“Today I end my term as prime minister.

I accepted the proposal to be prime minister with a lot of responsibility and strong conviction that I can contribute to changing things for the better.

The moment I understand that I can no longer exercise my mandate in accordance with my principles and beliefs, I choose to walk away.

I thank all my colleagues - ministers, their teams and the people who worked professionally and faithfully.

I will continue to serve my country from whatever position I may find myself, irrespective of where I live or what responsibilities I may have, either in the public sector or private. I believe that duty to the country is not about a position, but about the commitment we keep.

Thank you!”

Emphasis mine.

This move came without warning and with no explanation beyond the cryptic allusion to his inability to “exercise my mandate in accordance with my principles and beliefs.”

His resignation triggers the collapse of the Munteanu government which came into office on October 31, 2025. In his 8 months leading the government, Alexandru Munteanu has remained a bit of a cipher. His team projected an image of quiet professionalism, rejecting normal public communications1 and largely avoiding any big announcements on reforms or legislative projects.

This public perception has come under increasing strain over the last few weeks against the backdrop of the MoldATSA scandal and the public backlash against the proposed tax reforms.

President Sandu’s Press Conference

Following the Prime Minister’s facebook post, President Sandu called a press conference for 11 am this morning. At the press conference she thanked the Prime Minister for his service and then immediately sought to debunk rumors about his departure saying:

“The speculation that ‘he wanted to fight against abuses and was not allowed’ is false. The Prime Minister had a free hand to lead the Government as he considered correct. He chose to leave,”

This was apparently in response to narratives circulating on Telegram stating that President Sandu gave the Prime Minister a list of “untouchables” in PAS who he was not permitted to remove - even in cases of corruption.

The President stated that “Mr. Munteanu is a good man” and that…

“I was convinced and I am still convinced that he has the best intentions, but I expected more involvement in complicated decisions, more presence to listen to people, to explain what kind of reforms we need to make and why we need to make them.”

Asked by the press what contradiction caused the Prime Minister to resign rather than compromise his beliefs, she stated:

“I don’t think there were any contradictions, at least these things were not expressed and exposed. Both Mr. Munteanu and I have worked and are working with honesty and integrity. (…) This week I had several discussions with the Prime Minister about the reforms that have aroused a lot of debate in society, especially the tax reform, but also the salary reform. I also believe that these reforms could have been developed, consulted on and explained better, so that we could obtain the support of citizens,”

She went on to state that there was no conflict with the Prime Minister on the topic of the fight against corruption or on the plans to restructure and reform governance of state companies. She stated:

“There was only one objection related to the interpersonal relationship with one of the members of the Government, there was a discussion about the interpersonal relationship with the Minister of Education,”

A reporter followed up asking if Minister of Education Dan Perciun could be a candidate for prime minister. President Sandu refused to comment, noting that constitutionally the next step is consultations with the parliamentary factions. She stated that during the process of identifying a new candidate for prime minister, Munteanu would stay on in a caretaker role.

What Happened With Dan Perciun?

Following President Sandu’s statements, Minister of Education Dan Perciun confirmed that he had a discussion with the Prime Minister on Tuesday saying:

"It is true, indeed, that I had a discussion on Tuesday with the Prime Minister, during which I expressed my thoughts on the subject of budgetary-fiscal policy, on how certain things that were not fully discussed in the Government were found in that policy and sparked very heated discontent in our society,"

He went on to state that discussions like this are necessary and useful and seemed to reject the idea that it contributed to the PM’s resignation. About his future ambitions he emphasized his desire to stay on as Minister of Education and continue developing reforms there.

What Comes Next?

While various opposition politicians have called for early elections, that is almost certainly not going to happen. President Sandu will begin consultations with the parliamentary factions next week and PAS, representing the majority, will have to agree on a candidate. This new candidate will need to form a new team of ministers and prepare a program of government for a vote of confidence in parliament.

How long this takes is a bit of an open question. Back in February 2023 Prime Minister Gavrilita resigned2 and her successor was named the same day. Within 6 days, parliament had voted in the new government of Dorin Recean. This situation had been building over some time and the actual switch of governments was a relatively stage-managed process.

President Sandu announced that she would start consultations with parliamentary factions next week. Prime Minister Munteanu’s resignation was, by all appearances, more unexpected, so most likely time is needed to identify a replacement.

If PAS identifies a unifying candidate over the weekend or early next week, then a new government could be sworn in relatively quickly. On the other hand, if there are divisions in the party and multiple candidates are angling for the position, this could be a more protracted process.

In the meantime, the outgoing Prime Minister acts in an interim capacity. The caretaker government has substantially limited powers and until a new PM is sworn in they cannot initiate or approve legislative initiatives3.

Analysis: Why Now?

Right now we don’t have any satisfying answer to that most important question. The morning’s events give the impression of an unexpected change but for the moment we don’t know anything concrete.

President Sandu’s remarks are telling however. She seemed to acknowledge that Munteanu’s technocratic, low-visibility approach had failed to build public support for the government’s agenda. They also showed at least some disappointment from her end on his engagement with the issues.

From my perspective, it has been very hard to get any real idea of what that agenda has been for the last 8 months. Over time, this has been chalked up by some to failures of communication. The disastrous rollout of the proposed tax reform showed it was something much more fundamental. Ministries were fighting in public and it became clear that highly consequential reforms had not gone through even the most basic coordination process. In the middle of this national argument about tax reform came scandal after scandal related to MoldATSA and the management of state-owned companies. Through it all, Prime Minister Munteanu was largely absent.

The role of the PM’s conflict with Minister Perciun remains unclear, but Perciun’s remarks on this “discussion” seem to imply that the tax reform was creating rifts in the government behind the scenes. Stepping back, the scandals at MoldATSA largely predate this government - with the key appointments made before he took office. The tax reform on the other hand is a political disaster more directly attributable to his decisions - either proactively or due to an overly hands-off approach.

Perhaps, Munteanu concluded that this job is not for him and it is time to give someone else a chance. Perhaps President Sandu, PAS or some subset of his ministers lost confidence in his leadership and encouraged him to resign. Perhaps there is another shoe yet to drop - either in the alluded-to conflict with Minister of Education Dan Perciun or with some new information related to the ongoing scandals at state-owned companies.

Right now we simply don’t know.

July is when summer truly settles into Moldova. School is out, outdoor terraces are full, and the country’s festival season is in full swing. The markets are overflowing with fresh produce, and this is a great month to visit Piața Centrală for strawberries, cherries, apricots, cucumbers, new potatoes, lettuce, radishes, and a wide selection of herbs. Tourists often venture into the countryside for pictures in fields of lavender or sunflowers, and there are many festivals in the villages and towns around the country.

No major public holidays in July

July does not bring a major public holiday in Moldova, which makes it a quieter month on the official calendar. Even so, the month is filled with cultural and community events across the country.

Events and Festivals

• Noaptea Sânzienelor – July 4
  One of the month’s most distinctive traditions comes early, with Noaptea Sânzienelor. This year, Castel Mimi is hosting a special evening program built around summer traditions, wine, and local identity. Tickets include three glasses of wine, a souvenir glass and a gift. Designated drivers and non-drinkers can purchase a ticket that includes lemonade instead of wine.

  Tickets and more information are available here.

• Lavender Festival – Ceadîr-Lunga, Gaugauzia – July 5^th
  The At Mount winery, far to the south of Moldova, hosts a Lavendar festival where you can take photos in the vast fields of lavender. Details are available here.

• IA Mania - July 5^th
  IA Mania remains one of the best-known celebrations of Moldovan village culture, traditional dress, music, and food. Hosted in the village of Ustia, near Criuleni, this festival includes live music, shopping for handmade goods, and a celebration of Moldovan culture. Tickets and information can be found here.

• Film and Histories Festival – July 3–6
  Mereni hosts the first edition of the Film and Histories Festival, with a program built around memory, identity, film screenings, and discussion. It is a thoughtful addition to the summer cultural calendar. The festival wraps up in Chisinau on the final day but the majority of the activities will be held in the village of Mereni. The Ministry of Culture provides a complete agenda on their site here.

• Te Salut, Chisinau - July 17-19
  The “Hello Chisinau” festival will give visitors a chance to learn about the history of Chisinau while enjoying food and live entertainment. The festival will be on the pedestrian street “Eugen Doga.” More information can be found here.

• Portuguese Festival “Setubal” - July 18 - 19
  The Botanical Gardens “Gradina Botanica” will host a free Portuguese-themed festival this month. With performance of Portuguese music and food from 10 different chefs, don’t miss this chance to sample Portuguese culture. Some details are available here.

• GurmanIA Festival - July 26
  Take a trip to the north of Moldova for this food festival in the village of Țarigrad. This year’s festival will be held on July 26 but if you would like to learn more about the event, read this description of last year’s festival here.

Concerts and Performances

• Jazz a la Paris, Authentique - July 18
  If you enjoyed DescOpera in the Old Orhei valley and the village of Butuceni, venture back to the village for the French-Moldovan Jazz concert. Featuring musicians from both countries, the concert is sure to entertain jazz fans. More details and tickets are available here.

• Other Smaller-Venue Concerts
  In addition to all the live music you can hear at the many festivals this month, there are many smaller concerts happening throughout Chisinau. For a list of the many concerts, check out these websites: iTicket, Fest, Afisha.

Cultural performances in Chișinău

The major cultural institutions go on a summer recess in July, but they will be back as summer draws to a close. Smaller theaters will still be performing. Consult the website for your favorite theater for schedules of these performances.

Sports

• Summer outdoor sports

  July is one of the best months of the year for hiking, cycling, running, and exploring the countryside. Orheiul Vechi, the Codrii forests, and Moldova’s wine regions are especially attractive during the summer season. While there are fewer organized runs during the hot month of July, other sporting events are occurring throughout the month.

• Marton la Fetesti (Fetesti Marathon) - July 4-5
  Far in the north of Moldova, the village of Fetesti will host an organized race - with 14km, half marathon and full marathon options. For details including a detailed map of the course visit Run Moldova’s site here.

• Prime Fighting Championship - July 11 - Chisinau Arena
  If you enjoy mixed martial arts, don’t miss this championship event on July 11th. Tickets and details are available here.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

For most of three decades, Moldova entered Western conversations as a problem to be managed: small, poor, divided, with a breakaway region and a Russian garrison. That Moldova is gone. The country that opened the first cluster of its EU accession negotiations this June, that twice in two years beat back the most aggressive election interference in its history and that broke its dependence on Russian gas, is something else. Moldova is a partner. I spent a week in late June making exactly that argument in Washington, at the State Department, on Capitol Hill, at the Stimson Center, The Atlantic Council and The World Justice Project. The visit fell on the 36th anniversary of Moldova’s Declaration of Sovereignty, a useful reminder that sovereignty in our neighbourhood is not a date in a textbook but a choice re-made under pressure. The encouraging news is that the argument is landing.

What matters about Moldova’s turn West is not only its direction but the manner of it. Moldovans chose continuity in 2024 and 2025 while Russia spent more than $100 million to buy votes, fund proxies and flood the information space, and they chose it with Russian troops still illegally stationed on national territory and a war next door. A choice made under duress is sturdier than one made in comfort. For Washington, the implication is liberating. Moldova is not contested ground that demands careful neutrality. It is an aligned country, where the democratic preference of Moldovans and the strategic interest of the United States point the same way.

The argument lands because the partnership has a record, not a wish list. It is not charity. It is a security partnership with shared burdens. In April 2024 Moldova imported American liquefied natural gas for the first time, removing the single most powerful lever Moscow had held over Chișinău for a generation. It ran two national elections under hybrid assault without the public losing confidence in the result. It dismantled key parts of the financial machinery of Russian influence. None of it was free, but all of it was cheap against the alternative, and the support behind it has stayed bipartisan, reaffirmed in Congressional resolutions backed by both parties on the Hill.

The case for staying engaged is, at heart, about what Moldova contributes rather than consumes. Moldova is an emerging security provider, not just a security consumer. A stable, Western-anchored Moldova denies Russia a second front on Ukraine’s flank, a land bridge toward Odesa and the Black Sea and a propaganda victory that a nation can be dragged back once it has chosen the West. Modest, targeted cooperation buys down a far larger and costlier risk. This is the plain logic of peace through strength: stability is held by raising the cost of aggression, not by conceding to it. By that measure Moldova is among the cheapest deterrence investments available to the United States today. The contest, after all, is no longer mainly about tanks. It is hybrid, and the front line runs through citizens’ phones and electricity bills.

No file is more misunderstood abroad than Transnistria. It is too often read as a frozen conflict awaiting some grand external mediation. That framing is comfortable and wrong: it casts Moldova as a problem for others to solve and quietly hands Moscow a veto over our future. The reality is that Moldova owns this process and manages it peacefully, lawfully and on its own terms. What Moldova asks of its partners is not mediation but backing its agency, its reintegration efforts and sustaining the international pressure that holds Russia to its own commitments. Moscow committed at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit to withdraw its forces and munitions from Moldova and has ignored that promise for more than two decades. Until it complies, the shared task should be to keep making the illegal presence steadily irrelevant and costly, while preserving peace, development and protecting ordinary people on both banks.

This is also why the way the war in Ukraine ends matters so much to us. No country in Europe wants a just and lasting peace more than Moldova. But peace on the wrong terms could raise our risk rather than lower it, by freeing Russian capacity and reviving old ambitions along the Black Sea coast. The same resolve that has kept this war from spreading must carry through any settlement. Small states are not spectators to great-power bargains. We are usually the first place their consequences are felt. Moldova should therefore be a stakeholder in Europe’s security architecture, not a footnote to it.

There is a wider lesson in Moldova’s experience that Washington and Brussels would do well to study. A small democracy with limited means has shown that Russian hybrid interference can be beaten rather than merely endured, when investment in resilience comes early and elections are defended deliberately. What worked here, hardened cyber defences, stronger financial intelligence and a public increasingly inoculated against disinformation, is exportable to other front-line democracies. Moldova is not only a place to defend. It is a place to learn from.

Energy ties the whole argument together. Every cargo of American LNG that reaches Moldova is two things at once: a gain for our security and a market for U.S. energy. Pair the bipartisan POWER Moldova Act with grid interconnection through Romania and new generation at home, and the lever Russia has used most often simply stops working. With a 750-mile border with Ukraine, a secure, EU-integrated Moldova is also a natural platform from which American firms can help rebuild it.

I left Washington with more friends and a clearer sense of what comes next. The task is not to persuade anyone that Moldova deserves sympathy. It is to build on an alignment that already exists. A Moldova that completes its reforms, joins the European Union by the end of this decade and helps anchor stability in the Black Sea region is a lasting asset for the United States and Europe alike. A reliable partner, a growing market and a contributor to the security of a neighbourhood that has known too little of it. That is the partnership we came to advance and one I am now confident we can deliver together.

Iulian Groza is Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE), an independent think-tank in Chișinău. He is a former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Moldova, responsible for European integration and international law. His work focuses on EU accession, foreign and security policy, the rule of law and democratic resilience.

Last week I wrote 2 articles on the Ministry of Finance’s proposal to overhaul the tax system. If you didn’t catch them, you can find those articles here:

Since writing those article, Minister of Finance Andrian Gavrilită has been in a fighting retreat as pressure has built and parts of the proposed reform are abandoned one by one. On June 26 President Sandu called on the government to “take a break” regarding the tax reform saying:

"The tax reform must be done, but I think the Government should not rush. It must take a break, analyze the comments very well."

She called on the government to incorporate feedback and carefully analyze some of the most controversial elements such as VAT increases.

On June 28 opposition parties gathered a protest in front of parliament organized by PPDA MP Vasile Costiuc. Around 200 people attended, including senior members of multiple opposition parties including MAN, Our Party, PSDE and PPDA. Criticism came from many angles but mostly focused on the proposal to increase VAT on energy.

At the same time, government spokesperson Daniela Crudu announced that the reform is no longer moving forward saying:

“We have heard the various opinions and listened to the people. We have already announced that we are taking a break to rethink fiscal policy and the other proposed measures. In the coming period, we will review the proposals and continue extensive consultations, to identify a fair and sustainable formula for citizens and the economic environment,”

In an interview with ZdG defending the reform, Minister Gavrilită continued to stress that prices would not go up for “ordinary people” and explained that they are backtracking on aspects of the bill - either canceling provisions or extending the implementation timeline. In the interview he was asked how it was that the Minister of Health, who has stated that “This reform will destroy the healthcare system,” was not consulted prior to the bill being released to the public. The Minister replied that it was not consulted with the other ministries beforehand because there was no time.

Asked about the rush, Minister Gavrilită stated that he wanted to start consultations in March but they were delayed until the completion of a visit from the IMF. He stated that because of this delay, “only at the end of May did we agree on the principles and direction of reducing the budget deficit in a few years, so that we would have medium-term economic stability.” Asked if the reforms themselves were driven by the IMF he stated:

“The reform itself is not imposed, but the need to reduce the budget deficit and stabilize the state’s financial degeneration is a condition [of the IMF]”

Later, in another interview Minister Gavrilită stated that wage increases for public sector workers planned for September may need to be delayed without the tax law. He said that it was an IMF condition that new revenue would need to be found before raising salaries.

So, we now know that at least some aspects of the rushed nature of the reform was caused by the IMF. We also know that this huge reform was rolled out without serious consultation with other ministries1. This type of coordination would normally be managed by the Prime Minister - but he has still not made any substantive statements on this topic.

Where does the reform stand?

As of today, here is what we know about the planned changes. In the interest of keeping the main text tight, I’ll add some quick analysis in footnotes.

• Plans to tax wedding and birthday gifts will not be implemented2.

• No capital gains tax will be applied to the sale of primary residences. All other changes to capital gains tax and VAT for new housing will be delayed until 2028.

• HoReCa VAT will still go from 8% to 20% in October. VAT on food and agricultural products remains unclear and the ministry says that they are still considering what to do3.

• VAT for electricity, heating and natural gas will still go up in April 2027 after the heating season4.

• 0% tax on reinvested profits for large companies will be delayed (no date).

• No VAT hike on medicines

• Changes in salary taxes and structure will be delayed until 2028

This is still a moving target - the reform as it was proposed is falling apart in just about every direction.

MoldATSA Updates

The MoldATSA scandal continues to develop since I sent the latest update yesterday. Here is the latest:

• Anastasia Taburceanu’s work for the State Chancellory was funded by the EU. This was confirmed by the EU Delegation who stated that she was contracted under a project called “Reform Support Team” implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EU Delegation confirmed that she was contracted to “provided communication support to the State Chancellery and the Prime Minister’s Office” and that she resigned in June 2026. They stated that “The EBRD is evaluating the implementation of this contract. The Commission awaits the results of this evaluation to decide whether additional measures are necessary.” The confirmation came after the leader of the Moldovan National Party (PNM) Dragoș Galbur publicly alleged that Taburceanu was being paid €4,000 a month by the EU for her work at the State Chancellery. This would be in addition to her salary from MoldATSA. Galbur also alleges that she lives in Slovenia. Neither the sum nor details about where Anastasia Taburceanu lives have been independently confirmed.

• The Director of the Public Property Agency (APP), Roman Cojuhari, has resigned. He accepted that “The Public Property Agency is the institution responsible for monitoring the activity of Moldatsa” and stated that he was resigning due to the failures at the agency in this case and “to protect the image of the institution and the team.”

• The National Anti-Corruption Center (CNA) have opened a criminal investigation and are conducting searches at MoldATSA today. The case is opened under articles related to abuse of power and abuse of office.

PAS party leaders have started to make public statements about the scandal and especially about the resignation of Radu Marian. Minister of Education and Vice-President of the PAS Party, Dan Perciun, called the situation at MoldATSA “systemic error, a failure to react on time and to adequately investigate the incoming signals.” He stated that “People’s anger is understandable and perfectly justified” and that “There is a need for a course correction both in the party and in the administration of the state.” Additionally, he and others have praise Radu Marian’s personal integrity and his decision to step down and take responsibility for a mistake.

That last part may seem like a positive spin on a politically disastrous situation, but it has some merit. Journalist Mariana Rata of TV8 wrote a post marking just how new and important it is that this investigation is having serious impact. She wrote:

“Four resignations!!! I can’t remember a single time in the history of the Republic of Moldova when a media investigation has led to four resignations.

I’ve written hundreds of investigative reports over my career, from 2007 to 2026, under every government during that period, but I’ve never seen this many resignations follow a press scandal. And that makes me happy.

It means we are living in a different kind of state now—a state where those in power are beginning to understand that they must answer to the people when they are caught doing something wrong. Because in a democratic state, power belongs to the citizens. You cannot lie to them, and you should not risk disappointing them.”

(…)

🚿 This summer has brought a cold shower for the government. I hope it turns out to be a cleansing and revitalizing one. We want to be in the EU by 2030!”

She went on to call for the next resignation to be that of Constantine Batin from Expo Business Chisinau. Batin was the subject of TV8’s recent investigation who bluntly rejected the idea that just because someone was under sanctions as a Russian arms trafficker he (Batin) should not do business with them.

Disinformation and (Dis)Union

Last week Moldova’s internet lit up with a new story - Romania’s lower house “tacitly adopted” a bill on the unification with Moldova. The story on social media was that Romania unilaterally approved union, and Moldova’s pro-Kremlin politicians quickly made statements:

Igor Dodon called it a sign of Romanian imperialism:

“it is regrettable that politicians in Romania have launched such an imperialist policy, which risks quarreling both countries. And it is shameful that politicians in the leadership of Moldova are silent or tacitly approve Romanian territorial expansionism”

Mayor Ion Ceban chose to blame PAS (insinuating they are behind the effort):

“We condemn any attempt to attack the values ​​enshrined in the Constitution of our country. (…) We do not sell our country and condemn any statement by politicians in the context of the destruction of the country. The people are the only ones who decide. PAS’s actions are increasingly obvious. Their goal is to do everything, through the actions they take, to reach a situation in which Moldova is a failed state.”

Russian Foriegn Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova:

"It's no secret that Bucharest is hatching plans to take over Moldova. This isn't news to us; we talk about it constantly. Now this situation has taken a turn for the worse,"

She went on to talk about how scandalous it was that no referendum was planned, etc.

To unpack this, we need to clarify 2 key points:

1) What is “tacit adoption” of a bill?

Under the Romanian constitution multiple entities have legislative initiative - including parliament, the government and even citizens (via a petition with enough signatures). They can all propose legislation which then goes to parliament which is split into an upper and lower house - called the Senate and Chamber of Deputies respectively. Each bill starts in one chamber, which considers the bill before passing it to the other chamber for a decision. Who is the first considerer and who is a decision maker depends on the topic. This setup leaves open the possibility of a “pocket veto” - aka one chamber simply choosing to ignore a bill and therefore killing it. To prevent this, and to encourage speed, any bill not voted up or down in 45 days is considered “tacitly adopted” by the first chamber and moved to the one that makes the decision.

The bill in question wasn’t remotely serious and was put in the stack of unserious proposals5. From there it was never debated or voted on and was therefore tacitly adopted by the lower house after 45 days. It then goes to the Senate who has no obligation to pick it up and therefore it will die there in a drawer somewhere.

2) Where did this bill come from?

This bill was proposed by the SOS Romania party which is led by Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Diana Șoșoacă. This is her last month:

This is therefore a great example of an information warfare campaign. The Kremlin asked its proxy party in Romania to introduce nonsense legislation. They did, and now the Kremlin has spun up a HUGE messaging campaign attacking the legislation they produced and trying to pin it on PAS and the Romanian government6.

President Sandu reacted to questions about the bill saying:

“This is a document proposed by a Moscow agent, whose goal is to discredit the idea of ​​unification, and nothing more. It would be as if I came to parliament tomorrow with a legislative initiative to annex France to Moldova. Please, government, implement it. Unification isn’t happening that way, we all understand that perfectly well,”

Other Shor & Hybrid War Updates

Here are the other top stories in hybrid warfare and security news of the week:

• Moldova detained a Russian FSB officer. The alleged spy entered the country without diplomatic credentials, allegedly to visit monasteries and other touristic sites. In reality he was heading to Transnistria to collect information in the Security Zone according to the Security and Intelligence Service SIS. He is currently being held under 30 days preventative detention.

• President Sandu stripped Belarusian spy Alexandru Balan of his Moldovan citizenship. Recall, Balan was part of the April prisoner exchange with Belarus and Russia. RFE/RL also released a story this week alleging that Balan knew the names and identities of at least 7 Romanian undercover agents that he passed to Belarus. They also detailed the tradecraft he used to communicate with his handlers and how he was eventually uncovered.

• Flyone airline must be sold to new owners. That was the decision of the Council for the Examination of Investments of Importance for State Security (CEIISS) last week, who ruled that the airline needed to change owners in the next 90 days. The decision noted the proximity of the beneficial owners to sanctioned individuals. The airline is owned by Vladimir Cebotari who has been identified by SIS as a close associate of Vladimir Plahotniuc.

EU Accession Updates

We have a new section at Moldova Matters! For some time I’ve mostly put EU accession stories in the bucket of “international affairs.” That no longer fits neatly as the opening of negotiating clusters starts literally intertwining European and Moldovan law. So we’re going to try out a new section here and see how well it makes sense. Here’s an roundup of the top EU Accession stories of the last week:

• Hungary has put the breaks on opening new negotiating clusters. Prime Minister Péter Magyar has signaled publicly and privately that he opposes any fast track accession process for Ukraine, saying that it sends the wrong message to the Western Balkans7. The EU still hopes to open 2 more clusters this summer - Cluster 6: “external relations” and Cluster 2: “internal market.” Others could gradually reopen after. Romanian President Nicușor Dan explained what happened behind closed doors saying:

“Obviously, we would have liked this phrase [“accelerated process”] to remain, with regard to Moldova, but there were two conditions. There was a condition from Hungary, which said: “I don’t want this phrase for Ukraine” and a condition from many other states that said that “the language of Ukraine and the language of Moldova must remain the same”. And as a logical consequence, the language disappeared from both. It is a diplomatic moment, there are no practical consequences”

• The second Moldova-European Union Summit was held on June 22. The high level dialogue came with some announcements. The EU is preparing a €120 million euro package for the security sector in Moldova. An additional €11 million will be provided to strengthen Moldova against hybrid attacks and €17 million on border security initiatives. Additionally discussions on collaborating to build a med-tech cluster and other joint research initiatives have been initiated. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Moldova was 93% of the way through its commitments under the growth plan and if it finishes the remaining 7% could unlock an additional €503 million under this mechanism.

• EU is drawing up “gradual integration” plans. This was reported by Politico following both France and Germany circulating “membership lite” proposals and a general rejection of the “reverse enlargement” plan promoted by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos. The plan would reportedly grant EU membership benefits step by step as countries hit certain benchmarks. The article noted how something similar was already going on with Moldova’s integration into the EU mobile roaming space, cultural support programs and Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). Ukraine and Montenegro have both indicated opposition to this piecemeal approach.

PM Munteanu Fires the Control Unit

On June 24 Prime Minister Munteanu announced that he would be firing the 2 members of the Control Unit - an unofficial advisory body to the Prime Minister that tracks the delivery and implementation of government decisions and the tasks given to the ministries. Both members, Vasile Bolduratu and Angela Rojcov-Ciofu, had been appointed under Prime Minister Recean in 2023. Announcing the decision he stated:

"The standards of professionalism, institutional loyalty and integrity must be higher than anywhere else. Following the assessments and information analyzed in the recent period, I have come to the conclusion that the activity and composition of the Control Unit no longer benefit from the necessary trust to exercise this function. I announce to you that the members of the Control Unit resigned from their positions this morning. Public functions are not a privilege, they imply responsibility, and when the necessary trust to exercise a function is lost, the right decision is to make changes. And that is what we will do",

No clarifications were made as to what “assessments” of “information” preceded this move and this was not in response to any public reporting about either person8.

Following the announcement, ZdG analyzed their asset and income declarations and found that each advisor earned a salary of around 44,000 lei / month. However, they each served on a number of boards of state enterprises where they got additional renumeration. Specifically:

• Vasile Bolduratu - board member of the Thermoelectric Company (central heat and power company), National Lottery, State Enterprise "Radiocomunicații” (broadcasting infrastructure), Cartuș (defense manufacturer), Chisinau Glass Factory and the Costești Hydroelectric Company

• Rojcov-Ciofu - board member of the Chisinau International Airport, Moldova Post, Cricova Winery, and MoldExpo center

Vasile Bolduratu was earning around 500,000 additional lei per year from his board places while Rojcov-Ciofu was earning around 300,000.

No more information has been made available as to why the firings happened now, but the timing is important. The Prime Minister made this announcement just as the government was starting to grapple with the MoldATSA scandal - which itself has highlighted the serious problems with how state owned companies’ boards are comprised.

Keep Cool Out There!

Moldova is facing the first heat wave of the year. From Jue 30 - July 1 the North of the country is under Code Orange (temperature highs of 36-38 C) while the Center and South of the country is in Code Red (39-41 C). The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has begun installing rehydration tents in multiple districts as a resource for those who overheat while walking in the city. The National Road Administration has also issued reminders that under Yellow, Orange or Red codes trucks over 12 tons are banned from driving on roads between 10 am and 8 pm9.

The Power Lines Have Names Now

… and they’re making progress!

On June 18 Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy Nick Pietrowicz presented Prime Minister Munteanu with the completed feasibility study for the Strășeni–Gutinaș 400 kV high voltage line. This line, which will be fully financed with support of the United States, is now called the “Liberty Line.”

On June 26 Moldelectrica signed a contract with the Turkish company SA-RA which won a tender to construct 45 km of the new 400 kV Balți–Suceava power line. When announcing this, Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu announced the names for all 3 lines as follows:

1. Vulcănești–Chișinău “Energy Independence Line” (scheduled completion December 2025, expected Summer 2026)

2. Strașeni–Gutinaș “Liberty Line” (feasibility study done, completion planned around 2030)

3. Balți–Suceava “Resilience Line” (construction planned over the next 24 months)

So we now have Independence, Liberty and Resilience connections, building and planned, connecting Moldova to Romania and the European energy grid.

That’s a positive note to end on after the craziness of the last week.

Also - thank you to those of you who recently subscribed. In this news environment it is no small thing to keep up with the flood of events and to keep proactive projects and stories moving forward. For those of you who have subscribed - my sincere thanks. For those who haven’t yet, please consider doing so. Your subscription makes the work behind this newsletter possible.

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Last week we covered how an investigation from ZdG uncovered serious issues with the state enterprise responsible for managing Moldova’s airspace - MoldATSA. Firstly, the company’s director Dumitru Vangheli lied on his CV about being an Air Canada Pilot (or being a pilot at all). Secondly, since he took over the company Mr. Vangheli oversaw a huge increase in salaries for employees MoldATSA. One of these employees was President Maia Sandu’s cousin Anastasia Taburceanu. While Dumitru Vangheli was fired by the Public Property Agency (APP) and Anastasia Taburceanu resigned with a promise to return her salary, the scandal was far from over.

Another Cousin of Maia Sandu Resigns

On June 26 Tatiana Batin, chief of staff to Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu, resigned. She is the sister of Anastasia Taburceanu and cousin to President Sandu. Speaking of the resignation, Igor Grosu stated:

“I believe this was an honorable resignation, connected to the incident involving her sister and the situation at MoldATSA. We worked together for four years, and I have no complaints about her professional performance.”

Tatiana Batin has not spoken publicly about her resignation and Speaker Grosu has insisted that it was triggered by her sister’s involvement in the MoldATSA scandal. However, on the same day, TV8 released a new investigation into Tatiana Batin’s husband Constantin Batin with some serious allegations.

TV8’s flagship investigative program Black Box PLUS found that Constantin Batin conducted business dealing with Latvian citizen Marks Blats, who was under US sanctions at the time. Later Blats was also sanctioned by the EU, UK, Latvia and Ukraine. Blats is identified as part of an arms trafficking and sanctions evasion network led by Igor Zimenkov. This network supplies military technology to Russia for use in the war in Ukraine.

For the last 2 years, Constantin Batin has served as the director of the Free Economic Zone Expo-Business-Chisinau. Two weeks before he was appointed to this position he “swapped” companies with Marks Blats - this was in 2024. Batin gave Blats the company Berlagr SRL, a small sewing factory with 13 employees and income of 4 million lei in 2023. In return, he received Ecotech Group SRL, a hazardous waste disposal company that had 16,000 lei of turnover in 2024. Confusingly, Ecotech Group SRL was founded by Batin in 2020 for Balts. He transferred the company to Blats before, then got it back in the 2024 trade, where he gave Blats a vastly more profitable sewing factory.

Constantin Batin told TV8 that it was valuable for Blats to take over a company with operating history1 and that he himself wanted to get into the waste treatment business but ultimately did not do so because he got the job at Expo-Business-Chisinau. Asked how long he had known Blats, he was initially evasive claiming that:

“I’ve been working with Israelis since 2005. Since then, hundreds of people from Israel have come through me.”

Mr. Blats is also an Israeli citizen. After further prevaricating Batin explained he has known him since 2007-2008. When asked if he knew that he was under sanctions he replied:

Batin: “I learned from you that he was under sanctions. To me, honestly, it doesn’t matter much whether he has sanctions or not. This in no way influences me materially or otherwise.”

TV8 Reporter: - “I think it should matter.”

Batin: “For you as a journalist, it matters that you found out the news. For me, it doesn’t matter. The main thing is not to appear in sanctions, you understand? I know what I’m doing and I’m responsible for my activity.2”

Three months after swapping companies, both men transferred both companies to an Israeli citizen named Nairner Michael. Asked about this Batin stated:

“I sold them to a Jewish man originally from Moldova who wanted to return to Moldova and start a business here,”

TV8 reported that this is not an accurate characterization of their relationship because Nairner Michael had previously managed companies for both Mr. Batin and Mr. Blats3.

The investigation found substantial evidence of other eyebrow raising transactions with Israeli citizens, including one instance where Batin bought a company that had declared real estate assets worth 2.5 million lei. He paid €50,000 euros for the company and immediately liquidated the assets for 4.9 million lei (~€243,000).

In statements so far people, have claimed that Tatiana Batin resigned due to her sister’s scandal and that the TV8 story only broke after the resignation. However, it broke on the same day and her husband is quoted extensively in the story - so they knew it was coming.

Asked to comment on the story the Presidency replied to TV8

"the head of state has 24 cousins. Of all of them, only 2 are in public positions, in which they have engaged legally, transparently and based on their own skills and desires. Each one follows their own professional path and works in certain positions with no connection to Maia Sandu's career."

TV8 found that actually President Sandu has 2 more cousins in state employment, one working for the State Enterprise for Forestry and one working for Moldelectrica.

Radu Marian Resigns Over Recommending Dumitru Vangheli

PAS MP and Chairmen of the Parliamentary Committee on Economy, Budget and Finance, Radu Marian, resigned his chairmanship today in the latest fallout from the scandal. Marian had previously admitted that he recommended Dumitru Vangheli for the post of MoldATSA director and stated that:

“We grew up in the same courtyard at the Old Post Office. We’ve known each other for a long time, but we weren’t friends. I don’t know where he went to school,”

He has apologized for this mistake multiple times in the last few days and explained that he was trying to promote qualified people from the diaspora to areas where the state was looking for specialists. He also apologized for not vetting his CV before the recommendation “Even though I didn’t hire him. And I wasn’t involved in the competition, nor in the decisions regarding Vangeli’s salary.”

In his resignation statement he wrote that his continued role as chairman was distracting from the project of pushing towards EU integration but that he would continue working as an MP.

Dumitru Vangheli - Pilot in Video Games

Meanwhile, the inconstancies around Dumitru Vangheli’s CV and his work in Canada are starting to become clearer. In a followup to their initial investigation, ZdG spoke with Tudor Răilean, a friend of Dumitru Vangheli’s since childhood who moved to Canada at the same time as him. There, they remained close, living in the same building and often working together. He shed some light on what Vangheli was really doing while claiming to attain a commercial pilots license, fly for Air Canada and run a series of successful companies.

At the time that Vangheli’s claimed he was taking commercial piloting courses at CargAir, he was actually working at a Montreal hotel - a job he was fired from for stealing a bag of glasses according to Răilean. After that he worked as a pizza delivery driver.

On his CV Vangheli claimed to operate a number of companies including GoRepas - a company that did airline catering and refrigerated logistics. According to Răilean Vangheli did not own this company but worked on the production line. The 2 men later became subcontractors and bought their own refrigerated truck to do deliveries. Through these and other arrangements Dumitru Vangheli came to owe Tudor Răilean around 30,000 Canadian dollars which he failed to repay. When Răilean sued him he discovered that Vangheli had declared bankruptcy and discharged his debts of 97,450 Canadian dollars.

So at various times when Vangheli claimed to be either an airline pilot or the CEO of various companies, he was alternately driving an Uber, working low level catering jobs or running a crypto mining operation. All the while he apparently stayed fascinated by planes and told Răilean that he was taking lessons via Microsoft Flight Simulator.

Răilean told ZdG that he returned to Moldova in 2024 after Vangheli was already working at MoldATSA. He sought a meeting with his former friend to ask about the money he was still owed, but only got an appointment when he told the receptionist that an old colleague from Air Canada was calling. Răilean asked about the reported millions of dollars he had in Canadian accounts and crypto and Vangheli spun a new tale - that his crypto were frozen. He said that he had invested them in a Russian professional video game team and that when the war started the funds were blocked. Asked if he would expose him, Răilean stated that he told Vangheli "Live your life in peace, I have no business. Shall we solve something with the debt?" He did not repay the debts.

As to the luxury cars he reported owning, Răilean told ZdG that Vangheli loved fancy cars and showing off money he didn’t have. On multiple occasions he bought luxury cars which he drove around for a few months before returning them.

Dumitru Vangheli did not respond to requests for comment from ZdG.

Analysis - What a Mess.

What started as a fabricated CV has now caused the committee resignation of one of the most prominent members of the PAS Parliamentary faction, the resignations of 2 cousins of the President, and left us with a number of unanswered questions.

Let’s start with what we do know - Dumitru Vangheli’s whole CV is a fantasy, or a lie. Some could argue that it was “fake it till you make it” gone awry. Others would argue that he’s a conman. In either case, there is zero excuse for those who hired him.

For that we look to the MoldATSA board of directors. On the same day that this scandal broke the Public Property Agency (APP) announced that former Prime Minister Dorin Recean was appointed to this board in an unpaid position. Answering a question about this fact, President Sandu said:

"I don't know why the Public Property Agency decided this way, but they decided to appoint him in this situation to clarify what happened there. But Mr. Recean was appointed after the scandal,"

So Recean was brought in by the APP to start sorting the issue out. This indicates that they knew they had a problem, though it might have only been from calls for comment from ZdG.

What is most perplexing right now is why this is the only change that has been made to the MoldATSA board of directors. They were the ones who oversaw the competition and selected Dumitru Vangheli for director. They were responsible for overseeing company finances and approving executive compensation. In almost every conceivable way the board has failed. But no one has resigned and APP not fired them either.

Then we add the fact that MP Radu Marian has resigned his committee chairmanship. As far as we know right now, his only role in this whole mess was to recommend Dumitru Vangheli as a candidate for the position. Vangheli was one of 3 candidates, and the others were qualified. One of them, Midrigan Vitalie-Silviu, went on to be Vangheli’s deputy director and is now the acting director. So whether or not Radu Marian made a recommendation, the choice to hire Vangheli was made by the board of directors… right?

Maybe not. As I wrote last time, Moldova has chronic governance problems with state companies. MoldATSA does not have an independent board in any meaningful sense of the word and all members are also serving in ministries or state agencies where they were appointed by PAS. Perhaps the board isn’t being held accountable because they aren’t really accountable.

Tatiana Batin’s resignation is more likely tied to her husband's parallel scandal than the optics of her sister being caught up in this one. Whatever the case, MoldATSA and its various sub-scandals has told us a few things definitively. Firstly, PAS has trouble inside its own house and some people close to power are profiting from those connections. These scandals are already extremely damaging for the party’s image and anti-corruption credentials. The big question now is who gets held accountable?

Secondly, this has highlighted the serious problems in the governance of state owned companies. A simply glance at MoldATSA’s board is enough to see that the members are neither qualified nor independent. The fact that they have not yet been held accountable suggests that no one really thought they were.

This scandal highlights an urgent need for corporate governance reform for state companies. That reform should put an emphasis on independent board members and put an end to the system where these jobs are used as salary top-ups for junior civil servants.

This coming week should tell us a lot about how those in power choose to react to this story. We’ll follow along and bring you updates as they happen.

Last week ZdG released an investigation into Dumitru Vangheli, director of the State Enterprise MoldATSA. Their investigation found that he won the job while presenting false aviation credentials on his CV. This initial investigation has now spiraled into multiple scandals that continue to present unanswered questions.

Dumitru Vangheli is (not) a Pilot

The initial investigation targeted MoldATSA Director Dumitru Vangheli who was appointed in 2025 after a competition organized by the APP. On his resume, Vangheli claimed to have gotten his ATPL pilots license from the prestigious CargAir Piloting School in St Hubert Canada (2011-2012). This is the highest grade of pilot’s license and would have licensed him to fly commercial airliners. It requires 1500 hours of flight time, as compared to 70 hours for a basic pilots license or 200 hours for a commercial license. Following this his CV claims he worked as a co-pilot for Air Canada (2012-2014) flying ATR-72 and Boeing 737 Next Generation planes.

None of this is true. ZdG found that he did attend some part-time flying lessons at CargAir in 2018 but did not even attain a basic pilots license. Air Canada confirmed that he never worked for them - and that they had neither ATR-72, nor Boeing 737 Next Generation aircraft in their fleets at the time.

When initially asked about these discrepancies by ZdG journalists he replied:

“You understand that these are secret missions, and they are not going to disclose them to you, because you are not the secret services,”

A few days later he responded to questions in writing in more detail, but avoided explaining any of the discrepancies on his CV or his public wealth declarations.

Dumitru Vangheli’s Companies are… Confusing

On his CV Vangheli claimed a founder, CEO or administrator role in 4 companies - 2 in Moldova and 2 in Canada. ZdG found evidence of 6 more companies in each jurisdiction connected to him. The common thread is that by 2026 all of these companies are defunct, closed or deregistered. Beyond that, the story is much more opaque. On his wealth and asset declarations he claims millions of lei and hundreds of thousands of Canadian dollars in dividends from companies that shortly after ceased to exist. He claims cash accounts equivalent to millions of US dollars spread across lei, Canadian dollars and virtual currencies. He also claims 6 cars - a Rolls-Royce Ghost, Lexus RX 450H, Tesla Model S, Ford Escape PHEV, Toyota Camry and Mazda CX5.

At the same time he has taken out loans from Moldovan banks totaling €640,000 euros against his home equity.

Vangheli also reported donating 40,000 lei to the PAS electoral campaign 2 weeks after he was appointed director. This would have been in September 2025 in the middle of the election campaign.

There is no clear indication of wrongdoing here, but the numbers certainly raise a lot of questions. The starkest of them however is his salary at MoldATSA… and not only his salary.

MoldATSA is a Very Lucrative Place to Work

Before he even became the director of MoldATSA, as acting director in 2024 salaries began going up, including his own. That year he received a bonus of 99,000 lei and a “work intensity supplement” of 39,000 lei. In 2024 his salary was reported as 64,000 lei / month. By 2025 this was 112,000 lei / month.

Huge salary raises were not at all limited to the company director. Numerous employees reported exceptionally large salaries and the average salary at the company climbed from 24,400 lei / month in 2020 to 63,500 lei / month in 2025. It was also in 2025 that Mr. Vangheli hired his girlfriend on Valentine’s day with a salary of 85,000 lei / month.

Explaining the salary increases, Vangheli stated that the company had become much more profitable under his tenure (which is true) and that it was important to pay air traffic controllers competitive salaries as they are professionally quite mobile.

While it is true the air traffic controllers are paid quite well, these salary increases went well beyond controllers and included junior accountants and operational staff as well.

Suspended and Removed

Following the release of the ZdG investigation the Public Property Agency (APP) first suspended and then dismissed Dumitru Vangheli. The APP has stated that his CV was not verified as part of the hiring process and was essentially taken on trust.

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Maia Sandu’s Cousin Benefited from a Large Salary at MoldATSA

Anastasia Taburceanu, cousin of Maia Sandu and former press officer for Prime Minister Gavrilita was also reported to work for MoldATSA. When approached by ZdG she sated that her salary was 25,700 lei / month but noted that she was also paid bonuses which she refused to specify.

RISE Moldova then produced an investigation showing that her effective salary for 2025 was more than 75,000 lei / month, a much larger figure which climbed to 120,000 lei / month in 2026.

Taburceanu explained that her job with the company was in communications and that she was managing a rebranding effort as well as marketing campaigns and a relaunch of the company website. At the same time, this is not her only job. RISE found that she had multiple consulting contracts with various think tanks in 2025 - at times being seconded to the government for various projects.

Most confusingly, when talking to ZdG she sated that part of her activity is promoting the government implementation of the EU Growth Plan. She stated:

“The Growth Plan is implemented by the Government, so what I do is for all ministries. I collect information from my colleagues in the ministries and work with them. And those in the ministries are also responsible for the final communication products. The terms of reference state that I provide services for the State Chancellery,”

Later to RISE she clarified that this work is separate, but she did not comment on her contractual relationship with the State Chancellery or what she is paid for that work.

Following these revelations, Anastasia Taburceanu resigned from MoldASTA and promised to return all bonuses and supplements above her basic salary that she received while employed at the company. She went on to state:

"I am sorry that, through my individual actions and decisions, people were affected who had no connection to the given situation ,"

President Sandu later weighed in on the situation regarding MoldASTA and her cousin saying:

“I had absolutely nothing to do with this hiring. I didn’t recommend her, I wasn’t informed, and I wasn’t consulted about it. I only learned from the media investigations published in recent days that she had been hired without a competition and about the salary she received. It’s obvious that no communications role could justify 120,000 lei. I simply can’t imagine what a communications officer could produce to warrant that kind of salary, just as I can’t imagine what a driver could produce to justify receiving 60,000 lei a month.

The only people who should receive high, internationally competitive salaries are air traffic controllers, because the safety of our airspace depends on them. Everyone else appears to have received unearned money. I don’t know what she produced, but in my view it is immoral to accept money that hasn’t been earned, and that money should be returned. In the worst-case scenario, if it cannot be returned to MoldATSA, then all of it should be donated to an orphanage, a nursing home, or another worthy cause. There are plenty of ways to ensure that this money goes where it is deserved, rather than where it was not.”

Analysis - What’s Going on and What’s Next?

While there’s already a lot going on here this scandal has the feel of not quite being over yet1. We’ll keep following this story in the weeks to come, but I wanted to end today with some context and by highlighting the things I’ll be watching going forward.

What is going on with Dumitru Vangheli?

There is a LOT going on with Mr. Vangheli. At best he lied on his CV about his piloting background. At the same time, the whole CV is very suspect looking. The dates and roles overlap quite a bit. He claims to have been studying Spanish and French at the same time as he was getting his ATPL pilots license, while simultaneously running a company providing food catering services to multiple airlines and Starbucks. Then, while claiming to be a pilot, he was also founding a startup and acting as the CEO. This company had 2 departments - one running refrigerated food logistics, the other also providing airline catering services.

It’s possible that the companies are real and he overlaid the piloting information on the CV to burnish it. It is also quite possible that none of this is real and Mr. Vangheli is either a conman or a fantasist. In any case, a cursory reading of this resume should have raised serious questions - and apparently it didn’t.

Is there a crime here related to the salaries?

This is one of the most important and most complicated parts of this story when it comes to political perception. Firstly, MoldATSA is self funding and clearly quite profitable. So no Moldovan tax dollars are implicated in these huge salaries. It would be reasonable to speculate that if the company was being run profitably then those profits would accrue to the state itself as the shareholder. So, by this logic, artificially inflating their salaries the management and staff were defrauding their shareholders.

But that is not true the case here. Under international regulations MoldATSA says that they may only pay out a maximum of 5% profit to its shareholders. Any additional profits, after expenses, must be refunded to their airlines themselves. So, provided this is accurate, the real question is whether or not these salaries were unreasonable expenses based on the company’s regulations and international norms. The APP has launched an audit of MoldATSA to investigate this and has decided to audit 21 other state owned company’s salary practices as well.

The bigger question might be about how these salaries were approved and how they were overseen, that takes us to questions of…

Governance of State Owned Companies

This is a long term problem for Moldova. The State Property Agency (APP) was quick to state that they do not set executive compensation at the companies they manage nor do they set employee renumeration policies. That is technically true, but skips the fact that the APP has a seat on MoldATSA’s board.

The board is theoretically responsible for this kind of oversight and a quick look at the board composition shows immediate issues. All the board members except for 1 are representatives of ministries or state institutions. State Secretaries from the Ministry of Finance or Economy, Infrastructure or the State Chancellory, etc. The one exception is former Prime Minister Dorin Recean who was appointed as an unpaid board member on the same day as the first ZdG story broke.

“Unpaid” is an important word there. The APP stated that Mr. Recean was appointed to “contribute to strengthening the framework for managing aviation security risks.” That is a solid fit with his resume.

Most board members of state owned companies are paid however. The fact that they are mostly given to junior ministry employees has often been used as a sort of salary sweetener. Raising public sector salaries in Moldova is politically really challenging, so the board seats on the more than 200 state owned companies provide a lot of opportunities for salary supplements.

I’m not saying that none of these or any other board members for state companies are unqualified. I am saying that these boards are in no way diverse or independent. This is a long term problem in Moldova and one that is very common regionally - especially in the former Soviet space. So while this scandal is a lot more complicated than “the board didn’t do its job,” it does highlight how these boards aren’t really fit for purpose.

Anastasia Taburceanu - what’s going on there?

Firstly, I think we can state pretty clearly what isn’t going on. This story has gotten attention because Taburceanu is President Sandu’s cousin, but there is no indication whatsoever that this hire was about nepotism. Anastasia Taburceanu’s CV is very impressive and her experience puts her in the top tier of communications and PR professionals in Moldova.

So while I don’t think this is a family / insider story, I do think there is a story to watch around her salary. It is legitimately difficult to imagine what job she could be doing for MoldATSA that would justify such a high monthly payment. Keep in mind - this isn’t a high paid consultant coming in to do a brand overhaul, this is a salaried employee. It would be hard to reconcile if she was working there full time… but she wasn’t.

Taburceanu stated that part of her work was in support of the government’s EU Growth Plan for the State Chancellery. She then tried to clarify to RISE that this was unrelated to her work at MoldATSA, but did not explain what her contractual relationship with the Chancellery is. RISE also showed that she had other contracts in 2025 - some with the government or funded by donors in support of government agencies.

What is clear is that her work at MoldATSA was in no way full time. That raises even more questions about the amount she was being paid. How this interacted with her role at the State Chancellery remains an open question.

All of this is made more significant because she immediately resigned and offered to return her bonuses - and because President Sandu called the payments “immoral.”

No version of this looks good and there is a lot we don’t know here. I will be watching this space in particular in the weeks to come.

Today I want to share my perspective on this reform. My biggest takeaway is that this reform contains some of the boldest tax ideas Moldova has proposed in years - but it is being pursued through a rushed process, at a difficult geopolitical moment, without the institutional support needed to get a reform of this scale right

Too much, too fast, too little process…

This reform has a REALLY fast implementation timeline. The documentation states that the new rates should be in effect on this timeline:

• October 2026 - “food products, public catering, eCommerce”

• January 2027 - “medicines, cars, accommodation”

• April 2027 - “energy resources”

October is right around the corner and the Ministry of Finance must envision rapid movement on this legislation in order to meet that timeline. Right now this is just a proposal. It must finish public consultations, get approval by the government, passage by parliament in 2 readings, promulgation by the President and publication in the official gazette. After that, common sense dictates that time is left for vendors to update accounting software and for companies to adapt. With parliament scheduled to leave on Summer recess at the end of July that does not leave a lot of time.

To this end, the reform was announced on June 11 with a public comment period open until June 19 - that’s only 6 working days.

Veronica Sirețeanu, Deputy Director of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) and former Minister of Finance (February - December 2023), stated that while the allotted time complied with the law, it does not conform with the scope of this reform. She stated:

“Such a project would have required a minimum of 20 working days. For such a complex document, which contains changes with a transversal impact on the economy, this interval does not allow for a deep analysis and the formulation of well-founded positions”

Specifically she and AMCHAM have called for consultations by thematic blocks and for quality dialogue over speed.

I fully agree with that and note that it’s normal for thematic working groups to go through large reforms step by step before opening a whole legislative proposal up to public consultations. This isn’t just about getting input from the private sector and civil society - it’s also a mechanism to coordinate with the other ministries. It is telling that Minister of Economy Osmochescu has been silent on the reform except to note that they have not yet calculated the inflation impact.

It is more notable that the Minister of Health concluded that the reform will “destroy the healthcare system” on June 22 - well after the end of the official comment period. If it took the Minister of Health more than 6 working days to figure that out, I think we all deserve more time to digest a reform of this size.

This is about stability and confidence… not just taxes

In their 2025 election platform PAS promised fiscal stability. Specifically that tax policy would be changed (at most) once every 2 years and that they would present a…

“predictable fiscal calendar for the next 4 years, consulted with the business environment, civil society and social partners”

In this legislation’s current form, restaurants and hotels will see their taxes on non-alcohol products more than double by October. Energy taxes increases are being pushed until April, but that is more about waiting until after the cold season than anything else. This plan envisions rapid, sweeping changes.

More importantly, the 4 year plan is lacking and we don’t even know the 2 year plan. The Ministry is explicit in calling this the “Fiscal Policy 2027” and in the same press release states that a whole new Fiscal Code is coming. This larger reform will be developed over 2026-2027 with the goal of implementing it in 2028.

While they don’t explicitly unpack what the relationship between this reform and the larger 2028 goals are, they are implied in the structure. This document talks a lot about eliminating special tax regimes but doesn’t actually do that at all. So presumably companies operating under a Patenta or the IT Parks law have some big changes coming - but what are they, and when?

Where is the Prime Minister?

In Moldova it is sadly not unusual for ministries within the same government to publicly clash. The reasons here are complex but at a core level different ministries will pursue their own interests and portfolios when there is no central instruction or guiding principle to direct and / or coordinate them.

Rarely do these conflicts spill into the public like this and I have never seen it on such a huge issue. Comprehensive tax reform, whether in 2027 or by 2028, is an issue that touches every citizen in the country and every aspect of governance. That begs the question - where is the PM?

In late February Prime Minister Munteanu made an offhand comment about raising VAT for restaurants that set off a firestorm and caused Finance Minister Gavrilita to walk it back - explaining that restaurants are not being targeted and that a much larger reform is underway. Tacitly the message appeared to be that the PM did not know what he was talking about.

Since then we’ve heard nothing from him on this issue. Since June 11 he has not made any public statements, social media posts or press releases. No statements in support of his Minister of Finance, no explanations to the public about why rewriting the entire tax code is important, nothing.

When Prime Minister Munteanu was brought in out of almost total obscurity from the business community there was some hope that he would bring a private sector management style to government. Specifically, that the infighting between ministries would stop and people would start pulling in one direction towards EU accession.

If this is a management style, it is inspired by Lord of the Flies. If it isn’t one, it is simply neglect.

Diving into the Substance

Alright, enough about process - let’s talk about substance. There is a lot to like in this bill and a lot that I really worry about. I’m going to break these into the good, the bad and the ugly.

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Moldova’s Ministry of Finance announced on June 11 the most ambitious tax reform program in more than a decade. Titled Fiscal Policy 2027 with the subtitle “Moldova works, Moldova invests” and the tags “simplicity • compliance • convenience • competitiveness,” the proposal has set off a firestorm of reactions across the country.

In their press release, the Ministry of Finance stated that the proposal would provide a simpler tax system that would be easier to comply with and to administer. It claims that domestic companies would be made more competitive and that tax evasion would be reduced.

The proposed changes would impact almost every sector of the economy and every household - often in multiple different ways.

Big Picture - What is Being Proposed and Why?

At its core, the Ministry’s proposal identifies the following 3 main problems as important context:

1. The country has a chronic budget deficit.

2. The country collects relatively little tax as a percentage of GDP (~20%) when compared to other EU candidate countries (average ~22%) and EU countries (~25%).

3. Taxes are overly complex and fragmented. This refers to too many legal forms for doing business as well as lots of exemptions and carveouts in the tax code.

Taken together the Ministry argues that the current system hurts both economic competitiveness and the state’s ability to administer the tax system. They set out a reform agenda that they claim will address these problems be reducing the number of taxes while also reducing the number of exemptions. Philosophically, the reform aims to focus on taxing consumption while incentivizing investment.

In order to dig into the reform itself, we’re going to focus on 4 main areas:

1. Company profit taxes

2. Salary taxes

3. Value Added Tax (VAT)

4. Special Tax Regimes

5. Property taxes, local taxes and other changes

1) Zero Percent Tax on Reinvested Profits

Currently large companies in Moldova pay a 12% tax on profits and a 6% tax on dividends. This means that even if those initial profits were fully reinvested in the company (hiring new staff, buying new equipment, opening a new location, etc) they are taxed.

The headline announcement is that this reform zeros out taxes on reinvested profits, but things are a bit more complicated than that.

The new reform expands this mechanism to all companies regardless of size but also raises the effective tax rate on distributed profits from ~18% (12%+6%) to ~21% (15%+7%).

Note - the idea of exempting reinvested profits from taxes has been a confounding political issue in the past 3 years for anyone paying attention. I’ll leave those details in a footnote1.

Impact - Mostly Good!

Most business owners will find this to be a positive reform. It encourages investment and growth and will help companies scale. In short…

Pros:

• Tax breaks for companies that reinvest in growth

• Large companies now benefit from this tax break

• SMEs get this tax break codified into permanent law

Cons:

• SMEs taxes go up from the current scheme - most SME owners pay themselves in dividends so this hits them personally

Read more

Molovata Nouă located on the Eastern bank of the River Dniestr1 in Moldova. Unlike most areas on that side of the river, Molovata Nouă pledges it’s allegiance to the internationally recognized Moldovan government in Chișinău, rather than the Russian-backed separatist government of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (often called ‘Transnistria’).

Molovata Nouă, and a handful of smaller villages around it, defended themselves successfully against the separatist forces in the Transnistria War of 1992, and the town has remained in an unusual position ever since.

The ferry service has run since 2000, negating the need for vehicles and passengers to pass through the separatist controlled checkpoints and customs posts located on the bridges across the river by the city of Dubăsari ten kilometres south. Neither Transnistria nor Moldova control the traffic between Dubăsari and Molovata Nouă, as neither recognizes this as a border (Transnistria claims the whole Eastern bank, including Molovata Nouă and Moldova claims the whole of Transnistria).

At the jetty, a noticeboard from the local government of the district emphasizes how vital the link has been:

“historically and practically, the ferry is more than a transport link, in winter and in difficult conditions it helps ensure remote villages are supplied with food basic goods.”

The ferry journey from Molovata to Molovata Nouă takes around ten minutes and the crossing is free of charge for all passengers and vehicles. The service runs roughly every two hours from 7am to 8pm. The ferry is so popular that cars and lorries frequently have to wait for the next crossing in busier times. At the Molovata side, there is an “internal customs post” staffed by Moldovan officers, to control goods that may have come from separatist Transnistria. On the Molovata Nouă side, there are a handful of Russian and Moldovan soldiers and an old Russian APC guarding the off-ramp to the ferry as part of the joint security zone procedures which control the area around the River Dniester.

Molovata Nouă and the surrounding villages have been in a precarious situation for 35 years, but this situation may change soon. The Moldovan Government has recently exerted a lot of pressure on Transnistria, including banning Russian officers from entering Moldova, essentially trapping them in Transnistria. This follows several crises in the region, including Russia no longer providing free natural gas since 2025, previously a large part of the Transnistrian economy was making electricity with this gas and selling it to Moldova. Furthermore, with the Ukraine – Transnistria border closed since the outbreak of war, all traffic in and out of the separatist region is required to travel through Moldova, a factor being leveraged by Moldova as it plans to integrate Transnistrian businesses into the Moldovan economy and tax system.

These measures have led to some speculation that Transnistria’s de facto independence may be coming to an end. In March, a leaked document exposed the first plan for re-integration formulated by Moldova since 2003. Whilst the European Union has stated that Transnistria’s continued existence would not impede on Moldova joining the EU – indeed, Cyprus, a long standing EU member already has a similar breakaway territory within its borders - a plan to dissolve the region and re-integrate it entirely would make Moldova’s path to European integration simpler.

However, until re-integration is completed and the last Russian troops leave Moldova, Molovata Nouă and the surrounding villages will continue to rely on the ferry across the Dniester.

Hamish Fraser is a journalism postgraduate at Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen, Scotland. He is a guest contributor to Moldova Matters.

This week 3 new investigations were published into various aspects of Ilan Shor’s network. In each case investigative journalists have published sweeping looks into various aspects of Shor’s operations and detailed how they have grown beyond Moldova to become a core part of Russia’s financial and foreign influence infrastructure.

Each investigation is well worth reading in full - here we’ll link to them and summarize some of the key findings.

The Big Shor: A7 and the illusion of Russian financial innovation.

Published on 12 June by the Open Source Centre (OSC) in partnership with TRM Labs, authored by Zachary Tvarozna, Hamish Macdonald, James Byrne, Lucas Kuo, Denys Karlovskyi, Vasyl Yurkuts, Gary Somerville and William Gibson.

This 114 page report tracks the growth and evolution of the A7 network in great detail. The authors argue that past investigations focused on the A7A5 cryptocurrency have obscured a much larger set of financial infrastructure that largely relies on traditional banking but is optimized for sanctions evasion. The report centers Ilan Shor as the architect of Russia’s most important sanctions evasion network and documents its global reach as a financial clearing house for both large corporations and individuals needing small scale financial services. In this network A7A5 plays an important role, but only in support of more traditional infrastructure including Russian banks and entities in Kyrgyzstan which the report calls a “captured state.”

The main takeaway is the fact that Ilan Shor now sits at the center of a critical financial network that is fully backed by the Russian state. This network is growing rapidly and has global ambitions. At the same time, its very complexity highlights how challenging it is for Russian individuals and companies to access the global financial system right now.

“Corrupts everyone he sees”

Published on 17 June by Novaya Gazeta Europe, written by Alexey Stepanov and Olesya Shmagun

This brilliant report tracks Shor’s rise to the center of Russia’s sanctions evasion system. It takes his name from a 2016 report by Kommersant which quotes a Russian government source on why Ilan Shor was at that time banned from entering Russia. Because he “corrupts everyone he sees.”

The investigation looks at how Shor went from being banned from entering Russia to sitting at the center of the country’s financial architecture. According to a source cited by Novaya Gazeta Europe the key moment was a meeting between Ilan Shor and Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich in Israel. Shor had fled Moldova when PAS won elections in 2019 and was hiding in Israel at the time. According to their source:

“It’s all the same crowd, how can I explain it? Shor’s wife, singer Jasmine, is best friends with Tatyana Navka1. Abramovich and Shor bonded over Jewish topics. All these people are essentially part of the same circle and interact with each other. They become useful to each other. Then they go their separate ways.”

According to their reporting Abramovich personally introduced Shor to Vladimir Putin. Now, Shor’s unique value proposition in the business world is the fact that he’s been vouched for by people at the highest level of the Russian state.

Much of the article focuses on a company owned by Shor called “Diamant Estate” (sometimes “Diamond Estate”). This company was sanctioned by the UK for connections to Shor / A7 on May 26, 2026 and Novaya Gazeta Europe uncovered a series of corporate filings related to its activities. They report that Diamant Estate is at the core of Shor’s operations and funds all of his business and political projects - including A7, Evrazia, TV stations and others. Diamant Estate borrows money which it then loans to these companies. Critically, companies closely linked to Roman Abramovich are some of the key funders of Shor’s operations.

Interestingly, journalists with Novaya Gazeta Europe wanted to test out the smaller time financial services of A7 and called the company with the goal of buying a car in Germany. An operator at the A7 call center stated this was no problem and said:

“You transfer rubles to an A7-Agent account and provide us with an invoice from the German recipient. We use our infrastructure to select the route, and the money arrives within five days,”

So whether you need to send your rubbles abroad to buy a car, or invest in military drone construction, the Shor network has you covered.

From Chisinau to Yerevan: How Russia’s Evrazia brought its Moldova playbook to Armenia

Published on 5 June as a joint investigation between DFRLab and CivilNet by Victoria Olari, Sopo Gelava, Givi Gigitashvili, Ani Grigoryan, and Salome Tsetskladze

This report tracks the operations of Ilan Shor’s Evrazia NGO in Armenia and shows how election interference strategies and infrastructure used in Moldova was redeployed in Armenia. It maps how Evrazia is able to openly operate in Armenia where it positions itself as Russia’s answer to USAID2, Open Society Foundation and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The organization nominally provides Russian language classes, cultural events, Robotics classes, animation schools and more. In reality it is a platform for organizing election interference via social media campaigns, campaigns to mobilize the orthodox church, organized (paid) transportation of diaspora voters, etc. The report concludes:

“Evrazia’s operations in Moldova and Armenia are not separate initiatives; it is one operation running across two countries, which seems to share the same objective: to build political leverage for Kremlin-aligned forces ahead of elections. This constitutes an interference operation that uses the language of civil society to do the work of political campaigning. In Moldova, that operation has been widely documented, and Evrazia’s activities were designated a national security threat. In Armenia, Evrazia continues to operate freely.”

Other Shor / Hybrid War News

Outside of these amazing investigations, here are the other related stories of the week:

• The EU has added 6 people to their sanctions list for "actions destabilising” Moldova. This included former Bashkan of Gagauzia and leader of the Heart of Moldova Party Irina Vlah who was sanctioned for her work organizing paid election rallies in July 2025. It explicitly identifies her as a Russian agent who coordinated her role in the elections with the Kremlin and then took part in illicit financing efforts. Also sanctioned was Anton Tregub, the Russian coordinator of Victoria Furtuna’s Moldova Mare Party, and Anton Usov who has been reported as the coordinator of election interference efforts involving the Orthodox Church.

• A Moldovan court has issued a new arrest warrant for Ilan Shor. This warrant is related to an ongoing case where Shor is alleged to have embezzled $100 million dollars from Banca de Economii. In the same case the bank’s interim president from the time has already been sentenced to 10 years in prison. This is the second outstanding arrest warrant for Shor in pending cases, in addition to warrants related to his conviction in the “Theft of the Billion” case for which he has been sentenced to 15 years in prison.

• The usual suspects attended Putin’s Saint Petersburg Economic Forum. From Moldova, Igor Dodon, Zinaida Greceanîi, Vasile Tarlev, Victoria Furtuna and other Socialist MPs attended the “Russian Davos.” Ilan Shor and Marina Tauber were also in attendance. Romanian Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Diana Șoșoacă also attended and had her photo taken with Shor at the event. The event was held under a literal cloud as black smoke from Ukrainian long range strikes drifted over the city.

Politics, Security & Other Updates

Here’s a roundup of some of the top stories of the last 2 weeks:

• Transnistria’s economic crisis deepens. According to reporting from Zona de Securitate street lighting in many towns and cities in the region was turned off starting June 1. Residents who called the power company were simply told that it was an “order from above.” Meanwhile, budget shortfalls have led to the region’s “authorities” announcing that teachers’ summer vacation salaries will be paid in multiple tranches. Against this backdrop the region’s “Supreme Soviet” is proposing to outlaw the word “Transnistria” in any language and impose fines for its use3.

• Vladimir Voronin has stepped down as leader of the Communist Part of Moldova. This was announced at the 11th party congress where the longtime leader was named the “Honorary President of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova.” MP Diana Caraman will now lead the party.

• Metropolitan Vladimir has a fancy new apartment. An investigation by TV8 has shown that the leader of the Moldovan Orthodox Church4 recently registered an apartment worth over €200,000 euros in his lay name. The building is immediately adjacent to church headquarters and the apartment was apparently a gift from the developer in exchange for a sign off on the building’s construction. This comes in the context of a fairly scandalous5 construction process for the building where the developer lied to city hall and authorized a 3 story building while approving a 7 story building with the church and then constructing that. The new apartment joins a number of luxury apartments owned by Vladimir as well as a large house which is technically owned by his mistress but was actually bought with church funds6. Asked for comment Metropolitan Vladimir called it a smear campaign designed to undermine the church.

• Germany delivered 5 Piranha-V armored personnel carriers (APCs) to the Moldovan Army. These state of the art APCs join older model Piranha’s that were previously donated by Germany in support of Moldova’s defense.

• Igor Grosu was re-elected leader of the PAS Party. He ran unopposed at the Party’s 4th Congress.

• PAS has proposed Alexandru Vornicu as their mayoral candidate for the 2027 Chisinau local election. In the meantime, Vornicu will lead the PAS Chisinau Municipal Organization. Alexandru Vornicu is currently the Mayor of the suburb of Stauceni. As mayor he successfully broke Stauceni away from Chisinau municipality and attracted significant investments leading to a quadrupling of the town budget and many substantial infrastructure projects. It is highly unusual for any political party to name a candidate this far out - and more unusual as Vornicu is not a prominent politician in PAS.

• The Legal Resource Center of Moldova (CRJM) launched a website dedicated to tracking cases of electoral corruption in Moldova. The website gives details on ongoing cases, convictions, fines and more. It also has a map showing the geographic distribution of election corruption case around the country. This website was financed by the EU in a project implemented by UNDP and is meant to support journalists and international partners in tracking Moldova's electoral integrity cases.

Crime & Corruption - Telephone Fraud is Exploding

Since COVID-19 telephone fraud scams have been steadily growing in scope and sophistication. Originally referred to as “a relative got into an accident” schemes, whereby a caller would say just that and ask for money to help them, now these schemes peddle phony investments, pose as state officials and take other innovative approaches.

Parliament held hearings on the topic last week and found that financial scams are up 19% in the first months of 2026 when compared to 2025. This crimewave took on a geopolitical angle this week when the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) announced a link to Russia stating:

“SIS has come into possession of information indicating a coordinated process of collecting personal data of citizens of the Republic of Moldova by Russian special services. The data is collected through various methods, such as private databases illegally sold on the Dark Web, databases illegally extracted by hacking private servers, as well as the database collected by the Shor organized criminal group in recent years, which contains about 145 thousand citizens who provided personal data. The evaluation of the information held indicates detailed databases containing names and surnames, e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, home addresses, as well as copies of identity documents,”

SIS went on to note that this information is then passed by the Russian government to criminal networks as part of a “hybrid war to undermine national stability.”

Our Party leader and MP Renato Usatii also weighed in this week stating that he had gotten access to a server linked to a telephone scam network that had financially harmed 100,000 Moldovan citizens. He said that Moldova was only a small target of this international network with their primary target being Argentina. He described a new mechanism stating:

“It’s a new scheme where children and teenagers are turned into accomplices of criminals under the pretext of a mission from the authorities. They will call the children, pretend to be from the prosecutor’s office or the police, offer them to participate in a secret mission, tell them not to tell anyone, otherwise the parents will have problems. The mission is to search the house for money, documents and cards, take pictures and transmit personal data to the scammers, and hand over money and packages to strangers. This is a new phase ,”

In response to this growing issue the government has approved Moldova’s accession to the “Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime” which will ban the purchase of sim cards without a government ID.

Economics & Infrastructure

Here’s a roundup of the top stories of the last 2 weeks in economics:

• Parliament will force taxi companies to process payments in Moldova. A new draft law would require payments for taxi companies through apps like Yandex Go to be processed by Moldovan banks. Currently, when you take a Yandex cab in Chisinau the payment goes to Dubai. Moldova loses millions of lei in taxes yearly from this and similar arrangements and parliament has been extremely slow to act7.

• An auction has been launched to privatize the Chisinau Glass Factory. The Public Property Agency has set the starting price at 773 million lei and will require the purchasing investor to incest €20.3 million over 3 years.

• Annual inflation reached 6.8% in May causing the national bank to raise rates. The cost of eggs is up 36% year on year as high energy prices accelerate inflation across the board. The National Bank raised the base rate from 6.5% to 7% and now projects inflation to continue rising through the end of 2026 before starting to contract in Q1 2027.

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On Monday June 15, at the second Moldova - European Union Intergovernmental Conference hosted in Luxembourg the EU officially opened the first negotiating cluster with Moldova and Ukraine. Four years after getting candidate status the EU’s 27 member state all approved the start of official negotiations. President Sandu marked this milestone stating:

"Today, the Republic of Moldova took another step on its European path: we opened negotiations on the first group of chapters, Fundamental Values,"

"We got here thanks to the work we put in together and the effort of people who believe in the European future of the Republic of Moldova. Our country is moving forward, and the road ahead still requires perseverance. But today we have one more reason to be confident: the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union is no longer a distant goal, but a reality that we are already building,"

This event ends nearly 2 years of political paralysis and begins the real process of negotiations. Let’s look at what this means and what comes next.

What’s a Cluster Again?

The EU accession process is broken down into 33 negotiating chapters. These in turn are grouped into 6 main negotiating clusters. They are:

1. Fundamentals (judiciary, fundamental rights, rule of law, public procurement, public administration, etc)

2. Internal Market (free movement of goods, workers, capital, etc)

3. Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth (taxation, science, research, education, etc)

4. Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity (transport, energy, trans-EU networks, climate change, etc)

5. Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion (agriculture policy, food veterinary and phytosanitary safety, fisheries, etc)

6. External Relations (foreign, security and defense policy)

The most important cluster is Fundamentals - it is the first one to be opened and the last to close. Given Moldova’s struggles with corruption and work at justice reform it is also the most challenging1.

President Sandu has stated that Moldova is prepared to open all negotiating clusters. Various outlets have reported EU officials targeting July for opening the remaining clusters, but it is unclear how firm that timeline is. Moldova has been working informally on each cluster and has made significant process on 2/3 of the chapters in the last year. You can track progress chapter by chapter at this link.

A Milestone for Moldova and Ukraine

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the news stating:

“We’ve worked hard to reach this point. In recent years, Ukraine and Moldova have taken important steps forward together. It’s especially symbolic that I’m addressing you today from Chisinau on my way to France, where I’ll attend the G7 summit. Our good-neighborly relations with Moldova are strong. We support each other and move forward together on the path to European integration. And together, we will achieve this goal,”

Interestingly, President Zelenskyy was in Chisinau transiting the country on his way to the G7 summit in France. This was his second time using the Chisinau airport for transit with the first being June 9 when he returned from a trip to London via Chisinau. On that occasion he met with US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner at the Chisinau airport for what he called a “very positive conversation.”

Ukrainian delegations have primarily used the airport in Rzeszów Poland for international travels after February 2022. While no official reason for the change has been given, it comes against the backdrop of cooling Ukrainian - Polish relations2.

The location highlights just how close Moldova and Ukraine have become in recent years and serves as a reminder that the countries’ paths towards Europe have thus far been linked.

How Significant is This?

Overall, that remains to be seen. Procedurally, it is a big deal. Until now Moldova had negotiations in name but not in practice. Moldova and Ukraine attained candidate status in June 2022 and negotiations officially opened in late 2024. Since then there has been lots of behind the scenes work but officially the process was stuck in a sort of accession limbo. With the first cluster open the countries will actual begin back and forth negotiations on membership. Procedurally, the next milestone will be the opening of the other 5 clusters.

Politically the opening of the first cluster is a win for those who support EU enlargement. In Moldova, it sends a signal to voters that there is real movement and that EU membership is a tangible goal.

What is far less clear is what this move signals overall. France, Germany and other EU members are circulating a number of proposals for how to proceed that reflect very different underlying assumptions country to country. The opening of the first cluster was largely delayed by Hungary’s veto - which was wielded against Ukraine not Moldova. Orban’s hostility to Ukraine masked broader discomfort across multiple EU countries and his removal has brought those issues into the open.

As Moldova and Ukraine move towards the potential of opening other clusters in July, a key area to watch will be whether the countries de-couple in the process. Up until this point Moldova and Ukraine have been joined by various geopolitical dynamics. Now, that may change. Moldova’s smaller size and the fact that the country is not at war could mean that it moves ahead in terms of technical reforms. Meanwhile, some ideas from member states envision a geopolitical priority lane for Ukraine - but not Moldova. Now that actual negotiations are starting these issues become much less theoretical and the potential for a decoupling of the 2 countries increases.

Going forward the primary signal to watch is the speed with which the other 5 clusters open. If they are all opened in 2026 or in early 2027 then Moldova’s goal of membership by 2030 remains possible. If no more clusters open this year or if they are slow rolled then it is not. Opening cluster 1 this week means that the sprint to 2030 remains possible - but only that.

On the night of June 7 a drone crossed into Moldova airspace and apparently exploded in a field near the town of Lopatna in the Orhei district. Lopatna is located on the Nistru river immediately across from Transnistria. The Ministry of Defense stated that the Army picked the drone up on radar at 00:20 which is around the same time residents called police to report the sound of an explosion. No one was hurt in the incident.

Security services responded to the call and found drone fragments. The next day journalists recorded images of a small crater - around the depth of a large bucket - in the field.

Few details about the apparent drone strike have been reported and what we do know includes sharply conflicting statements. The Ministry of Foriegn Affairs put out a statement saying that “according to preliminary data, it is most likely that the drone is of Ukrainian origin.” They went on to state:

"Regardless of the drone's origin, Russia, which started an illegal war in a neighboring country, bears responsibility for any drone that enters Moldovan territory. We stand in solidarity with the Ukrainians who are fighting and giving their lives for the freedom of their country, as well as for peace on the European continent, including peace in Moldova,"

At the same time, Ukraine’s Foriegn Minister put out a statement on X writing:

"Another Russian drone crashed in Moldovan territory during Russia's massive attack on Ukraine last night. We express our full support to our friends in Moldova and note their continued condemnation of Russian aggression. This incident clearly demonstrates that Moscow poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but to the entire region and all of Europe,"

Moldova’s Ministry did not comment to various outlets on the discrepancy.

Earlier on June 7 President Sandu gave an interview with journalist Nicolae Chicu where she stated that the country must begin manufacturing defensive interceptor drones. She stated:

“We need to start producing drones that can intercept and shoot down drones. (…) I have asked the Government, especially in the context of the latest events, to prepare the amendment of the legislation. Because, on the one hand, the state must produce these drones and anti-drones, but on the other hand, we must also allow the private sector. For example, our state does not have these new technologies, we do not have experts, because we have not trained such experts. But there are foreign investors who have these technologies, it’s just that the law does not allow it today (…) Because we need to have these interceptor drones that combat drones that come more and more often to the territory of our country and create real dangers ,”

We’ll come back with updates on this story in the main roundup.

Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar announced that Hungary and Ukraine had agreed on a new framework to protect the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine’s Zakarpattia region. This move has renewed hopes of unblocking the opening of negotiating clusters between Ukraine and the EU. Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos praised this progress, writing:

“Prime Minister Magyar’s announcement of the agreement between Hungary and Ukraine to promote minority rights paves the way for progress in Ukraine’s EU accession process.

This will allow Member States to move forward with work on opening the first chapter of negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine and Moldova already meet the rule of law requirements set by Member States.

It is time to accelerate the process of accession of these countries to the EU. This is the best way to ensure respect for minority rights,”

When announcing the agreement with Ukraine, Peter Magyar announced Hungary’s support for opening negotiating clusters but not for an accelerated membership for Ukraine. He stated:

“Hungary does not support accelerated EU accession negotiations. If Ukraine manages to close all 33 accession chapters within 10 or 15 years, our country will hold a decisive, legally binding referendum on this issue,”

These announcements come amidst a flurry of activity seemingly aimed at creating pressure to finally begin negotiations. The European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee voted decisively on June 3 to accelerate Moldova’s accession and to open negotiating clusters - noting particularly the country’s progress on justice reform. Moldova has had a parliamentary delegation in Brussels for meetings and Deputy PM for European Integration Cristina Gherasimov called these developments an “important signal” and stated that EU Council level discussions will soon take place to finalize the last administrative procedures for opening negotiations.

After many delays it is possible that Moldova and Ukraine will begin officially negotiating this month or early next. We’ll follow this story and update you as it develops.

Trump Nominates a US Ambassador to Moldova

In an unexpected announcement, the White House nominated 40 ambassadorial positions on June 1 sending the list to the Senate for confirmation. This list included the following nomination for Moldova:

“Joseph Burkhalter, of Georgia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Moldova.”

Joseph Mark Burkhalter, generally referred to as Mark Burkhalter, is a businessman and former state legislator in Georgia. He does not have direct foreign policy experience, but has had business ties outside the US including in the UK. Burkhalter studied Political Science, German and Slavic languages while an undergrad at the University of Georgia1. This would mark the first time that a political appointee has been made ambassador to Moldova.

In 2020 President Trump nominated Mark Burkhalter to be the US Ambassador to Norway. His nomination was later withdrawn over a resurfaced 1994 scandal in which Burkhalter authorized and distributed a racist campaign flyer2 that lawsuits from the time alleged was designed to emphasize a democratic incumbent’s race. Incumbent Gordon Joyner’s face was blackened, one eye distorted, lips thickened and he was given an afro. Burkhalter later admitted to authorizing and later covering up the payment for the flyer in violation of Georgia House ethics laws. He paid a civil penalty and apologized to Joyner.

Moldova has not had a US Ambassador since Ambassador Kent Logsdon departed in June 2024.

Analysis: Will this impact his new nomination?

Not likely. The scandal around his 2020 nomination was set against the backdrop of the Black Lives Matter movement and a national discussion around race in the United States. The fight against his nomination was led by Democratic Senator Bob Menendez at a time of Democratic confidence after the 2018 midterms and going into the 2020 Presidential Elections. This weekend, Bob Menendez will mark 1 year in prison as he serves an 11 year sentence for corruption3 against the backdrop of a democratic party in substantial disarray.

At the same time, it is very possible that all of these nominations will get caught up on complex Senate politics ahead of the midterms this year. We’ll just have to wait and see.

Other Foriegn Affairs and Security News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• Fallout from the Russian drone strike in Romania. Following last week’s drone attack Romanian President Nicușor Dan has been absolutely clear in attributing the attack to Russia. Romania expelled the Russian Consul General in Constanta in response and announced consultation with NATO allies. Romania also announced a deal on joint drone production with Ukraine. This follows similar moves by the Gulf states in the context of the Iran war as more and more countries turn to Ukraine for counter-drone expertise.

• Igor Dodon, Vasile Tarlev and Victoria Furtună attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. They spoke of the need for Moldova to return to the CIS, join the Eurasian Economic Community, open negotiations with Gazprom, drop sanctions against Russia, etc. The forum, often called the “Russian Davos,” took place against the backdrop of overnight Ukrainian strikes on military targets in the region that send billows of black smoke over the city. This year’s forum also saw the return of a US delegate for the first time since 2018 in the form of Rodney Mims Cook Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts. A group of online influencers / conspiracy theorists including Candace Owens and the Tate brothers also attended the event.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top political stories of the week:

• The Archbishop of Chisinau and Metropolitan of Bessarabia resigned amidst scandal. Archbishop Petru’s resignation was announced by church officials citing the 80 year old’s age, health and that it was for “for the good of the Church.” That last part was likely doing the heavy lifting. Shortly after his resignation unverified videos began to circulate allegedly showing the Archbishop having sexual relations with an unknown man. These videos were immediately spread by various Telegram channels and used as attacks against both the Metropolis of Bessarabia and the LGBTQ community. This is not the first time that the Archbishop has faced accusations. In 2014 a number of junior clergy made public allegations about recent and historical sexual advances by the Archbishop. The Metropolis of Bessarabia made statements distancing itself from the conduct in the video “if true.”

• Local elections conclude. In Orhei, independent candidate Ramiz Ansarov won the second round mayoral elections with 57% of the vote. While he ran as an independent he formerly ran for parliament on the party lists of the Heart of Moldova Party. In Taraclia, Socialist Candidate Iacobceac Ecaterina won the mayoral race with 51%. Both towns will now have non-Shor administrations for the first time in many years.

• “Mr. Nobody Against Putin” shown in Chisinau. The Oscar and BAFTA award winning documentary was shown in Chisinau at an event attended by director and protagonist Pavel Talankin. Many people posted pictures with Mr. Talankin and his Oscar online. The film shows the rapid onset of indoctrination and militarism in Russian schools following the invasion of Ukraine. Pavel Talankin worked at a school in a small Russian city and filmed this process before escaping to the West. Speaking at the event, he noted that the Russian authorities took note of who fled the country at the onset of the war and who didn’t. He stated:

“The Kremlin looked out the window and asked: ‘What generation is leaving?’ They did an analysis and realized that exactly the generation that grew up after the collapse of the USSR, which had not been educated in this propaganda, was leaving. Then they stormed schools and kindergartens to forcefully introduce indoctrination,”

For anyone who hasn’t seen the film, I strongly recommend it. It portrays a chilling representation of how this war has changed Russia and leaves you with the clear sense that there will not be any return to normal when it ends. Here’s the trailer:

June is when summer truly arrives in Moldova. Schools finish for the year, outdoor terraces fill up, and the country’s festival season gets underway. This month also brings the bounty of fresh fruits and vegetables that make summer meals in Moldova incredibly refreshing. This month you should be able to find locally grown strawberries, cherries (sweet and sour), cucumbers, new potatoes, lettuce, radishes, apricots and a wide selection of fresh herbs. Be sure to plan a trip to Piața Centrala to view, smell and buy all the fresh things your heart desires!

Holidays and Traditions

• International Children’s Day – June 1
  Children’s Day is now an official public holiday in Moldova and is celebrated throughout the country with concerts, games, workshops, and family activities. Cathedral Park traditionally hosts some of the largest celebrations in Chișinău while local authorities organize events throughout the city.
  More information: https://www.fest.md/en/events

Concerts and Performances

• Ricky Martin Live – June 12
  One of the biggest concerts of the year comes to Chișinău when Ricky Martin performs at Zimbru Stadium.
  Tickets and information can be found here.

• Turandot – June 12
  Arena Chișinău hosts a performance of Puccini’s classic opera. Tickets and information here.

• Coldplay & Adele Candlelight Concert – June 16
  An evening of orchestral interpretations of popular songs in a candlelit setting. More details can be found here.

• Closing of the Concert Season – June 29
  The Palace of the Republic closes its 2025–2026 season with a symphonic performance. Tickets and details are available here.

Festivals

• JAZZ’n Chișinău International Festival – June 10–12
  The annual jazz festival returns with performances and workshops throughout the capital.
  More information: https://www.fest.md/en/events

• Născut în Moldova – June 13–14
  One of the country’s largest family-oriented music festivals featuring famous Moldovan artists such as Zdob și Zdub, Carla’s Dreams, Irina Rimes and Alternosfera. Also performing, fresh off his big Eurovision performance will be Satoshi. There will also be food vendors, and activities for all ages.
  More information can be found on their official site here.

• Art Labyrinth: Pulse of the Earth – Beginning June 18
  A festival focused on alternative culture, music, workshops, and immersive outdoor experiences. Some initial details and connections to their social media can be found here.

• DescOperă – June 19–21
  One of Moldova’s most distinctive cultural events returns to Orheiul Vechi. Opera performances are staged outdoors against the backdrop of one of Moldova’s most spectacular historical sites. For a list of performances and tickets visit the ticket page here.

• Kaleidoscope Festival – June 20–21
  Held at the Botanical Garden in Chișinău, Kaleidoscope combines electronic music, art installations, food vendors, and live performances. For a complete line-up and to purchase tickets, visit their page on iticket here.

• Dacii Liberi Moto Fest – June 26–28
  This motorcycle and rock festival takes place at Mileștii Mici and combines live music, camping, wine tourism, motorcycle exhibitions, and rides through the winery’s underground galleries.
  More information on the activities and the evolving lineup, as well as links to buy tickets can be found here.

Civic and Community Events

• Moldova Pride Festival
  June is Pride Month and the annual Moldova Pride Festival is expected to include cultural events, film screenings, discussions, community gatherings, and the annual Pride March in Chișinău. The main Pride Events are scheduled for June 21 and details can be found here.

Sports

• Moldova National Football Team
  The national team has World Cup qualifying fixtures during the June international window.
  Schedules and ticket information are available on the Moldovan Football Federation’s site here.

• Summer Outdoor Sports
  June is one of the best months of the year for hiking, cycling, running, and exploring the countryside. Orheiul Vechi, the Codrii forests, and Moldova’s wine regions are all particularly attractive before the peak summer heat arrives.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

The city of Galați is around 20 km from the port of Reni in Ukraine and around 60 km from the larger port of Izmail. Galați is even closer to the Moldovan border and port of Giurgiulești. Russian attacks against Ukraine’s Danube delta ports have been frequent since the start of the war and Romania’s adjacent counties often push out “Ro-Alerts” to residents telling them to seek shelter1. This is the first time though that any Russian drone has stuck such a large piece of civilian infrastructure outside of Ukraine.

The Romanian authorities report that 2 F16 fighters had been scrambled with permission to shoot down the drone. Evidently they did not.

Romanian President Nicușor Dan condemned the attack and promised a "firm response at the national, allied, and international levels" saying that “Romania is a NATO member state and will under no circumstances allow Russian aggression to spread to its citizens.”

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Support for Reintegration Grows in Transnistria

Journalists with Zona de Securitate partnered with the think tank Watchdog to conduct a study on the perceptions of the residents of the Transnistria region. The most interesting outcome was for their question:

“If a referendum were held next Sunday (you were asked to vote) on the reintegration of Transnistria with the Republic of Moldova, would you vote for or against integration?”

The results showed more than half of the region’s residents would vote for reintegration with Moldova given the chance. This followed a broader trend of dissatisfaction with the region’s leadership, people reporting that they are “tired” of the unrecognized status of the region and a desire for freedom of speech. When asked about what problems they face in their lives, the most common response was “the unrecognized status of the Transnistria region” which was selected by 38% of the respondents. That beat out “low salaries / low pensions” which came in at 37.5%. Both numbers rose since 2025.

Polling, journalism and freedom of expression are prohibited in Transnistria so these numbers come with some caveats. The study was conducted via an online survey which was “cross-checked” via a series of focus groups. The authors stress that these results are unweighted and that as such “the opinion of women and young people in the region is under-represented.”

Even with these caveats, the study shows real movement over time and attests to a directional change in the region in favor of Moldova and against Moscow.

5 More Transnistrian “Officials” Lose Their Moldovan Citizenship

President Sandu stripped 5 people resident in Transnistria of their citizenship. No official reason was published, but Zona de Securitate reports that they are employees of the MGB (former KGB).

This is the latest in a series of such moves to strip regional “officials” involved in human rights abuses of their Moldovan passports. Former Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Alexandru Flenchea recently speculated that these moves are the proximate cause of Russia’s recent threats against Moldova - including offers of expedited Russian citizenship and threats of military force. He stated:

“Here Moscow probably doesn’t fully understand what Chisinau is after by withdrawing citizenship, because what interests them is the action against the Russian military. Why is Chisinau punishing them? It’s a signal. It’s a signal that Chisinau wants to do what? And because they don’t know exactly what, just in case, they are warning Chisinau through direct threats,”

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• President Sandu attended the GLOBESEC Forum in Prague. There she was presented the GLOBESEC Award for “her commitment to defending democracy under pressure and her role in anchoring Moldova’s future in stability and reforms.”

• Foriegn Minister Mihai Popșoi visited Beijing. In meetings with his counterpart, Minister Popșoi spoke of cooperation in the area of culture and tourism. Specifically, he announced an interest from Chisinau in establishing direct flights to Beijing, and discussed including Moldova on China’s “Approved Destination Status (ADS)” list. Countries on the ADS list are approved destinations for Chinese tourists and Moldova’s inclusion would allow tour agencies to organize group tours to the country2.

• US Senator Mark Kelly traveled to Chisinau and met with President Sandu. They discussed Moldova’s resilience against hybrid attacks and President Sandu thanked the United States for the recent announcement of $8 million dollars of cybersecurity support over the next 4 years.

• Igor Dodon announced that he will travel with a Socialist Party delegation to the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum in June. He made the announcement with Russia’s ambassador delegate posing in front of a photo of Putin. On his way, Dodon stopped in Belarus and met with Alexander Lukashenko who warned Moldova against giving up its sovereignty and turning its back on traditional friends.

Major New Sanctions Against Shor’s A7 Network

This week the UK expanded their Regulation 17A Russia sanctions to crypto-asset exchanges. These new sanctions target a broad array of entities facilitating sanctions evasion and supporting Ilan Shor’s A7 group of companies.

Regulation 17A previously applied to sanctioned banks. It is a powerful tool that blocks indirect transactions as well as direct ones. Previously, sanctions against crypto operations only covered direct counterparts, but these new sanctions regulate backwards and forwards assurance as well. Effectively, if funds have ever interacted with a sanctioned entity they remain sanctioned no matter who has them now. The UK is the first country to bring these banking style sanctions into the crypto space.

The most prominent entity that was immediately hit with these sanctions is the crypto exchange HTX. The designation stated:

“The Secretary of State considers that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that HUOBI GLOBAL SA is or has been involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia by providing financial services, or making available funds, economic resources, goods or technology, to a person, namely A7 LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, which is carrying on business in a sector of strategic significance to the Government of Russia.”

HTX distanced itself from Huobi Global S.A. claiming that the Seychelles based exchange was a distinct entity3.

HTX is one of the largest crypto exchanges in the world with trading volumes surpassing $3.3 billion last year. It is reported to be owned by Chinese crypto-billionaire Justin Sun. The American SEC had previously investigated Sun and his TRON blockchain over allegations of selling unregistered securities, “wash trading,” and market manipulation. They further were investigating allegations of sanctions violations and terrorist financing including Hamas. Sun was previously reported to be avoiding travel to the US for fear of arrest.

In late 2024 Justin Sun invested $75 million into Donald Trump’s World Liberty Financial and soon after all these investigations were dropped. He is now suing World Liberty Financial claiming “extortion” and they have sued him as well.

Other Shor / Hybrid War News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• Former Bashkan Eugenia Gutsul released an e-book from prison. The book is allegedly comprised of 30 letters she wrote from prison alleging political persecution, complaining about her conditions and more. Titled “The Gutsul Case: Anatomy of Political Persecution” the book got quite a rollout with a special website and downloads in English, Turkish and Russian4.

• The Court of Appeal upheld Gutsul’s conviction. While her lawyers promise to appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, this effectively confirms her 7 year prison sentence. Gutsul will be transferred from Prison 13 to a women’s penitentiary to continue serving her sentence.

Politics and News

Here are the top political stories of the week:

• Local Public Administration (LPA) reform is progressing. 608 decisions on voluntary mergers have been made as local councils respond to the government’s proposed financial incentives. President Sandu put out a statement on the process encouraging all communities to have an open discussion on the issue and consider mergers. She stated:

“The reform has been put aside for too many years because it is extremely complicated and does not bring either votes or applause. But postponing the reform means depriving our villages of the chance to develop. 87% of the municipalities in Moldova have under 3,000 inhabitants. If we compare the average population per municipality, in Moldova it is 17 times smaller than in Lithuania, for example. Large municipalities are stronger and have the capacity and resources to provide better services to people.“ (...)

“We want developed localities and encourage city halls to unite. The government announced that it will offer three times more money than previously: 3,000 lei for each inhabitant, multiplied by the total number of inhabitants, for localities that voluntarily unite their administrations. The village and local identity are preserved, only the administrations unite ,”

• Mayor Ceban put on a show in parliament. Chisinau’s mayor entered parliament while in session with the apparent goal of making statements protesting LPA reform. After some heated words he attempted to speak from the parliamentary rostrum and was removed after a scuffle with security.

• Moldova will create emergency fuel stockpiles. The parliament passed this law in the first reading. It would mandate fuel stocks of 61 days of consumption of 90 days of net imports. Storage responsibility would be split between a government created or designated “Central Storage Entity” and private sector importers. The law was motivated by the current global oil crisis and aligns Moldova with EU norms.

• Parliament will reduce taxes on renewable energy infrastructure. Customs duties will be dropped to zero for wind turbines (previously 8%) and energy storage (previously 5%). VAT on these imports will still be paid but can be deferred for up to 20 months. These moves follow similar actions for solar panels that are already in effect5. In 2026 Moldova has become a net exporter of renewable energy and storage is now the main need in the sector.

Economics and Infrastructure

Here are the top economic stories of the week:

• The National Bank nor projects 8.1% inflation in 2026. In their announcement they call this “a significant increase compared to the initial forecast, before the conflict in Iran, of approximately 4.7%.” GDP growth is now projected at 2% for the year.

Ending on a High Note

This week the film Fjord won the Palme d’Or trophy at 79th Cannes Film Festival. The film starred Sebastian Stan and was directed by Cristian Mungiu, a Romanian director with Moldovan roots. 15 year old Moldovan actress Vanessa Ceban also played a leading role.

The film explores how a Romanian-Norwegian couple with 5 children adapts to life in an isolated coastal town in Norway.

President Sandu issued her congratulations writing:

“It’s a great joy to see a world-renowned director with Moldovan roots, whose originality and talent create memorable films that touch and inspire audiences across the continent. Mungiu’s films are, above all, a discussion about the values ​​that define us as a society. It is his ability to honestly and boldly raise crucial issues that has once again earned him recognition on the world’s highest filmmaking stage,”

Since Moldova (and the EU) collectively exhaled following the victory of pro-EU parties in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, there’s one question I get more than any other, and it goes something like this “Moldova / Maia Sandu keep talking about joining the EU by 2030, do you think they really mean it?” or “that’s not realistic right?” or “what happens if reality doesn’t match this rhetoric?”

To be clear, these questions are not coming from Moldovans but from citizens of EU countries - some diplomats, some journalists, some analysts and some working for INGOs.

Since I get this question many times each week I thought it was time to share my thoughts here. This article is in the “Perspective” section and is therefore best understood as my opinion and analysis of the situation. I believe it is an informed one, but while I may characterize how different parties view the big questions at hand I want to stress that I’m sharing my analysis and not speaking for anyone else.

We’ll first look briefly at a recent letter from Chancellor Merz on a new enlargement mechanism and then dive into how these statements and approaches are driven by very different analysis of the current geopolitical situation.

Merz’s Letter

Last week German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sent a letter to EU leaders advocating for a new approach to EU enlargement with regard to Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans. The letter promptly leaked and brought the debate about EU enlargement into the foreground.

In his letter, Chancellor Merz calls EU enlargement a “geopolitical necessity” and starts from the premise that “We want Ukraine to become a full member of the European Union.” He writes that the process is much too long and that “I am convinced that we need a new dynamic for Ukraine as well as for the Western Balkans and Moldova.”

Justifying the need for a new dynamic he writes:

“It is obvious that we will not be able to complete the accession process shortly, given the countless hurdles as well as the political complexities of ratification processes in various Member States1. However, with a view to the peace process, we do not have time for further delays. It is now time to boldly move on with Ukraine’s EU integration through innovative solutions as immediate Steps forward.”

In reality, the letter argues for more of an EU-shuffle: some steps forward, a few steps sideways and some backwards. This comes in the form of a new idea called “associate membership” which Merz advocates for Ukraine. Here’s how it would look:

• Immediate opening of all negotiating clusters with Ukraine

• Participation in EU institutions as an observer without voting rights - including the European Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, etc.

• Full member state commitment to Article 42 security guarantees

• Step by step application of the EU Acquis and EU budget framework

• Snap back mechanism to withdraw privileges in case of backsliding

Chancellor Merz advocates for this political arrangement for 2 primary reasons:

1. Ease of implementation, he writes: “It would not require the ratification of the Accession Treaty according to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union nor any Treaty changes, but merely a strong political agreement.”

2. Wartime necessity, he writes that “It will help facilitate the ongoing peace talks as part of a negotiated peace solution.”

What About Moldova?

In this letter Moldova is vaguely lumped in with the other candidate countries, specifically those in the Western Balkans, with a promise for future work to accelerate the accession process. This would de facto separate Moldova and Ukraine by placing Moldova in the traditional slow-lane while creating a new kind of waiting room for Ukraine2.

Ukrainian President Zelenskyy immediately rejected the formulation writing on X: “There can be no complete European project without Ukraine, and Ukraine’s place in the European Union must also be complete - full and equal.” He later sent a letter to EU leaders emphasizing that Ukraine is pushing forward on reforms and writing:

“We are defending ​Europe - fully, not partially, and not with half-measures,” (…) “It would be unfair for ​Ukraine to be present in the European Union but remain voiceless,”

Asked about Merz’s letter at the GLOBESEC Conference, President Sandu responded more cautiously saying:

“We see that this is a proposal and we are following the discussion. I am not against gradual integration as long as it does not substitute full membership. At the moment, the Republic of Moldova is following the process for full membership, and our commitment is to prepare the country by 2030. We are ready to discuss these ideas, but the ultimate goal is full membership. We hope that this proposal will not delay the process and will not substitute the concept of full membership,”

“Don’t rush” vs “What are we waiting for!?”

This letter is only the latest attempt by EU leaders to find some shortcut or geopolitical fudge to figure out how enlargement can work. It follows European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos’ recent “reverse enlargement” idea - basically Moldova and Ukraine join the EU now but gain both rights and responsibilities piecemeal as negotiations conclude and reforms are done. This formula is favored by Ukraine but was rejected by a number of member states.

That fact, as well as the plain language of Merz’s letter show us what the real problem is - some EU members are just not sure whether or not they want Moldova and Ukraine at all (not to mention the other candidates). Diplomatically this is usually hidden behind 3 official “concerns”

1. Security - how can Ukraine join the EU while at war? how can Moldova join without reintegrating Transnistria? etc.

2. Reforms - the process of joining the EU is really long! Moldova and Ukraine simply aren’t ready.

3. Viktor Orban - “we all want enlargement but Orban is blocking it” etc

It has become quite clear that these are just excuses. Not that the concerns aren’t real - but they aren’t the core problem. Chancellor Merz proposes Article 42 security guarantees without membership and before the war ends. Reverse enlargement takes care of worries about reforms not happening. Viktor Orban is gone.

Why are we stuck still? why are no negotiating clusters open?

Meanwhile, Moldova and Ukraine are barreling full speed towards 2030. Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration Cristina Gherasimov recently announced progress on clusters 4 & 5 in Brussels. Even while negotiations are not officially open, Moldova is working through the process with EU institutions unofficially. Both Moldova and Ukraine are very set on that 2030 timeline.

How can we understand these conflicting approaches?

Read more

On May 13 a drone entered Moldova near Sauca at 4 pm and flew the length of the country before exiting into Romanian airspace approximately 1 hour later. The drone was spotted and filmed by residents in Balti and in other towns as it flew over. The country’s airspace was temporarily closed while the Army tracked the drone on radar for portions of its flight.

This is now the most extensively tracked and by far the longest drone flight over Moldova of the war. Video filmed from the ground appears to show a Shahed 131 / Geran-1 drone. This model is a kamikaze attack drone that is normally fitted with a warhead, not a model typically used as a decoy.

Moldova’s limited air defense constrain the country’s options for response, but we have recently seen how different countries are approaching drone incursions in very different ways. As we’ve written before, Romania has opted to observe drones and send alerts to people on the ground - but not to shoot them down. This week, a Romanian fighter jet with NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission shot down a Ukrainian drone that went off course over Estonia. In Lithuania, a drone entered the airspace from Belarus and headed towards Vilnius - this resulted in the evacuation of the president, prime minister and parliament to bunkers as well as widespread alerts for people to seek shelter.

This drone flight in Moldova, which passed over major population centers, has highlighted Moldova’s passive response - where the army confirms after the fact whether (or not) they detected it at all.

Putin, Russian Citizens and Transnistria

On May 14 the Russian Duma passed a bill giving Putin the right to invade foreign countries to protect Russian citizens abroad. According to the Kyiv Independent, this bill allows for military intervention “where Russian citizens face arrest, detention, trial or other perceived persecution by foreign nations and international courts.”

On May 16, Vladimir Putin signed a decree simplifying the process of obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of Transnistria. The proximity of the 2 events led to much online chatter and speculation about potential military intervention in Moldova.

Responding to the news President Sandu said that “they probably need more people to send to the war in Ukraine,” and noted that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has led to a surge in Transnistrian residents applying for Moldovan citizenship - not Russian.

Valeriu Pasa of Watchdog wrote an excellent analysis of these events as a hybrid action utilizing reflexive control. He noted that the law in question already existed, but previously Putin would have needed approval from Russia’s Federation Council - as if they would have denied it to him. He also noted that anyone and everyone in Transnistria who wanted Russian citizenship got it long ago. The process did not need to be simplified, it was nearly universal before. Finally, Pasa noted that Putin would attack Moldova if he had the opportunity, but that…

“Moldova is protected today not because it “does not frustrate the bear”, but because the Ukrainians shed their blood so as not to let the Russians go any further.”

The purpose of these stories is therefore to create fear. Fear in Moldova of Russian attack. Fear in Armenia ahead of their elections (where this story was amplified as well), fear in Europe to dissuade countries of accepting Moldova into the EU. Russia’s “press” and troll farms amplified the story, then the Western Press spread it uncritically1. That’s reflexive control.

Other Security, Transnistria & Hybrid War News

Here’s a roundup of the other top security stories of the week:

• Austria expels Russian diplomats over rooftop antennas presumed to be used for spying. Euronews reports an investigation showing a growing network of electronic installations on the roofs of Russian diplomatic posts across Europe. This mirrors a story covered by Moldova Matters in 2023 about Russia’s spies and antennas in Chisinau - proving once again that hybrid operations that are tested in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and elsewhere ultimately are brought to EU countries.

• Transnistria has created a “Together” Social Support Fund and is gathering donations to pay salaries and pensions and to fund social services. This was reported by Zona de Securitate who note that funds here will not only pay pensions - but also the salaries of soldiers and the security services. Sheriff Holding quickly contributed 100 million Transnistrian rubbles (around €5 million euros) to the fund. At the same time the region extended their Economic State of Emergency another month.

• Mass disinformation campaign about an alleged scheme to “replace the Moldovan people” with 300,000 foreigners. The campaign alleges that Moldova plans to import these foreigners, called “uncontrolled criminals” from Asia, and give them free food and housing. It was amplified by disgraced journalist Natalia Morari as well as pro-Russian politicians like Irina Vlah and Victoria Furtuna. The “great replacement” themed campaign had a clear racial tinge as Morari and others spoke about how South Asians with large families will become the majority in only 8 years. The Russian campaign appears to have been launched opportunistically based on recent comments by Minister of Economy Eugeniu Osmochescu who stated that Moldova needs an additional 300,000 active workers in order to reach EU productivity levels. He did mention targeted immigration in these comments, but mostly focused on the need to mobilize workers from the approximately 1 million people in Moldova (largely aged 25 - 45) who are not officially employed2.

• The Matryoshka network and other election interference tools tested in Moldova have been deployed against Armenia. Russian propaganda stresses that a re-election of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will mean war. The campaign of interference includes operations very similar to those used in Moldova - but more of them. This campaign began 243 days before the elections and has saturated Armenia’s information space for most of the last year.

• Armenia’s “fact investigation platform” fip reported details on Russia’s hybrid campaigns across Europe. fip’s reporting was based on a document dump, presumably hacked and released to them3, detailing operations within Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA). This Orwellian sounding agency is responsible for Russia’s external propaganda and disinformation operations as well as active kinetic hybrid attacks and operates under First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of Russia, Sergei Kiriyenko. fip’s investigation is worth reading in full as it details past and future operations against Armenia, France, Ukraine, Germany, Moldova, Finland and Norway. The report found that disinformation targeting EU countries was meant to dissuade leadership and the public at large from accepting Moldova and Ukraine into the bloc. fip wrote that “Significant efforts were made to discredit Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan, and Moldovan President Sandu.” The report also produced text messages where former Romanian MP Sebastian Ghiță negotiated with Kremlin handlers fees for information operations that his network of TV channels could conduct in order to discredit Maia Sandu and PAS. The apparent Kremlin agent is wanted in Romania on numerous corruption related charges and is currently a fugitive in Serbia.

President Sandu Awarded the “European Order of Merit”

Established in May 2025 on the 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration, the European Order of Merit recognizes people for their “significant contribution to European integration and the promotion of EU values.” President Sandu was picked among the first group of recipients and received the award in Strasbourg this week.

Speaking in Strasbourg, President Sandu stated:

“Thank you for the European Order of Merit. Receiving it alongside leaders who have shaped this continent, built on the idea that Europeans are stronger together, is an honor.”

But if we are to measure merit, then this distinction belongs to the people of Moldova. They are the ones who earned it. For three decades, Moldovans have built their European future, overcoming a difficult economic transition, taking to the streets when democracy was in danger, resisting when oligarchs tried to conquer the state, and voting for Europe again and again in the face of Russian threats and blackmail. This is merit.”

She went on to speak of the merit of Moldova’s civil servants, journalists, police, engineers, policymakers, entrepreneurs and judges who are leading the country’s “dramatic shift towards Europe” and fighting for the nation’s democratic resilience in the face of Russian pressure.

The European Order of Merit is given in 3 classes - Distinguished Members, Honourable Members and Members. In 2026 Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Angela Merkel were among the Distinguished Members, President Sandu was among the Honourable Members and humanitarian José Andrés among the Members.

Heckling and Standing Ovations

Cristian Rizea was removed from the hall by security after yelling “Maia Sandu is a dictator” during her speech. Except for this notable interruption, President Sandu got a standing ovation at the event.

So who is Cristian Rizea? At this event he claimed to be a Romanian journalist and apparently was accredited as such. He is not a journalist and his accreditation does not reflect well on the European Parliament. Rizea is a criminal, conspiracist and buffoonish attention seeker. He was indicted for a spectacular array of corruption offenses in Romania dating from his brief stint as an MP there. He then fled to Moldova and managed to resist extradition for some years before being expelled from the country in 2023 and placed in jail. Apparently he was let out on house arrest last summer and is back to his old games.

Back in 2021 I wrote an article explaining my editorial choices and what makes the cut for Moldova Matters and what doesn’t. I focused a whole section of that article on Rizea as an example of news that was often hilarious but not really important. The personality type that combines kleptomania with the desperate need to always be on TV is bound to create spectacle. This time he managed to actually make the cut thanks to the apparently lax security at the European Parliament.

Inconclusive Local Elections

On May 17 Taraclia and Orhei had early local elections for mayor. Both towns’ mayors were part of the Shor network and resigned in December when Ilan Shor announced that he was withdrawing his projects and candidate support in Moldova. In Orhei the Supreme Court of Justice issued a last minute ruling upholding the Central Election Commission’s (CEC)’s decision to remove PPDA candidate Victor Perțu from the ballot. The CEC had found that Perțu remained part of the Shor network and sought to camouflage this by moving to PPDA.

Neither race was conclusive and both will move to a runoff election. In Taraclia independent candidate Alexandr Borimecicov (31% first round vote) will face off against Socialist Ecaterina Iacobceac (28%). The PAS candidate came in 3rd with 15%. Leading candidate Alexandr Borimecicov has reported almost zero campaign financing - either income or expenses. At the same time he is running a number of paid facebook ad campaigns promoting his campaign promise to pay for just about every problem the city faces with unspecified external grant funding.

In Orhei, independent candidate Ramiz Ansarov (23.14% first round) will face off against Sergiu Aga (19.53%) of the League of Cities and Communes. Sergiu Aga is a Priest who is well known for blending civic and spiritual pursuits. He currently runs a “Christian Philanthropy” organization, serves as a municipal counselor and as a district counselor.

We’ll come back with updates on these elections and what the results say about how these 2 primary seats of the Shor network’s political power are (or aren’t) moving on.

Other Politics & News

Here’s a roundup of the other top political stories of the week:

• Moldova hosted the 135th Ministerial Session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Chisinau gathering brought together 50 delegations from member states as well as 20 foreign ministers. It marked the conclusion of Moldova’s rotating presidency of the Committee of Ministers. At the event, 34 member states, including Moldova, backed an agreement on the creation of a “Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.” President Sandu spoke at the event saying that “Russia is the most pressing and severe threat to the security of our continent today and, probably, for the coming decades.”

• Scandal around a shooting at an army base in Cahul. Initial reports stated that a 20 year old contract soldier improperly handling a Glock pistol shot an 18 year old contract soldier and that a 16 year old who was visiting the 18 year old subsequently died of cardiac arrest. Later it was found that the 16 year old had also been shot with the same bullet and died of the gunshot wound. The shooter is in detention and multiple investigations have been launched. Parliament held closed door meetings on the tragedy and later announced that the soldier broke protocol by bringing the gun into a visitor area and showing it off. They also established that paramedics did not realize the 16 year old was shot because the bullet entered “through the aorta, then into the heart” in such as way as to cause minimal external bleeding. Opposition politicians have called for the Minister of Defense to resign (he won’t), though Renato Usatii has called for more concrete reforms to procedure (such as locking gun lockers when entering visitor areas). He also visited the shooter in prison and shared the story of how shattered he is.

• PAS turns 10. Maia Sandu and a small team founded the PAS party on May 15 2016. On the 10th anniversary she wrote:

“10 years of resilience and action! On May 15, 2016, the PAS founding congress took place, and we had no idea then how difficult this path would be. But we were united by a strong hope that Moldova could overcome the darkness. When we founded the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), we had a simple, yet at the time, nearly impossible, goal: to free the country from the corrupt group that had subjugated Moldova, ruled through terror, and completely isolated us from the world. We managed to do it together,”

• Commander Butcher sentenced to 15 years in prison. The NYTimes reports that Neo-Nazi Michail Chkhikvishvili was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his plot to kill Jewish children in NY using poisoned candy. Recall, Michail Chkhikvishvili aka “Commander Butcher” of the Neo-Nazi terror organization the “Cult of Maniac Killers” was arrested in Chisinau in July 2024 after a joint American-Moldovan operation. The activities of his and related groups were later covered by a joint investigation of the Washington Post, Wired, Recorder (Romania) and Der Spiegel (Germany). It’s dark reading and we still have no idea why he was in Chisinau.

• The IMF released updated forecasts for Moldova showing inflation and slowing growth. They now project 8.1% inflation in 2026 and economic growth slowing to 1.5% of GDP. Their final calculations for 2025 showed 7.8% inflation and 2.4% growth. The IMF notes that the downturn of indicators is completely due to the war in Iran and that the situation could become worse depending on how long the crisis carries on.

Ending on a High Note

Literally a high note since we’re talking about Eurovision! Moldova’s Satoshi placed 8th in the Grand Final and was praised for a fun and upbeat song and performance.

Unfortunately, the whole affair landed with a fairly mixed note in Moldova. While the public vote in Moldova awarded the most points to Romania, the national jury gave top points to Poland and Israel. They only gave 3 points to Romania and 0 to Ukraine.

This situation has created a HUGE scandal in Moldova. Former government spokesman Daniel Vodă explained saying that “the jury from the Republic of Moldova seemed not to understand that Eurovision is also a geopolitical contest, not just a musical one.” He went on to explain the scandal saying:

“The problem is that the jury results appear first. And the initial impression was an unfair one: that the Republic of Moldova had turned its back on Romania. That is false. The public voted for Romania. The public saved its honor ,”

Traditionally neighboring countries often support each other and both Romania and Ukraine gave high points to Moldova from their juries. The Romanian Embassy was forced to respond noting no serious damage to diplomatic relations because the “audience’s sincere support speaks louder than any assessment [jury score].”

The scandal did not stay contained online as PAS MP Dinu Plângău called for the resignation of the management of Teleradio-Moldova. The state company did not itself control the jury votes but did organize the jury. Shortly after sitting MPs joined the online calls, Vlad Ţurcanu, CEO of Teleradio-Moldova, resigned. In a statement he noted that his team did not control the jury decision but that he took responsibility as the director of the organization.

Eurovision is no stranger to political controversy, but this is an unusual level of mess. The whole thing made it into the NYTimes as an example of how politics has consumed a song contest. So Moldova looks bad here on both ends - through the “scandal” of the jury vote itself and through the fairly hysterical reaction.

Oh well, the song was fun. Congrats to Bulgaria for their first Eurovision win!!

Today we’re going to unpack what we know so far and look at where this political crisis might be heading.

Who is Irina Gutnic?

Until last week, Irina Gutnic was among the most senior members of Ion Ceban’s City Hall administration and the MAN political party. In October 2022 Mayor Ceban asked Gutnic to join his administration as Deputy Mayor. At that time, Irina Gutnic had just 4 months before become the director of Apă-Canal Chisinau - the capital’s water and sewage utility. She accepted the job as Deputy Mayor but chose not to officially leave Apă-Canal and instead suspended her activity there. This means that she remained the director on paper and had the right to return to her position later.

Her appointment as Deputy Mayor was blocked twice by the municipal council before she was appointed by mayoral order in order to bypass the councilor’s objections. Some in Mayor Ceban’s Socialist Party1 had opposed her appointment, but Councilor Eugenia Ceban, Ion Ceban’s Mother, had rallied support for her. Since becoming Deputy Mayor Irina Gutnic has appeared alongside Mayor Ceban, often seated at his right hand, at nearly all the public events he attends.

While Gutnic’s exact portfolio at City Hall was never publicly defined, her past and recent statements imply that she was heavily involved in administrative coordination, questions around procurement, management of municipal enterprises, emergency commission matters and more. In short she played a major behind-the-scenes role in Mayor Ceban’s administration.

In addition to her job in City Hall, Irina Gutnic was also the leader of the MAN party’s Chisinau territorial organization. For most political parties, the head of the Chisinau territorial organization would be among the most senior. For MAN this is even more true as Chisinau is by far their most important region of support.

In December 2025 TV8’s show “Black Box” reported an investigation into her clothing, wealth and lifestyle. In their exhaustive reporting they identified luxury clothes and shoes owned by the Deputy Mayor worth well over 1 million lei. They also noted the string of new BMW cars that she has parked at her house and compared all of this to her official salary of 27,000 lei / month.

For her part, Irina Gutnic claims that she lives within her budget, owns no cars but has generous friends and family who lend them to her, and that those €950 shoes or €2500 euro dresses are actually just simple clothes custom made for her by her tailor for mere 100s of lei.

Timeline of Events

Before digging into her specific accusations, it is worth briefly outlining the timeline of events here:

• May 11 - Mayor Ceban dismisses Deputy Mayor Irina Gutnic with no reason given.

• May 12 - Apă-Canal Chisinau convenes an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to terminate her employment there. Apă-Canal Chisinau is structured as a joint stock company that is owned and controlled by the city.

• May 13 - Irina Gutnic gives a press conference with a series of accusations against the mayor casting herself as a whistleblower.

• May 14 - Irina Gutnic submits a complaint to the Anti-Corruption Agency accusing Mayor Ceban of abuse of power in her firing.

• May 14 - Irina Gutnic resigns from the MAN territorial organization.

• May 15 - Irina Gutnic claimed that Ceban’s team tried to intimidate her into resigning on May 11. She claims that they offered her the position at Apă-Canal where “there would be no pressure, no blackmail, and I would just sit quietly there.”

• May 15 - Irina Gutnic gave an extended interview to “Black Box” on TV8 with further accusations against Mayor Ceban.

• May 18 - Mayor Ceban begins making vague claims that this is all a “coup attempt” organized by PAS

• May 19 - Irina Gutnic gives another press conference, alleging that on May 15th her house was broken into in order to gather information on her. She then stated that on May 18th her facebook account was hacked from multiple devices located in foreign countries. She went on to detail more accusations of wrongdoing against Ceban.

…and she doesn’t appear to be done. This story remains alive and Gutnic has clearly indicated that she has more information to share in the future. So what has she said so far?

Whistleblower(?) Accusations Against the Mayor

Former Deputy Mayor Irina Gutnic has had a lot to say about her former boss since her first press conferences on May 13. At that event, she opened by stating that she does “not know exactly what the true reasons for my dismissal were,” claiming that she learned of it from the press. She stressed that her firing was illegal because the process of firing a Deputy Mayor goes through the municipal council. At the same time, Gutnic stated that she offered to resign in January but her resignation was not accepted.

“The decision to go public was not an easy one, but it is an inevitable one, given the decision of the general mayor.”

In her statement she claimed that she would sue over her wrongful termination, not to get her job back but to uphold the law.

Author’s Note: Already there is a lot going on here so look to the footnotes in this section for some analysis starting here2.

Here are some of the claims that Gutnic has made about Mayor Ceban:

• “The “Alternativa” bloc is a camouflaged project.” She claimed that many in the MAN party are sincerely pro-EU and that they were blindsided when Ceban chose to form the Alternative Bloc with obviously pro-Russian political forces. Gutnic claimed that MAN party members were not consulted and that Ceban’s unilateral decisions caused confusion and disillusionment.

• Chisinau City Hall is politicized to support Ceban and the MAN party. “Employees are politically exploited. They are made to work 7 days a week for the personal image of Ion Ceban.” She claimed that City Hall employees, including herself, were sent to campaign for MAN during work hours. She suggested that at times all staff but 1 or 2 people from departments around the city would be sent to campaign - bringing public work to a standstill.

• Ceban funds a network of influencers with public money. Gutnic claims that the anti-PAS anti-Sandu Telegram channel “Casa de Nebuni” (“House of Madmen”) is run by MAN party member Andrei Oțel. And that this channel and others are funded via indirect contracts with the municipal enterprise Autosalubritate (Chisinau’s trash company). She claims to know of 5-7 Telegram channels that are coordinated by City Hall and funded in similar ways. Andrei Oțel denies any connection to this or other Telegram channels. Autosalubritate says it is unaware of such contracts.

• Actions that “go beyond the limits of legality.” Gutnic referenced various actions taken in City Hall that exceeded legal limits or outright broke the law. These allegations are technical and procedural in nature - using non-existent emergency powers to circumvent the city council or other process. The actions taken - road repair, trash removal, etc are not themselves abnormal, but she alleges the process involved abuses.

• Ceban’s connections with Russia. Gutnic referenced Ceban’s Russia connections cryptically saying:

“Regarding relations with the Russian Federation, we will come back with more details, but given Axerov’s [Nidjat Askerov] presence in Chișinău City Hall, things speak for themselves. He appears in the conviction decision of Dan Cuclescu [Denis Cuculescu] in the treason case.”

This statement references Denis Cuculescu’s treason conviction earlier this year. In that trial various witnesses connected him to the FSB and to Nidjat Askerov (subject of a parallel trial) and him to Ceban and Dodon. Gutnic implies that she knows more about this connection as a City Hall insider but does not elaborate3.

Serious Claims, Missing Substance

This is only a sampling of some of the most serious claims that Irina Gutnic has been making. Many claims, such as those about Ceban’s connections to Russia are really teasers - letting people know that she has more to say. Others are simply very personal - she claims that Ceban is a tyrant, that everyone in city hall is terrified of him, that he is a danger to Chisinau and Moldova as a whole, etc.

In Moldova, the public element of political scandals such as this one is usually only the tip of the iceberg. It is possible that Irina Gutnic has a lot to say and simply wants to drag it out over a few news cycles. It is also possible that she is calibrating her statements to cause damage but also imply that she has much more - presumably be in service of negotiating a deal behind the scenes.

We’ll have to wait and see how this plays out.

The Primaria’s Response

Initially Mayor Ceban tried to avoid responding to the accusations saying:

“We are not going to respond to a lady who is angry that she no longer has a position and who came out to vent all this anger in public. I personally announced her resignation.”

At the same time, he also vaguely insinuated that Irina Gutnic was being controlled by outside forces - claiming that she is friends with former PAS party member Andrei Spînu.

By May 18 however the response got more forceful and had a new (if not clearer) narrative. Ceban stated that “They were planning a coup attempt within the Chisinau City Hall” and that “they” apparently is PAS. He stated that this whole thing has been orchestrated to force his resignation and said that Irina Gutnic had been wearing a wire and recording all conversations in the building. He provided no evidence for these statements.

Other MAN party members pushed back as well with MP Gaik Vartanyan downplaying the seniority of her role by saying that she was in no position to be privy to the decisions on creating the Alternative Bloc4.

Chisinau Deputy Mayor Victor Pruteanu highlighted some of the contradictions in her statements saying:

“If things were so bad, then why did she remain silent for so many years? And if she hadn’t been fired, would she have continued to remain silent? Until Monday, Ceban posed no threat to Chisinau, and now suddenly he does?5”

How Significant is All of This?

Very. Ion Ceban’s political project relies on a few key pillars:

1. Technocratic competence - They repair the streets, renovate the sidewalks, reconstruct parks and make sure the buses run on time. Even Mayor Ceban’s sharpest critics usually agree that Chisinau has improved during his terms.

2. Pragmatic pro-EU stances - Ceban and the MAN party claim to support Moldova joining the EU. The “pragmatic” part generally means that they also promise better relations with Russia.

3. Being a safe alternative to PAS - it’s right there in the name “National Alternative Movement” (MAN) and Alternative Bloc.

Parts 2 & 3 of the formula largely unraveled over the course of 2025. Ion Ceban as a pro-EU politician was never believable for close watchers of Moldovan politics. His choice to create the Alternative Bloc with a who’s who of the most well known pro-Russian politicians in Moldova further undermined this claim for anyone paying attention. Though most voters probably never read Alternative’s electoral program6, most seemed not to buy the pro-EU story or that they were a real pro-EU “alternative.” In these areas Irina Gutnic’s allegations show that at least some people within MAN were having their own doubts about the pro-EU direction of the party.

More importantly though, her allegations directly attack point 1 - technocracy and competence. Gutnic paints a picture of a city government fully co-opted to burnish the political image of one man. They campaign for him while taxpayers fund their salaries, close down public services when he needs them to fill out rallies and break the law when he tells them to. Most damaging of all - she alleges that online influencers and channels set up to attack Moldova’s president and government are being paid out of tax revenues meant to support trash pickup. If these allegations are true - in whole or in part - they threaten to shatter Mayor Ceban’s image as a hard working public servant only focused on city problems.

At this stage Irina Gutnic’s allegations are just that. It is possible that they will lead to criminal investigations but so far they are only words. What makes this significant though is Irina Gutnic herself. For whatever reason, a very senior member of both the city hall administration and the MAN party is airing out dirty laundry. Her position and seniority lends credibility to what she alleges, even if her own history and the odd manner of her firing pose serious questions in their own right.

For now, this story is still developing. We’ll check back with updates as they come.

On Tuesday the 14th of April, CFM tested the suitability of Revaca station as an interchange for the airport. The test involved extending the terminus of the Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) train from Kyiv to Chișinău to Revaca, ten kilometers south of Chișinău and transferring 45 Ukrainian passengers from there to the airport by bus. The direct train from Kyiv was relaunched after a hiatus of more than twenty years in 2022 to allow for Ukrainians to reach Chișinău Airport easily. Passenger traffic at the airport has nearly doubled since the war in Ukraine started, and a large proportion of passengers on the Ukrzaliznytsia service travel to Chișinău in order to fly further afield.

The test was proudly published by CFM on its website and Facebook page, with the company planning to make preparations for Revaca to become the permanent terminus of the Kyiv to Chișinău train. CFM say that they have achieved a travel time of just 15 minutes between Chișinău central station and the airport, utilizing the bus connection at Revaca. In a press release, they stated “this integrated solution aims to reduce the time it takes to avoidance of urban congestion and increased comfort for passengers.”

As well as Revaca becoming the terminus for the Kyiv train, CFM also hope to restart a regular suburban service on the Chișinău - Revaca - Sîngera route later this year, with Revaca set to be renamed as ‘Revaca-Airport’ to highlight its status as an interchange for the airport.

The test train on the 14th of April was the first passenger train to call at Revaca since January 2025, when the Chișinău to Bender-3 suburban service was cancelled due to the ‘difficult financial situation’ faced by CFM, which was so severe that the organization delayed paying salaries to employees in 2024 and 2025. Since then, the railway line to Revaca underwent rehabilitation and reconstruction which was completed successfully in November last year. The station at Revaca itself, however, requires significant improvements before regular service can restart, with plans to invest €8.5 million into modernizing the route.

Longer Term Future for CFM: Aligning Moldovan Railways with Europe

The rehabilitation of Revaca station is one of a number of improvements that CFM are making to the network. Despite having just one domestic train service operating now (a return from Ungheni to Chișinău) the organisation is exploring the possibility of purchasing low cost passenger vehicles, called “railbuses”, to operate on regional routes throughout the country including the planned airport shuttle service. If these trains enter service, they will be the first new passenger carriages in use in Moldova since the Soviet era.

European Union funding allocated to CFM has already brought about the rehabilitation of several sections of railway line, particularly those which are vital for goods transport between Ukraine and the European Union. In the future, this funding will be used to rebuild and electrify the mainline from Chișinău to the Romanian Border at Ungheni. The line will be changed from Russian gauge (1524mm) to the standard track gauge (1435mm) used across most of Europe. This will eliminate the need for train carriages to be raised at Ungheni before crossing into Romania, shortening journey times significantly. In order to minimize the impact on existing services, the new track will likely be placed alongside the old Russian-gauge track to allow for service to continue whilst the upgrades take place.

It is planned that this work will also incorporate the section of line to Revaca-Airport, allowing for a 140-160km/h rail service on the route Revaca-Airport - Chișinău - Ungheni - Iași - Bucharest.

Whether Revaca becomes a meaningful improvement or simply a temporary workaround will depend on whether these larger modernization plans materialize - something that remains uncertain given CFM’s ongoing financial challenges.

Hamish Fraser is a journalism postgraduate at Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen, Scotland. He is a guest contributor to Moldova Matters.

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Romania Re-enters Political Crisis

On May 5 Romania’s government collapsed when the Social Democrats (PSD) withdrew from the governing coalition of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and joined George Simion’s AUR party in a vote of no confidence. The collaboration between a center left party like PSD and far-right AUR has caused alarm in Brussels as the “cordon sanitaire” breaks down and cooperation with a far right party brings down a centrist government.

President Nicușor Dan called for calm stating:

“It is not a happy moment in any democracy. However, it is a democratic decision of the parliament. I call for calm. Romania is a stable state, the state institutions are functioning and Romania has a direction that it is following. There is consensus among the pro-Western parties on the major directions of Romania (...)
We will have a government within a reasonable time, I exclude the scenario of early elections and, I emphasize, at the end of the negotiations, we will have a pro-Western government. (…)
“With calm, we will get through this,”

Meanwhile, George Simion declared that AUR is willing to enter government.

Next there will likely be a protracted series of consultations and negotiations as Romania seeks a stable governing majority.

Romanian MEP Siegfried Mureșan, a major voice in support of Moldova in the European Parliament, spoke of how this turn of events could negatively impact Moldova. He noted that if there is a weak prime minister, then there will still be public support but that “bilateral projects will remain on paper and drag on.” On the possibility of the far right entering government, he went on to warn:

“A prime minister who acts like a puppet, calling himself pro-European but dependent on the anti-European PSD-AUR majority, will not enjoy the trust of Europe. This, unfortunately, will also affect the Republic of Moldova. If the prime minister in Bucharest does not have the trust of the EU, he will not be able to achieve results for Moldova. (…) If Romania has a prime minister who lacks trust, that will be bad news for Moldova as well,”

In April last year I took stock of what challenges Moldova could face if George Simion or AUR came to power in Romania. Here’s a link to that article:

International Affairs News

Here’s a roundup of the other top international affairs stories of the week:

• President Sandu attended the European Political Community (EPC) Summit in Yerevan. President Sandu traveled to the event with Romanian President Nicușor Dan and in addition to the summit and bilateral meetings met with leaders of EU countries on the topic of Moldova’s accession. This meeting included Nicușor Dan, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian PM Giorgia Meloni, British PM Keir Starmer, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and others. While no official readout was given, Romanian President Dan later stated that they anticipate an answer by the end of June on opening negotiating clusters with Moldova. The delay comes as EU leaders discuss Ukraine’s EU bid with Hungary’s new government.

• More talk of Union with Romania - in the foreign press. In an interview with Le Monde, President Sandu reiterated her past comments on The Rest is Politics Podcast that joining with Romania would be a faster way to enter the EU. She went on to note that there is no public consensus for this, citing 40% support in Moldova1. Romanian President Nicușor Dan was asked about these comments while on a visit to Croatia and replied citing a 2018 vote in Romania’s parliament that indicated openness to union if Moldova wanted it. Also this week, a recent poll showed that 7 in 10 Romanians would support union with Moldova.

• Moldovan Flag Day celebrated in Chicago. Moldova’s flag was raised in the heart of Chicago as the country’s new consulate celebrated the April 27 holiday with State Senators, county officials and members of the diaspora. The event celebrated Moldova’s connections to the local community and the growing and successful diaspora in the United States writ large.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top politics news of the week:

• Parliament votes a new governing regulation in the first reading. The law restructures parliamentary procedure with a few notable changes. Firstly, it seeks to lock in the political configuration of parliament by cracking down on “political tourism.” MPs who leave their parliamentary faction would no longer be allowed to join a new faction or represent a party that was not elected to parliament in the last election. This does not prevent MPs from leaving their party, but makes it harder to consolidate new groupings as became common in the Plahotniuc era2. The draft regulation also defines Romanian as the working language of parliament and would stop the default translation of legislative projects into Russian - leaving translations as an option “when appropriate.” Opposition MPs claimed that this would prevent them from speaking Russian in parliament (it wouldn’t under the draft law) and walked out in protest. The draft regulation would also allocate schedule time to the opposition every 6th week in an “opposition day” where factions in opposition or independent MPs could add items to the agenda.

• Parliament introduced legislation to impose oversight on the Commission for Emergency Situations (CSE) and update the definition of states of emergency. Under the draft legislation, Parliament’s Committee on National Security, Defense and Public Order will be able to examine “at any time the executive orders issued by the CSE during crisis situations.” They could then submit reports to parliament which would be able to modify or overturn these emergency government decisions. The draft legislation requires the government to submit a report to parliament at the conclusion of a state of emergency detailing actions taken under emergency powers and their impact. Finally, the law would make the declaration of a state of emergency more flexible by giving the government the option of declaring one with a duration 30 to 90 days. Currently, states of emergency are fixed at 60 days.

• Alexandru Machidon3 was sworn in a Prosecutor General. He had been acting Prosecutor General since May 2025 and took office officially on April 30 after passing the vetting commission and getting support from the Superior Council of Prosecutors.

• Moldova will lift import duties on a range of American products. 59 MPs voted for the law in the second reading which would exempt most industrial products while retaining protective duties for some agricultural products such as “beef, pork and poultry meat, milk and dairy products, as well as sugar and sugar products.” The stated goal of the legislation is to maintain Moldova’s new 10% tariff rate and “reciprocate” the US lowering tariffs from 25%. As usual with “Liberation Day” none of this is what it seems but I’ll leave that for a footnote4.

• Anti-Corruption prosecutors have announced their decision to appeal the sentence against Vladimir Plahotniuc. They will again seek a 25 year sentence saying that “the punishment imposed does not reflect the seriousness of the acts.” Plahotniuc was previously sentenced to 19 years in prison and is himself appealing.

• Moldova’s Association of Independent Press (API) reported 97 attacks against journalists in 2025. This is the highest number since 2017 and includes bullying, intimidation, hacking of accounts and other threats - both online and offline. Most serious were 12 physical attacks and death threats. Last week we wrote about the strength of Moldova’s independent press… but also the challenges it faces. If you missed it, you can find that article here:

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PPDA and Shor?

Democracy at Home (PPDA)’s candidate for the Orhei Mayor’s election, Victor Perțu, was removed from the race by the Central Election Commission (CEC) for being part of a “camouflaged bloc.” The CEC noted that Victor Perțu was a member of the Shor Party and remained active in the Shor network after the party was declared unconstitutional. Their decision cited an overlap between the Shor network and PPDA and found that Shor candidates were seeking office under a new flag.

This decision provoked outrage among the opposition, including Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban and Igor Dodon who called the decision political and evidence of a “captured state.” The CEC decision was overturned by the Orhei Court - though the CEC will appeal the decision.

ZdG has made a deep study of events held by Victor Perțu with PPDA leader Vasile Costiuc and found that numerous Shor Party elected officials, activists, defendants in cases of electoral corruption and defendants in cases related to illicit financing and paid protesting, are all present at these events. PPDA claims that the events are open and anyone can come. The story from ZdG is too long to detail here, but is worth reading for those interested.

We’ll be keeping an eye on links between the Shor network and PPDA in the context of this year’s local elections.

Economics & Infrastructure (& Iran)

Here’s a roundup of the top economics / infrastructure / Iran crisis news of the week:

• Fuel prices remain volatile. While diesel prices have begun to fall gasoline prices remain high following the protracted uncertainty of the American-Israeli war against Iran. Compared to pre-war prices diesel is 44.58% more expensive while gasoline is 28.98% more expensive. On May 1 Chisinau increased public transport prices by 17% due to “the current situation of practically doubling the cost of fuel.”

• The Ministry of Finance says food prices increases are “inevitable” due to the global oil crisis. The Ministry said that the government will not look for short term populist solutions but will take “very targeted” actions including support for agriculture via tax refunds and potential support for inter city transit.

• The National Bank (NBM) has increased the base rate from 5% to 6.5%. This was done “out of the need to configure monetary policy in a way that would mitigate pressures on the inflationary process.” NBM now projects annual inflation in 2026 to hit 7%.

• De minimis tax exemptions will end October 1. The Ministry of Finance announced this date when the €150 euro tax free package import regime will be eliminated. In 2025 Moldovans received approximately 10 million packages from Temu, Joom, Aliexpress and others.

• Moldovan Railways are solvent again. Minister of Infrastructure Vladimir Bolea announced that all employees had been fully repaid wage arrears and that the company had eliminated its historical debts by the end of April.

Ending on a High Note

On May 7 the Moldovan pavilion at the 61st Venice Biennale officially opened. The Biennale is an international art and culture exhibition hosted every 2 years in Venice Italy since 18955. This marks the first time Moldova has participated in this event - sometimes called the Olympics of the art world. Moldova’s Minister of Culture Cristian Jardan called the country’s participation in the event a “significant moment for the country's cultural diplomacy.”

Moldova’s exhibit, titled “On the Thousand and Second Night” was created by artist Pavel Brăila and consists of numerous traditional carpets floating between the floor and ceiling supported by drones. It is described as “neither a refuge nor an escape from the ongoing war on life, but a way of making evident the power of imagining other possible exits.”

The exhibit is open to the public and can be visited until November 22, 2026. You can find more information on the official website here.