On Tuesday the 14th of April, CFM tested the suitability of Revaca station as an interchange for the airport. The test involved extending the terminus of the Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) train from Kyiv to Chișinău to Revaca, ten kilometers south of Chișinău and transferring 45 Ukrainian passengers from there to the airport by bus. The direct train from Kyiv was relaunched after a hiatus of more than twenty years in 2022 to allow for Ukrainians to reach Chișinău Airport easily. Passenger traffic at the airport has nearly doubled since the war in Ukraine started, and a large proportion of passengers on the Ukrzaliznytsia service travel to Chișinău in order to fly further afield.

The test was proudly published by CFM on its website and Facebook page, with the company planning to make preparations for Revaca to become the permanent terminus of the Kyiv to Chișinău train. CFM say that they have achieved a travel time of just 15 minutes between Chișinău central station and the airport, utilizing the bus connection at Revaca. In a press release, they stated “this integrated solution aims to reduce the time it takes to avoidance of urban congestion and increased comfort for passengers.”

As well as Revaca becoming the terminus for the Kyiv train, CFM also hope to restart a regular suburban service on the Chișinău - Revaca - Sîngera route later this year, with Revaca set to be renamed as ‘Revaca-Airport’ to highlight its status as an interchange for the airport.

The test train on the 14th of April was the first passenger train to call at Revaca since January 2025, when the Chișinău to Bender-3 suburban service was cancelled due to the ‘difficult financial situation’ faced by CFM, which was so severe that the organization delayed paying salaries to employees in 2024 and 2025. Since then, the railway line to Revaca underwent rehabilitation and reconstruction which was completed successfully in November last year. The station at Revaca itself, however, requires significant improvements before regular service can restart, with plans to invest €8.5 million into modernizing the route.

Longer Term Future for CFM: Aligning Moldovan Railways with Europe

The rehabilitation of Revaca station is one of a number of improvements that CFM are making to the network. Despite having just one domestic train service operating now (a return from Ungheni to Chișinău) the organisation is exploring the possibility of purchasing low cost passenger vehicles, called “railbuses”, to operate on regional routes throughout the country including the planned airport shuttle service. If these trains enter service, they will be the first new passenger carriages in use in Moldova since the Soviet era.

European Union funding allocated to CFM has already brought about the rehabilitation of several sections of railway line, particularly those which are vital for goods transport between Ukraine and the European Union. In the future, this funding will be used to rebuild and electrify the mainline from Chișinău to the Romanian Border at Ungheni. The line will be changed from Russian gauge (1524mm) to the standard track gauge (1435mm) used across most of Europe. This will eliminate the need for train carriages to be raised at Ungheni before crossing into Romania, shortening journey times significantly. In order to minimize the impact on existing services, the new track will likely be placed alongside the old Russian-gauge track to allow for service to continue whilst the upgrades take place.

It is planned that this work will also incorporate the section of line to Revaca-Airport, allowing for a 140-160km/h rail service on the route Revaca-Airport - Chișinău - Ungheni - Iași - Bucharest.

Whether Revaca becomes a meaningful improvement or simply a temporary workaround will depend on whether these larger modernization plans materialize - something that remains uncertain given CFM’s ongoing financial challenges.

Hamish Fraser is a journalism postgraduate at Robert Gordon University in Aberdeen, Scotland. He is a guest contributor to Moldova Matters.

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Romania Re-enters Political Crisis

On May 5 Romania’s government collapsed when the Social Democrats (PSD) withdrew from the governing coalition of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and joined George Simion’s AUR party in a vote of no confidence. The collaboration between a center left party like PSD and far-right AUR has caused alarm in Brussels as the “cordon sanitaire” breaks down and cooperation with a far right party brings down a centrist government.

President Nicușor Dan called for calm stating:

“It is not a happy moment in any democracy. However, it is a democratic decision of the parliament. I call for calm. Romania is a stable state, the state institutions are functioning and Romania has a direction that it is following. There is consensus among the pro-Western parties on the major directions of Romania (...)
We will have a government within a reasonable time, I exclude the scenario of early elections and, I emphasize, at the end of the negotiations, we will have a pro-Western government. (…)
“With calm, we will get through this,”

Meanwhile, George Simion declared that AUR is willing to enter government.

Next there will likely be a protracted series of consultations and negotiations as Romania seeks a stable governing majority.

Romanian MEP Siegfried Mureșan, a major voice in support of Moldova in the European Parliament, spoke of how this turn of events could negatively impact Moldova. He noted that if there is a weak prime minister, then there will still be public support but that “bilateral projects will remain on paper and drag on.” On the possibility of the far right entering government, he went on to warn:

“A prime minister who acts like a puppet, calling himself pro-European but dependent on the anti-European PSD-AUR majority, will not enjoy the trust of Europe. This, unfortunately, will also affect the Republic of Moldova. If the prime minister in Bucharest does not have the trust of the EU, he will not be able to achieve results for Moldova. (…) If Romania has a prime minister who lacks trust, that will be bad news for Moldova as well,”

In April last year I took stock of what challenges Moldova could face if George Simion or AUR came to power in Romania. Here’s a link to that article:

International Affairs News

Here’s a roundup of the other top international affairs stories of the week:

• President Sandu attended the European Political Community (EPC) Summit in Yerevan. President Sandu traveled to the event with Romanian President Nicușor Dan and in addition to the summit and bilateral meetings met with leaders of EU countries on the topic of Moldova’s accession. This meeting included Nicușor Dan, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian PM Giorgia Meloni, British PM Keir Starmer, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and others. While no official readout was given, Romanian President Dan later stated that they anticipate an answer by the end of June on opening negotiating clusters with Moldova. The delay comes as EU leaders discuss Ukraine’s EU bid with Hungary’s new government.

• More talk of Union with Romania - in the foreign press. In an interview with Le Monde, President Sandu reiterated her past comments on The Rest is Politics Podcast that joining with Romania would be a faster way to enter the EU. She went on to note that there is no public consensus for this, citing 40% support in Moldova1. Romanian President Nicușor Dan was asked about these comments while on a visit to Croatia and replied citing a 2018 vote in Romania’s parliament that indicated openness to union if Moldova wanted it. Also this week, a recent poll showed that 7 in 10 Romanians would support union with Moldova.

• Moldovan Flag Day celebrated in Chicago. Moldova’s flag was raised in the heart of Chicago as the country’s new consulate celebrated the April 27 holiday with State Senators, county officials and members of the diaspora. The event celebrated Moldova’s connections to the local community and the growing and successful diaspora in the United States writ large.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top politics news of the week:

• Parliament votes a new governing regulation in the first reading. The law restructures parliamentary procedure with a few notable changes. Firstly, it seeks to lock in the political configuration of parliament by cracking down on “political tourism.” MPs who leave their parliamentary faction would no longer be allowed to join a new faction or represent a party that was not elected to parliament in the last election. This does not prevent MPs from leaving their party, but makes it harder to consolidate new groupings as became common in the Plahotniuc era2. The draft regulation also defines Romanian as the working language of parliament and would stop the default translation of legislative projects into Russian - leaving translations as an option “when appropriate.” Opposition MPs claimed that this would prevent them from speaking Russian in parliament (it wouldn’t under the draft law) and walked out in protest. The draft regulation would also allocate schedule time to the opposition every 6th week in an “opposition day” where factions in opposition or independent MPs could add items to the agenda.

• Parliament introduced legislation to impose oversight on the Commission for Emergency Situations (CSE) and update the definition of states of emergency. Under the draft legislation, Parliament’s Committee on National Security, Defense and Public Order will be able to examine “at any time the executive orders issued by the CSE during crisis situations.” They could then submit reports to parliament which would be able to modify or overturn these emergency government decisions. The draft legislation requires the government to submit a report to parliament at the conclusion of a state of emergency detailing actions taken under emergency powers and their impact. Finally, the law would make the declaration of a state of emergency more flexible by giving the government the option of declaring one with a duration 30 to 90 days. Currently, states of emergency are fixed at 60 days.

• Alexandru Machidon3 was sworn in a Prosecutor General. He had been acting Prosecutor General since May 2025 and took office officially on April 30 after passing the vetting commission and getting support from the Superior Council of Prosecutors.

• Moldova will lift import duties on a range of American products. 59 MPs voted for the law in the second reading which would exempt most industrial products while retaining protective duties for some agricultural products such as “beef, pork and poultry meat, milk and dairy products, as well as sugar and sugar products.” The stated goal of the legislation is to maintain Moldova’s new 10% tariff rate and “reciprocate” the US lowering tariffs from 25%. As usual with “Liberation Day” none of this is what it seems but I’ll leave that for a footnote4.

• Anti-Corruption prosecutors have announced their decision to appeal the sentence against Vladimir Plahotniuc. They will again seek a 25 year sentence saying that “the punishment imposed does not reflect the seriousness of the acts.” Plahotniuc was previously sentenced to 19 years in prison and is himself appealing.

• Moldova’s Association of Independent Press (API) reported 97 attacks against journalists in 2025. This is the highest number since 2017 and includes bullying, intimidation, hacking of accounts and other threats - both online and offline. Most serious were 12 physical attacks and death threats. Last week we wrote about the strength of Moldova’s independent press… but also the challenges it faces. If you missed it, you can find that article here:

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PPDA and Shor?

Democracy at Home (PPDA)’s candidate for the Orhei Mayor’s election, Victor Perțu, was removed from the race by the Central Election Commission (CEC) for being part of a “camouflaged bloc.” The CEC noted that Victor Perțu was a member of the Shor Party and remained active in the Shor network after the party was declared unconstitutional. Their decision cited an overlap between the Shor network and PPDA and found that Shor candidates were seeking office under a new flag.

This decision provoked outrage among the opposition, including Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban and Igor Dodon who called the decision political and evidence of a “captured state.” The CEC decision was overturned by the Orhei Court - though the CEC will appeal the decision.

ZdG has made a deep study of events held by Victor Perțu with PPDA leader Vasile Costiuc and found that numerous Shor Party elected officials, activists, defendants in cases of electoral corruption and defendants in cases related to illicit financing and paid protesting, are all present at these events. PPDA claims that the events are open and anyone can come. The story from ZdG is too long to detail here, but is worth reading for those interested.

We’ll be keeping an eye on links between the Shor network and PPDA in the context of this year’s local elections.

Economics & Infrastructure (& Iran)

Here’s a roundup of the top economics / infrastructure / Iran crisis news of the week:

• Fuel prices remain volatile. While diesel prices have begun to fall gasoline prices remain high following the protracted uncertainty of the American-Israeli war against Iran. Compared to pre-war prices diesel is 44.58% more expensive while gasoline is 28.98% more expensive. On May 1 Chisinau increased public transport prices by 17% due to “the current situation of practically doubling the cost of fuel.”

• The Ministry of Finance says food prices increases are “inevitable” due to the global oil crisis. The Ministry said that the government will not look for short term populist solutions but will take “very targeted” actions including support for agriculture via tax refunds and potential support for inter city transit.

• The National Bank (NBM) has increased the base rate from 5% to 6.5%. This was done “out of the need to configure monetary policy in a way that would mitigate pressures on the inflationary process.” NBM now projects annual inflation in 2026 to hit 7%.

• De minimis tax exemptions will end October 1. The Ministry of Finance announced this date when the €150 euro tax free package import regime will be eliminated. In 2025 Moldovans received approximately 10 million packages from Temu, Joom, Aliexpress and others.

• Moldovan Railways are solvent again. Minister of Infrastructure Vladimir Bolea announced that all employees had been fully repaid wage arrears and that the company had eliminated its historical debts by the end of April.

Ending on a High Note

On May 7 the Moldovan pavilion at the 61st Venice Biennale officially opened. The Biennale is an international art and culture exhibition hosted every 2 years in Venice Italy since 18955. This marks the first time Moldova has participated in this event - sometimes called the Olympics of the art world. Moldova’s Minister of Culture Cristian Jardan called the country’s participation in the event a “significant moment for the country's cultural diplomacy.”

Moldova’s exhibit, titled “On the Thousand and Second Night” was created by artist Pavel Brăila and consists of numerous traditional carpets floating between the floor and ceiling supported by drones. It is described as “neither a refuge nor an escape from the ongoing war on life, but a way of making evident the power of imagining other possible exits.”

The exhibit is open to the public and can be visited until November 22, 2026. You can find more information on the official website here.

Today we’re going to start getting caught up on the other critical stories of the last week - but due to the volume of news we’ll split the Weekly Roundup into 2 parts. In Part 1 we’ll look at the biggest stories of the week and in Part 2 we’ll do a roundup of the many smaller - but equally important updates. You’ll have Part 2 in your inbox tomorrow.

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Moldova Participates in Major Prisoner Exchange with Russia / Belarus

On April 28 the news broke that Moldova was a participant in a high level prisoner swap involving the intelligence agencies of 7 countries. Five prisoners “convicted” of espionage by Russia or Belarus were swapped for 5 persons held by EU countries and Moldova. While much of the news focused on the prominent Polish-Belarusian opposition journalist Andrzej Poczobut who was freed in the exchange, Moldova was notable for being responsible for 4 of the 10 prisoners exchanged - trading 2 and getting 2 back.

Two agents of Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) were returned home as part of the swap. In exchange, Moldova freed Belarusian spy Alexander Balan and Nina Popova.

Alexander Balan was the former deputy director of SIS during the Plahotniuc period. He was since arrested in Romania and charged with treason1 on accusations of passing intelligence to Belarus. Nina Popova is the wife of a Russian soldier serving in Russian army formations in Transnistria who was sentenced to 1 year in prison in October 2025 for attempting to bribe a border guard. After flying from Istanbul to Chisinau she was told that the was banned from entering the country, after which she attempted to slip the customs officer $300 in her passport and was arrested.

Upon his arrival, Belarus welcomed Alexander Balan with flowers from members of the State Security Committee of Belarus. State media celebrated the return of “Belarusian spies Alexander Balan and Vladislav Nadeiko.”

Russia’s state news agency TASS published video of Moldova’s SIS operatives being led by FSB agents to the exchange.

SIS Director Alexandru Musteață commented on the return of the men saying:

“Our officers, two young, dedicated and patriotic officers, went there on a secret mission, the details of which I cannot confirm or provide. Unfortunately, the mission failed, they were captured, which is why we have an internal investigation and an internal assessment of this fact. We started it the moment they (SIS officers, no.) were captured. We started the internal investigation from the beginning. We have completed 99% of the entire assessment. What remains are their statements. Now that they are home, they are safe, my colleagues will talk to them to create the picture - what happened that this operation failed and we will make a decision”

He noted that the 2 men were undergoing medical checks and will return to service in a non-clandestine role.

Commenting on the exchange President Sandu stated:

“It was a complicated operation, we had the support of the institutions of the United States, Romania, Poland. A lot of work was done, there were many risks and I repeat, I am glad that in the end we managed to make this exchange and that these two citizens of the Republic of Moldova, people of good faith, loyal to our state, are home safely and I hope that their health is also good. They are going to undergo some tests to make sure that everything is fine,”

On May 10, President Trump posted on Truth Social about the exchange writing

“We have just secured the release of three Polish citizens and two Moldovans from Belarusian and Russian detention. Thanks to my special presidential envoy, John Coale, we were able to exert serious pressure for this release to take place.

My friend, the President of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, met with me last September and asked me to help release Andrzej Poczobut from a Belarusian prison. Today, Poczobut is free thanks to our efforts.

The United States stands with its allies and friends. I thank President Aleksandr Lukashenko for his cooperation and friendship,”

Analysis of the Prisoner Exchange

According to reporting this operation was incredibly complex and involved coordination among multiple Western intelligence services. Alexander Balan was released by Romania while still pending trial into Moldovan custody so that he could plead guilty and be pardoned (for crimes in Moldova) prior to being repatriated to Belarus. American Special Envoy John Coale apparently helped coordinate the effort alongside the intelligence agencies of US allies and Moldova. This is the first time that Moldova participated at an organizational level in a coordinated effort of this kind, and it marks a clear signal that Moldova’s intelligence agencies are operating closely with partners in complex operations.

While it is unlikely that Russia would have ever dealt bilaterally with Moldova on an issue like this, it is notable that Moldova’s release of 2 of the 5 prisoners held in the West was a key enabler of the broader operation. Most importantly, the Moldovan authorities were able to bring the 2 SIS operatives home safely.

Sheriff’s German Companies

RISE Moldova reported on a network of German companies owned by the Sheriff corporation and its founder Viktor Gushan. The network of companies came to light after Der Spiegel reported millions of euros of tax evasion by 2 media companies - Kartina Digital GmbH and Kartina TV - both with connections to Sheriff Holding.

These companies, which provide Russian language TV streaming services, were part of a large network uncovered by RISE including companies trading in textiles, real estate, media, advertising, software development and more. Kartina Digital GmbH alone was found to have underpaid taxes by €39 million euros in the years 2010 - 2019. The company is also involved in an ongoing lawsuit in the United States with American company Actava, which is seeking $25 million in damages for fraud and breach of contract.

Gushan’s TV stations promised 200 Eastern European channels in a streaming package targeting Russian speakers in Germany, the US, Israel, Canada and other parts of Western Europe. Previous investigations have shown that some of these stations broadcast AfD political advertisements for Russian speakers in Germany.

The investigation by RISE is a reminder that while Viktor Gushan controls almost the whole economy of Transnistria, and is alleged to control much of the region’s “government,” he has not yet been sanctioned by Western government for the political oppression or human rights abuses endemic in the region.

Other Transnistria Updates

Here are the other important Transnistria related updates of the week:

• Ukraine is strengthening their defensive lines on the Transnistrian border. Ukraine’s local commanders posted pictures of the new lines and noted that they…

“will allow the construction of a staggered defense system, capable of promptly reacting to any provocations or obvious manifestations of aggressive actions from the self-proclaimed unrecognized satellite of the Russian Federation”

• Transnistrian “President” Vadim Krasnoselsky commented on the increasingly threatening rhetoric from Russia. His comments follow Russian media and diplomatic sources alleging that Moldova is considering a military resolution to the conflict and threatening responses. Krasnoselsky responded to this saying:

“I still believe in prudence and common sense. No matter how complicated our relations may be, I still believe Moldovan politicians. I believe that they are telling the truth and that they are opposed to a forceful solution to the Transnistrian issue. Of course, there are many nuances: Moldova’s armament, and the special units participating in NATO programs. But that aside, I believe the Madam President when she says she does not want to resolve the Transnistrian issue by military means. And for that, unequivocally, of course, we thank them,”

• Parliament passes law imposing taxes on Transnistria. On April 30 parliament passed the law in the final reading which will phase in equal taxes for companies operating in the Transnistrian region. Taxes will first be applied this year to non-essential products such as alcohol, but will then be gradually phased in and cover all products by 2030. In the original draft, the law envisioned adding VAT taxes on natural gas purchases and balancing electricity by June 2026. The final bill pushed this back and allows the government to establish tax rates in these areas starting in August 2026 based on the progress of negotiations - essentially providing the government a tool of economic leverage. Taxes collected under this law will go into the “convergence fund” and begin funding Moldova’s broader strategy of convergence. Transnistria’s Supreme Soviet sent an official letter of protest to Speaker of Parliament Grosu objecting to the law as taxation without representation2 and highlighting how new taxes will further damage the already crippled regional economy.

Proekt Reports Abramovich is A7’s “Krisha”

Investigative journalists at the Russian outlet Proekt (“Project”) released an investigation into the vast and growing network of payment facilitation companies working to circumvent sanctions against Russia. They showed that all manner of transactions - from facilitating the purchase of Russian gas deliveries to Turkey, to allowing individuals to bypass Bank of America due diligence to buy a Cybertruck, now pass through this opaque network of operators. Proekt reports that the FSB “gets income from each operation” and that Ilan Shor’s A7 companies sit at the center of the web.

Proekt reported that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich has close links to Shor’s A7 companies and according to their sources serves as the operation’s “krisha and sponsor.” In Russian slang, “krisha” or “roof” is the person or organization under which criminal activity is conducted and protected politically. In this formulation Abramovich is both Shor’s protection, patron and in some sense partner. According to Proekt’s source, Abramovich chose Shor for his ability to “build schemes.”

They further report that when Shor flew to Moscow from Israel in November 2023 he did so on a plane owned by Abramovich and that A7 has offices in multiple buildings owned by the Russian oligarch. Representatives for Abramovich deny these connections and any connections to Shor more generally.

In their reporting, Proekt puts A7 at the center of Russia’s sanctions evasion financial architecture, with their sources claiming that they now have a 15% share of all cross-border financial transactions. The report connected A7 to at least 25 companies under US and EU sanctions - including manufacturers of military drones and armaments.

This reporting is the first to publicly confirm rumors of a connection between Abramovich and Shor. It also highlights how his A7 network continues to grow and facilitate sanctions evasion efforts as well as to help finance Russia’s war efforts.

Europe Day and Victory Day

On May 9 Russia and many countries of the former Soviet Union celebrate “Victory Day” and the end of the second world war (for Russia). This year Moscow did not see any of the normal pomp and circumstance - namely tanks and ballistic missiles on parade in Red Square. Instead the holiday saw a more muted parade held under the shadow of potential Ukrainian drone attack.

In Moldova, this holiday has become a symbol of geopolitical tension, with pro-Russian politicians and activists dressing up in WW2 uniforms and proudly displaying Russian and Soviet military symbols. On the other side people celebrate Europe Day, the European Union’s holiday which marks the end of the war and the transition to peace in a united Europe.

Visiting Chisinau on May 8th, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas spoke alongside President Sandu and outlined how this holiday is seen in countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union saying:

“I come from a country where there were different communities and different approaches to May 9th. We discussed why we couldn’t celebrate May 9th as Victory Day. If, after May 9th, when the war ended, Stalin had said: you are free, you can live in freedom and independence, we would also have celebrated that day as Victory Day. But since that was the day the atrocities began for my country, we cannot celebrate May 9th as Victory Day. I’m glad we have different pasts, but we need to focus on a common future, and that’s what Europe Day means,”

On May 9th President of Cyprus Nikos Christodoulides visited Chisinau and hailed Moldova’s progress since June 2022. He stated that “The main objective of the Cyprus Presidency [of the Council of the European Union] remains the official opening of the negotiation chapters starting with cluster no. 1 in June itself.”

Speaking on May 9th to an academic conference of more than 1200 of Moldova’s history teachers, President Sandu spoke to the 2 observances of the same holiday saying:

“Yes, May 9 is Victory Day. We must respect and honor the memory of those who fought and died in World War II. But history didn’t end in 1945. Afterward, a regime began that brought deportations, organized famine, repression, fear, and attempts to suppress our national identity. Therefore, we must not confuse the memory of the war’s victims with the glorification of the Soviet regime. (…) At the same time, it is important to understand that there is no contradiction between Victory Day and Europe Day. The European project emerged as a response to the devastating consequences of war and totalitarianism,”

The US Moldova Initiative (USMI) is a 501c3 public charity corporation based in New York State. It was granted 501c3 status by the IRS in 2024 but had no discernible activity until they launched their website on March 13 2026. According to the website USMI “connects Americans and Moldovans through exchange, civic engagement, and the belief that real relationships change the world.”

The website makes the case that now is a critical moment in Moldova as it is a “nation in conversation with its own future.” It goes on to note that this “conversation is happening against a backdrop of significant geopolitical pressure, economic challenge, and the lingering effects of disinformation campaigns designed to sow division and undermine public trust in democratic institutions.”

USMI highlights Moldova’s break with Russia and efforts at energy independence, European trajectory and also the value of Moldovan culture, wine and traditions. The site strongly supports Moldova’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic space and notes that

“American engagement here is not charity. It is strategic investment in a more stable, democratic Europe.”

What Does USMI Do?

According to their website, USMI has “Five interconnected programs that build lasting bridges between American and Moldovan societies,” namely:

1. Dialog Programs

2. Educational Exchanges

3. Civic Education and Democratic Development

4. Cultural Diplomacy

5. Policy Dialog and Advocacy

Right now they don’t present any information on actual activities and programs that have taken place. In the News & Updates section of their website USMI writes that “We are just getting started” and invites readers to check back in the future.

It appears that they are starting with number 5 - Policy Dialog and Advocacy. Explaining that activity on their website they write:

“At the policy level, USMI facilitates off-the-record exchanges between American and Moldovan officials, think tank researchers, and civil society leaders on issues of shared concern — from energy security and anti-corruption reform, to diaspora engagement and Moldova’s European integration trajectory. We are nonpartisan and non-prescriptive: our role is to create the conditions for honest, well-informed dialogue, not to advocate for specific political outcomes.”

USMI’s July Congressional Delegation

Documents reviewed by Moldova Matters indicate that the US Moldova Initiative is working to organize a privately sponsored congressional delegation (CODEL) to Moldova in late July 2026. The proposed visit would involve a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers and include meetings with senior Moldovan officials, business leaders, and civil society representatives. At least one member of Congress has indicated an intention to participate in the delegation, alongside their spouse and chief of staff.

A CODEL is a foreign trip by Members of Congress where they meet local leaders, learn about local conditions and conduct meetings to better inform US policymaking. Importantly, there are 2 types of CODELs:

1. Publicly Funded - Travel costs are covered by US taxpayers and visits are coordinated with US Embassies abroad. These are considered official government travel.

2. Privately Funded - Travel costs are paid by an outside organization, usually a nonprofit. These are typically framed as educational or fact-finding trips.

Privately funded CODELs are subject to approval by the House and Senate Ethics Committees and require disclosure of who is funding it and for what purpose. They are very common - but not for Moldova1.

USMI is organizing this trip for Members of Congress and is apparently open to families and staff as well. That makes this a very expensive endeavor and it is worth looking into just who is behind USMI and who is planning to pay for this proposed CODEL.

Sam Alaverdov - Executive Director of USMI

The Executive Director of USMI is Sam Alaverdov2 - a name that long time Moldova Matters readers should be very familiar with. From December 2024 through June 2025 Moldova Matters published a 3 part investigation into Mr. Alaverdov’s other charity - alternately named the “American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Pridnestrovie and Moldova Inc.” and the “American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Ukraine and Moldova Inc.” - and given the rather clunky acronym ACFHCUM.

ACFHCUM and the US Moldova Initiative (USMI) are both registered at the same address - Sam Alaverdov’s house in Valley Stream NY.

In spite of years of records of almost zero fundraising and zero expenditure on charitable causes, ACFHCUM signed an $85,000 contract in September 2024 with Washington DC Lobby and PR firm Qorvis Holding Inc to enhance the reputation of then presidential candidate Vasile Tarlev in Washington.

Mr. Tarlev has been widely reported as a part of Ilan Shor’s political network in Moldova. This included multiple undercover investigations in Moldova, reporting about how Shor chose Tarlev as a candidate himself and Tarlev’s own party vice president asserting that he had joined Ilan Shor.

The planned DC PR and lobbying trip never happened. Due to visa issues Vasile Tarlev never traveled to the United States for meetings with think tanks, media organizations and members of Congress as planned. But Qorvis was paid $45,000 on September 30 2024 for this work. According to the initial contract, this payment should have come from ACFHCUM but the non-profit recorded neither fundraising nor expenditure in the time in question. ACFHCUM’s 2024 tax filings showed zero activity in 2024. Following my extensive investigation Moldova Matters reported that Qorvis was actually paid the $45,000 by Sam Alaverdov personally.

Reached for comment on that previous story, and asked why his non-profit had engaged this contract, Mr. Alaverdov replied simply “I like him.”

You can read the previous 3 part investigation here:

Sam Alaverdov’s 2021 CODEL in Ukraine

USMI’s planned privately funded CODEL to Moldova is not the first experience Mr. Alaverdov has participating in the organization and funding such trips. In August 2021 a 501c3 non-profit called The Humpty Dumpty Institute (HDI) organized a CODEL to Ukraine and listed ACFHCUM as the funder of the trip in filings with the House Committee on Ethics. This trip brought Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX), Rep. Barry Moore (R-AL) and Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX) to Kyiv so that they could “get a better understanding of the complexities of the region through meetings with the Ukrainian government, business, and cultural leaders.”

This CODEL was noted in the press as the most expensive of 2021 and cost over $46,000. This accounted for travel and lodging for the Members of Congress, their wives, staff, HDI staff and Sam Alaverdov.

According to tax filings ACFHCUM claimed neither income nor expenses in 2021. It remains unclear to this day who actually paid for this trip.

A Very Complicated CODEL….

That 2021 trip to Kyiv has garnered a disproportionate amount of scrutiny from some of the darker corners of the internet. There was nothing unusual about the trip itself and no credible allegations of impropriety. CODELs like this are quite normal in the American system. The problem for this trip was The Humpty Dumpty Institute (HDI) where Mark Epstein - brother of Jeffery Epstein - had served as a long time board members3.

The conspiracy theorist website “The National File,” founded by Alex Jones, published an article about the CODEL which latched on to the word “children” in American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Pridnestrovie and Moldova Inc and combined it with “Epstein” to create a wild array of conspiracies involving Soros, the Vatican, Israel, China, Ukrainian Nazis, Zionists, the deep state, the Clintons and many more.

This article, and the many more it spawned had absolutely no merit - but they did have impact. Rep. Barry Moore was harried by “journalists” chasing the story multiple times in the halls of Congress with questions about the trip and HDI. I myself continue to get emails from conspiracy theorists about the trip and Sam Alaverdov to this day.

While the deep state allegations had neither sense nor merit, the article did grab onto the most salient question - how did a tiny cash strapped non-profit pay more than $46,000 for this trip? and where did the money come from?

USMI’s Partners and Donors

I reached out to USMI and Sam Alaverdov with questions about the organization of this CODEL and the source of its funding. They did not respond to these questions as of the time of writing.

In the 2 years since USMI was granted 501c3 status by the IRS they have filed form 990 e-postcard for their tax returns. This is a simplified filing for small non-profits with under $50,000 in gross receipts and does not provide us information about their actual income, expenses or donors. This means that USMI’s tax filings to date provide almost no visibility into its finances because it qualifies under these rules for very small organizations.

On their website USMI has a page titled “Our Partners.” Rather than listing donors or institutional funders, this page presents an odd list of entities in Moldova - NGOs, companies (a major supermarket chain, a construction company, a winery, etc) and government agencies - such as Moldova’s UNESCO office and the UN Refugee Agency in Moldova (UNHCR).

I did not reach out to every partner listed on their website, but I did contact the most notable listings - namely UNHCR Moldova and Moldova’s UNESCO office. A spokesperson for UNHCR Moldova told Moldova Matters that the organization has no association with USMI.

Representatives for Moldova’s UNESCO office did not respond to requests for comment by the time of publication.

Most interesting of all though is the first partner that they list - WKF Moldova, which the USMI site calls the “national kickboxing federation of the Republic of Moldova.” It is not. This organization came to prominence in summer 2025 when they attempted to organize the so-called “European Kick Boxing Championship” in Chisinau in partnership with Mayor Ion Ceban. 195 “athletes,” almost all from Belarus and Russia, traveling to the event were barred from entering Moldova. The government explained that WKF is not internationally recognized, had no permission to operate in Moldova and the leader of WKF, Fritz Exenberger, had previously been expelled from the (real) International Sport Kickboxing Association (ISKA) for fraud. The Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that those blocked from entering represented a “high risk to national security.”

The PAS faction in Chisinau’s Municipal Council noted that the official observer of the event was a law enforcement officer from Transnistria and that it involved:

“more than 200 participants from Russia and Belarus to the capital of Moldova, including military personnel, representatives of the occupied territories of Ukraine, persons under international sanctions, and athletes associated with the special services of Russia and Transnistria.”

The inclusion of WKF Moldova as a featured partner raises additional questions about how USMI selected and vetted the organizations presented on its website.

What about donors?

USMI lists no donors and does not even have a mechanism on their website to accept donations. They do have a footnote on the contact form that those wishing to support their work should get in touch, but no mention at all on the website that they are a 501c3 or other important information for prospective donors such as their IRS supplied EIN number.

So What is the US Moldova Initiative?

Since launching their website less than 2 months ago, USMI has begun the process of organizing a bi-partisan Congressional Delegation to Moldova and gotten at least one member of Congress, and their family, to officially indicate interest. For a non-profit with no past operating history and no clear source of funds this represents a very big splash in Washington.

The fact that this organization is led by Sam Alaverdov increases the questions about what exactly it is. His former organization, the “American Charity Fund for Helping Children of Pridnestrovie and Moldova Inc.” had zero record of any activities in support of children in Pridnestrovie (Transnistria), Moldova or Ukraine. At the same time Moldova Matters has reported multiple stories highlighting how ACFHCUM has been legally recorded - in FARA filings and House Ethics Committee filings - as having spent large amounts of money on political activities. None of these funds are recorded either as income or expenses in their tax filings in the years in question.

Putting aside how USMI is funded, or how ACFHCUM’s finances worked, Sam Alaverdov personally paid $45,000 to a Washington based PR and Lobby firm in order to promote the image of Shor-linked Moldovan politician Vasile Tarlev. While there is nothing illegal about Mr. Alaverdov making that payment4, it is notable in the Moldovan context as an extremely large donation to a Moldovan politician’s PR campaign. The fact that Mr. Alaverdov “likes” Mr. Tarlev does not adequately explain why he took this action.

If USMI organizes their July 2026 CODEL as planned this organization will move into a central role in Moldovan-American international relations. It will have proved both the financial ability to pay for this private CODEL, and the connections in Washington to make it possible. That alone would make the emergence of USMI worth noting. The identity of its director and his past connections, as reported by Moldova Matters, make it more than noteworthy.

We will be following USMI and its planned CODEL closely in future articles.

Each year Reporters Without Borders (RSF) publishes a global press freedom index that assesses nations on a 0 to 100 point scale - taking into account legal protections for journalists as well as other factors including intimidation and censorship. Countries are ranked and broadly grouped into 5 categories - “Good,” “Satisfactory,” “Problematic,” “Difficult” and “Very Serious.” The 2026 index is quite a warning - global press freedom is at a 25 year low. For the first time in the history of the index 50% of countries globally fall into the categories of “Difficult” or “Very Serious.”

In this time of retreat for freedom of speech and the press around the world, Moldova stands out as a rare good news story. The country climbed 4 places to rank at 31 globally. That puts Moldova as the only EU candidate country ranked as “Satisfactory” and the only country in the region with that rank - surpassing Ukraine (ranked 55), Romania (49), Bulgaria (71) and others.

The ranking puts Moldova in the middle of Europe and far ahead of the United States (64) which RSF notes is “experiencing a significant and prolonged decline in press freedom.”

Good Signals - But Still a Challenging Situation

In Moldova there is a sense of pride that the nation has managed to climb the ranking in a year that saw some of the most profound attacks on both the country’s information space and democracy as a whole. The fact that Moldova ranks higher than numerous EU member states and all EU candidates is rightly a point of pride and a real accomplishment in this context.

At the same time, Moldova’s independent press faces huge challenges. Marking the occasion ZdG writes:

“the free press operates in an increasingly complicated environment, marked by increasingly frequent misinformation, pressures, and limited resources”

These challenges - especially in the context of information warfare, were also highlighted by President Sandu’s statement on the day where she wrote:

“A democracy can endure only if there are courageous, fair, and dedicated journalists. On the occasion of International Press Freedom Day, I thank all media professionals in our country who, through their efforts, have contributed to strengthening resilience and defending democracy, in the face of unprecedented attacks on the Republic of Moldova’s right to decide its own future.

It is encouraging that the seriousness of our press is reflected in the evolution of the Press Freedom Index of the organization “Reporters Without Borders” (RSF), where our country has risen this year by four positions, reaching 31st place. We have thus achieved the best score among countries seeking accession to the European Union and are the only country in the region classified as “satisfactory.” However, there is still much work to be done, especially in countering increasingly sophisticated tools used to spread falsehoods and disinformation aimed at manipulating public opinion.

Freedom of expression cannot be equated with the freedom to spread lies, and protecting the truth remains a responsibility of society as a whole. To defend our values, it is essential to build strong cooperation between the press, institutions, and citizens—based on trust, mutual respect, and an unequivocal commitment to democracy and the common good.”

It is critical that Moldova’s free and independent press be strong enough to hold the government to account and to provide citizens with factual information in the context of Russia’s ongoing attacks on the country’s information space. Among the biggest challenges to this is what ZdG called “limited resources” - a turn of phrase that greatly understates the challenges that media organizations face.

In Moldova, the most sustainable independent media organizations rely on grants for around 70% of their operating budgets. Many smaller investigative or regional media outlets rely on grants for more than 97% of their budgets. The destruction of USAID and serious damage to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) by DOGE in the United States removed core institutional funders in this space. In 2025 the European Union as well as member states rushed to fill these funding gaps in the context of Moldova’s elections.

This very needed support only highlighted how fragile the finance of Moldova’s independent press is. With global crises popping up almost weekly, there is no certainty that 2026 will see the same level of support. Long term, media organizations know that funding of this kind will fall greatly when Moldova joins the European Union and no longer has access to funding from development partners in the same way. This year’s RSF Press Freedom Index was a great sign of Moldova’s progress, but serious challenges remain.

How You Can Help

In 2025 I co-founded a US NGO (501c3) called the Moldova Resilience Fund (MRF) as a way to support independent media and civil society organizations that support Moldova’s democratic resilience.

Since launching in November, MRF has raised $39,800 from 43 donors and distributed $11,500 in flexible grants to local organizations. You can read a report on our activities in the MRF Q1 update on our website here.

While MRF is a new organization with an all volunteer executive board, we have been busy meeting with media organizations and NGOs in Moldova to figure out how a small player like us can have the biggest impact. Members of our team have also been meeting in the United States with diaspora groups and individuals who care about Moldova’s democratic future to discuss ways that they can get involved. Based on these discussions, we’ll be announcing more of our 2026 programming soon - if you want to stay in the loop sign up for our mailing list here.

Right now, the Moldova Resilience Fund is the only tax-deductible 501c3 organization in the United States that raises money specifically to support local organization in Moldova that provide fact based coverage of important events, conduct investigations and otherwise support the country’s civil society in these challenging times. If you find this cause important - consider making a donation to the Moldova Resilience Fund here:

Make a donation to MRF today

For US citizens or residents donating to a 501c3 like MRF is often the most convienent way to support a cause you believe in. But giving directly to local organizations that you want to support is also a really good option. On the MRF website we’ve compiled a list of some of the independent media organizations that we feel have the highest impact because of their fearless coverage and detailed investigations. MRF subscribes to these organizations on Patreon and shares the list to encourage those who want to make a monthly small dollar donation to do so directly - you can view our list as well as links for how you can support them here.

Other Ways to Help MRF

The Moldova Resilience Fund is a startup - and we’re always looking for dedicated people with out-of-the-box ideas for how we can be more effective. MRF will expand our board this year and we’re specifically looking for people with US non-profit experience willing to provide strategic advice - and for people with a background in providing on-the-ground support for independent media organizations in places like Moldova.

If you have ideas, want to get involved or otherwise want to reach out - drop me an email here:

david@moldovaresilience.org

Final Thoughts on World Press Freedom Day

As I reflected on the RSF index and what World Press Freedom Day means in 2026, my mind was drawn to the cascade of bad news we are getting from a world that keeps slipping deeper into crisis. These are truly unprecedented times - wars are spreading at the same time as social media pumps disinformation into our national and international discourse. This disinformation fuels the profits of social media companies at the same time as legitimate advertisers pull their placements with independent media in favor of facebook, YouTube and Tiktok. This is a vicious cycle that starves the free press of resources at the same time as it fuels disinformation.

Against this backdrop, we are also contending with a new age of AI that promises to fundamentally disrupt how we interact with information - with both positive and negative effects.

The role of independent journalists doing public interest reporting and investigations has never been more important. I’m not the sort of person who romanticizes this work - and I know that far too many journalists are not reporting without fear or favor and are themselves driving agendas. But I also know that the hard work that goes into uncovering the truth in a complicated world has a profound positive impact on our democracies. In Moldova, there is a vibrant free press that has made a huge impact in a time of hybrid war and democratic backsliding globally.

So for me, today is a day to honor those who do the work - but also to support them.

Sincerely,

David Smith

Holidays

• Labor Day - Friday May 1. This is the first official holiday of the month and it means the week starts with a long weekend.

• Hederlez - Wednesday May 6. This traditional spring holiday is celebrated throughout Gagauzia with different events in different towns and villages. One of the highlights is a horse race and show in the town of Ceadîr-Lunga. More information can be found here.

• Europe Day and Victory Day - Saturday, May 9. Moldova celebrates both the Soviet Victory Day and the European, “Europe Day” holidays on May 9. Events are held throughout Moldova with the central program happening at the Great National Assembly Square. More information here.

Spring is full of holidays and days off so plan accordingly.

Opera, ballet, and concerts

The month has a strong musical lineup, with several big events appearing on Chișinău’s 2026 calendar.

• Hans Zimmer by The Symphonians - Sunday May 3. The Organ Hall presents the Symphonians performing many of Hans Zimmer’s famous movie scores. Tickets are available here.

• Lupii lui Calancea & GUZ - This folk rock group comes to Chisnau on May 7 as part of their new album launch. Tickets are available here.

• Vivaldi la Veneția - Sunday May 10. Billed as an “educational concert for children and adults,” the Organ Hall presents selections from Vivaldi. Tickets available here.

• Ricky Martin Concert - June 12. While not a May event, be sure to get your tickets now for this major concert event for Chisinau. Pop superstar Ricky Martin comes to Moldova at Zimbru Stadium on June 12. Tickets and details here.

Festivals and city life

May is also when outdoor events start to pick up in earnest.

• Spring Wine Vernissage 2026 - Friday May 15. One of the signature wine events of the season, held at Capitoles Park. Tickets are 400 MDL at the door. Details here.

• DroneFest Moldova 2026 - May 16-17. This second edition evento at Valea Trandafirilor park features drones being used in various sporting type functions. A video of what to expect can be found on this Instagram page. More details here.

• BITEI 2026 - May 21 - 31. The International Theatre Festival at the National Theater Eugene Ionesco brings performers and plays from around the world. For a list of the performances and to buy tickets, visit the theater’s page on iTicket here.

• Chisinau Auto Expo - May 16-17. Chisinau Arena will host an Auto Expo featuring over 100 new models of vehicles. Details here.

Sports

There is also a good lineup for runners and outdoor sports fans.

• Duathlon - Saturday May 10. Sporter will host a Duathlon competition where participants run, bike, then run again. To register, visit the official site here.

• Wake Run 2026 - Saturday May 16. Wake Park, to the west of Chisinau, is hosting a trail running event. Participants can choose the half marathon, 10k, or family run. Details available here

• National Tennis Center Grand Opening - May 23 - Built as part of Satul Germen between Chisinau and the airport, the National Tennis Center will open on May 23 with an exhibition match. Details and tickets available here.

• Legal Half Marathon Chișinău 2026 - Sunday May 31. The month closes with one of the biggest running events in the city. Participants can register for a family run, a 10k, or the full half marathon. Registration is available here.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

It was recently announced that the Republic of Moldova is joining the “Coalition of the Willing” for Ukraine. This is a development worth explaining more clearly both in terms of what it means and why it is a smart decision for our country.

First, in simple terms: the “Coalition of the Willing” brings together states that aim to support Ukraine. Most are European either members of the European Union, such as France, Germany, Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria, or non-EU countries like Norway and the United Kingdom. Some are NATO members, others are not. The group also includes key global partners such as Canada, Australia, and Japan.

The shared objective is clear: to build security guarantees for Ukraine once peace is achieved, ensuring that the country does not find itself in the same situation again. Why does this matter for us, in the Republic of Moldova? For several very concrete reasons.

First, there is the geopolitical dimension. Europe is taking on an increasingly prominent role in Ukraine’s security, and key decisions are being shaped within flexible formats such as this one. By participating, Moldova is present at the table where the future of the region, our region, is being discussed. We gain access to information, coordination, and real conversations on security. It is the difference between observing developments from the outside and actively shaping them. I support the latter approach.

Second, the Republic of Moldova brings real value. Our military are highly trained in demining. In post-war Ukraine, demining will be one of the most pressing challenges. This is about saving lives, restoring normalcy, and enabling reconstruction. Moldova can make a direct contribution here. We are not only participating, we are helping in practical terms.

A third element relates to technology, particularly drones. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated their importance. Drones are used not only for security purposes but also for agriculture, monitoring, and civil response. Through cooperation, Moldova can learn quickly, adopt best practices, and develop its own capabilities. This translates into stronger protection and better preparedness for the future. For a small country, this is a smart direction.

Fourth, this is about sovereignty. The Republic of Moldova is acting in line with its own interests and strategic documents. It is building its security step by step and deepening cooperation with Ukraine from training to defence industry cooperation and intelligence exchange. This reflects a mature and planned approach. Neutral countries such as Ireland and Austria are pursuing similar paths.

Finally, there is an economic dimension. Ukraine’s security has a direct impact on regional stability. A stable Ukraine means fewer risks for the Republic of Moldova across the economy, investment climate, and infrastructure. Participation in such formats also supports diversification and strengthens our international positioning. It forms the basis of a responsible foreign policy, promoted by the Presidency.

The decision itself is sound. The natural next step is to ensure broader public understanding within the country. The discussion on concrete actions should be brought into Parliament. Members of Parliament need to be clearly informed about the action plan and the next steps. This strengthens transparency and limits space for misinterpretation or manipulation, which has already surfaced in public discourse. Just as Moldovan military professionally defuses dangerous explosives and contributes to peace, political leaders and responsible institutions are called upon to communicate clearly and engage all parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces in an open dialogue. This helps ensure that a beneficial decision for the country is properly understood by society.

The reasons are outlined above, but the broader point remains simple: the Republic of Moldova has chosen to be present where the region’s security is being discussed. It has chosen to contribute with what it does best, within its constitutional framework. That deserves to be explained more often.

Daniel Vodă is an Associated Senior Expert in foreign policy and strategic communication at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). He previously served as spokesperson for the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova.

On Sunday April 26 Moldova’s National Meteorological Service issued a “code orange” for high winds across the country from 10 am until 9 pm. At 2 pm Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban announced that all outdoor events in the city were cancelled effective immediately and urged all residents to stay home saying:

“We repeatedly call on all residents and visitors of the capital to stay sheltered unless there is an urgent necessity to go out.”

This cut short the Chisinau marathon that was organized in the city center as well as other planned events. High winds impacted communities all around Moldova with 92 communities experiencing power outages and downed trees blocking roads and damaging cars all across the country.

In Chisinau, a 66 year old woman was injured after being hit by a billboard that blew off its mount and a 6 year old child sustained serious injuries after being hit by a falling tree branch at the Chisinau Zoo. The child is in intensive care.

In addition to falling trees, numerous cars were damaged by falling roof tiles blown off of apartment and house roofs onto parking below.

President Sandu Commemorates 40th Anniversary of the Chernobyl Disaster

President Sandu traveled to Kyiv on April 26 to join President Zelenskyy in commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. In her remarks at the event she called attention to the lies the underpinned the disaster and praised the work of the international community who helped build the new containment system. The President stated:

“A Soviet regime that put its own reputation above people’s lives. That kept people in the dark while a reactor burned out — because the powerful believed they had the right to decide what the powerless were allowed to know.

Over 3,500 Moldovans were among those sent here as liquidators1. Many of them, with insufficient protection and without knowing the whole truth. They were asked to be brave in the name of a system that did not return this courage with honesty. Moldova commemorates them today. (…)

This evidence matters more than ever. Because the contempt that caused this disaster has not disappeared.

The same lack of respect for human life that defined the Soviet reaction is reflected today in Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian cities, in the occupation of nuclear power plants, in the war that Moscow refuses to even call a war.”

While in Kyiv, President Sandu met with President Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko to discuss bilateral cooperation in energy, regional security and EU accession. In a joint press conference she expressed Moldova’s support for Ukraine and called on the EU to “officially open negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine without delay.”

Romania Enters Political Crisis

Romania’s Social Democratic Party (PSD) reigned from the coalition government of Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan and has announced a coming vote of no confidence with the support of George Simion’s AUR party. Prime Minister Bolojan has stated that he does not plan to step down and will send a new list of ministerial candidates from the now minority government to President Nicușor Dan.

Together, PSD and AUR have 219 of 463 seats in parliament, short of the 233 needed for a majority or to oust the government. They are whipping votes and seeking to attract members of the SOS Romania, POT and PACE opposition parties (41 votes) or the 22 independents. The remaining coalition of PNL, USR and UDMR control 164 seats.

The move has set off alarm bells across Europe as a major Social Democratic Party is making common cause with the far right. PSD Senator Victoria Stoiciu, originally from Moldova, resigned from the party when the news was announced saying:

“I believe that an absolute cordon sanitaire is needed to keep extremist forces in total political isolation. Any violation of this principle is not just a tactical error, but a normalization of fascism. Step by step, until the monster is too big to be killed.” (...)

“I cannot and will never support the normalization of fascism. It is a red line that cannot be crossed.“

Internally the alliance of PSD and AUR is a major challenge to President Nicușor Dan and threatens to further upset Romania’s complicated political balance of power. For Moldova, any actions that bring AUR into the mainstream threaten the bilateral relationship between the PAS government and Romania. We’ll watch this story closely in the weeks to come.

Security Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top security related news of the week:

• Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian Security Council, threatened Moldova over the alleged mistreatment of Russian citizens. After the Russian Duma passed a bill giving the president authority to militarily intervene whenever a Russian citizen is threatened in a foreign country, Shoigu gave an interview where he claimed that the 220,000 Russian citizens living in Transnistria “are now threatened due to the reckless and irresponsible actions of Kiev (sic) and Chisinau.” When discussing options to protect them he stressed that “Russia will take all measures and use all available methods” adding that “Nothing should be ruled out2.” Moldova’s Ministry of Foriegn Affairs as well as the EU issued statements affirming support for a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian issue and affirming Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• Russian drone crashes in populated area in Galati. On April 25 Romanian military command stated that British Eurofighter Typhoons were scrambled with authorization to shoot down detected incoming drones in Romanian airspace. One drone crashed in Galati near the annex of a house resulting in the evacuation of 535 local residents and the disconnection of gas to 20 streets. No one was hurt and the drone was removed and detonated in a controlled explosion. The same night the wreckage of a second drone was found in Romanian territory near the border with Ukraine. Responding to the news, President Nicusor Dan stated:

“I strongly condemn Russia’s irresponsible behavior. Incidents like the drone that crashed last night in Galati demonstrate disrespect for international law and threaten the safety of the citizens of Romania, a NATO member state. Romania is not a party to this conflict. Yet, its consequences are felt on our streets, in our homes, and in our lives. This is the first time Romanian property has been actually damaged—a point we take very seriously,”

• A “drone like object” was found crashed on the roof of a Chisinau apartment building. It was found in the early morning of April 28 by a resident and resulted in the evacuation the of the building as police examined the crash. Police have since clarified that no explosives were found and that the components of the drone are being examined. No additional information is available at this time.

• Former director of Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) Alexandru Balan was extradited to Moldova on April 24. He will begin serving his 1.5 year prison sentence for the disclosure of state secrets. Balan is also on trial in Romania on charges of treason and allegations that he was passing secrets to the Belarusian KGB. There has been much speculation about why he would be extradited to serve a minor sentence while facing much more serious charges in Romania. Balan pled guilty to the charges in Moldova and is apparently doing the same in Romania. Balan was reported to have been sending hidden notes and making covert phone calls to persons in Moldova saying that his situation “must be raised at a political level.” Reportedly, he was attempting to reach out to Moldovan MP Renato Usatîi. At the same time, a source from Romanian specialized police DIICOT told local outlet HotNews that…

“Given the functions he held, this man also crossed paths with other intelligence structures from other states. He probably has some information and since he expressed his desire to collaborate with the authorities, it can be used. It’s also about pragmatism in such cases. I don’t think there’s a problem with DIICOT losing an important defendant,”

**Update: Immediately before publication it was announced that Alexandru Balan was pardoned and exchanged for 2 Moldovan Security and Intelligence (SIS) officers who were being held by Russia. President Sandu’s office stated:

"In order to be able to bring you (the SIS officers) home, following a complex operation, the 2 officers were exchanged, as requested by the other side, with two other people: a citizen of the Russian Federation, Popova Nina, who was acting against the state of the Republic of Moldova, and Alexandru Bălan, a citizen of the Republic of Moldova, accused of treason in the interests of the KGB in Belarus, who was pardoned in order to be able to leave for Belarus," (…)

“it is a gain that cannot be measured by a simple mathematical equation - we brought home two citizens who work for the Republic of Moldova, giving up, in return, 2 prisoners who worked against the Republic of Moldova."

This operation has been in the works for several months and was coordinated by SIS with the support of the United States, Poland and Romania. President Sandu thanked President Donald Trump "for his involvement and that of the US administration in the success of this action."

We’ll return with more updates on this breaking story in future roundups.

Political Updates

Here’s a roundup of the top political stories of the week:

• The State of Emergency in the energy sector has ended. Parliament voted on April 25 to end the emergency early but to maintain a State of Alert for an additional 60 days. They cited the success in repairing the damaged high voltage line and noted that actions had been taken to “maintain the functionality of the oil market in crisis conditions” and prevent major disruptions.

• An investigation from DIEZ spotlighted a thriving (and public) market for educational fraud. In their investigation, journalists from DIEZ found numerous companies and web advertisements offering services writing undergraduate and graduate thesis for as little as 7500 lei. Many of these services operated public websites and accepted payments via the MIA payments system. After posing as interested students and getting invoices for the offered work, DIEZ journalists sent 1 leu to the accounts indicated in order to get the names of the persons owning them. In one case, they found that a service was run by Ala Mușchei, former candidate for the Democracy at Home (PPDA) party in last parliamentary elections. She had been 84th on the party list and listed her profession as an “text editor.” Minister of Education Dan Perciun responded by saying that there would be zero tolerance for academic fraud. He stated that new software, already purchased, would be used to check thesis starting this year and that the ministry was reviewing legal options. Parliament has since announced hearings on thesis buying with relevant state agencies as well as law enforcement.

• Natalie Portman’s parents visited Telenesti on April 20 for Easter of the Dead. Portman’s grandmother was originally from Telenesti. The family later moved to Chisinau before emigrating to Israel in 1978. Portman’s parents Avner Hershlag and Shelley Stevens visited family graves and met with local mayor Vadim Lelik and discussed the town’s ties with the diaspora.

Shor / Hybrid War Updates

Here are the latest stories in Russia’s hybrid war against Moldova:

• Convictions in electoral corruption cases continue. This week the court convicted 5 Pobeda (Victory) party leaders and activists for bribing voters in the 2024 referendum - issuing fines of 45,000 to 50,000 lei. In a separate case, the presidents of the Ungheni and Rezina Shor Party organizations were sentenced to prison time after being convicted of illicit party financing. Cases like this continue to roll in month after month as the authorities bring cases to court and individuals in the Shor network are held accountable.

• New arrest warrant issued for Ilan Shor. Prosecutors have issued an arrest warrant related to a case of Shor’s role as an “organizer of illegal financing of political parties.” This case relates to the 2023 bombshell undercover investigation where politician Arina Spătaru (aka Arina 007) cooperated with prosecutors as Shor recruited her and others to create a new “pro-European” political party that would be captive to his network. A new extradition request for Shor has been sent to Russia. Commenting on the news, Arina Spătaru stated:

“In 2023, I participated in this investigation as an undercover agent. I didn’t take any money from Shor—not then, nor since. I did it because I believe Moldova must rid itself of political corruption and the influence of criminal groups. Three years later, I see that things are moving forward. Slower than they should, but they are moving forward,”

• Igor Chaika has been named the new head of Rossotrudnichestvo. Chaika has been sanctioned by the US, EU, UK and Canada over his role in the Kremlin’s attempts to destabilize Moldova. He has been a key behind the scenes player in organizing Kremlin support for the Shor network, the Socialist Party and as the owner of many blocked TV stations in Moldova. Rossotrudnichestvo is officially tasked with administering foreign aid and cultural exchanges for the Russian Federation. It operates like a state run version of Shor’s Evrazia NGO - utilizing soft power to forward Kremlin foreign policy and security objectives.

After the conviction in absentia of Ilan Shor, this is the second conviction related to the Theft of the Billion.

The decision was 672 pages long and detailed the complex network of money flows, shell companies, foreign bank accounts, private planes and other assets derived from the theft. At the core, the court found the scheme to work as follows:

• Ilan Shor took fraudulent loans from 3 banks through companies that he directly or indirectly controlled. This was between June 2013 and February 2014.

• These funds were converted into foreign currency and transferred to various companies outside Moldova based on fictitious purchase contracts for alcohol, furniture, perfume, construction materials and more.

• The funds were then laundered through a web of shell companies in many jurisdictions. The ultimate beneficial owner of many of these companies was Vladimir Plahotniuc.

• Plahotniuc was the creator and leader of this largest bank fraud in Moldovan history and the ultimate beneficiary of many of the funds.

The court concluded:

“this sentence will not create feelings of injustice, but will serve as a guarantee that the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and in other state laws are protected, and that their violation is countered and sanctioned. For the reasons set out above, expressed both in favor of and against the defendant Vladimir Plahotniuc, as well as taking into account the identified aggravating circumstance, the panel of judges will opt to impose a sentence on the defendant in the form of imprisonment,”

Breaking Down the Sentence

The sentence broke down as follows:

• 13 years for the creation and management of a criminal organization

• 12 years for bank fraud in the years 2013-2014

• 12 years for bank fraud in the years 2014-2015

• 8 years for money laundering 2013-2014

• 8 years for money laundering 2014-2015

Once applying rules around concurrent sentencing as well as time served this netted out to 19 years.

Plahotniuc refused to attend his sentencing.

Appeals

Plahotniuc’s lawyers immediately indicated that they will appeal the ruling and attacked the credibility of both the court and evidence in public statements. Prosecutors stated that they will review the ruling and consider whether they will appeal as well. Prosecutors had requested a sentence of 25 years in prison in total.

We’ll take a deeper dive into the appeals process and what might come next below.

Further Cases

Prosecutors have noted that additional cases against Plahotniuc are ongoing and some will soon be in court. Specifically, cases against him for falsifying passports and identity documents while a fugitive are being built in collaboration with the jurisdictions involved in these false documents. Other complex cases in grand corruption continue to be investigated.

What it All Means

The conviction and sentencing of Plahotniuc is a milestone, not only for Moldova’s justice system but for the country’s democratic system as a whole. There are very few cases of any country holding a former authoritarian leader criminally accountable in a judicial process. Dictators often escape accountability entirely, or fall in violent revolutions without due process. Moldova has held the man who fully captured the state - as well as the justice system itself - legally accountable a mere 7 years after he fell from power.

Let’s take a look at what comes next in terms of appeals, what this means for Moldova’s justice reform and what is says about the standing of the man whose name people once feared to say aloud.

What the Conviction Says about Moldovan Justice

Read more

On the Sunday and Monday following Orthodox Easter Moldovans gather in the graveyards to commemorate a very Moldovan holiday, “Paștele Blajinilor,” often translated as Easter of the Dead. On this day Moldovans remember those who came before and gather in the graveyard for a picnic where they symbolically share food and wine with their lost relatives.

On the occasion, President Sandu put out Easter wishes writing:

“On Easter, we give ourselves the time to return to what really matters: our roots, our family, and the invisible thread that connects generations. Let us turn our thoughts these days to those who gave meaning to our path and who remain part of us, through everything they left us. And let us find in the moments spent with our loved ones, in peace and gratitude, the reconciliation we need and the strength to move forward,”

This is the last event of Moldova’s long Easter season - stretching from lent fasting through Catholic and Orthodox Easter and on to this very local commemoration. If you’d like to read more about Easter of the Dead we published a guest essay on the topic back in April 2024 which you can read here:

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Politics & News

Here are the top stories of the week:

• The Alternative Bloc and Faction continue to disintegrate. After Mayor Ceban confusingly announced that his MAN party would withdraw from the Alternative Bloc but remain in the Alternative parliamentary faction - while also loudly distancing itself from that faction - Mark Tkaciuk announced that his Civic Congress party was withdrawing from the parliamentary faction. He said that in a circumstance where MAN loudly distances itself from its partners the only honest move was to break away.

• The Central Election Commission (CEC) submitted plans for revising the electoral code for public consultations. The amendments envision tighter control over social media advertising, including parties declaring all their paid channels and platforms being required to report spending and targeting. The plan pays specific attention to Gagauzia, where the CEC proposes to add additional eligibility criteria for those standing for Bashkan. Specifically, a candidate for Bashkan would be required to speak both Gagauz and Romanian, be at least 35 years old and have lived in the region for at least 1 year. Additionally the amendments would restructure the Central Electoral Council of Gagauzia, reducing the membership from 9 to 7. Two members each would be appointed by the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, the Executive Committee of Gagauzia and the Comrat Court. One would be appointed by the CEC and the chair and vice chair of the CEC would be permitted to attended Central Electoral Council meetings without voting rights.

• The Electronic Government Agency (AGE) announced that digital ID documents through the EVO app will be useable for interactions with banks and government agencies by June. The agency plans to eliminate the requirement to personally visit agencies by Fall through the use of electronic signatures. EVO is part of the government’s plan to digitize 100% of state services by 2030.

• President Sandu commemorated the victims of the Stalinist Famines. She marked the occasion, commemorated on the 3rd Sunday in April, in the village of Mingir where 1400 people died in the famine - nearly half of the population. She stated:

“The famine of 1946–1947 affected hundreds of thousands of people and led to the loss of 200,000 lives. Figures that still terrify us today, but which cannot fully encompass the trauma that parents and children, young and old, went through,” (…)

“When the truth is told, even after decades, it brings justice. It helps us to understand, not to forget and not to repeat. And, above all, only the truth sets us free,”

• Local Public Administration (LPA) reform is becoming contentious. The MAN party protested last week against the planned reform calling it “a direct attack on local public administration” and claiming that PAS would use it to eliminate mayors from other parties. Meanwhile, activists like Vasile Tofan continue to give interviews calling for more radical reform and urging the government to think bigger. The government hopes to pass LPA reform this year but we are still at the early stages of what promises to be a long process.

Energy Crisis

The energy crisis caused by the American-Israeli war against Iran continues to create uncertainty in Europe’s energy markets. The fragile ceasefire and negotiations have caused fuel prices to drop slightly in Moldova, but diesel remains 51% more expensive than before the war started while gasoline is 23% more expensive. Fuel imports continue without issue and the country continues to maintain stockpiles of around 19 days of gasoline and 11 days of diesel. With the situation slightly stabilizing, on April 15th, Prime Minister Munteanu again announced that he would ask parliament to lift the State of Emergency. At the time of writing he has not yet done this, possibly owing to the holiday schedule.

Rising prices continue to have knock-on effects with Transnistria announcing a 17% increase in ticket prices for suburban buses and intercity transit. Moldova’s Lukoil stations also continue to operate as the Trump Administration extended waivers on American sanctions until October.

In order to help farmers with the near term diesel prices, and the projected medium term problems with fertilizer, the Ministry of Agriculture announced that they were creating a new component of the Agricultural Credit Facility Program to support loans for working capital. The program is set to launch through banks within 2 weeks and provide lines of credit up to 500,000 lei at a fixed 5.1% APR for 5 years. This support is targeted at “micro and small farmers1.”

Transnistria & Security

Here’s a roundup of the top security stories of the week:

• Chisinau has declared the leadership of the Russian army in Transnistria “undesirable.” Zona de Securitate has reported that the military commanders and their deputies will be blocked from entering Moldova. Transnistrian “Foreign Minister” Ignatiev called the move “unreasonable and destructive,” noting that the Russian army units and the Russian “Peacekeepers” are “a single entity” and saying that any restriction on their operations would “negatively impact the peacekeeping operation.”

• Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, General Kirill Budanov, says that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria is not part of peace negotiations with Russia. In an interview with Malenkaia Strana he called the troops there a “known threat” but stated that Ukraine is not putting this condition forward in order not to complicate the peace process.

• Romania is becoming a “boulevard for Russian drones.” That statement was made by former Romanian President Traian Băsescu who added “we are starting to look ridiculous.” The comments come after reports of multiple drone incursions into Romanian airspace in the delta region. DW reports that for multiple political and technical reasons Romania has made a decision not to shoot down these drones and to largely let them pass through the country’s airspace to attack Ukraine.

• The Russian Duma passed a bill in the first reading to allow the president to deploy military forces to “protect the rights of Russian citizens.” This bill focuses specifically on Russian citizens who are detained, arrested or prosecuted outside of Russia, and is likely being passed in the context of the EU’s proposals for setting up a “Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.”

• Alexandru Balan will be extradited to Moldova following sentencing. The former director of Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) pled guilty to divulging state secrets and was sentenced last week to 1.5 years in prison. He joined the court hearings via video call as he is currently under house arrest in Romania where he faces treason charges (he is also a Romanian citizen) and up to 20 years in prison. Those charges relate to his participation in a Belarusian spy ring where he was caught passing secrets to the KGB. Romania has agreed to extradite him to Moldova to begin serving his sentence.

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs stories of the week:

• President Sandu attended the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in Turkey. There she met on the sidelines with President Erdogan and discussed economic cooperation, attracting investments and “the protection of the Gagauz language and culture and joint support for the development of the region.” Turkey is Moldova’s 2nd largest export designation and the 4th largest source of foreign investment after Romania, Germany and France.

• A Moldovan Parliamentary Delegation held meetings in Washington DC. PAS MPs Radu Marian, Adrian Băluțel and Andrian Cheptonar, join Ambassador Vlad Kulminski for meetings with congressmen and Senators including Sen. Ted Budd (R-NC), Sen. Steve Daines (R-MT), Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Rep. Keith Self (R-TX), Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY), Rep. Pat Harrigan (R-NC), Rep. Deborah Rep. Ross (D-NC), Rep. Bill Keating (D-MA) and others. MP Radu Marian wrote of the trip:

“We are here to consolidate the partnership between our countries and strengthen the parliamentary dialogue with the US Congress. I reiterated that US support in combating Russian pressure on the Republic of Moldova has been, is and will be essential for Moldova to remain a free, democratic country and part of the free world. We share the same values ​​with the US,” (…)

“I thanked for the recent investment of 130 million dollars for the Straseni-Gutinas power line, which is to be built by an American company2. I mentioned that the Republic of Moldova is ideally positioned for American investors who want to scale production and support the reconstruction efforts of post-war Ukraine”

Khotyn Fortress Partially Collapses

Today we’re ending on a bit of a sad note with the news that the iconic Khotyn Fortress in Ukraine had a partial collapse of its outer wall. Khotyn is one of the castles and fortresses built by Stefan Cel Mare when he was Voivode of Moldavia. It’s an iconic castle that many readers will have seen before in movies and, in my case, on the cover of my 4th grade history textbook in Virginia.

Unbelievably, the collapse was caught on camera and can be viewed online here. So unbelievable was the story that the mayor of the town was forced to put out a statement saying:

“Unfortunately, it is not artificial intelligence. Yesterday (April 17, 2026), a very unpleasant and extreme emergency situation occurred in our beautiful Hotin fortress. Yes, there was a partial collapse on the great wall. And this collapse is very significant. Everyone is alive! Most importantly, no one was injured,”

The local authorities plan on restoring the wall in the future.

Lots of news happened while I was on a short vacation so today’s update is a bit long - but I really encourage you to grab a coffee and dig in because there was lots of important news.

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The State of Emergency in the Energy Sector to Continue

After initially indicating that he would ask parliament to lift the State of Emergency, Prime Minister Munteanu convened the National Crisis Management Center on April 2 and announced that the State of Emergency will continue. Following the repair of the Isaccea-Vulcănești high voltage line, the energy system remains unstable as engineers check the repair and make adjustments. At the same time, April-May is a critical time in Moldova’s energy sector as the Thermoelectric plants will soon cease central heating and return to summer mode - causing a loss of around 50% of domestic energy production.

Moreover, the authorities particularly highlighted the crisis caused by the War in Iran. With the country 100% reliant on fuel imports, the decision to maintain the State of Emergency will also let the government adapt quickly to this new and larger crisis. The temporary cease fire between the United States and Iran caused diesel prices to fall slightly, but uncertainty remains after talks in Pakistan failed to find a solution over this weekend.

Moldova’s Ministry of Defense announced that all Moldovan soldiers deployed as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are safe. Moldova has 32 peacekeepers deployed in south Lebanon with UNIFIL where they are serving alongside the Italian Army.

With these crises as a backdrop, Moldova announced a major milestone in the shift to renewables this week. The country has now exceeded 1 GW of installed renewable capacity, of which 73% is solar and 25% wind. The Ministry of Energy made the announcement stating:

“In the last five years, installed capacities have increased 13.23 times. Compared to 2020, when the total installed was only 77.37 MW, there is an increase of 946.05 MW, with 2025 playing a decisive role in this evolution,”

The Government Presents their Concept for LPA Reform

Alexei Buzu, Secretary General of the Government, unveiled the high level concept for the promised Local Public Administration (LPA) reform. He announced 4 objectives for the reforms, namely:

1. Strong mayors through administrative-territorial consolidation

2. Strong mayors through increased financial autonomy

3. Strong mayors through real institutional capacity

4. Strong mayors through transparency, accessible services and involved citizens

Essentially, they hope that efforts to create larger local government units will strengthen capacity and services at the local level. In order to accomplish these goals, the government laid out 3 high level changes:

• Voluntary amalgamation. The government has set a goal that no local authority (towns and villages) should have fewer than 3000 residents by 2027. Currently, 87% of town halls have fewer than 3000 residents. Buzu noted that 310 local councils are already starting the voluntary amalgamation process. At the same time, parliament is voting on legislation to simplify this process further. The reform plan provides for financial incentives for LPAs that chose to merge. Forced mergers for those that don’t is not spelled out but is heavily implied.

• Reducing the number of districts from 32 to 10. Moldova’s 32 raions (districts) would be replaced with 10 larger districts which Buzu said would be engines of regional development - managing roads and common infrastructure.

• Elevating Taraclia to a municipality with sub-LPAs. Essentially, the town government of Taraclia would be merged with the current Raion (district) government of Taraclia. Other towns and villages in the region would retain their local government. This would make the region something of a hybrid district-municipality. This special case is likely related to local demographics (see footnote1).

Secretary General Buzu explained the 3000 resident threshold saying:

“In the Republic of Moldova, out of 10 families that do not have sewage, 8 are in municipalities with a population of less than 3,000 inhabitants. Out of 10 families that do not have a water supply connection, 7 are in municipalities with a population of less than 3,000 inhabitants. This is the reality ,”

He went on to note how important it is for LPAs to have more capacity and expertise in order to attract funding through EU accession mechanisms and to implement local projects.

Business leader Vasile Tofan2 has emerged as a major critic to the proposal which he called “much too timid” and “too small for the size of the problem.” He stated:

“Local taxes in a town hall of 3-4 thousand people barely cover about 60% of the cost of the fiscal apparatus that collects them. In other words, almost 2 out of 3 lei in taxes are expenses on tax collectors - an absurd model ,”

Tofan went on to note that Romania averages 6000 residents per LPA and that these are going bankrupt. The country is exploring a move to a minimum of 18,000 residents. He explained:

“In other words, we are deliberately undertaking a very politically costly reform, unpopular anyway, in order to amalgamate at a level that was bankrupt from the start. What is the point of these costs then?”

Recent polling from IMAS has shown that 42% of citizens disapprove of the merging of city halls compared to 22% who consider is somewhat necessary, 18% who consider it important and only 7% who consider it extremely important. 65% oppose the merging of districts while 24% were in favor. The Socialist Party has called on the government to hold a referendum on the final plan.

Recall, Moldova Matters published an op-ed from Vasile Tofan on the subject in March:

News and Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• On April 2 parliament formally denounced Moldova’s membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The degree was immediately promulgated by President Sandu. Parliament cited Russia’s failure to uphold the CIS agreement by invading Georgia and Ukraine while maintaining illegal troop deployments in Moldova. This is the biggest step so far in Moldova’s attempts to remove itself from the 1991 agreement and its many sub agreements.

• Mayor Ceban announced that his MAN party was withdrawing from the Alternative Bloc. At the same time the party will remain in the Alternative Faction in parliament. Explaining the reason he stated “We dissociate ourselves from any actions and statements that contradict the interests of the people and the course of European integration.3”

• Moldova fell in the EIU Democracy Index, published by the Economist, from a “flawed democracy” to “hybrid regime.” The index measures various factors across 167 countries and did not publicly explain the change for Moldova or detail the methodology. The news caused lots of opinions and assessments in Moldova, with opposition parties celebrating and repeating lines about PAS capturing the state. Analysts suggested that the change was likely the methodology’s failure to account for hybrid attacks and the government’s response. IPRE Director Iulian Groza explained:

“In other words, a country that actively defends itself against hybrid aggression paradoxically pays a methodological price in the index for its own defensive measures,”

• Scandal at MediaCor - Yuri Dud’s interview with Denis Kapustin. Russian YouTuber Yuri Dud interviewed the leader of the Russian Volunteer Corps at the media center located on the State University campus. Kapustin is banned from the Schengen area and has been widely described as a neo-Nazi. His volunteer corps fights for Ukraine with a manifesto focused on overthrowing Putin and creating a Russian ethnostate. The Ministry of Education promised an investigation into how the interview took place at MediaCor, while the center’s management put out a statement saying that they do “not intervene in the selection of guests or in the editorial content of the materials produced” in the center.

• No Easter benefits this year. Minister of Labor and Social Protection Natalia Plugaru answered a reporters question on the topic saying that the focus was instead on winter heating compensation. Last year (an election year) more than 230,000 people benefited from one time holiday payments of between 1500 and 5000 lei. Meanwhile, Alexandr Stoianoglo proposed a bill in parliament to give an Easter Amnesty and drop all charges and fines related to electoral bribery and vote selling. While he couched the bill in religious terms, it was hard to avoid the fact that these voters were largely bribed by the Shor network to vote for him.

• PPDA connections with Shor? Vasile Costiuc’s Democracy at Home (PPDA) party announced that their candidate for Orhei Mayor this year will be Victor Perțu. This means that Unionist party PPDA is running a former senior member of the Shor party and campaigner for the Pobeda Bloc in one of the most significant mayor’s races in the country. Costiuc initially dodged questions about the nomination before giving this answer filled with confusing and unsubstantiated allegations:

“if the man is not officially banned from holding office, if he is not convicted, if he has not stolen and is not under criminal investigation, I do not see the logic in talking about a man who, what did he do? Carp and Maia Sandu participated in the theft of the billion”

• Minister of Finance Andrian Gavriliță announced that the President and Prime Minister are getting a raise. Currently President Sandu is the lowest paid head of state in Europe with a salary of just 22,000 lei / month. The Prime Minister currently earns 17,000 lei. In the last PAS term, salaries for ministers and other high level officials were raised but these top positions were skipped due to political sensitivities. The Socialists and other opposition parties regularly call for ministers to earn no more than a minimum pension. Responding to this expected criticism, the Minister of Finance stated that a “worthy country cannot pretend that politicians do not need salaries. I propose to citizens to beware of politicians who tell them that they will work even without salaries.”

International Affairs

Here’s a roundup of the top foreign policy stories of the week:

• Europe has woken up to a future without Viktor Orban. Responding to the landslide victory of pro-EU reformer Peter Magyar, President Sandu posted congratulations writing:

“Moldova looks forward to accelerating our partnership with Hungary — building on the friendship that unites our people — and to working together for a stronger, more united, resilient Europe.”

• US Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) visited Chisinau on a working trip. The ranking member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee met with President Sandu and discussed the regional security situation, EU integration and joint US-Moldovan projects.

• A group of opposition MPs traveled to Georgia to meet with parliamentary factions and the Georgian Dream government. The group included Igor Dodon, 2 other socialist MPs, an MP from Alternative and Vasile Costiuc of PPDA. PAS and Our Party declined to join the delegation. Following meetings, Igor Dodon suggested that Georgia’s political situation4 “is a good example, which Moldova should follow.”

Transnistria and Security News

Here’s a roundup of the top security stories of the week:

• Mihail Podoleak, advisor to President Zelenskyy, confirmed that mines were placed on some parts of the border with Transnistria. He explained that this was a precaution against Russia being tempted to use the region to conduct strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics.

• On April 3 another Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace before returning to Ukraine.

• The “authorities” in Tiraspol premiered a new “documentary” titled “The Transnistrian People: Forged Over the Centuries.” The propaganda film, largely made with AI, sought to position the “Transnistrian people” at the center of various major historical events in Europe.

• Former Transnistrian official Ruslan Mova was denied entry into Moldova. Mova is the former head of the region’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and was one of 9 regional officials stripped of their Moldovan citizenship by President Sandu in February. The motivation for Mova was his direction of, and participation in, the imprisonment of political prisoners and repression against the population. He left Chisinau on a Ukrainian passport and was stopped on March 30 trying to renter the country. With Moldova controlling 100% of the active “border crossings” into Transnistria, this means that officials who lose their citizenship due to human rights abuses risk either being trapped in the region, or trapped outside of it.

• Ion Chirița and Nikita Sirenko were convicted and sentenced in relation to their participation in training camps in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The men were part of Shor’s efforts to prepare for mass riots and violent demonstrations around the 2024 presidential elections. In particular, they were trained in piloting and using military style drones and making explosives and incendiary devices. The men admitted their action but claimed they were patsies for others. Ion Chirița was sentenced to 3 years in prison, suspended, and Nikita Sirenko was sentenced to 3.5 years with 3 years suspended. Sirenko, a Finnish citizen, will be expelled from Moldova at the end of his sentence.

• The US Department of Justice alongside European partners including Ukraine and Romania dismantled a worldwide network of infected home routers. The hack, directed by Russia’s GRU, used DNS poisoning to monitor traffic and create phony websites in order to capture login details and monitor messaging and emails. If you want to read more about this tactic, and how it was used to attack Moldova’s elections, see my recent report:

Economics and Infrastructure

Here’s a roundup of the top economic stories of the week:

• Moody’s has upgraded Moldova’s credit rating from B3 to B2. This is the highest credit rating for the country in 25 years. The company cited ongoing reforms, progress on EU accession and a “demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to shocks” - noting particularly the pivot away from Russian energy, efforts which they say have “contributed to an overall reduction in Moldova’s political event risk from previously very high levels.” New reports show that Moldova’s external debt was €10.11 billion euros as of December 31, 2025. This is up 2.4% since 2024 but down 2.7% as a percent of GDP. The vast majority of these loans are long term and at favorable interest rates from the IMF (27%), World Bank (26%), European Commission (15%), EBRD (7.8%) and others.

• The Ministry of Finance will delay VAT taxes on small imports until Fall. The imposition of VAT on parcels under €150 euros was planned to come into effect in July but has now been moved with a planned testing period in September and full implementation in October.

• Parliament is working to replace the Prima Casa (First House) program. High demand has led to the year’s funds for the program already being depleted on April 1st. Prima Casa is a subsidized preferential mortgage program with lower rates and a minimum down payment. The program will continue through banks, but government funds for additional subsidies for first home buyers are depleted. Critics of the program and its expansion under the last parliament say that it created demand for housing exceeding the supply resulting in a run up in pricing. That happened, and now the real estate market has essentially stalled with Q1 sales down 80% year on year. Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on the Economy, Budget and Finance, Radu Marian stated that the program “must be replaced with a mechanism that will stimulate the construction of new affordable apartments, rather than create pressure on the market through increased demand.” This new mechanism to encourage the construction of affordable housing will be announced soon.

• Parliament has introduced a draft law to eliminate tariffs on American goods. The law would have exceptions for local products including beef, pork, poultry and dairy. Speaker Grosu presented it as a “reciprocal gesture5” for the US dropping tariffs on Moldova from 25% to 10%, and spoke about the substantial support provided to Moldova from the United States including in energy infrastructure.

Crime, Corruption and Justice Reform

On March 31st anti-corruption police (CNA) and Anti-Corruption Prosecutors announced the detention of 4 police employees and 1 prosecutor for:

“complicity in passive corruption, manifested by the illicit demand of 400 thousand dollars for the settlement of a criminal case .”

Allegedly the accused demanded this bribe to sway the outcome of an undisclosed money laundering case. Newsmaker reported that other officers of the police unit, the National Investigation Inspectorate (INI), felt that their fellow officers were being detained on flimsy evidence. Many officers attempted to join the preliminary court hearings but were not let in. There were rumors that members of the INI resigned en-masse, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs responded saying that “There were dissatisfactions. We worked with the management team, both of the INI and the IGP. Today, this team is intact.”

Details on the alleged bribery are scant so we’ll return to this story as it develops.

Some of my thoughts and memories about Moldova’s April 2009 protests which occurred in the immediate aftermath of the parliamentary elections.

I remember my lunch on April 5, 2009, because I never finished eating those crispy fried potatoes with pickled tomatoes. It was still Great Lent, ahead of Orthodox Easter on April 19th, during which my family observed a strict 49-day diet that excluded meat, dairy, and fish.

“Who did you vote for?” my mother asked.

To this day, after voting in four Moldovan and two Romanian elections, I have never had my family ask me that question. It has never quite been a topic of conversation in our family, not because it is a secret, but because there is a degree of trust in each other’s judgment. Election day has always been a huge event for my family. My mom has been a poll watcher for over a decade, likely since the 2011 local elections. I recall getting back from summer camp during the coldest rainstorm of June, waiting to see her because it was my first time away from home. She was running the mobile ballot box and stopped by for five minutes to hug me when she happened to be in the neighborhood. Equally, during the electoral season, we always gathered in front of the TV to watch the debates and interviews. As I grew up, I became increasingly impatient to vote. When I was 16, my Facebook post urging people to vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections went viral, with a few media outlets sharing it. I exercised my right to vote for the first time just hours before boarding my one-way flight to Canada, during the 2020 presidential election. But to this day, I can’t forget that bitter feeling, paralyzing my mouth, and the pit in my stomach, growing slowly as I lay there trying to sleep, while the TV was playing in the background, showing the election results.

“Why does it matter?” asked my grandmother.

My grandmother was born in the middle of World War II, when Moldova was already bleeding red. She would rarely talk about the Soviet Union, even when I asked her to. She spoke about the kolkhoz and the early-morning harvesting of tobacco leaves, the boarding school where she worked as a custodian and overnight guardian, and her unhappy marriage that left her grey-haired at 30.

My grandmother did not look up as my mother started scolding her. Whenever difficult conversations arose, she would stare into the distance, and after a while grow prickly, taking umbrage at every little thing. My mother, on the other hand, leaves the room when a conversation gets heated, to avoid saying something she might later regret. I found her on the stairs leading to our terrace, which opens onto the main street of our village. You could see anyone passing by, but also the grand forest unraveling across the long, stretching hills. I sat next to her for a while without saying anything. I was not angry at my grandmother, but I could understand my parents’ frustration.

The aftermath of those elections saw the most violent protests in Moldova’s history since gaining its independence. Like most of the countries in the Soviet Union, Moldova gained its independence without bloodshed. Between 1991 and 2009, it was only the casualties during the war in Transnistria in 1992 that represented a dark page in the country’s history.

The next day, there was fire on the TV. I remember seeing young faces and the police with their tall riot shields and nightsticks. To this day, I can’t quite stand the view of a cylindrical baton despite its purpose. I remember the fire. On the stairs of the Parliament Building and inside the Presidential Palace.

It all happened very quickly or, perhaps, incredibly slowly. Or maybe, all at once? After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic states moved swiftly to rebuild their political and economic systems through lustration and shock therapy, overhauling everything at once rather than pursuing gradual reform. Moldova, like many other former Soviet republics, opted for a more gradual approach. That was mainly because the political system was largely inherited by the Old Guard, who clung to power. The Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), led by Vladimir Voronin, was one such example.

I thought about this as I was writing the date in my notebook at the beginning of my Post-Communist Transformations class. Coincidence or not, on April 7th, we covered the Color Revolutions and transitional justice. One of the assigned readings states that, in Moldova, “the ten years that politicians spent debating lustration, starting in 2000, allowed the communist elite to retain and convert its economic and political clout” (Vacroux 2018, 357). And memories started playing out before my eyes, moving through time, bringing me back to our black, box-shaped TV bought in 1996. I was 6 in April of 2009. But there is something about seeing a revolution for the first time that makes the memory untouchable. There is something about your parents’ fury and the red segment growing on the screen longer and longer as the Communist Party gains more and more votes.

PCRM had been in power since 2001. Moldova followed the pattern of a post-communist comeback, in which the old regime returned in the second or third election after independence, despite the initial victory of non-communist candidates. This has been the case in many former communist countries, such as Hungary, where the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), led by József Antall, won the 1990 election. Still, four years later, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the successor to the former ruling communist party, won an absolute majority, securing 209 of 386 seats. In 2001, PCRM secured 71 out of 101 seats in the Parliament. At that time, Moldova was a parliamentary republic in which the legislature elected the head of state. PCRM, holding the parliamentary majority, thus unilaterally elected Voronin as the president.

Communists maintained power in the 2005 elections as well, winning 45.98% of the vote and 56 seats. However, they fell short of the 61-seat supermajority required to elect the president on their own. Voronin was re-elected with the support of the Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD), which had been one of his more vocal opponents, the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM), and the Social-Liberal Party (PSL). And on the night of April 5th to 6th of 2009, we went to bed knowing that the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) had counted enough votes to declare PCRM’s victory.

But the next morning, after CEC processed 96.51% of the tally sheets from polling stations, PCRM emerged with 49.94% of the vote and 60 seats, and young protesters began gathering in the Great National Assembly Square (Piața Marii Adunări Naționale), claiming the election was rigged and demanding a rerun.

The independent Moldovan newspaper Ziarul de Gardă reports that the message communicated online to bring people together was: “Young people declare April 7th a day of national mourning in the Republic of Moldova.” The political opposition also amplified this message, calling for a boycott of the election.

The protests started peacefully, with participants holding signs reading “Better dead than communist”, “Wake up, drugged homeland”, “No to election fraud”, “Down with the communist clan”. Thus, in the afternoon of April 7th, the central Chișinău saw at least 30,000 protesters rallying against the election results. As the day turned to evening, the protest grew increasingly violent.

The protesters first started throwing stones into the Parliamentary and Presidential buildings, which later escalated into full-scale fire as they stormed the buildings. Moldova’s PROTV’s coverage wrote about Voronin’s portraits being set on fire while the protesters chanted “Fight, Resist, I am anti-communist!”

While the protests turned violent with the destruction of state property, a young student, Dragoș Musteață, hoisted the European Union and Romanian flags on the Parliamentary and Presidential buildings. Later, he’d recall his act as one through which he wanted to signal that the buildings “belonged” to a European future rather than the communist regime, theoretically removing the incentive for protesters to vandalize them. The protests saw the Romanian (and EU) flags with a frequency perhaps last seen in the late 89s to early 90s, when the pan-Romanian movement gained incredible momentum.

In the evening, the Moldovan police fired rubber bullets at demonstrators in the Square to disperse them, also deploying tear gas and water cannons. Many protesters were also severely beaten by police. This escalated into intense altercations between police and protesters, with at least 193 demonstrators, mainly students, being detained. Seventeen years later, Marian Macovei, who was 32 at the time and ended up physically paralyzed in the following years as a result of the police brutality, would recall the basement of the Buiucani Police Station, where he was taken, as the “corridors of death.” Many of those detained suffered violent mistreatment while in police custody.

At the same time, the PCRM was busy pointing fingers at the political opposition, accusing the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Our Moldova Alliance of organizing a “coup “ that formed a human shield of students, high school students, and pupils, whom they instigated to come to the square. But the blame did not stop at the Prut, as the Moldovan communists also accused Bucharest of attempted coup d’état, given the omnipresence of Romanian symbols during the protests. While the unionist movement that sought to merge Moldova and Romania together never quite disappeared, it most certainly weakened in the late 90s. The sudden resurgence of unionist sentiment added another pressure point for the communist regime. The communists moved swiftly: the Romanian Ambassador to Moldova, Filip Teodorescu, and counselor Ioan Gaborean were expelled, visas were reinstated for Romanian citizens, and Romanian journalists were denied entry into Moldova.

On the other hand, Voronin immediately called Moscow, which in turn called on the European Union and Romania to intervene and prevent what he described as threats to Moldova’s sovereignty. For Lavrov, who even 17 years ago was still Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Romanian flags and Romanian slogans were being used as a “cover” to undermine Moldova’s sovereignty.

What happened to the political opposition that called Moldovans to take to the streets while comfortably shielded in their own residences? Vlad Filat, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), served as the Prime Minister from 2009 to 2013, and was sentenced to 9 years in prison in 2016 for passive corruption. Nevertheless, Filat was released at the end of 2019 through a compensatory appeal, which was implemented to address human rights violations within the prison system. At the end of 2025, Filat was placed on an international wanted list following a French court’s money laundering conviction.

Another opposition figure was Mihai Ghimpu, leader of the Liberal Party (PL), who served as acting President of Moldova and President of the Parliament for a year after the protests. I grew up knowing Ghimpu as the most vocal supporter of reunification with Romania, but also as the uncle of Chișinău’s mayor at the time, Dorin Chirtoacă. Chirtoacă took over the PL’s leadership at the end of 2018; however, the PL never returned to Parliament after the 2019 elections.

Serafim Urecheanu is a name I have not heard in a long time, but in 2009, he led Our Moldova Alliance, which, a few years later, merged with Filat’s PLDM. At last, he pretty much vanished from Moldova’s political landscape. Marian Lupu is a name one won’t hear often these days, but back in 2005, he was elected as the President of the Parliament as a PCRM member. After calling the April protests “an attempted coup d’état” organized by the political opposition, Lupu became part of it, serving as Moldova’s interim president from 2010 to 2012. Today, Lupu is remembered mostly for his ties to Moldova’s oligarch, Vlad Plahotniuc, who chaired PDM for three years before fleeing Moldova in 2019.

These figures greatly benefited from the protests, gaining general support. For that time, they felt like a breath of fresh air, and that’s why young Moldovans took it to the Assembly Square. They successfully marketed themselves as the carriers of the “European dream” by positioning themselves against the outdated, intransigent, and, ultimately, morally corrupt communists. Perhaps their perceived legitimacy rested solely on this contrast because, after the protests were cracked down on and the CEC confirmed PCRM’s victory once again, Moldova entered a deep political crisis of polarization, leaving the country without a president for almost 3 years. Because the head of state required a 61-seat supermajority that the PCRM lacked, the Parliament was so divided that it failed to cooperate on electing a president.

Certainly, the stakes were incredibly high in the past two elections, in 2024 and 2025. However, looking back, I can’t quite think of an election that has marked Moldova more than April 2009. This is the closest Moldova came to a revolution. Some call the protests the Twitter Revolution because the protesters mobilized online, but also because it was a youth movement, and Twitter at the time stood for youthful innovation and breakthroughs, which the Moldovan opposition wanted to be associated with.

Yet the Twitter Revolution, if you will, is not regarded in Western scholarship as part of the chain of revolutions in former communist states, starting with Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 and continuing with the Orange Revolution and later the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. If one insists on a narrow theoretical framework in which the label of “revolution” is granted only where there is some degree of continuity, Moldova’s April protests are not even considered part of the club of attempted revolutions that Azerbaijan (2005), Belarus (2006), and Russia (2011-12) share. I do find this omission significant because the protests’ organization, intentions, and consequences closely resemble those of a revolution. A revolution is typically led by a counter-elite, with high mass participation, occurring bottom-up, aiming at the fundamental transformation of the political class and the socio-economic system, and resulting in a new political class, new institutions, and new property relations (Lane 2009).

But I do not think the events of April 2009 represent a turning point in Moldova’s consciousness merely because they loosely fit the scholarly definition of revolution.

April 2009 was of paramount importance because it showed, and continues to show, that Moldova has not done its work on the transitional justice chapter. It is important to return to the fact that people mobilized following the alleged victory of the communists, a party that stands for so much suffering inflicted on Moldova. A party that brought not only a painful geopolitical rupture embodied by the USSR’s annexation of Moldova from Romania, but also a fracture in Moldova’s identity that remains difficult to reckon with. The Moldovan educational system is exceptional in the weight it places on the study of history, with particular attention to the Soviet Union and the damage it caused to Moldova through the Stalinist deportations, during which so many Romanian-Bessarabian families were callously persecuted and murdered, the demographic engineering, collectivization, and rapid industrialization, all of which have left deep legacies on the Moldova we live in today. And yes, victims of the communist regime are mourned and remembered. But transitional justice is two-dimensional: for it to be effective, perpetrators must also be punished and denounced. Today, this remains a difficult thing to do, mostly because a lot of time has passed.

Yet politicians proudly continue their careers wielding Soviet symbols, like the red star of the PSRM and the hammer and sickle of the PCRM. Moreover, they actively court Russia’s president, who, besides all the war crimes he is committing in Ukraine, wholeheartedly believes the dissolution of the USSR “was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

I think April 2009 marks the apogee of a contradiction in Moldovan national identity, which sought to resolve itself through the removal of the Communist Party. What complicates its aftermath is not the failure to achieve that aim, but the absence of meaningful and sustained reckoning with the violence and brutality of the protests. This left intact the same dynamic of the early post-communist years: victims are remembered, but few are held accountable. That unaddressed gap, I believe, is one of the many fault lines that run through Moldova’s identity. The first step to shrink this gap would be to fully declassify the files related to the April 2009 protests and continue the investigations into the gross human rights violations that occurred.

While the most immediate consequence of failing to deliver justice is the complete alienation of firsthand victims, the longer-term risk of leaving such trauma unaddressed is its diffusion into the broader public consciousness, which will fossilize over time into a collective victim mentality. A victim mentality at the national level manifests as learned helplessness, in which suffering becomes so central to a country’s self-understanding that it displaces agency. It is the difference between a nation that says “this was done to us” and one that also asks “what do we do about it.” Moldova has an abundance of the former and a deficit of the latter. Decades of deportations, forced collectivization, linguistic suppression, and political pressure by the Soviet Union and, later, Russia, have given Moldovans every reason to see themselves as a people acted upon rather than acting.

April has always been a particularly strange month for me. Running on cereals and bread during the last weeks of Great Lent, pruning the grapevines in our vineyard, planting potatoes and onions and garlic and everything else I can’t think of but that surely grows in my parents’ garden, and covering the tree trunks with slacked lime… And hoping, so desperately hoping, that the temperature will not drop overnight so the blossoming trees and the plants don’t freeze… And the air, saturated with pollen, grows stifling, the church bells ring and ring, and the swallows begin building their nests under the eaves of our house…

One of my favorite poems is T.S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” which opens with the line “April is the cruelest month.” Eliot’s wasteland is built on the ruins of World War I, where the cruelties of war emerge from the “forgetful snow” as it melts with the arrival of spring. The poem paints a blurry picture of loss, distortion, and disorientation: the tragedy has already occurred, yet the visceral, restless imagery conveys a sense of looming threat, as if the worst is still somehow ahead. I wonder whether we do something similar with April 2009 every time we return to it… whether memory, revisited enough times, becomes its own distortion. So much has happened in between, events that have reshaped how Moldovans see themselves and the world around them. But that feeling of something unresolved keeps haunting us, and maybe it grows a little stronger in April.

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On 7 April 2009, in the Republic of Moldova, one could see perhaps for the first time so clearly the rupture between society’s democratic instinct and the reflexes of a system that had failed to understand that history had already moved in a different direction.

For many citizens, especially young people, that moment was one of political and moral awakening. It marked the emergence of a generation that no longer accepted fear, lies, or geopolitical captivity. In essence, it was a pro-European revolution, captured in a slogan well known across Europe: “Refuse! Resist! I am anti-communist.”

But it was also a stolen revolution. Not because the European idea disappeared - on the contrary, it endured and grew stronger. It was “stolen” because the energy of that moment was not translated quickly enough into a strategic reconstruction of the state.

We experienced alternations of power, grand speeches, and historic promises, but delayed the difficult decisions for too long: cleansing institutions, breaking away from toxic dependencies, exiting geopolitical ambiguity, addressing the banking fraud, and dismantling a captured state.

This is why, following last year’s decisive parliamentary elections, the year 2028 is no longer seen merely as a technical milestone in the EU negotiation calendar. It is a test of maturity and social cohesion.

The President of Finland, Alexander Stubb, put it simply and clearly: foreign policy rests on three pillars: values, interests, and power. For the Republic of Moldova, this formula says a great deal.

We clearly have values and interests. Our values are freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human dignity. Our interests are peace, security, development, and accession to a space of prosperity governed by rules.

Power, in the hard sense of the word, is usually the privilege of larger actors. But this is precisely where the intelligence of a small state begins: the ability to turn cooperation into influence and diplomacy into relevance.

In this context, the recent vote by 60 Members of Parliament to withdraw from the core agreements of the CIS is a delayed but necessary strategic correction.

It is evident that we are not losing jobs by leaving the CIS. Moldova’s economy is already integrated with the European Union. Trade data shows that the EU is by far Moldova’s main trading partner: in 2025, around 67% of Moldovan exports went to the EU market, compared to just 4.5% to the CIS, of which only 1.5% went to Russia.

We are not losing markets. A healthy economy exports where there are rules, predictability, and respect for contracts. The wine and fruit embargoes, energy blackmail, and the use of trade as a political weapon have demonstrated the opposite.

Membership in the CIS has not protected us from Russian pressure, from ongoing cognitive warfare, from the instrumentalisation of Transnistria or Gagauzia against Chișinău, from attempts to polarize society along linguistic, identity, or religious lines, or from persistent attacks on our security.

Cooperation with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and others can continue bilaterally, pragmatically, based on mutual interest.

Georgia left the CIS in 2009 after the 2008 Russian invasion. Ukraine has drastically reduced its participation and has repeatedly withdrawn from agreements following Russia’s aggression, which began in 2014 and escalated with the full-scale invasion.

Why now? Because the economic, institutional, and political future of the Republic of Moldova lies where investments, development funds, credible standards, and reliable markets are—and that is in the European Union.

The EU Growth Plan for Moldova, worth up to €1.9 billion for 2025–2027, is concrete proof that Europe is investing in our transformation. In March 2026, Chișinău received a second tranche following the implementation of a new package of reforms.

This is the key point: the European Union offers the opportunity, but it is Moldova’s mission to turn it into reality.

The EU is more than economic benefits. It is a community of values - freedom, democracy, the rule of law.

This is why the 2028 deadline must be respected. Beyond political slogans, it represents a historic window of opportunity. Analyses by the European Initiative clearly indicate that 2028 is seen as the target year for signing the accession treaty, allowing ratification to follow within a realistic timeframe up to 2030.

Public support confirms this trajectory: a recent ATES poll shows that 62.1% of respondents in Moldova would vote for EU accession, rising to 84.3% among the diaspora.

The window of EU accession also points towards Romania. A recent statement from Bucharest by Romania’s President, Nicușor Dan, that Romania will continue to support Moldova’s EU integration and “the integration of our two economies” signals a shift in paradigm—from political support to real economic integration.

This means infrastructure interconnection, cross-border investments, energy cooperation, logistics, companies, joint projects, and tangible improvements in everyday life. Moldova thus becomes not just a subject of solidarity for Romania, but a strategic constant on both the public and private agenda.

Recent crises confirm this direction. Russia is well aware of Moldova’s vulnerabilities and exploits them, including through attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure that indirectly target our country.

Following strikes at the end of March, authorities in Chișinău warned of serious risks to energy stability, with Energocom managing a deficit of around a quarter of daily consumption.

This situation was overcome thanks to partners from Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland - four of which are EU Member States.

The direction is clear: interconnection with Romania, coordination with Ukraine, access to the European market, diversification, local sources, and renewable energy development.

Renewable energy usage in Moldova has experienced rapid growth, with installed capacity increasing 12-fold over the last five years, with an impressive 1 gigawatt registered in April. This is the path towards genuine energy security and beating already in 2025 Moldova’s own target of 25% renewable usage ahead of the 2027 deadline.

On the Nistru River, the lesson is equally clear. Contamination following Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure triggered an environmental alert across the basin.

Parliament explicitly condemned Russia, the Government activated emergency mechanisms including European ones available to candidate countries and institutions continue to document damages.

Here, Moldova’s diplomacy has a major mission: to transform an ecological crisis into a solid case of international accountability for transboundary damage.

In other words, diplomacy means linking our crises to European and international mechanisms of support, explaining why Moldova’s security is part of Europe’s security, and turning vulnerability into legitimacy and cooperation into results.

For a small country, smart diplomacy is one of the few forms of power available.

This is why 7 April 2009 must be read today not only as memory, but as a warning. A generation took to the streets then for a different future.

It would be unjust - and strategically irresponsible - to miss this moment again. Leaving the CIS alone will not solve everything. Nor can EU support replace our own internal effort.

But together, these developments show that Moldova has finally begun to align its compass in the right direction.

The slogan of the 7 April generation can now be updated:
“Refuse! Resist! I am a convinced pro-European.”

2028 is our obligation to those who believed in freedom on 7 April, to those who want security, jobs, clean water, stable energy, and institutions that respect them.

It is a national effort in which everyone must be called upon to contribute - so that, this time, we succeed together.

Daniel Vodă is an Associated Expert in Foreign Policy and Strategic Communication at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). Between 2020 and 2025, he served as Spokesperson for the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.

This report examines the intersection of three elements that, taken together, form a coherent operational architecture: political organizations such as Evrazia, financial platforms such as A7 and cryptocurrency-based payment systems. These components do not operate independently - they form an integrated system designed to move money across borders, obscure its origins and deliver it efficiently to actors engaged in political and hybrid warfare activity.

At the center of this system is A7A5, a ruble-backed stablecoin linked to Promsvyazbank (PSB) and developed within Russia’s emerging sanctions-resistant financial ecosystem. At first glance, A7A5 appears to be part of a broader effort to create alternatives to Western financial infrastructure. However, its role is more complex. Rather than serving as a destination asset, A7A5 appears to function as a bridge - facilitating the movement of funds from the Russian financial system into more liquid and widely usable cryptocurrencies.

This distinction is critical. Evidence from Moldovan investigations suggests that election-related payments were not conducted in A7A5, but in widely accepted stablecoins such as USDT. This raises a key question: if A7A5 is not the end point, what role does it play?

The answer lies in liquidity. This report argues that A7A5 and the broader A7 system are best understood not as standalone financial products, but as components of a larger mechanism designed to convert constrained, sanctioned capital into globally usable digital assets. In this context, cryptocurrency is not simply a tool of convenience - it is an enabling layer for political operations.

By tracing how funds move from Russian financial institutions through intermediary systems and into operational use in Moldova, this report aims to clarify how financial innovation is reshaping the landscape of election interference.

Today I’m sharing a report I authored on the financial architecture and use of cryptocurrency in election interference as well as the broader Shor network. The whole report is shared below with Moldova Matters readers, but you can also access it on the Watchdog site at this link.

The Shor Network

Ilan Shor is a fugitive Moldovan oligarch best known as the mastermind of the “Theft of the Billion” for which he was convicted in absentia in 2023 and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Since fleeing Moldova for Israel in 2019, and later to Russia, Shor has built up a broad network that mixes financial crime with functions promoting Russian foreign policy including sanctions evasion and hybrid warfare.

Three core elements of this network are as follows:

• Political Parties - Following the dissolution of the Shor Party in 2023, the network has relied on the unregistered “Pobeda” (Victory) Bloc. This bloc was formed in Moscow and acts as a political center for Shor’s various candidates and splinter parties operating in Moldova.

• NGO “Evrazia” - This Russia-based NGO that functions as a parallel political infrastructure. They distribute funds - including voter bribery efforts, payments to co-opted priests, “social support” payments to communities and more. Evrazia organized trips for young “activists” for trainings in Russia, which led to follow on trainings on weapons use and violent tactics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The NGO sits at the core of influence operations including efforts targeting populations outside of Moldova. It also hires staff for the command and control infrastructure that operates as “managers of pro-Russian party campaigners“ - overseeing political strategy and operations for pro-Russian parties in Moldova.

• A7 - A Moscow-linked financial structure associated with Ilan Shor and his network, identified by EU sanctions as being involved in efforts to influence Moldova’s elections and political processes. It functions as a financial and operational platform - enabling the movement of funds, including through digital or crypto-based tools - to support pro-Șor political activities, sanctions evasion efforts and broader destabilization efforts.

These elements of the Shor network do not operate as distinct entities and have been reported to share office space. They work together towards a goal of creating new captured states under Russian control.

The US, UK and EU have targeted elements and individuals of the Shor network for their role in trying to subvert Moldova’s elections. But the network is not only operating in Moldova. Evrazia is actively involved in Kyrgyzstan where they work to prop up the government with a familiar toolkit. They train journalists, have launched a TV station and Evrazia funded the creation of “Eurasia Park” in Bishkek similar to OrheiLand and GagauziaLand parks in Moldova. RISE Moldova has also reported that the President of Kyrgyzstan Sadyr Japarov uses a plane that has been painted with the name and symbols Kyrgyz Republic but is owned by Ilan Shor.

The financial services company A7 acts as a facilitator for the network’s political operations as well as for sanctions evasion. It has grown to be the part of the network with the largest international footprint with operations inside and outside of Russia including in the Middle East and Africa.

How A7 Works

In October 2024 investigative journalists at RISE Moldova reported that Ilan Shor had begun registering a new network of companies in Russia. The main company in this cluster is called A7, and there are more companies with varying names such as A7-Agent, A71 and more. While it wasn’t initially known what the purpose of these companies was, it was notable who Shor’s business partner was - Russian state owned Promsvyazbank (PSB). Shor owns 51% of A7, while the sanctioned bank owns the other 49%. PSB is sanctioned by the US, EU, Canada, UK, and other nations as a “core bank for Russia’s defense sector.” It is nominally cut off from global financial flows via the SWIFT network. PSB was also one of the primary partners in Shor’s voter bribery schemes during the 2024 Moldovan elections.

Subsequent reporting showed that the purpose of the A7 network of companies is to facilitate cross border payments and currency trades between Russia and the rest of the world. A7 created the crypto stablecoin A7A5 as one of their key tools in this effort1.

A7 was sanctioned by the UK in May 2025, the EU in July 2025 and the US in August 2025.

A7A5 as a Financial Bridge

While most cryptocurrencies’ values fluctuate according to market speculation, “stablecoins” are pegged to fiat currencies 1:1. The most famous of them is USDT (US Dollar Tether). For every $1 of USDT purchased, a real $1 of USD is held by the company behind USDT. A7A5 is the first ruble-backed stablecoin. Purchases of A7A5 are (allegedly) 1:1 pegged with ruble deposits in PSB bank.

The stablecoin is technically registered in Bishkek Kyrgyzstan and operates under that country’s pro-crypto regulatory structure. Since it was launched in January 2025 the currency has seen rapid adoption, with the Blockchain analysis company Elliptic estimating aggregate volume of transactions around $100 billion in 20252.

Initially A7A5 launched on the sanctioned Moscow based crypto exchange called Garantex. In March 2025 an operation by the US Secret Service, in partnership with German and Finnish law enforcement, forced the exchange offline and froze wallets holding USDT. Elliptic aided in this operation and subsequently tracked the transfer of A7A5 and other crypto assets out of Garantex to a new, Bishkek based, crypto exchange called Grinex. According to a spokesperson from Elliptic, they found pictures of Garantex offices with the company logo and A7A5 logo displayed prominently suggesting a connection between the entities.

The main purpose of A7A5 is as a facilitator for the purchase of USDT. Election interference operations and sanctions evasion require hard currency such as USDT that can easily be converted to fiat currencies. At the same time, the centralized nature of USDT means that the issuing company, Tether, can freeze wallets due to sanctions violations. One use of A7A5 is as a safe storage location for funds when they are not being moved. When it’s time to make a transaction, the user buys USDT with their A7A5 on a decentralized exchange, makes a transfer and the receiver gets the money and quickly changes it back to A7A5 or into hard currency. Since the USDT never sits in a wallet it is very hard for the authorities to freeze it.

While there are lots of stablecoins in the world, A7A5 is unique as the first state-supported example. In October 2025 the Russian Central Bank recognized A7A5 as a “digital financial asset” - the first of any kind in Russia. This legalized it for foreign trade. In February 2026 Vladimir Putin joined a ribbon cutting ceremony at the opening of an A7 branch in Vladivostok via video link. A7A5 and the wider A7 network have been positioned as a major part of Russia’s financial infrastructure.

A7A5’s Liquidity Issues

The main purpose of A7A5 is to provide a ruble safe harbor for people who want to use USDT for global commerce but do not want to leave their money in USDT for fear of sanctions. After 1 year of operations A7A5 passed $100 billion dollars in aggregate transactions - but growth was slowed by a lack of liquidity. In July 2025 the issuing company behind A7A5 was injecting $150 million dollars of liquidity into their own decentralized exchange each day. These numbers fell off significantly by November and totaled $2.3 billion USD by the end of the year.

The problem is that users want to use A7A5 as either a bridge to USDT or as a temporary safe harbor. They don’t want to end up with rubles or A7A5. The issuer of the coin was injecting this liquidity in order to spur demand and build up a self-sustaining market. At the same time, they introduced another innovation that they hoped would attract more outside crypto investors to A7A5 - a rate of return. Due to the war, Russia’s Central Bank has maintained high interest rates in order to combat inflation. A7A5 and PSB promised holders of the coin a 50% share in the interest generated by the rubles backing their coins in the PSB bank. Back in June 2025 interest rates were near 20% so end users could get a healthy rate of return.

Even with these incentives, A7A5 did not develop an organic liquidity pool and mostly functioned as a clearing house rather than a true stablecoin. This was largely due to sanctions keeping them off all but their own distributed exchange and exchanges operating out of Kyrgyzstan.

In the later half of 2025 and early 2026 A7A5 has tried various tactics to address this liquidity problem and draw more people to the platform. Here are some of the key initiatives:

• PSB Card Purchases - From August 2025 holders of PSB bank cards were able to directly buy A7A5 with their cards. This resulted in the purchase of $26 million dollars of A7A5 through the end of the year.

• Stablepay - A7A5 launched a virtual debit card called “Stablepay” that allows users to top-up with A7A5 and spend it on overseas services such as Netflix and ChatGPT. Elliptic has reported trouble with uptake and unreliable service.

• Increasing Rate of Return - The APR split for holders of A7A5 was reallocated in early 2026 with the bank retaining 1% return and the rest going to the coin holder. As of March 2026 A7A5 advertises a 14% rate of return for holders.

• Digital “Veksels” - A7 created a set of off-blockchain paper promissory notes that we will look at in more depth below.

The Veksel Mechanism

Another financial product advertised by A7 is a promissory note (Veksel in Russian) that acts similarly to a traditional bearer bond. The notes, which come in a variety of denominations, are printed on security paper and have the appearance of private money.

On the A7A5 website you can see example bills with descriptions of how they work.

The bills have a scratch off feature similar to a lottery ticket that covers up QR codes A and C. Here are their functions:

• QR Code A: Takes you to a dedicated page for this note that allows you to confirm the balance.

• QR Code B: Scratching off the cover of one of these 3 QR codes will allow you to verify the transfer of the note to another person. Each note can be transferred like this up to 3 times.

• QR Code C: Scratching off the cover of this code allows you to redeem the note. It will take you to a Telegram bot that gives you redemption options.

Redeeming the note takes place fully outside of the banking system and is explicitly advertised as occurring outside of SWIFT. Holders have multiple options for redeeming the note:

• At an A7 Office - The company is expanding offices in Russia to “every major city” and has at least 2 offices in Africa. Note holders can withdraw rubles through these branches.

• Via A7A5 - The note can be redeemed for A7A5 deposited digitally into the holder’s wallet.

• In Foreign Currency (Cash) - A7 will send an agent with cash to the holder in select foreign cities. They claim redemption options in Dubai, Istanbul and parts of China. In China A7 claims to be able to deliver cash in less than 4 hours.

The Elliptic spokesperson who commented for this report called this system innovative, noting that they have never heard of similar bearer-bond-like instruments using crypto.

A7’s promissory note scheme is designed to further evade attempts at freezing crypto wallets and enforcing sanctions. They function as an off-blockchain IOU for companies in Russia seeking to make purchases in China and elsewhere.

The Shor network’s financial operations are extensive and expensive. They represent major investments into infrastructure and are not simply a short-term workaround. A7A5 and their other tools are part of an effort to bypass the SWIFT system and create long term options for evading American and European financial sanctions.

Investing in Election Interference

Shor’s network has many parts but all of them seek to promote 2 goals - profit for Shor and furthering the Kremlin’s political goals. Given that, it appears that A7 / A7A5 have 3 primary purposes:

1. To facilitate sanctions evasion, cross border financial transactions and to acquire USD outside of the traditional banking system.

2. To make a profit for Mr. Shor and PSB

3. To create a slush-fund to support Shor’s political manipulations in Moldova (and elsewhere)

While we can’t see into A7 or Evrazia’s books, there is strong precedent for this type of arrangement by the Russian security services. Russia has used smugglers, money launderers, hackers and all manner of criminals in support of their efforts to destabilize other countries and conduct hybrid operations. In exchange, their criminal activities are tolerated or even protected by the state. Russia’s operations targeting Moldova’s elections required substantial amounts of money and utilized USDT and crypto for many transactions. It’s highly likely that, while Shor’s network is making money for him, the cost of doing business is self-financing hybrid attacks against Moldova (and elsewhere).

How Crypto was Used in the Moldovan Elections

During the 2024 and 2025 Moldovan elections the Shor network spent large sums of money attempting to subvert the vote and overthrow Moldova’s democracy. This involved voter bribery schemes as well as mass information operations. In 2024 journalists from Ziarul de Gardă (ZdG) went undercover and infiltrated Shor network operations. In their reporting they found that most network “activists” were being paid via accounts set up with Russia’s PSB bank. This proved cumbersome as the money could only be withdrawn in Transnistria. In many other situations the Shor network relied on cash smuggled across the borders to bribe voters and fund their operations.

By 2025 a new ZdG undercover investigation showed a change - “activists” were offered payments in crypto now. In their investigation titled “The Kremlin’s Digital Army” the ZdG journalist was paid in crypto for participating in the “InfoLider” disinformation network. They also offered payments via PSB or in Euros as cash.

None of this crypto was A7A5 and the network relied on USDT and other mature cryptocurrencies as the primary vehicle for financing election interference operations. In a speech made by President Maia Sandu on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the Venice Commission in October 2025 she highlighted an example saying:

“As our law enforcement agencies blocked conventional channels, the operation shifted to crypto. One wallet alone, uncovered by the anticorruption agency, held over €100 million — funds used for troll farms, fake media, protests, and vote buying.”

In a prior speech made at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, President Sandu called out “crypto, shell companies, prepaid cards” as well as smuggled cash as major sources of illicit election financing. She estimated that “Russia spent the equivalent of 1% of Moldova’s GDP, to influence the 2024 elections.”

President Sandu and others in the Moldovan government have clearly warned that Russia is testing these capabilities in Moldova but will not stop there. The subsequent growth of the Shor network in Kyrgyzstan as well as their innovations in creating new illicit financial instruments since the elections has shown that the network is learning and adapting. These tools are being leveraged both for evading sanctions and to create mechanisms for financing hybrid warfare operations around Europe. Thomas Rowley at Reporter.London reported in December 2025 about a Hungarian subsidiary of a Kyrgyz company operating as a clearing house for A7 in Budapest. Following the Moldovan elections this network has shown signs of growth rather than retrenchment.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this report suggests that the financial architecture surrounding A7 and A7A5 is not designed to create a parallel monetary system in the traditional sense. Instead, it functions as a conversion and distribution mechanism - one that transforms restricted forms of capital into assets that can be deployed quickly, discreetly and at scale.

In this system, A7A5 plays an important but limited role. It is not widely used as a store of value, nor does it appear to be the currency in which political operations are conducted. Rather, it serves as an intermediary layer: a bridge between the Russian financial system and the broader cryptocurrency ecosystem.

Operational evidence from Moldova indicates that crypto payments tied to political activity - whether framed as “activism,” mobilization, or direct voter incentives - are overwhelmingly conducted in highly liquid stablecoins, most notable USDT. This reflects a basic reality of the cryptocurrency ecosystem: liquidity and acceptance matter more than origin. USDT offers both. It is stable, widely recognized, and easily convertible into cash or goods across jurisdictions.

This dynamic helps explain both the structure and the limitations of the A7/A7A5 system. While it can facilitate the initial movement of funds out of sanctioned or controlled environments, it ultimately depends on access to deeper pools of liquidity in order to function. Without the ability to convert into assets like USDT, its utility would be sharply constrained.

Seen in this light, the system is less about replacing existing financial infrastructure and more about exploiting its edges. It leverages gaps between jurisdictions, regulatory regimes, and technological systems to move value in ways that are difficult to track and even harder to disrupt.

At the same time, A7/A7A5 continues to create innovative new products aimed at building the liquidity required to become an asset in itself. Sanctions enforcement has so far limited this kleptocratic startup to more transient usages. But the ambition of the project and the long term investment in sanctions-proof financial rails means that this is an ongoing challenge for policymakers in the United States and Europe.

For now, if A7A5 represents the entry point into this system, USDT and similar coins represent its exit - and, in practical terms, its point of effectiveness.

Moldova’s 2024-2025 experience has shown that it is difficult to defend national borders in an international financial system - even with ardent sanctions enforcement. The Kremlin’s hybrid attacks against Moldova are helping them sharpen tactics and build new capabilities that are not, and were never meant to be solely about Moldova. The use of cryptocurrencies in financing hybrid operations is likely to grow in significance as the Shor network and other Kremlin actors build ever more sophisticated capabilities and deploy them at scale.

Wherever you are in the world - happy Easter from Moldova Matters and enjoy the time off!

- David

Orthodox Easter Holidays

This month, Moldova celebrates Orthodox Easter, or Paște, on April 12th. This holiday is one of the most important days of the year for Moldovan families and many people journey back to the villages and towns where their older family members still live. The religious services for Easter begin Saturday evening with services leading up to the lighting of candles at midnight using a flame that is brought to Moldova from Jerusalem. Services continue through the night until priests begin blessing food brought by individuals that will later be served to their family. The celebrations are full of traditions including:

• Washing your face in basin of water that has coins at the bottom is said to bring wealth and good luck.

• Hard-boiled eggs are dyed brownish red by boiling them with the skins of red or yellow onions. Family members take turns tapping an egg against another family members eggs in a competition to be the last one to have an uncracked egg.

• Salt, blessed by the priest, is often poured in the local well for good luck.

• People dress in new clothes and spend the days ahead preparing their garden, whitewashing tree trunks and making their house beautiful for spring.

The Sunday of Easter and the Monday after are holidays and most business will be closed.

The following Sunday, the 19th, is a uniquely Moldovan Holiday called Paște Blajinilor. This holiday serves as a memorial day where Moldovans go to the cemetery and visit the graves of their ancestors. The cemeteries are filled with people including many of the diaspora who have returned home for the holidays. At the grave sites are tables and benches where families share food and wine with those visiting the cemetery. Many will give a “pomana” which is a gift to remember the dead and might consist of bread, eggs, dish towels, cups and plates, or a small amount of money.

This holiday also continues on Monday the 20th and both days are official holidays. You can read a guest essay about this unique holiday from Elena Vrabie here, originally published in Moldova Matters in May 2024:

Spring is full of holidays and days off so plan accordingly:

Official holidays:

• Paște (Orthodox Easter) - Sun/Mon April 12-13

• Paște Blajinilor (Memorial Easter / Easter of the Dead) - Sun/Mon April 19-20

• Labor Day - Friday May 1 (Note: Thursday, April 30 is considered a short work day)

• Europe Day / Victory Day - Saturday May 9

• Children’s Day - Monday June 1

While the week between the two Easter holidays is very quiet, there is still a lot of activity in Moldova. Here are a few notable events.

Opera, Ballet, and Concerts

The Maria Biesu Theater has a full schedule this month with two notable events at the end of the month:

• Sparticus - This Russian ballet from 1956, based on the novel Sparticus, will be performed for one night only, April 26. Tickets are available here.

• The Marriage of Figoro - Mozart’s renowned Opera will be be performed in Italian. Tickets are available here.

Other large musical events are happening throughout the month:

• Rock Symphony - The Moldovan Youth Orchestra will perform interpretations of some of the most popular rock and alternative bands ever. Join them at the Chisinau Arena on April 4th and get your tickets here.

• Bands and Brews - On April 1st, LaBREWatory is hosting another edition of their Bands and Brews event. The event features live music and a selection of their craft beers. Tickets can be purchased at the door. For details and information on bands, visit their event page here.

• Symphony Concert - The Symphony and National Philharmonic will be perform a selection of three composers at the Palatul Republicii on April 17th. Details on the performance and tickets can be found here.

• Three Double Piano Concert - The Organ Hall presents a performance of double piano pieces by Bach and Tchekovski. This event is for one night only on April 26 and tickets can be details can be found here.

Theater and Comedy

• Asa, Buna Seara - Six comedians present the history and historical hereos of Moldova at the Chisinau Arena on April 5th. Details can be found here.

• Opera de trei parale – Bertolt Brecht’s Opera de trei parale (The Threepenny Opera) appears at Satiricus on April 24th at 18:30 as a musical-theatre work that blends crime, romance, and social satire. Details available here.

Sports

• Chisinau Half Marathon - On April 26th, Chisinau will hold the spring half marathon. This weekend is full of events including a kids marathon on the 25th. For details on the many events and registration links, visit Sporters Website here.

  • In addition, join fellow runners on April 18th at Valea Morilor Park at 9:00 am to practice for the marathon. Details here.

This section is done in partnership with the team behind Digital Nomad Moldova - the one stop shop for those considering taking advantage of Moldova’s new digital nomad visa process! Learn more on their website.

On March 28 Moldova’s Minister of Energy announced that the high voltage line struck during Russia’s attack on the March 23 was fully repaired. This followed a difficult few days with the country coming very close to instituting rolling blackouts on March 27 due to challenges purchasing enough import capacity.

Minister of Energy Dorin Junghietu, speaking to ZdG stated, that this “was a deliberate attack” and provided more information on the target saying:

“We have seen several photos, but they cannot be made public, because they are sensitive information and would expose more than they should, but one of the critical pillars of this line was deliberately attacked with several drones. They knew very well where to hit, where they wanted to hit.”

He put the attack in the context of the recent “accident or attack at the hydroelectric power plant in Ukraine, which polluted our Dniester River” strongly implying that Russia was targeting infrastructure in Ukraine what would necessarily have a knock-on effect in Moldova. He described the high voltage line pillar targeted as “critical” and also hard to repair. This is partly because it is in a remote location in the Danube delta region that is inaccessible for heavy equipment if the ground is wet from rain.

While the acute phase of the emergency has passed, this vulnerability remains. The Minister has pledged to complete the works on the Vulcănești – Chișinău power line by May, but noted that it will not protect from this specific targeting as a small part of the line will still pass through Ukraine1.

Kremlin disinformation campaigns targeted the country’s vulnerability, with Russian state media reporting on the problem - but not the cause - and social media campaigns blaming it on “incompetence of the government.” Socialist MP Bogdan Țîrdea and fugitive former Shor Party MP Marina Tauber called the State of Emergency a fiction designed to create fear and take away personal liberties.

A main narrative is also that Moldova should restart purchases of electricity from the MGRES power plant in Transnistria - currently impractical if not impossible2. Socialist MPs Igor Dodon and Zinaida Greceanîi traveled to Moscow on a “short-term working visit” to discuss energy supply and blame the PAS government for not purchasing energy from Russia / MGRES.

The government announced that it plans to ask parliament to lift the State of Emergency next week after the repaired line is fully tested and certified. The Ministry of Foriegn Affairs also announced that they plan to seek compensation from Russia for the damage3.

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Iran Energy Crisis

While the high voltage line strike was an acute crisis, the much bigger crisis facing Moldova is the energy crisis caused by the United States’ and Israel’s war against Iran. Prices continue to rise with diesel now 56.3% more expensive than when the war began and gasoline 25.7% more expensive. As of March 30th fuel stocks provide for 17 days of supply for gasoline, 7 days for diesel and 16 days for LPG. While imports are continuing as normal there are substantial worries across Europe of shortages if the war continues much longer.

On March 26 the government met in extraordinary session and has begun implementing response measures including:

• The National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE) will update its formula for calculating standard diesel price limits. Previously the formula relied on a 14 day average of purchase prices, now it will use a 7 day average. This will allow prices to rise more quickly and prevent gas stations from closing en-masse when the purchase price exceeds the allowed retail price.

• If gas stations run out of standard diesel, they are required to sell premium diesel at the standard price.

• Lukoil is allowed to purchase supplies on the local market to supply their stations. This rule does not allow them to restart imports or violate other aspects of American sanctions, but is designed to expand the number of operating gas stations during the crisis.

• Regulated fare prices for bus and mini-bus routes will be updated weekly according to price rises.

• Fuel importers are required to present their April plans to the government and are prohibited from importing less fuel in April than they did in March.

Reactions and Analysis

Moldova’s Union of Transporters and Road Workers (UTA) called the initial 16% increase in bus and mini-bus fares “a superficial measure that does not solve the root of the problem.” They blamed the government for imposing a regulated market but not taking responsibility via subsidies for a crisis. The association is calling for 0% VAT rate on fuel for transport operators, deferred tax payments for new vehicle imports, direct subsidies via travel vouchers for vulnerable passengers (pensioners, students, etc) and more. They also noted that the “disastrous state of district and inter-district roads” following Moldova’s harshest winter in a decade is another hidden tax on them as they struggle to maintain and repair their vehicles.

UTA and farmers are among the first groups to face stress from this crisis but certainly not the last. Experts interviewed by ZdG painted a bleak economic picture and few solutions for the government. Eugen Muravschi from Watchdog explained that the biggest issue is diesel which is used for agriculture and transit. He noted that Moldova’s excise taxes on fuel are already low - more than 2x lower than the European norm - which leaves very little room to cut. These taxes also fund road repair and after last winter the road network is a mess. A VAT cut for all fuel sales would be too damaging for the budget, but he suggested that targeted measures for farmers and transport operators might help.

Adrian Lupusor director of the think-tank Expert-Grup presented an analysis showing a real economic crisis may be coming. He wrote:

“If the oil crisis persists or intensifies, prices at $120–$140 per barrel could reduce Moldova’s GDP by 10 percentage points due to rising import prices, production costs, and consumer prices. This could lead to an economic recession of approximately -5% in 2026 and a continued shock into 2027,”

He noted that Moldova is more vulnerable than its neighbors because fuel imports account for a high percentage of all imports at 15.9%. His analysis indicates that the inflation caused by fuel prices should mostly be absorbed by the coming economic recession4.

Analysis: The Bigger Picture

Naturally, Kremlin disinformation networks are spreading narratives blaming the government, or sometimes Romania, for the shortages. They are likely trying to plant useful stories now in the hopes that some take root when the crisis spreads from the pump to the wider economy in the coming weeks and months.

The success of that campaign seems doubtful. More than any economic crisis in living memory this crisis can clearly be attributed to one man - Donald Trump. Americans worried about $4 / gallon gas may not realize that Europe is now facing $7 - $8 / gallon rates5 - numbers that are expected to rise sharply if this war continues.

That’s the best case scenario. Politico reports multiple European leaders describing sleepless nights as they try and deal with an oil supply shock larger than that of 1973, 1979 and the war in Ukraine combined. Leaders are now contemplating options for “demand destruction” including drive-free Sundays, gas rationing and similar approaches.

While polls show that Americans overwhelmingly disapprove of this war, I don’t get the impression that they widely understand how enraged Europeans are. In a recent podcast from Pod Save America, Jon Lovett described Trump’s negotiations with Iran as 2 people playing chicken after the cars have already crashed head on - just shouting at each other over blown airbags. In that analogy, Europe (and even more so East Asia) are like collateral roadkill that neither party noticed except when Trump somehow blames them for the crash. The war has seriously threatened NATO’s cohesion, been a massive boon to the Russian war effort and threatens huge and lasting harm to the continent’s economies.

With no end in sight, this war is upending the global security and economic order - and small countries like Moldova have very few ways to insulate themselves from the damage.

If you’re interested in a more comprehensive analysis of the European vs American perspectives on this war, I recommend the most recent episode of The Rest is Politics Podcast.

International Affairs & Security

Here’s a roundup of the top international affairs and security news of the week:

• President Sandu made the first official visit of a Moldovan head of state to Slovakia. There she signed agreements on promoting joint investments and on deepening security cooperation. The President thanked Slovakia for assisting both in the Nistru river cleanup and in supporting the provision of electricity during the recent crisis. She highlighted both crises as examples of how “Ukraine’s resilience matters far beyond Ukraine itself. It is essential for Moldova’s security and for European security as a whole.”

• Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu attended the 4th anniversary of the Bucha massacre in Ukraine. In the 22 days that the Kyiv suburb was occupied, ending on March 31, 2022, Russia committed more than 9000 war crimes and murdered more than 1700 civilians. Writing about the event Speaker Grosu stated:

“It’s been four years since the massacre in the city of Bucea, one of the towns in the suburbs of Kiev, which experienced unimaginable atrocities from the Russian army. I was there four years ago. I saw it. And you can’t forget it. Today, together with other European leaders, we commemorated the victims of that massacre,”

• Transnistria further delays salary payments. In June 2025 the regional “authorities” began splitting salary payments into 2 installments6 allowing for the second half of the payment to come at the end of the following month. This has now been pushed back further until the 9th of the next month. This delaying tactic is essentially a zero interest loan from workers to their employer and, while it can buy time, it does not materially change the conditions causing the crisis.

• On March 31 another drone entered Moldovan airspace. The Shahed drone was tracked on Ukrainian radar as it flew over Transnistria for around 7 minutes before returning to Ukraine.

• Ukraine has announced new security measures on their border with Transnistria. The Ukrainian army has announced that the border is now “heavily mined” and that they are in the process of installing barbed wire and autonomous video warning systems. They have also announced the deployment of additional mechanized troops to strengthen the defenses.

Politics

Here’s a roundup of the top politics stories of the week:

• Parliament has accepted the resignation of PAS MP Nicolae Botgros. The famous composer previously announced his resignation because he felt forced to choose between politics and music due to laws around side-jobs. Opposition MP Renato Usatii proposed an amendment of these laws to allow musicians, actors and athletes to continue with their careers while in parliament. Currently, only academic jobs are allowed for sitting MPs. Speaker Igor Grosu supported the idea and suggested that parliament study loosening the rules, noting that Moldova has far stricter compatibility rules than other countries in the region including Romania.

• The EU delegation announced that the Chisinau-Ungheni rail line would be the first electrified railway in the country. It will be rebuilt on European rail guage and allow for travel of up to 140 km / h. The Ministry of Infrastructure has previously announced that the first phase of this project will connect downtown Chisinau to the Eugen Doga International Airport.

• Irina Vlah had a wonderful birthday. The opposition politician declared 423,000 lei in cash birthday gifts for her recent 51st birthday. These came from dozens of people - family, former employees, party members and even a former interim president of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ). This birthday haul exceeded 2 times her annual salary. Moldovan birthday traditions are really very strict - you buy all of your friends and family dinner and drinks and they give you gifts - which are very rarely cash. When you become a (certain type of) politician, suddenly, lots of cash gifts. What a wonderful tradition.

Crime & Corruption

Here are the top justice sector stories of the week:

• Justice reform is progressing, but judges are under heavy pressure. That was the takeaway this week from the General Assembly of Judges convened by the Superior Council of Magistracy. Guest speakers included President Sandu and European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, Michael McGrath who spoke on justice reform. A report on 2025 activity showed that judges are now averaging 103.7 cases per month, a 24.3% increase from 2024. The removal of judges who fail vetting has continued to increase pressure on those who remain.

• Veaceslav Platon’s trial hasn’t had a hearing in a year. The last hearing in the case of “fraud and money laundering in particularly large proportions” was heard in March 2025 as judges have repeatedly accepted requests for delays due to Platon’s lawyer being on sick leave. Platon is scheduled to have his UK extradition hearing from May 11 - 13, after his lawyers there successfully delayed it from its originally scheduled November 2025 dates. Platon has been out on bail in the UK since July 2025.

Ending on a High Note

Moldovan musician Sergei Stepanov, known as “Epic Sax Guy,” appeared on Britain’s Got Talent, getting “yes” votes from all 4 judges. Simon Cowell liked the performance, but seemed genuinely baffled as to who this strange dancing saxophone player was. Not so with Rapper judge Olajide Olayinka Williams (KSI), who is apparently a mega-fan and basically went crazy while the performance was happening.

Epic Sax Guy became a household name across Europe after competing in Eurovision in 2017 for Moldova with the band SunStroke Project. Their performance of “Hey Mamma” got 3rd place, which was frankly a crime as they were far better than the top 2.

If you want to put a smile on your face, here’s the Britain’s Got Talent appearance:

…and here’s Hey Mamma from 2017

…and here’s Moldova’s delightfully insane and genuinely fun 2026 Eurovision entry

Ok, that’s much better than economic crisis and war. I hope it cheered you up as much as it did me.

Most of the following newsletters are on Substack but not all.

Days Until the Hungarian Elections

Journalists Veronika Munk and Zoltán Szalay write this excellent newsletter counting down to Hungary’s April 12 parliamentary elections. Europe is holding its collective breath as Viktor Orban’s Fidesz faces opposition challenger Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party. This vote has the potential to shape issues related to Moldova and Ukraine’s EU accession as well as the geopolitical direction of the bloc as a whole. Munk and Szalay take you through the twists and turns of the extremely dirty campaign, highlighting Russian hybrid attacks and the increasing number of threats against journalists in Hungary.

Following the elections the newsletter will continue following government formation and covering the country’s major news developments.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Power Vertical (Newsletter / Podcast)

Brian Whitmore’s Power Vertical Podcast is one of the original great podcasts looking at Russia and its role in the former Soviet space. I was thrilled to join Brian as a guest in an episode right before Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections to discuss Russia’s hybrid attacks and election interference. Now the Power Vertical is on Substack as well, where you can get episodes and follow updates from the Power Vertical team.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Ukraine’s Arms Monitor

Written by Olena Kryzhanivska, a Ukrainian defense analyst based in Canada, Ukraine’s Arms Monitor is a go-to resource for tracking military developments in the war in Ukraine. It combines detailed reporting on weapons and technology with sharp analysis of how the conflict is driving rapid innovation - particularly in areas like drone warfare. As Ukraine and Russia adapt in real time, this newsletter offers one of the clearest windows into how modern warfare is evolving.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Goulash (VSquare)

Goulash is a newsletter from VSquare, an investigative journalism network focused on Central and Eastern Europe. It combines investigative reporting with sharp regional analysis - with a particular strength on Hungary and its wider influence.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Eastern Flank

Journalist Michał Kranz publishes this weekly newsletter focused on the top stories in Eastern Europe - which he defines as “all the countries east of Germany, Austria, and Italy, north of Greece and Turkey, and west of Russia, as well as Georgia and Armenia in the South Caucasus.” His newsletter is great for keeping up with the region, but I tune in for his analysis of how Eastern Europe impacts, and is impacted by, wider geopolitical events around the world.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

The Baltic Flank

While we’re on the topic of flanks - I recently discovered the Baltic Flank and have no idea how I missed it before. Written by investigative journalist Holger Roonemaa, the newsletter focuses on European security issues as well as Russia’s hybrid war against the West. While it casts a wide net, the main lens for the reporting and analysis is a focus on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

PolandWatch

Written by veteran journalist Stuart Dowell, PolandWatch is both a deep dive into Poland’s internal politics, and an analysis of its place in the wider region. The country’s complex political dynamics have foreshadowed many broader trends in European politics - including populism, democratic backsliding, migration challenges and more. It has also shown how a country can come back from the brink. PolandWatch is great for following these wider trends as they play out in the Polish and regional context.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Brief Eastern Europe

Brief Eastern Europe is a regional newsletter covering politics and society across Central and Eastern Europe, with a focus on connecting developments across countries. It’s part of the New Eastern Europe family which also has an excellent podcast called “Talk Eastern Europe.” Their newsletter is a great way to track the main stories around the region and also get solid opinion and analysis of key events.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Balkan Brew

Journalists Rodolfo Toè and Tommaso Siviero write this excellent weekly newsletter looking around the Balkans and picking out some of the most interesting and impactful stories in the region. If you’re like me, the Western Balkans especially can feel hard to get a handle on politically. Balkan Brew helps me catch the most important stories and (often) notice how many countries are facing challenges similar to those we are seeing in Moldova.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

how we cee it

That’s CEE = Central and Eastern Europe. Journalist Tomas Hrivnak covers a range of stories in business, tech, and security facing the region. I’ve recently enjoyed a number of stories looking at defense sector investments and how regional security is being impacted by the war in Iran.

You can read and subscribe at this link.

Did I Miss Something?

If you’ve got some newsletters that help you make sense of the region that didn’t make my list - share them in the comments!

On March 27, 1918, Bessarabia, a former Tsarist province dating back to 1812, when the Principality of Moldavia was divided in two, united with the Kingdom of Romania. Bessarabia, unlike modern Moldova, had clear cut natural borders, stretching from the Prut River in the West and the Dniester River in the East, Habsburg Bukovina in the north and the Danube mouth, and Black Sea in the south.

The decision was made by Sfatul Țării, the local parliament, a quasi-representative body like many others in the national peripheries of the former Tsarist Empire. In the later parts of WWI, similar indirectly representative bodies were created at a time where war prevented direct elections. Such parliaments decided the fates of other provinces and fragments of empire - creating national states (e.g. Poland and Estonia), or recreating lost independent states out of pieces of the Russian Empire (e.g. Lithuania).

This is to say Sfatul Țării was broadly representative and held democratic legitimacy according to the standards of the time. Moreover, it had legitimacy to decide the future of the province. The Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and other Russian political parties as well as the province’s main ethnic groups were represented. They all recognized the Sfatul Țării as the supreme and legitimate institution of the province.

Since then, the legitimacy of Sfatul Țării’s vote on March 27, 1918 has often been questioned or contested with the argument that the Romanian Army controlled the province since mid January 1918. At that time, the Sfatul Țării had requested Romanian support in a situation of deteriorating security and rampant violence. Much of this was driven by the disintegration of the Russian Army on the Romanian front and the transformation of these units into Bolshevik raiding parties in the chaotic context of the Russian civil war.

With this background, on the historical day of March 27, 19181, 3 members of the Sfatul Țării voted against the Union with Romania and 36 abstained. Only 86 voted for, while 12 were declared absentees.

The divided vote speaks to the fact there was some room for freedom of the ballot. In one example, Ștefan Balamez, a Ukrainian who was one of the three voting against the Union, worked in the interwar period in various capacities in the Chișinău City Hall. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1940 in the aftermath of the Red Army’s occupation of Bessarabia and sent to Siberia where he died in 1942. This demonstrates not only was there freedom of the vote, but that it did not clearly map onto what we might now call pro-Romanian or pro-Russian lines.

The vote was contested mainly by the Bolsheviks, but also by the former Tsarist political class. These forces, though irreconcilable enemies on the battlefield across all of the collapsing Russian Empire, allied in a common front during the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920).

The Ukrainian political elites of all ideological stripes also vehemently contested the Union of Bessarabia with Romania as the province was perceived as part of ethnic Ukrainian lands2. This is in spite of all credible statistics (including Tsarist ones), showing that Ukrainians only made up around one quarter of the total population. Meanwhile, the Romanian-speaking populations3 made up around 50-60% of the province’s residents4.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania came as a surprise to the residents of the other regions on the right bank of the Prut river that make up modern-day Romania. Bessarabia did not have a privileged place in the Romanian discourse before 1914. Transylvania was the most coveted Romanian speaking territory due to many factors, one of them being the level of national consciousness among Romanians in the region. There were also major political differences. The Bessarabian peasants were more preoccupied with the land reform than with any nation-building agenda, and Romania as a Kingdom was perceived as a harbinger of landlords’ interests. Furthermore, the King, even though he converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy, was suspected of not being of their own faith.

The drive to unite Bessarabia with Western Moldavia (from which it was detached by the Russian Empire in 1812) and thus the Kingdom of Romania was driven by both internal and external factors. Even though Sfatul Țării was legitimate, it did not have resources and organizational capabilities to impose its authority outside the capital - and it sometimes struggled to control the capital itself. This was largely due to Bolshevik raiders and political fanatics sent from Odessa to spread propaganda and sow anarchy. This type of violent and chaotic situation was engulfing much of the collapsing Russian Empire as the Bolsheviks sought power at any cost.

Paradoxically, in this late stage of WWI, the sworn enemies in the Entente Powers and Central Powers managed to agree on this union. France, Great Britain and Germany all, for various reasons, recognized (or tolerated) the decision of Sfatul Țării of March 27, 1918. The United States neither endorsed nor opposed but chose to closely observe the process.

Within Bessarabia a sense of national identity had been growing - but with serious contradictions. Soldiers and elites serving on various fronts during the war had come to understand that they were linguistically the same as their brethren West of Prut River. At the same time, Bessarabia remained deeply Russified and even during the Sfatul Țării’s meeting of March 27th 1918 most of the discussions took place in Russian. This was because it remained the language of their education and most knew Romanian only at the vernacular level.

The Union of Bessarabia with Romania made the century long process of Russification of the Moldavians of Bessarabia reversible. In the interwar period, they enjoyed full national rights and schools in Romanian with Latin alphabet. Rights were granted to minorities as well, including to education in other languages. In the economic sphere, in the south, sometimes the minorities (Bulgarians) enjoyed privileges in detriment to the local Romanian speaking population, such as fishing rights in the Prut valley.

The interwar gave a fresh life to Romanian language and culture and made speaking Romanian more and more prestigious and respectful. In Bessarabia, it was no longer simply a tolerated language that was limited in the public space. The language was lively and loved by the Moldavians / Bessarabians across ethnic groups, including by the Gagauz. The latter were – in contrast to the Soviet period – one of the most integrated ethnic groups in the Romanian cultural and linguistic milieu. They were also one of the most loyal ethnic groups to the Romanian state as they were not attracted by Bolshevik ideology and propaganda before, during or after the Tatarbunar insurrection of 1924 - the peak of Soviet hybrid war against interwar Romania.

Being part of Romania between 1918-1940 spared tens of thousands of lives that otherwise would have become victims of Soviet state terror - as happened in other parts of the USSR. This included the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), created on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in 1924. This region served a similar role to modern day Transnistria, allowing the new Russia to maintain a claim on Bessarabia until they could come back in force.

In the MASSR alone, about 40,000 persons of all ages and ethnic backgrounds died during the Holodomor of 1932-1933, and about 5,000 were executed by death squads during the Great Terror of 1937-8. Tens of thousands more were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. Life in interwar Romania was not paradise on earth either, it was the era of extremes all over Europe, but Romania did not practice state terror on the scale seen in the Soviet Union.

Note: Romania bears responsibility for its role in the Holocaust during World War II. Under the Antonescu regime, hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed in Bessarabia and Transnistria, often in coordination with Nazi Germany. Among the victims were many Jews who were educated in, and closely connected to, Romanian language and culture.

A number of survivors later played a role in preserving elements of Romanian literary and cultural life in Soviet Moldavia after 1944. Their contributions formed part of a broader, complex process through which Romanian cultural identity persisted despite sustained pressures of Russification in the Soviet period.

Looking at 1918 Through a Modern Lens

The events of 1918 remain highly relevant in both Romania and the Republic of Moldova, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. For some, the parallels appear striking: a moment of regional instability, uncertainty about borders, and the question of how small states can secure their future. In this view, unification with Romania is sometimes presented as a potential safeguard against renewed Russian aggression.

At the same time, the differences between 1918 and today are profound. The Union of Bessarabia with Romania was decided in the context of collapsing empires, limited state capacity, and a very different international system. Any comparable decision today would have to follow true democratic procedures, reflect the will of the population, and take place within a complex European and international legal framework.

In this context, occasional political statements in favor of unification - such as the expressions of personal support by President Sandu for a hypothetical referendum - should not be understood as signaling an imminent or likely political project. Public discourse on Union often operates at the level of identity and historical memory rather than concrete policy. In practice, there is limited political momentum for unification in either Chișinău or Bucharest.

Moreover, the regional security environment, while unstable, does not necessarily make Union more feasible. On the contrary, a deterioration of the security situation - such as a further Russian advance in southern Ukraine - would introduce significant risks and uncertainties. In such a scenario, Romania and its allies would likely prioritize stability and deterrence over undertaking a complex and potentially destabilizing political integration.

A more immediate and tangible challenge remains the unresolved status of the Left Bank, or Transnistria. As in the early 1990s, this issue is both a domestic and a regional security problem, now with broader European implications. Any sustainable solution would require the withdrawal of Russian forces and the demilitarization of the region, followed by a cautious and gradual reintegration process that does not undermine Moldova’s internal political balance or its European trajectory.

In this sense, while the legacy of 1918 continues to shape political imagination and identity, its direct replication under current conditions appears unlikely. The questions facing Moldova today are less about territorial reconfiguration and more about security, governance, and integration within the European framework - challenges that differ fundamentally from those of 1918.

“Please pay special attention to air raid signals today. There are intelligence reports that Russian forces may be preparing a massive attack. Appropriate instructions for our air defense forces have already been issued. Please take care of yourselves and Ukraine ,”

There was a massive attack with Russian drones overnight as well as a major daytime attack on March 24th. In total Russia launched more than 1000 drones against Ukraine including Shaheds and Gerbers1. Ukrainian air defense shot down 541 drones but 15 got through and scored hits.

At 7:15 pm on March 23rd residents in Chisinau noticed the lights briefly go out and then flicker back on. In the morning the Ministry of Energy announced that the key high-voltage line between Isaccea (Romania) - Vulcănești (Moldova) had been hit and damaged. They wrote:

“On the evening of March 23, at around 7:15 p.m., due to Russian attacks on the territory of Ukraine, our energy infrastructure, the property of the Republic of Moldova, was affected. What happened? Several “Shahed” drones targeted our energy infrastructure. And as we see in this picture, this is the effect.“

Understanding the Infrastructure Situation

On January 31st, 2025 most of Moldova lost power due to “serious problems in the Ukrainian power grid” that caused a massive voltage drop on the Isaccea-Vulcăneşti-MGRES high voltage line - which triggered automatic disconnections. At the time I wrote a detailed overview of the key infrastructure and I recommend re-reading that article for context. In short, Moldova gets up to 60% of its power from Romania via a line that runs from Isaccea in Romania through Ukraine to Vulcăneşti in Moldova and then back and forth across the Moldovan-Ukrainian border before it meets the MGRES power plant in Transnistria. From there the power line runs to Chisinau.

The damage on March 23rd was to a particularly critical section of that power line between Isaccea and Vulcăneşti which also runs through Ukraine. You can see the whole system on the map on the left as well as an illustration of the part targeted on the map on the right below.

Moldova has been working to create its own direct connection to Romanian power via the Vulcăneşti - Chisinau high voltage line that was supposed to be completed in December but is running behind schedule. That line would allow Moldova to bypass Transnistria BUT critically not fully avoid transiting Ukrainian territory. It would still require the small segment Isaccea-Vulcăneşti which was targeted.

At the time of writing we do not know if this was intentionally targeted by Russia or if it was accidentally hit by a drone targeting the Ukrainian port of Remi (either off-course or shot down). We do know that this was the first Russian attack directly on Moldovan owned critical infrastructure in this war.

State of Emergency

On March 24th Prime Minister Munteanu convened the National Crisis Management Center and requested that parliament be called into extraordinary session to declare a state of emergency. He stated:

“Crash drones were identified in the immediate vicinity of the affected infrastructure, which imposes access restrictions for technical teams and the need to carry out demining works to fully allow the necessary intervention and in safe conditions,”

Parliament was convened on March 24th and held a debate on declaring a State of Emergency in the Energy sector for the next 60 days. Prime Minister Munteanu explained the gravity of the situation saying:

“The 4 interconnection lines with Romania have been activated, but the situation remains complicated. Starting tomorrow, the estimated deficit will reach 350-400 MW during peak hours. Chain disconnections, as you can deduce, remain very possible. We cannot rule out new attacks, we cannot wait,”

The these interconnections mean that the country is maintaining electricity through emergency “island connections” via smaller 110 kV lines. I explained island connections in the January article I referenced above.

The Minister of Energy estimated that repairs could take 5-7 days. The reason is that explosive materials remain on the site and army sappers have to make it safe before technicians can affect the repairs. There is also the risk of continued attacks on the line.

The State of Emergency was passed with 72 votes in favor, 18 abstentions and 0 against. Igor Dodon explained that the Socialists refused to vote for the bill because their suggestion that Moldova start buying power from the MGRES plant again were not taken into account (I’ll explain why this makes no sense in a footnote2).

Following the declaration of the State of Emergency, the government issued a series of orders and recommendations as follows:

• Called on all users to minimize electrical consumption during peak hours (6 am - 9 am and 5 pm - 11 pm). They warn against the use of elevators in this time in case of outages.

• Mandated that Thermoelectric plants in Balti and Chisinau have been instructed to produce at full capacity.

• Called on public and commercial buildings to reduce light by 30% and refrain from using decorative and advertising lights.

• Called on industrial activities to schedule operations outside of peak hours.

• Mandated export and re-export restrictions on petroleum products until a stockpile of 5,000 tons of gasoline and 25,000 tons of diesel are stored.

• Accelerated import processes for fuels.

• Restricted gas station purchases in containers to 20L jerrycans.

• Instructed grid operators to prioritize hospitals and critical infrastructure in case of shortages and resort to rolling blackouts as a last resort.

Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban called on city residents to conserve power and he condemned the “the war and Russia’s attacks on Ukraine.” He announced plans to move schools to online education and suspend trolleybus routes if there are major shortages.

On March 25th the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) met to approve a decrease in electricity prices, but postponed the move for the duration of the State of Emergency.

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The Other Energy Crisis

This new State of Emergency replaces last week’s State of Alert which was called to respond to America and Israel’s war against Iran. Fuel prices continue to increase in response to the global supply shock with prices for gasoline now 23.74% higher than before the war and for diesel 49.3% higher.

This has caused the Employers’ Association of Auto Transport Operators (APOTA) to announce that “an enormous number of regular district and inter-district trips [bus and mini-bus routes] will be suspended, and their number could reach 80% of the total number.” The prices of bus tickets are regulated and the association claims that the National Road Transport Agency (ANTA) is not raising prices fast enough to keep routes profitable.

On March 23rd President Sandu convened the National Security Council (NSC) and after meeting warned that prices will continue to rise. She stated:

“All of the energy shocks, despite the measures we have taken—and because we do not have oil, because we do not have natural gas—are clearly affecting us through rising prices, both at the household level and across economic sectors. We will continue to monitor the situation, and our hope is that this crisis will end sooner rather than later, but we must also prepare for the worst-case scenarios

We have a pricing formula, or a price formation mechanism, that assumes a slower transition to market prices—over a period of 14 days—and this helps us, to some extent, avoid extreme volatility. However, this does not mean that prices will not eventually reach global market levels,”

Right now prices in Moldova remain lower than those in Romania and much of the region because of this 14 day transition period. Across Europe many countries have different levels of market responsiveness to rapid price changes which has led to drivers crossing borders to fill up in other states and countries like Hungary to create differentiated prices for citizens vs foreigners.

President Sandu went on to speak about support mechanisms for farmers, but noted that the only long term options is increased adoption of renewables. Indeed, without Moldova’s hard pivot to wind and solar it is likely the country would already face substantial rolling blackouts.

President Sandu concluded saying:

“So, I repeat, we are monitoring the situation, and it is a worrying one. I will say this plainly: it is a very worrying situation if things do not stabilize, if prices do not stabilize in the coming weeks,”

Nistru Oil Spill Updates

On March 19th Prime Minister Munteanu announced that water supplies were being reconnected for Balti, Soroca, Singerei and Floresti. He stated:

“I know that these days have been difficult. Thank you for your patience. I also thank the teams in the field who worked non-stop so that people have water. The interventions at the Cosăuți station and in the localities have yielded results. The supply is being resumed in stages, with strict control at each stage. The installed filters remain in operation, and the teams remain in the field for continuous monitoring and rapid intervention, if necessary”

This outcome was achieved via a massive cleanup effort by many parts of the Moldovan state including the National Army. It was supported by Romania and donations from EU partners including Poland and Belgium. Many filters and dams were installed along the river which allowed for the water feeding these towns and regions to return to safe levels.

On March 25th Minister of Environment Gheorghe Hajder posted a video from Ukraine where he was checking on the origin of the spill. He explained that the origin of the leak (still unnamed) had been stopped and no more oil was entering the river. He explained that small slicks may still be seen working their way down the river but with the containment mechanisms in place and the source of the problem stopped the crisis was ending.

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Politics & General News

Here’s a roundup of the other top stories of the week:

• Parliament voted for the final denunciation of Moldova’s participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The bill passed in the first reading 58-28. Moldova joined the CIS after it was created in Minsk in January 1993 along with many former Soviet Republics. Moldova has slowly been disentangling itself from various multilateral aspects of the CIS since 2022.

• Ion Ceban claims that the Nistru oil spill was not real. The mayor claimed that without official test results he did not believe what the government was saying and alleged that it was all a 2 pronged conspiracy. First, to distract from rising gasoline and diesel prices, second, to “introduce a foreign operator to provide water and sewerage services in the north of the country.”

• Invest Moldova has begun a major promotion campaign on the BBC. The campaign, titled “Moldova – a Trustful3 Partner for Export,” plans to air 250 TV broadcast commercials on BBC news from February through April. They are targeting 5 million views. You can see one of the videos on youtube here.

• PAS MP Nicolae Botgros has resigned from parliament. The famous conductor and artistic director of the National Folk Music Orchestra “Lăutarii” had run in 11th place on the PAS list. He has publicly struggled with a transition to politics and has been accused of incompatibly splitting his time by continuing some performances. This month RISE posted an investigation into a real estate deal that Lăutarii was involved in which began as a public project for a music school and ended as an apartment building. Nicolae Botgros denied wrongdoing, and it isn’t clear if the investigation prompted his resignation. Asked to comment on his resignation he simply said “where is art, where is politics, they are far apart.” At the beginning of this Spring 2026 parliamentary session he had previously promised to remain in parliament “until they take him with his feet to the other side.” He joins an unusually high number of MPs who ran on the PAS list only to leave parliament very early in their term.

Plahotniuc Will be Sentenced on April 22nd

This date was set by the court after hearing closing arguments from the prosecution and defense. The case involves his role in the theft of $1 billion dollars from 3 Moldovan banks. In their closing arguments the prosecution requested a 25 year jail sentence - the maximum allowed. The defense called for an acquittal and accused both the prosecutors and the judges4 of not acting neutrally in the trial. Plahotniuc himself took the stand on the final day to speak in favor of his innocence. The court will proclaim guilt or innocence and announce the sentence on April 22nd.