. Other trips included Budapest, Riga, Brussels, Vienna, Barcelona and Tokyo.

Intriguingly, for many of these flights the planes were painted with the official name and symbols of the Kyrgyz Republic and used to ferry the President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov to official visits.

On of the flights on March 2-7 2025 overlapped with Ilan Shor’s birthday and went to the Maldives. RISE quotes the Moldovan authorities as having received no information from Interpol that Shor left Russia since he arrived there from Israel in February 2024.

In their second investigation, RISE reported on recent data leaks from Russia’s sanctioned PSB bank that showed top Shor lieutenant Marina Tauber held more than $500,000 dollars cash equivalent in the bank. Tauber did not report such holdings on her asset declarations before she fled the country ahead of her 7 year 6 month prison sentence for money laundering and other crimes. RISE reports that the bank’s 21% interest rate is providing her with healthy yearly returns. Ilan Shor was also found to have an account in the bank with the equivalent of $87,000 in cash.

Other Security & Hybrid War News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security stories of the week:

• Dmitri Constantinov doesn’t “want to go to prison.” The former President of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia thus explained why he is on the run from the law in a newly released video. He called his recent 12 year prison sentence for embezzling more than 46 million lei “unfair” because the word “embezzlement” implies the theft of public funds and he was actually convicted of stealing this money from a private company - a situation he calls an “an economic dispute between private entities.” Constantinov is wanted by police and assumed to be in the Transnistria region after he escaped with a network of accomplices - changing cars at least 3 times - the day before sentencing.

• The authorities announced a joint Moldovan-Ukrainian investigation into a Russian plot to assassinate Ukrainian public officials. Few details are available at the time of writing, but we know that one of the targets of the investigation was a Moldovan citizen named Nicolae Andrei Șepeli. He was previously convicted of an unspecified crime in Russia before being transferred to finish his prison sentence in a Moldovan prison. He as pardoned by President Sandu in April 2022 on the recommendation of the Prosecutor General and Commission on Issues of Pardoning Convicted Persons. This pardon was conditional on a sort of parole agreement and has been canceled citing new information2.

Dodon’s “Kuliok” Trial Continues

Vladimir Plahotniuc has refused to testify in ongoing court proceedings against Igor Dodon in the case that has been nicknamed “kuliok” (bag). The case stems from a secretly recorded video, presumably by Plahotniuc himself, showing a discussion between himself and then President Igor Dodon in 2019. In the video, Plahotniuc passes Dodon a black bag with the implication that it contains money. Recall that Vladimir Voronin, when it appeared he was being forced out of politics last summer, told the world that the bag contained €860,000 euros.

During court hearings, long portions of the video not involving the bag were played for the first time. They involve a negotiation between Dodon and Plahotniuc about the formation of a governing coalition in the wake of the 2019 parliamentary elections. Plahotniuc, then leader of the Democratic Party, asks Dodon for his terms and Dodon stipulates that there will be 2 coalition agreements:

1. The Secret Agreement - to be signed between Plahotniuc and Dodon at the Russian Embassy in the presence of the Russian Ambassador.

2. The Public Agreement - to be signed by the Democratic Party leader (Plahotniuc) and the Socialist Party leader (Zinaida Greceanîi) and released publicly.

While the public agreement divided up ministries and created power-sharing working groups, the secret agreement involved Federalization. This almost certainly referred to the reintegration of Transnistria via the constitutionally asymmetric Kozak Memorandum3. Dodon explained that “The word federalization is a problem for us too. I explained it to Putin and Putin agreed,” and the 2 men agreed to use the term “special status.”

In parallel, Plahotniuc asked for assurances that criminal cases against him opened in Russia would be closed. Dodon stated that Putin had invited Plahotniuc to Russia under his “personal guarantee” in order to discuss this. Plahotniuc asked for assurances that did not involve him going to Russia, to which Dodon replied that Dimitri Kozak insists on the coalition agreement coming first.

Dodon additionally discussed party financing, with the clear implication that he was referring to Plahotniuc financing the Socialist Party, where he said “For us, 600-700 per month,” adding that this will increase “up to 700-800.” Plahotniuc expressed some surprise at this number, and Dodon insisted that “If you want to change something, I have to consult with Moscow.”

Note: Plahotniuc’s refusal to testify reflects his right against self incrimination as he is also a defendant in a related case that has not yet been brought to court.

Other Crime, Corruption & Justice News

• Police increase the suspected body count of the Beriozchi serial killer. The crimes, which were first announced on Christmas Eve, are still being investigated as the police process the alleged killer’s sprawling pig farm. Chief of Police Viorel Cernăuțeanu answered questions about progress stating:

“Active investigative measures are currently underway, which will undoubtedly further shock society. We’re talking about events from 2005-2008, 2015, and 2018, when the suspect committed quite serious crimes. Without going into details, the investigation has already clearly identified three victims. Three more victims are under investigation,”

• Interpol has refused to issue a Red Notice for Denis Cuculescu who was recently convicted of fraud and treason. The agency cited their rules against getting involved in political or security related prosecutions as the reason. Moldovan police are reapplying and attempting to negotiate, focusing on the fraud conviction.

• Vlad Filat announced that Interpol dropped their Red Notice against him. This was confirmed by the Moldovan police but the reason is unclear. The warrant involved Filat’s recent prison sentence in France.

• Anti-Corruption Prosecutors announced a new criminal case against Plahotniuc regarding the use of false identity documents. This will be his 6th ongoing criminal case in Moldova and the 3rd international case involving his many identities discovered when he was arrested in Greece (the other cases are in Greece and Romania)

The Conflict over the Dereneu Church

A conflict between the Moldovan Orthodox Church (under Moscow) and the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia (under Bucharest) over a church in the town of Dereneu has spilled into national politics. Back in 2018 the parish priest joined many other parishes around the country by defecting to the Metropolis of Bessarabia. This sparked a violent reaction, fueled by members of the Moldovan Orthodox Church and the local mayor who forcibly removed the priest and occupied the church. This case has spent years winding through the courts because the church building is state property. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that parish choices and historical claims grant the right to use the building to the Metropolis of Bessarabia.

Forward to the present, Moldovan Orthodox Church Archbishop Petru of Ungheni and Nisporeni, lit the match when he and various priests and parishioners occupied parts of the church grounds and tried to celebrate mass earlier this month. They were joined by a growing mob that the government now says are primarily “organized” outside agitators unrelated to this small town. Socialist MPs have attended the protests and the police have had to intervene to prevent the mob from forcibly removing the parish priest and occupying the building.

This conflict has resulted in pictures and video clips being spread through Russian disinformation networks with claims that the Moldovan government is seizing churches or that a “Ukrainian scenario” is underway. Russian Foriegn Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has called this an “attack on Orthodoxy” and a stain on any claim that the West believes in human rights.

In other Orthodoxy news, Russian Patriarch Kirill awarded Transnistrian “President” Vadim Krasnoselsky the Order of Prince Daniel of Moscow, 2nd Class “for his contribution to the development of church-state relations.”

Other Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• Democracy at Home (PPDA) MPs Sergiu Stefanco and Ana Țurcan-Oboroc stole a car off a police impound lot in Cahul. They claimed that the car was seized as part of bankruptcy proceedings against a local farmer in violation of a law passed in late 2025 that suspended asset confiscations from farmers. The car belongs to a local party leader’s wife. The farmer then returned the car in less than an hour saying “I don’t want to break the law.” PPDA leader Vasile Costiuc praised his MPs “for their courage” and denied reports (and video evidence) that the man had immediately returned the car. The car was released the following day through normal legal procedure.

• The Ministry of Education launched a letter writing campaign on the 4th anniversary of the full scale war. The campaign is called “A letter in place of a hug” and encourages 6-12 graders to write a “simple and sincere letter, in which they convey a message of encouragement and hope” to their peers in Ukraine. Secretary of State Valentina Olaru stated that the letters don’t need to be “long or perfect” but that they should “come from the heart” and send the message “we are not indifferent.”

Economics & Infrastructure

Here’s a roundup of the top stories of the week:

• Moldova is planning a high-speed electric rail link Chisinau-Ungheni. Minister of Infrastructure Bolea stated that a feasibility study is starting with the goal of planning a 140 km / hr rail line of European gauge. This line would connect from the Chisinau airport through Ungheni to Bucharest. When Romania completes their Pașcani - Iași line then this link would connect Chisinau to the entire European high speed rail network.

• Questions swirl over the failure to complete the Vulcănești - Chișinău high voltage line in 2025. Politicians and ministers repeatedly claimed that the line would be put into use by December 2025 and have recently given contradicting answers as to what went wrong. President Sandu recently spoke in an interview explaining that while the power line is complete and has been tested the power stations at either end are behind their contractual deadlines. Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu was forced to clarify that this isn’t really true. The contract deadline was never December 2025 but June 2026. He said that he made the public statements on the basis of verbal conversations he had where he urged the companies to complete the work faster - but that no such agreements were put on paper. When pressed he claimed that the contractors made “promises” but again, only verbally.

• Moldelectrica has hit a milestone - for the first time they have reported battery storage as an energy source. Currently 25 MWhs of batteries are installed but the Ministry of Energy predicts up to 200 MWh by the end of the year thanks to private investment. They note that new tenders for wind farms with 170 MW capacity are being prepared and that these tenders require 0.25 MWh of storage to be installed alongside every 1 MW of generation.

• Is the economy growing again? The National bank thinks so. They announced that GDP growth in Q3 of 2025 was 5.2%. They also announced that January inflation was 4.85% and within the bank’s target zone. The bank believes that the economy has now come out of stagnation.

• Parliament has voted to raise the VAT threshold for companies to 1.7 million lei. Ultimately, MPs sided with the government against proposals to further increase the threshold to 3.2 million.

• Economist Veaceslav Ionita has presented findings on the structural problems of the housing market in Moldova. He cites lack of housing supply driven by regulatory problems and poor financial instruments for builders as the driver of the ever-increasing housing prices in Chisinau. Specifically, he cites a 0.5% fee on the total project cost that is required to even start building. This means that a €100 million euro apartment building would have a €500,000 euro fee just to begin construction - much higher than in other parts of Europe. In terms of financing he notes that bank loans for real estate have exploded from 3.7 billion lei in 2015 to 29.4 billion lei in 2025 with half of this difference coming in the last 2 years. Critically, while around 70% of financing for new housing construction used to come in the form of loans to construction companies, today that figure is only 10% with the majority of lending going directly to households. Construction companies are unable to access cheap financing so they sell apartments in unbuilt projects in advance of construction and individual households make these purchases and wait 5-7 years to either move in or flip the completed property for up to 3x profit. This contrasts with an EU average of 50-70% of residential construction financing coming from bank loans offered at lower than mortgage rates. Since subsidized prima-casa mortgages cannot be spent on buildings that are unfinished this means that state money is subsidizing purchases on a supply constrained market and further driving up the price.

Here are some key comparisons between the Transnistria region and the rest of Moldova1:

Additionally, industrial output from Transnistria has fallen 30% in a single year. The region is now operating at 75% of their 1989 industrial output.

Veaceslav Ioniță estimates that 60% of the region’s economic activity relies on Russian gas. On February 5th the MGRES power station switched over from natural gas to coal. No reason was given and they switched back to gas on Monday February 9th. The interruption implies continued difficulties getting deliveries of Russian gas. Transnistria now has an extremely limited emergency supply of coal after last winter’s long crisis. They are unable to resupply as the coal required comes from a specific mine in the Donbas under Russian occupation.

Looking at the big picture, Ioniță explained the depth of the crisis writing:

“In 2025, the left bank of the Dniester River entered the deepest economic and social crisis in at least the last 25 years. Industry has collapsed, GDP has fallen dramatically, exports are at a historic low, and the population - both employees and pensioners - lives worse than a decade ago. All these developments show an extremely complicated situation, unprecedented for the region”

I’ve written before about how the inherent contradictions in the Transnistrian economic and governance model have become impossible to reconcile. Now we are starting to see clear indications of the structural collapse of the region’s economy.

In parallel, human right’s NGO Promo-Lex reports a sharp deterioration of human rights in Transnistria in 2025. They particularly cite total control of the information space, increased propaganda, militarization of eduction - with specific focus on disabled children and those in institutions - and inhumane conditions in detention facilities.

The region’s “authorities” are pushing for even more control of the information space and have rolled out their own messaging app this week called IDC Matrix. Transnistrian “President” Krasnoselsky has urged people not to use “imported apps” claiming that IDC Matrix is safer. Journalists who have tested the app have shown that there is no end to end encryption - meaning that all messages are available to the operator.

Other Security News:

Here are the other top security stories of the week:

• Another Russian drone crashed in Moldova. The authorities confirmed this one was also a Gerbera model without a warhead. It crashed in the village of Sofia in the Drochia district.

• Moldova was ranked 5th globally in cybersecurity. The annual ratings, called the National Cyber ​​Security Index (NCSI), from Estonia’s E-Governance Agency, listed the top 5 countries as the Czech Republic, Canada, Estonia, Finland and Moldova. Foriegn Minister Mihai Popșoi called the ranking “proof that Moldova is becoming a safe and resilient digital hub.”

Prime Minister Munteanu Visits Kyiv

The Prime Minister led a delegation including Minister of Energy, Dorin Junghietu, Minister of Internal Affairs, Daniella Misail-Nichitin, Minister of Infrastructure Vladimir Bolea, and State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergiu Mihov. In Kyiv they met with their counterparts and announced various joint projects including a new bridge across the Nistru at Cosăuți-Imapol2. In joint remarks with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, Prime Minister Muntean stated:

“My special attitude towards Ukraine is well known, given that I have lived here for more than 20 years. As Prime Minister, on my first visit to Ukraine, I returned with respect and solidarity towards the Ukrainian people, who are on the front lines in defense of peace and human values”

He expressed strong support for Ukraine and presented a new humanitarian package from Moldova. This package, valued at over €700,000 euros, includes emergency vehicles, generators, medical supplies and food.

Prime Minister Munteanu also visited the Wall of Remembrance of the Fallen for Ukraine and met with President Zelenskyy. Following their meeting, President Zelenskyy wrote on facebook:

“During the meeting with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, Alexandru Munteanu, bilateral projects between our countries were discussed. Energy, railways, infrastructure - everything must be implemented.”

Thank you for your support for Ukraine and our people. We have a common vision of the future in the European Union, and the path of Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to the EU must be common, so that all residents of our region benefit from the strengthening of our peoples and Europe as a whole,”

Other International Affairs Stories

Here’s a roundup of the other international news of the week:

• Maia Sandu on her nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. President Sandu responded to questions this week on her nomination speaking in the context of the news of a new prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia saying:

“I’m grateful that people are watching our country, that they appreciate our courage and resilience, but there are many people nominated for this award.

Today I looked at the Ukrainians who returned home from Russia, and these are the people who deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. These are the people who sacrifice their lives for peace, because they want to bring peace back to their country, to their villages, to their cities, and to our continent,”

• Politico - the EU plans to bring Ukraine into the block in 2027. The outlet reports that EU leaders are working on a plan for a “multi-speed” Europe that they are calling “reverse enlargement.” Under this idea, Ukraine, and theoretically Moldova and other candidate countries, would be brought into the EU before negotiations are fully complete. The countries would start as members with limited voting rights and limited responsibilities. They would then complete the qualifications for full membership and phase into full membership. The idea is to make membership inevitable and allow a solid timeline to be incorporated into draft peace proposals supported by the United States. This idea is opposed by Germany but being pushed by France, Italy, Poland and others. The plan outlines 5 steps for implementation which are all focused on neutralizing the veto from Hungary. Viktor Orban stated this week that Ukraine is an “enemy” of Hungary and vehemently opposes Ukrainian membership in the EU. The plan envisions an unofficial negotiations process, where Ukraine works through negotiating clusters and reforms even as Hungary opposes officially opening these clusters. Then, they wait for Orban to leave - ideally by losing the Hungarian elections in April. If that fails, they plan to lean on Trump to force Orban to support the agreement in the context of a peace treaty. As a final option, Hungary’s voting rights can be suspended under EU Article 7. Politico quoted an unnamed Moldovan official’s reaction saying that Moldova…

“wants to join a European Union that functions effectively beyond 27 member states, and we welcome discussions on the internal reforms needed to make this possible.” (…) [but]

“full membership - with equal rights and full participation in EU decision-making - must remain the clear and final destination.”

Author’s Note: If you are interested in following the Hungarian election with coverage in English I strongly recommend the “Days Until Hungarian Elections” substack. Written by veteran journalists they detail both the campaign as well as the major election interference being conducted by the Kremlin to force a pro-Orban outcome.

Days Until the Hungarian Elections

Weekly analysis on the upcoming historical Hungarian elections by Denník N and Napunk.

By Veronika Munk

Hybrid War Updates

Here are the top stories in the Kremlin’s hybrid war against Moldova from the week:

• Watchdog reports another connection between the FSB and Mayor Ion Ceban. Their investigation shows that FSB affiliate Nidjat Askerov held an “assistant” badge giving him access to the Chisinau Primaria (city hall). Askerov has been documented as working alongside FSB agent, and Ceban campaign consultant in 2019, Iurii Gudilin. ZdG has previously reported that Gudilin worked with Askerov to provide financing to the MAN party “like the PSRM” (Socialists) with a total of €600,000 euros per month. Askerov also recently appeared in the treason trial of Denis Cuculescu, who claimed that Askerov recruited him as an FSB asset to funnel this money into Moldova via crypto and other illicit schemes. Mayor Ceban’s people deny this and claim that the “assistant” badge was fabricated with AI.

• One man and 2 women sentenced for preparing violent provocations and attempting to create mass public disorder. They were convicted in the context of the paramilitary training camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were organized by Russian agents and the Shor network. The trio was arrested while trying to cross back into Moldova with drones and incendiary devices. After arrest, the man was held for 12 months in pre-trial detention and then released as this is the maximum allowed by law. One of the women was released on judicial control, the other was released on house arrest in Tiraspol3. All have now fled and are now wanted. They were sentenced to 4 and 5 year terms.

• Lukoil no longer accepts credit cards. Gas stations in the Russian network have now been cut off by local banks which are implementing US sanctions against the company. For now they are trying to work in cash but the viability of the network is in real question as they await buyout offers for the parent company’s assets in Europe.

Political News

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• Moldova may ban social media for children under 16. The government has announced the beginning of public consultations on the plan which Minister of Education Dan Perciun has called “very realistic.” The government envisions the start of a national conversation and consultations with the potential for a decision being made by the end of the year. President Sandu, speaking on the occasion of the global “Safer Internet Day,” called attention to the problems facing children saying:

“Our children are growing up in a very different world than the one we grew up in. Real, social life, with friends, colleagues, and family, is gradually being replaced by a networked life - inauthentic, without physical presence, without real relationships.”

• Moldova is represented by 5 athletes at the olympics. The team consists of 3 biathlon athletes and 2 cross country skiers. The flag was carried at the opening ceremony by skier Iulian Luchin.

• Gagauzia’s elections are tentatively scheduled for May 17. The Central Election Commission (CEC) is now in dialog with the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia to resolve issues with the election legislation in the region. The core problem is a pickle of the People’s Assembly’s own making. The CEC demands that they amend recent legislation that named the Central Election Committee of Gagauzia as the governing body for the vote. Because there can only be 1 CEC under the Moldova constitution this body must be renamed as the “Electoral Council.” Unfortunately, the People’s Assembly adopted legal amendments in 2024 that had 2 effects: 1) their term of office expires exactly 4 years after the last elections, and 2) they are unable to pass any legislation in the lame duck session. Now, with their terms expired in November they are unable to rename the commission / council and have frozen themselves in place. They are working on a technical solution (which I’ll leave in a footnote4) that will allow elections by May.

Crime, Corruption & Justice Reform

Here are the top stories of the week in the justice sector:

• Polls show people believe the justice sector is improving. The think-thank IPRE released a poll on “integrity in the justice sector” (full results in English) that showed 49% of respondents saying that the situation has improved in the last 3 years while 20% said that things got worse. 56% credit government actions with the improving situation. Of the remaining issues, 57% named corruption as the top problem, 15% cronyism and 15% unprofessionalism.

• Moldova slides slightly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. In 2025 the country was ranked 80th of 182 countries and territories with a score of 42 points (0 means total corruption, 100 is no corruption). This is a slide from the 2024 rankings where Moldova was 78th with 43 points. Within the EU, both Bulgaria and Hungary are ranked worse than Moldova with 40 points. Moldova is tied with Kosovo and China. Romania was slightly better with 45 points and Ukraine worse with 36 (placed 104th). Transparency noted that the global average has fallen to 42 points - a 10 year low.